One of the clearest signs of a seismic shift underway inside Gaza is the rise of new clan-based militias positioning themselves as alternatives to Hamas’ rule. The most striking example is the enclave of Hossam al-Astal, a former Palestinian Authority security officer who now openly challenges the Islamist movement and offers Gazans a vision of life beyond its control.
On the outskirts of Khan Younis, in the war-ravaged and largely abandoned village of Kizan al-Najjar, al-Astal has built a militia known as the “Strike Force Against Terror.” Its ambitions stretch far beyond local self-defense. Al-Astal is pitching his enclave as a full-fledged alternative to Hamas’ rule — promising security, food, water, electricity, and, most importantly, freedom from the regime’s repression. “Anyone tired of living under Hamas’ yoke is welcome here,” he says. Dozens of families contact him daily, and several dozen people already live under his protection. He’s planning to admit another 300 to 400 people soon — but only after vetting them to ensure they have no ties to Hamas.
This is more than a humanitarian outpost. It’s the embryo of a parallel governance system that, according to al-Astal, exists with the quiet backing of Israel and Western governments. He claims to receive food, water, and even military gear from Israel, and his camp runs on solar panels that keep the lights on despite the ongoing blockade. In one video, he shows sacks of flour and juice marked in Hebrew. “Everything — the food, the water — comes from Israel,” he says.
A Network of Alternative Authorities
Al-Astal’s enclave isn’t the only one. In Rafah, near the Egyptian border, another power center has emerged — the militia of Yasser Abu Shabaab, a Bedouin commander who has controlled parts of the city’s east for months. His forces run makeshift schools, clinics, and kitchens, and thousands have moved under their protection.
The two groups coordinate closely. One of Abu Shabaab’s commanders described them as part of a unified movement called the “People’s Forces,” whose mission is to create a protective strip of local control from Khan Younis to Rafah — in cooperation with Israel. “We are one body,” he said. “Our goal is for people to live under our protection, in peace with our neighbors” — a direct nod to Israeli involvement.
Such militias are becoming part of a new governance reality in Gaza. Israel has little appetite for direct civilian administration and no interest in restoring the Palestinian Authority’s control. But supporting clan-based militias that fill the power vacuum fits neatly into its strategy to weaken Hamas. In June 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly acknowledged Israel’s support for clans opposing the Islamists — though he has avoided elaborating since.
Hossam al-Astal: From Death Sentence to “New Gaza”
Al-Astal himself is a symbol of this transformation. He once worked in Israel and later served in the Palestinian Authority’s security services — until Hamas seized power in 2007. Since then, the group has repeatedly arrested him and even sentenced him to death for allegedly helping assassinate Hamas operative Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia in 2018, an operation widely attributed to Israeli intelligence.
“They arrested me again and again for different reasons — corruption, ties to Ramallah. From the very beginning, I opposed them,” al-Astal recalls. Despite the risks, he believes Hamas is now weak and has lost the support of most Gazans. More than 80 percent of the population, he claims, does not want the Islamists to return to power — but many still fear reprisals if they speak out.
“We’re trying to convince people — through media and direct contact — that Hamas is over. There will be no ‘Hamas 2.0,’” al-Astal says. He insists he’s receiving growing signals of support from across Gaza and calls on “everyone who believes in peace” to join his project.
The Birth of a New Political Logic
Al-Astal’s enclave isn’t just another act of resistance; it’s the beginning of a new political architecture in Gaza. Until recently, anti-Hamas initiatives were scattered and underground. Now they are building structure, coordination, and — most importantly — external backing.
This marks a new phase of the crisis: the goal is no longer just to weaken Hamas, but to create space for post-Hamas governance rooted in local communities, clan networks, and engagement with outside powers. These enclaves could become the building blocks of a new political order in Gaza — one where Hamas’ monopoly is replaced by a more flexible, decentralized, and multi-layered system of authority.
The End of Monopoly: Hamas’ Internal Crisis Reaches a Breaking Point
Gaza is undergoing its most dramatic internal upheaval since Hamas took power in 2007. For nearly two decades, the primary battle line here was drawn between Palestinians and Israel. Today, more and more of the fighting is between Palestinians themselves. These aren’t isolated skirmishes or local feuds — they’re symptoms of a deep systemic crisis eroding Hamas’ foundations and ushering in a post-Hamas era.
A question that once seemed unthinkable — “What comes after Hamas?” — is now being debated not only in think tanks and regional capitals but on Gaza’s streets. A generation raised under blockade increasingly sees Hamas not as a shield, but as a brake on progress; not as a symbol of resistance, but as a source of repression and clan-based tyranny.
Hamas’ biggest threat no longer comes from Tel Aviv or the IDF. It’s emerging in Beit Lahia and Khan Younis, in the Jamash, Durhamush, and al-Mujaida clans, and in the thousands chanting “Hamas out” and “We want to live.” This is the new internal front — one that may ultimately prove more dangerous to Hamas than any Israeli airstrike.
From Revolution to Stagnation: How Hamas Lost Its Grip
The Rise and Fall of an Islamist Monopoly
To understand the magnitude of what’s unfolding in Gaza, it’s worth remembering how Hamas became the region’s dominant force in the first place. In 2006, the Islamist movement swept parliamentary elections, capitalizing on public disillusionment with the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Just a year later, a violent coup split Palestinian politics in two: Fatah retained control of the West Bank, while Hamas seized Gaza.
The early years were marked by euphoria. Hamas cast itself as “the true voice of resistance,” built an extensive social services network, and enjoyed broad public backing. But by the mid-2010s, the sheen had worn off. Economic blockade, repeated wars with Israel, political deadlock, and increasingly authoritarian rule eroded its legitimacy.
Surveys by Pew Research Center and Arab Barometer tell the story starkly: in 2010, Hamas enjoyed support from over 60% of Gazans. By 2024, that figure had fallen below 30%. At the same time, calls for leadership change and a new political order surged. In that context, an internal explosion was not a matter of “if,” but “when.”
Internal Frontlines: Clans, Rebels, and Former Security Chiefs
Since early 2025, Gaza has become a battlefield for dozens of armed clashes between Hamas fighters and rival militias — many of them clan-based. Between September and early October alone, at least 18 such incidents were documented, leaving 27 people dead and more than 70 wounded.
The most dramatic confrontations erupted in Beit Lahia and Gaza City’s Sabra district, where fighters from the Jamash and Durhamush clans battled Hamas forces. One clash killed Muhammad Imad Akul, the son of a prominent military commander, sending shockwaves through the movement.
Even Hamas’ offensive in Khan Younis against the al-Mujaida clan ended in failure: the group lost up to 16 fighters and failed to crush the resistance. It was the first time a clan not only withstood a Hamas assault but successfully repelled it — a clear sign the group’s power is no longer absolute.
Meanwhile, figures like Hossam al-Astal — a former PNA security officer — are carving out autonomous enclaves. His “safe city” in Khan Younis is a one-square-kilometer pocket sheltering about 200 people. There are no tunnels or religious police here, but there is a private security force and a basic humanitarian infrastructure.
The Collapse of Fear: Protest and Open Defiance
Since March 2025, Gaza has seen regular mass demonstrations. Chants like “Hamas out” and “We want to live” have rung out openly for the first time in years.
The group’s response was predictable: arrests, torture, and public executions. Human rights monitors say at least five people — including activists and suspected protest leaders — have been executed since spring 2025. Among the most shocking cases was the killing of 22-year-old Odai Nassar al-Rabee, who was abducted after a rally and returned to his family bearing signs of brutal torture.
But repression hasn’t stemmed the protest wave — it’s radicalized it. Anti-Hamas Telegram channels and TikTok pages now draw tens of thousands of followers, becoming a counterweight to official propaganda and fueling a growing information insurgency.
Administrative Collapse: Humanitarian Breakdown and Institutional Decay
The breakdown of Hamas’ centralized control is visible across every level of governance. One stark example came in November 2024, when 98 out of 109 humanitarian aid trucks were looted near the Kerem Shalom crossing — an attack blamed on armed groups linked to the “People’s Forces” and local clans.
The humanitarian fallout is devastating. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), by mid-2025 more than 78% of Gaza’s population lives below the poverty line, 62% suffer from chronic food insecurity, and 47% of children under five are malnourished. The healthcare system has effectively collapsed: around 60% of hospitals are damaged or nonfunctional.
As formal institutions crumble, the influence of clan networks and local militias is growing. Israel now views them as potential partners in building alternative governance structures — an idea that would have seemed unthinkable just two years ago.
The End of an Era? Post-Hamas Scenarios and Regional Fallout
Like any revolutionary or authoritarian system, Hamas’ rule follows a predictable arc: rise, consolidation, stagnation, and decline. Today, the movement sits squarely between the latter two stages. It still wields significant military power and retains control over parts of the bureaucracy — but it has lost the most critical asset of all: legitimacy. That doesn’t mean its downfall is imminent, but it does mean the old order is irreversibly breaking down.
The key question is no longer whether Hamas survives — but what comes next, and how that will reshape the region’s geopolitical balance. Analysts now outline three broad scenarios, each with its own risks and opportunities for the Middle East and beyond.
Scenario 1: “Fortress Gaza” — Hamas Holds On Through Force
The first scenario envisions Hamas clinging to power through sheer repression and the mobilization of whatever resources it has left. This path rests on three pillars:
- The Machinery of Violence – Israeli intelligence estimates that Hamas’ military wing, though reduced from roughly 30,000 fighters to 18,000–20,000 after two years of war, remains a formidable force. The group is aggressively recruiting new fighters, including teenagers and former prisoners.
- Control of Infrastructure – Despite the destruction, Hamas still commands key communication lines, weapons depots, and its extensive tunnel network, estimated at 500–600 kilometers in total length.
- External Support – Iran, Qatar, and Turkey continue to maintain ties with Hamas. In 2024 alone, Qatari funds transferred more than $120 million in humanitarian and financial aid, much of which ended up under Hamas’ control.
Under this scenario, Hamas would likely launch a brutal purge, attempt to physically crush clan-based resistance, and tighten ideological and religious control. In the short term, that could work: protests might be suppressed, and the international community would face a dilemma over whom to negotiate with if no credible alternative has emerged.
But the strategic costs are obvious. Such a “fortress” would function as an isolated quasi-state with a shattered economy, a demographic crisis, and virtually no legitimacy. Internal pressures would keep mounting, while external support would gradually shrink. This scenario might buy Hamas two or three more years — but it would do nothing to resolve the deeper structural crisis that now threatens its very existence.
Scenario 2: “Fragmentation” — Power Splinters Into Clan-Based Enclaves
The second scenario — already unfolding on the ground — envisions the gradual dissolution of centralized authority and the emergence of a fragmented, multi-nodal governance system. The signs are unmistakable:
- According to ACLED, intra-Palestinian armed clashes rose by 230% between March and October 2025, most of them involving Hamas and local clans rather than Israel.
- Gaza is now home to at least 12 armed groups that operate independently of Hamas, including the “People’s Forces,” “Sabra Brigade,” and “Sons of Gaza.”
- In five districts — including Khan Younis, Rafah, and Beit Hanoun — de facto autonomous zones have appeared, where Hamas police no longer patrol and humanitarian aid is distributed by local committees.
Under this scenario, Gaza morphs into a patchwork of enclaves governed by clans, rebel factions, and former security officials. Israel and international organizations could leverage these emerging centers as entry points for future civilian governance projects.
From a security standpoint, violence would become decentralized. Local clashes may multiply, but Hamas’ capacity for systemic control would sharply decline.
Geopolitically, fragmentation benefits those seeking to weaken Gaza’s radical Islamist project. Israel could pursue a “divide and rule” strategy, forging tactical alliances with individual clans and building coalitions from the ground up. The U.S. and EU might advance ideas of municipal self-governance and channel targeted aid through local actors.
The risks are clear: without a central authority, chaos could spread, criminal networks could thrive, and new extremist groups might emerge. Yet despite these dangers, fragmentation is currently the most realistic trajectory on the table.
Scenario 3: “Post-Hamas Order” — A New Administration and International Trusteeship
The third scenario is the most ambitious — and potentially transformative: the creation of a new civilian administration unlinked to Hamas, backed by international stakeholders and regional powers.
This idea has been circulating since 2024, and several steps are already in motion:
- Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been floated as a possible coordinator for forming a temporary Gaza administration.
- The U.S. and EU have pledged more than $6 billion for rebuilding Gaza’s infrastructure — contingent on the creation of an “effective and inclusive governance model.”
- Egypt and Jordan have called for Palestinian Authority participation in the process, though Ramallah remains cautious, wary of being branded a collaborator.
Local actors such as Hossam al-Astal and other former PNA security officials could play pivotal roles. Their ties to Israel and contacts with Western institutions lay the groundwork for a future “bottom-up administration.”
The main challenge is legitimacy. Much of Gaza’s population is deeply skeptical of external governance, and the PNA has lost much of its credibility. Without broad public buy-in, any new governing body risks being purely symbolic.
Still, this scenario has the potential to fundamentally reshape the conflict. If realized, Gaza could become a testing ground for a new model of Palestinian governance — one not rooted in Islamist ideology and not defined by permanent war with Israel.
Geopolitical Implications: A New Regional Architecture
The transformation of Gaza would reverberate far beyond its borders:
- Israel – Weakening Hamas reduces the threat of regular rocket fire and opens a window for a new security regime. Israel could shift from a “decapitation” strategy to one of “reformatting” Gaza.
- Palestinian Authority – Participating in a new administrative framework could restore its political relevance — if it can overcome its reputation for ineffectiveness.
- Iran and Its Allies – Losing Hamas as a forward base would undercut Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” especially amid mounting pressure in Lebanon and Syria.
- Turkey and Qatar – Both would be forced to navigate a tension between ideological loyalty to Hamas and pragmatic ties with the West.
- U.S. and EU – They would gain an opportunity to reset the Middle East agenda — not through a failed “peace process,” but by shaping a managed space in Gaza.
The Legal Dimension: Crisis of Legitimacy and International Law
Hamas is already in violation of core principles of international humanitarian law — from extrajudicial executions to using civilian infrastructure for military purposes. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented widespread torture, summary killings, and the use of children in combat.
This creates a foundation for Hamas’ international delegitimization. In 2025, the U.N. Security Council debated a resolution calling for the creation of “transitional governance mechanisms” in Gaza — effectively branding Hamas a barrier to peace. Although the resolution was blocked by China and Russia, the debate itself signaled a major shift in the global framing of the conflict.
A New Logic of Conflict
The central takeaway is clear: the Gaza conflict is no longer strictly Israeli-Palestinian. Its main axis now runs within Palestinian society itself. That internal fracture not only weakens Hamas but opens the door to a new political dynamic.
The potential collapse of Hamas will not happen overnight. It will unfold in three stages:
- Erosion of legitimacy – already well underway
- Fragmentation of power – currently in full swing
- Formation of a new administration – likely within the next one to two years
Which of these stages becomes final will depend on the interplay of external actors and internal forces. But one thing is certain: the era of Hamas’ monopoly on power is drawing to a close.
Strategic Recommendations: Steps for Regional and Global Players
- For Israel: Shift from a strategy of annihilation to one of building alternatives. Support for clan structures and local administrations should become systematic and institutionalized.
- For the Palestinian Authority: Craft a new approach to returning to Gaza — not as the old ruling power, but as part of a broader self-governing coalition.
- For the U.S. and EU: Tie financial assistance to concrete steps in building new governance institutions.
- For Regional Powers: Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia should act as mediators in shaping a transitional administration.
- For International Organizations: Establish a monitoring mission to document human rights abuses and help maintain basic order during the transition.
… Hamas’ story is reaching a critical inflection point. A movement once seen as unshakable now faces an internal uprising more threatening to its survival than any external assault. The real question is no longer if Hamas will fall — but what will follow, and who will shape Gaza’s political future. The answer will define not only the fate of the Palestinians but the balance of power across the entire Middle East.