Does Washington’s current approach to Europe amount to a clean break with the postwar model of transatlantic partnership—recasting alliance politics from an institutional, liberal framework into an ideologically selective one? And if so, what are the structural consequences for the European Union’s political stability and for the architecture of global security?
The End of the Postwar Consensus as a Structural Process
For more than seven decades after World War II, Europe developed within a unique political settlement that fused liberal democracy, the welfare state, and institutionalized multilateral cooperation with the United States. Forged during the Cold War and cemented through NATO, the Bretton Woods system, and later the European Union, this order offered not only military protection but also an unspoken respect for the autonomy of Europe’s domestic political systems. The United States acted as security guarantor and architect of the overarching institutions—but not as a direct ideological referee of its allies’ internal political evolution.
By the mid-2020s, however, that consensus came under sustained pressure from multiple directions at once: the erosion of Europe’s social model, demographic shifts, migration crises, the collapse of trust in traditional parties, and a fundamental change in U.S. foreign-policy thinking. Donald Trump’s return to power in January 2025 was not the root cause of these dynamics, but it did accelerate them—pushing latent tensions into the open and giving them an explicit political form.
For the first time in the entire postwar period, official U.S. strategic documents no longer merely criticize specific European policies. They openly question the legitimacy of the party-political elites that have governed Europe since 1945. This marks a qualitatively new phase in transatlantic relations—one that cannot be reduced to punditry, but demands analysis through political theory, comparative democracy, and strategic studies.
From Democracy Promotion to Ideological Vetting of Allies
Historically, U.S. regime-change policies were directed outward, beyond the Western core. Cold War Latin America, the post-9/11 Middle East, and parts of the post-Soviet space in the 2000s all fit this pattern. Even when Washington employed dubious or coercive tools, it justified them through a universalist language of democracy, human rights, and market economics.
What makes the current moment fundamentally different is the geographic and civilizational shift in the target of pressure. Europe—long treated as an equal partner and bearer of a shared political identity—is now effectively recast as a space for ideological correction. This is not regime change in the classic, forceful or revolutionary sense. It is a subtler, institutionally mediated process better described as the strategic reconfiguration of elites.
At its core is support for political forces that claim value alignment with the current U.S. administration—especially on migration, cultural identity, skepticism toward multilateral institutions, and the primacy of national sovereignty. In this context, backing far-right or radical conservative parties is not a short-term tactical maneuver, but part of a broader effort to redefine what “the West” actually means.
Western Identity as a Tool of Foreign Policy
The centerpiece of this new approach is a redefinition of Western identity itself. For decades, the West was framed as a set of institutional and normative principles: the rule of law, pluralist democracy, individual liberties, secularism, and inclusivity. This version of the West was portable, exportable, and universalist.
Under the Trump administration’s strategic discourse, the emphasis shifts from institutions to civilization. Christian heritage, cultural homogeneity, traditional gender roles, and hard national borders move to the foreground. Migration is no longer treated primarily as a socioeconomic challenge, but as an existential threat to cultural cohesion.
This civilizational reading of the West carries profound consequences. It collides head-on with the postwar European project, which was explicitly post-national and post-ethnic. The European Union—built on overcoming national antagonisms through institutional integration—becomes conceptually incompatible with a politics of civilizational nationalism.
Germany as the Test Case for Strategic Transformation
Germany occupies a central place in this unfolding shift. As Europe’s largest economy, a key political hub of the EU, and a historical anchor of the postwar liberal order, it has become the primary testing ground for Washington’s new mode of engagement with Europe.
The rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) reflects not only domestic socioeconomic tensions, but a deeper crisis of confidence in the traditional parties associated with globalization, the energy transition, and liberal migration policies. Support from conservative circles in the United States is less financial than symbolic and network-based: recognition, institutional contacts, and ideological validation.
Crucially, this does not amount to overt interference in the electoral process. It operates in the gray zone between public diplomacy, transnational party networks, and ideological exchange. Yet in mature democracies, this form of influence often proves more effective than blunt pressure, which tends to provoke backlash.
France, Italy, and Austria: A Continental Pattern Emerges
Similar dynamics are visible across other major European states. In France, the rise of national-conservative forces coincides with the breakdown of the Fifth Republic’s traditional party system. Italy has already produced a model of right-wing governance that combines formal loyalty to EU institutions with hardline rhetoric on migration and cultural identity. In Austria, far-right parties have long been integrated into the political mainstream.
From Washington’s perspective, these trends open a window to cultivate a new political stratum in Europe—one less committed to EU strategic autonomy and more inclined toward bilateral relationships with the United States. This is especially relevant amid intensifying competition with China and a reassessment of relations with Russia, where a unified European position has often constrained U.S. freedom of maneuver.
A Transatlantic Clash of Interests Behind Ideological Rhetoric
The core problem is that beneath the ideological language lies a fundamental conflict of interests. Europe’s current elites, despite internal divisions, largely seek to preserve the EU as an autonomous geo-economic actor—capable of pursuing its own industrial, trade, and regulatory policies. That includes efforts to manage relations with China independently, diversify energy ties, and develop defense initiatives not fully subordinated to Washington.
The Trump administration, by contrast, operates from a logic of hard sovereignty and transactional alliances. In this framework, Europe is not a partner with its own strategic ambitions, but a region whose political and economic configuration should be functionally aligned with U.S. national interests.
Backing far-right forces thus becomes a lever against Europe’s political center, weakening its capacity for consolidation and long-term strategic planning.
Theoretical Framework: From Liberal Internationalism to a Hierarchical Bloc Order
To make sense of these developments, it is not enough to stay within the bounds of descriptive political analysis. What is required is a turn to the theory of international regimes and alliances. The postwar transatlantic order rested on a model of liberal internationalism in which the United States acted as hegemon but legitimized its leadership through rules, institutions, and procedural predictability. NATO, the IMF, the World Bank, GATT—and later the WTO and the EU—did more than provide a framework for cooperation. They formed a normative ecosystem in which allies enjoyed limited but genuine autonomy.
The Trump administration’s strategy is conceptually incompatible with this model. It more closely resembles what academic literature describes as a hierarchical bloc order—one in which loyalty outweighs procedure, and ideological alignment matters more than institutional stability. In such a system, allies are judged not by their adherence to formal commitments, but by their willingness to follow the political line of the center of power.
This shift means that the domestic political configuration of European states is no longer treated as a sovereign internal matter. Instead, it becomes a metric of foreign-policy reliability. The logic of alliance is fundamentally altered: it ceases to be a community of states and becomes a club of politically compatible regimes.
The Democracy Paradox: Electoral Radicalism as a Tool of Stability
At first glance, backing far-right parties appears to contradict Washington’s professed commitment to democracy. Within the new strategic logic, however, the paradox resolves itself rather neatly. Democracy is no longer understood as a process or an institutional balance, but as an outcome that aligns with the hegemon’s expectations.
If radical forces come to power through formally democratic elections, their victory is treated as legitimate—even when the consequences include weakened judicial independence, constrained media freedom, or curtailed minority rights. Democracy is thus reduced to a voting procedure stripped of its liberal substance.
This marks a sharp departure from previous decades, when the United States at least rhetorically prioritized the institutional resilience of democratic systems. Today, the overriding concern is the manageability and predictability of allies on strategic issues—from sanctions regimes to military planning.
The European Union as an Object, Not a Subject, of Strategy
One of the most consequential outcomes of this shift is the marginalization of the European Union as a collective actor. Historically, the EU functioned as an internal counterweight to American influence within the West. It enabled European states to forge common positions, smooth internal asymmetries, and act as a unified force in trade and regulatory policy.
Support for nationalist and Euroskeptic forces objectively undermines these mechanisms. Even without formal exits from the EU or the eurozone, the rise of parties committed to prioritizing national sovereignty paralyzes consensus-based decision-making. The result is a European Union locked in perpetual internal conflict, incapable of strategic action.
For Washington, this opens the door to replacing complex multilateral engagement with simpler bilateral arrangements, where power asymmetries are far more pronounced. The approach lowers the transaction costs of U.S. foreign policy—but at the price of eroding the very foundations of European integration.
Historical Parallels—and a Crucial Difference
International history offers plenty of examples of great powers supporting ideologically aligned regimes in allied states. In most cases, however, this occurred under conditions of acute systemic confrontation, as during the Cold War. Today’s environment is different. There is no single existential adversary comparable to the Soviet Union.
China, for all its economic weight, does not advance a universalist ideological project capable of mobilizing the West on a values-based level. Russia, despite its military capacity, remains a regional power. Against this backdrop, a radical ideological reengineering of Europe looks less like a forced response to external threat and more like a deliberate choice in how to manage allies.
That makes the strategy inherently riskier. In the absence of external pressure capable of disciplining partners, Europe’s internal conflicts may take on a life of their own—beyond Washington’s ability to control.
The Socioeconomic Dimension: Why the Far Right Becomes Functional
The rise of far-right forces cannot be explained by external support alone. It is rooted in the structural transformation of European societies. Decades of deindustrialization, widening inequality, the crisis of the welfare-state model, and a pervasive sense of lost control over migration have created fertile ground for political radicalism.
The Trump administration is effectively capitalizing on these dynamics, turning Europe’s internal crises into instruments of foreign policy. Far-right parties are “functional” not because they offer sustainable solutions, but because they fracture existing coalitions and weaken institutional constraints.
This, however, creates a strategic dilemma. Political movements propelled by protest rarely demonstrate the capacity for long-term governance of complex economies. Their internal volatility may generate unpredictable foreign-policy consequences, including heightened friction within NATO and the EU.
Implications for the Architecture of Global Security
The erosion of European political cohesion inevitably reverberates through the global security system. NATO may formally remain a military alliance, but it is increasingly dependent on the domestic political stability of its members. A fragmented Europe is less capable of collective crisis response, whether on its eastern or southern peripheries.
Ideologizing alliance politics also undermines the principle of collective responsibility. The risk emerges of first- and second-tier allies, whose security guarantees vary according to political loyalty. That logic cuts against the core premise of a defense alliance and incentivizes the pursuit of autonomous military strategies.
Strategic Consequences and Possible Scenarios
In the medium term, several trajectories are conceivable. One is managed fragmentation, in which the United States maintains influence over key European capitals through a web of bilateral relationships, while the EU persists in a weakened form. Another is a deepening crisis of European integration, marked by escalating internal conflict and a diminished global role for Europe. A third scenario involves a counter-mobilization of European elites who, recognizing the threat to their autonomy, attempt to reconfigure the EU and articulate a more independent strategic vision.
Which path prevails will depend not only on U.S. policy, but on Europe’s capacity to offer a compelling project of its own—one that goes beyond defensive reflexes and speaks convincingly to its future.
Systemic Synthesis: A Shift in the Logic of Hegemony and the West’s Crisis of Governability
Taken together, these dynamics point to something far deeper than a tactical recalibration of U.S. policy toward Europe. What is underway is a transformation of the very model of hegemony. The United States is moving from a liberal, institutionally mediated form of leadership to a system of selective ideological control, in which allies are ranked according to their political and value compatibility with the center of power.
This shift entails a retreat from universalism as the foundation of American legitimacy. In the postwar era, Washington positioned itself as an arbiter of rules meant to apply to all participants in the system. In the current configuration, it increasingly acts as a political moderator—rewarding certain domestic models while penalizing others. The result is a profound erosion of trust in the idea of a predictable world order, as rules become contingent and dependent on the political winds in Washington.
For Europe, this creates a fundamentally new dilemma. For the first time since 1945, the primary threat to its political autonomy does not come from outside the Western bloc, but from within the transatlantic partnership itself. U.S. support for far-right forces does more than intensify internal polarization; it shatters the tacit postwar understanding of noninterference in the domestic political architecture of allied states.
Strategic Consequences for Europe: From Normative Power to Arena of Competition
One of the most significant consequences of this shift is the erosion of the European Union’s status as a normative power. For decades, the EU cast itself as a source of rules, standards, and regulatory models that extended outward through trade, association agreements, and diplomatic leverage. That role depended on internal cohesion and a relative homogeneity of values.
The rise of radical nationalist forces—bolstered by external actors—undermines this foundation. Increasingly, the EU struggles to articulate unified positions even on core issues of foreign and security policy. Europe begins to lose its role as a subject of global governance and instead becomes a terrain of competing external strategies—American, Chinese, and, to a lesser extent, Russian.
Just as importantly, Europe risks losing the capacity for long-term strategic planning. Political cycles become more volatile, governments more hostage to electoral swings, and foreign policy more fragmented and reactive.
The Transatlantic Alliance: Institutional Form Without Political Substance
NATO and the broader machinery of collective security formally remain intact, but their political substance is steadily hollowed out. An alliance built on collective solidarity now faces internal differentiation, where the degree of U.S. commitment increasingly depends on the political orientation of individual governments.
This sets a dangerous precedent. A military alliance stripped of political neutrality becomes brittle in moments of crisis. Decisions risk being made not on the basis of agreed obligations, but through the lens of political expediency—undermining the very logic of collective defense.
At the same time, the ideologization of alliance politics encourages a quiet militarization of European decision-making. As external guarantees appear less reliable, individual states may accelerate national defense programs. Over time, this fuels fragmentation of the security system and deepens mistrust within Europe itself.
The Global Context: A Signal to the Rest of the World
Washington’s actions in Europe are closely watched elsewhere. In Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, they are read as indicators of how the United States treats allies whose domestic politics fall out of ideological favor. That perception weakens incentives for long-term alignment with Washington and strengthens the appeal of more flexible, multi-vector strategies.
China, in particular, gains a strategic advantage by presenting itself as a partner that does not interfere in domestic politics or impose value-based conditions. Even where this claim is imperfect in practice, it becomes persuasive when contrasted with ideologically driven pressure from the United States.
Paradoxically, then, the policy of ideological vetting of allies may weaken America’s global position—even if it enhances short-term leverage over specific regions.
Non-Obvious Conclusions
The first conclusion is that support for far-right forces in Europe is not a strategy for strengthening the West, but a form of managed destabilization designed to reduce allied autonomy.
The second is that Europe’s democratic crisis is increasingly treated as a resource of foreign policy rather than as a problem requiring collective institutional solutions.
The third—and most fundamental—is that the liberal international order is eroding not under pressure from external adversaries, but as a result of decisions taken by its principal architect.
Strategic Recommendations
For Europe, the priority is restoring political governability and strategic autonomy. That will require more than cosmetic reforms; it demands a rethinking of the integration model itself—redistributing competencies, renewing social policy, and forging a coherent migration strategy.
For the United States, the rational course would be a return to an institutional logic of leadership, in which differences in domestic political models among allies are not treated as measures of geopolitical reliability.
For the international system as a whole, adaptation to a more fragmented and less normative order is unavoidable—one in which stability depends less on formal alliance membership and more on actors’ ability to balance flexibly.
A Ten-Year Outlook
Over the next decade, the most plausible scenario is a weakening of the European Union as a unified political actor, even as its economic significance endures. Transatlantic relations will persist, but in a more transactional and less value-driven form. The global order will become increasingly regionalized, with rising influence for middle powers and a declining capacity of great powers to impose universal models.
In that context, Europe faces a stark choice: accept the role of an object in other powers’ strategic games—or attempt to articulate, once again, its own project of political and civilizational agency.