The United States and Iran are formally demonstrating that they do not want a return to full-scale war. But this is not peace. This is not detente. This is not even a classic ceasefire. It is an armed pause, in which each side keeps its finger on the trigger while simultaneously bargaining over the price of a future agreement.
Following the declaration of the ceasefire on April 8, the region did not emerge from the crisis. It merely transitioned into a different phase: from the phase of open strikes to a phase of strategic suffocation, energy blackmail, diplomatic bargaining, and a demonstration of readiness for a new escalation. The US maintains a major naval and air force deployment within Iran's reach. Tehran, for its part, is not demobilizing, withdrawing forces, or pretending that the conflict has been resolved. On the contrary, the Iranian system is using the pause to regroup, restore damaged infrastructure, reassess vulnerabilities, and strengthen its internal vertical of power.
The main mistake of those who view this crisis solely through a map of military bases is this: Iran does not have to defeat the US in a classic military sense. It only needs to make an American victory politically, economically, and reputationally disadvantageous. That is exactly what is happening.
Hormuz: The Chokepoint Stalling the Global Economy
The Strait of Hormuz has once again proven a simple truth: geography is sometimes stronger than aircraft carriers. It is not just a maritime passageway between Iran and Oman. It is an energy artery upon which oil prices, insurance rates, freight, inflationary expectations, exchange rates, and the political well-being of dozens of governments depend.
According to the EIA, about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products per day passed through Hormuz in 2024. This made the strait the largest oil transit hub on the planet. By the first quarter of 2026, flows through it had decreased by nearly 30 percent to 14.6 million barrels per day, according to EIA estimates. For the global economy, this is not a statistical adjustment, but a blow to the supply system.
The IEA assessed the scale of the crisis even more harshly: in April 2026, global oil production dropped by another 1.8 million barrels per day to 95.1 million barrels per day, and cumulative losses since February reached 12.8 million barrels per day. Production in the Persian Gulf countries affected by the closure of Hormuz was 14.4 million barrels per day lower than pre-war levels. This is no longer just regional turbulence. It is an energy shock with a global macroeconomic price tag.
The market reacted exactly as it should have: with a rising risk premium, more expensive insurance, a spike in shipping costs, a redistribution of the tanker fleet, pressure on oil refining, and growing anxiety in fuel-import-dependent countries. The IEA specifically recorded a drop in oil refining: in the second quarter of 2026, refinery utilization was expected to fall by 4.5 million barrels per day to 78.7 million barrels per day, and for the year down to 82.3 million barrels per day. This means a shortage not only of crude oil, but also of diesel, jet fuel, fuel oil, naphtha, and petrochemical feedstocks.
Trump in the Oil Trap: Easier to Start a War Than to Exit It
US President Trump has found himself in a position where military force no longer guarantees a political outcome. His administration is trying simultaneously to win concessions from Tehran, open Hormuz, avoid looking weak in front of Israel, prevent a market collapse, and avoid a new anti-war wave inside the United States.
This is a nearly impossible combination.
On May 27, Trump stated that the US is not yet satisfied with the parameters of the deal with Iran, that Washington is not discussing the easing of sanctions, and that under a possible agreement, Hormuz must be opened immediately but must not be controlled by anyone. He also acknowledged that the issue of Iranian highly enriched uranium remains one of the most painful elements of the negotiations.
A few days later, the rhetoric changed: on June 3, Trump claimed that Iran had supposedly already agreed not to have nuclear weapons, and that the Supreme Leader of Iran was involved in negotiations with the US. This does not mean a finished agreement. It means that Washington is trying to sell the markets and the voter the image of a diplomatic breakthrough while the actual package of agreements has not yet been assembled.
For Trump, the problem is that any compromise with Iran will inevitably be compared to the 2015 nuclear deal concluded under Barack Obama. For him, this is a toxic comparison. He cannot simply return to the logic of the previous agreement and call it a victory. He needs something tougher, louder, and symbolically more convincing. But Tehran also understands the psychology of the deal. And therefore, it is in no hurry to make Washington's task easier.
The Iranian Strategy: Do Not Surrender, Raise the Price of Pressure
The Iranian logic is extremely rigid. Tehran believes that it is fighting not for prestige or abstract influence, but for the survival of the regime. This is the key to understanding its behavior.
When a state believes that a war for regime change is being waged against it, it stops responding to pressure the way external players expect. Sanctions, strikes, diplomatic isolation, cyberattacks, liquidations of commanders, and strikes on infrastructure may all weaken Iran, but they will not necessarily force it to capitulate. Moreover, external pressure often provides the Iranian authorities with an internal political resource: mobilization, repressive legitimization, the argument of "national defense," and the ability to suppress dissent under the pretext of a military threat.
The US and Israel clearly expected that a combination of airstrikes, sanctions pressure, and the threat of an expanding war would force Tehran to retreat quickly. But the Iranian system has been built for nearly half a century as a besieged fortress state. It has survived the war with Iraq, cycles of sanctions, assassinations of military officials and scientists, domestic protests, financial isolation, a technological blockade, and international pressure.
The system may be inefficient, harsh, corrupt, and ideologically driven. But it cannot be considered fragile just because it is inconvenient for the West. This is exactly what became the strategic miscalculation of Washington and Tel Aviv.
The Nuclear Issue: Not Just a Bomb, but the Currency of Negotiations
Iran's nuclear program today is not merely an object of control. It is a negotiating asset, a safety mechanism, and an instrument of strategic bargaining. The higher the level of distrust, the higher the value of this asset.
The IAEA, in document GOV/2026/8, indicated that as of June 13, 2025, Iran's total stockpile of enriched uranium was estimated at 9,874.9 kg, including 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 percent U-235. The Agency also recorded a lack of access to four declared enrichment facilities and explicitly stated that it could not provide information on the current size, composition, and location of the enriched uranium stockpiles in Iran.
This creates a fundamental problem for any deal. The West demands verification, transparency, and control. Iran demands security guarantees, the lifting of sanctions, access to assets, and recognition of its right to a peaceful nuclear program. Between these positions lies a chasm of distrust.
Following strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities, Tehran is unlikely to agree to total capitulation on the nuclear issue. It may agree to a freeze, a technical limitation, the dilution of part of the material, enhanced monitoring, or the export or transfer of part of the stockpiles under third-party guarantees. But it will not agree to a scheme that would be perceived in Tehran as the dismantling of sovereign technological potential under the threat of force.
This is precisely why the negotiations will be agonizing. This is not just about centrifuges. It is about who in the region has the right to strategic autonomy and who must live in a regime of external clearance.
The Arab Monarchies: Wealth Does Not Protect Against Geography
For the Persian Gulf countries, the current crisis has been a disturbing reminder: ultra-modern airports, financial centers, sovereign wealth funds, skyscrapers, ports, tourism projects, and forums of the future do not eliminate the region's basic vulnerability. Its economic model depends on the security of maritime routes, investor confidence, and the predictability of logistics.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman have spent recent years selling the world the image of a stable, technologically advanced, and investment-attractive Gulf. They built not just infrastructure, but a reputation: the region as a safe haven for capital, a hub for energy, logistics, finance, sports, tourism, and artificial intelligence. But the war with Iran hit this very image.
The IMF rightly highlights three main channels of the war's impact on the economy: energy prices, supply chains, and financial markets. For the Gulf, this is not an abstract formula. It is a question of borrowing costs, foreign direct investment inflows, privatization plans, tourism demand, insurance rates, and budget balance.
Yes, the wealthy monarchies have reserves. Yes, they have sovereign wealth funds and fiscal buffers. But even the largest reserves do not eliminate the problem of trust. An investor may return after a crisis, but they will return with a different risk model. They will demand a premium. They will insure themselves. They will diversify. And they will remember that the region of the future can turn into a region of missile alerts overnight.
The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: Different Answers to a Single Fear
The UAE traditionally relies on strict technological security, external partnerships, and accelerated diversification. For Abu Dhabi and Dubai, it is critically important to show that even under the conditions of a regional war, they are capable of remaining reliable hubs for trade, capital, and logistics. Hence the interest in air defense systems, partnerships with Western and Israeli structures, and the strengthening of port infrastructure and alternative routes bypassing the most dangerous zones.
Saudi Arabia acts more cautiously. Riyadh understands that direct involvement in an anti-Iranian coalition could jeopardize its oil infrastructure, cities, Vision 2030 projects, and the Crown Prince's entire image as the architect of an economic breakthrough. The Saudis do not need a war for the sake of others' strategic illusions, but a managed de-escalation in which Iran does not become a hegemon, yet the region is not consumed in the fires of a major war.
Qatar plays a different role. It is trying to capitalize on its diplomatic flexibility. Doha has long built an image as a mediator: with channels of communication, money, media influence, and the ability to speak with those with whom others prefer not to speak publicly. In this sense, Qatari mediation is not a humanitarian gesture. It is an element of foreign policy capitalization. In the modern Middle East, a mediator receives not only gratitude, but also leverage.
Pakistan and the Factor of Muslim Diplomacy
Pakistan's involvement in mediation efforts adds a distinct dimension to the crisis. Islamabad is not a neutral observer in a cultural-political sense. It is a nuclear-armed Muslim power, connected to the Gulf financially, to Iran geographically, to China strategically, and to the US historically. It is important for Pakistan to prevent an uncontrolled regional explosion that would hit its security, energy, migration flows, and internal balance.
For Tehran, Pakistan's participation is convenient because it reduces the feeling of negotiating under direct Western dictation. For Washington, it is a way to have a channel that does not look like a concession to Iran. For the Gulf countries, it is an opportunity not to find themselves as the only Arab mediators in a conflict where every mistake could turn into a missile strike or an energy shock.
That is precisely why the future memorandum of understanding, if it appears, will not be a simple diplomatic document. It will become a temporary construct designed to establish a few minimum rules: do not expand the war, gradually open Hormuz, define a mechanism for controlling the nuclear issue, agree on limited sanctions relief, and create a platform for the next round of negotiations.
The Israeli Calculation: Tactical Might Without a Strategic Guarantee
Israel acts in this crisis based on its core doctrine: to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear military potential and to stop Tehran from establishing a dense ring of proxy threats around Israel. From a military standpoint, the Israeli logic is clear. However, Israel's strategic dilemma lies elsewhere: strikes can delay the program, but they do not necessarily destroy the political will to rebuild it.
The history of the Middle East demonstrates that the bombardment of a facility often destroys concrete but reinforces the determination to build a new one deeper, more covertly, and under heavier protection. If a regime is convinced that its destruction is sought, it will seek more deterrence, not less. In this sense, the Israeli and American reliance on kinetic force might yield a short-term military effect, while simultaneously amplifying Iran's long-term motivation for asymmetric deterrence.
Herein lies the central paradox. The heavier the pressure, the higher the probability that Iran will bargain not for symbolic concessions, but for real guarantees. The greater the threats, the more expensive uranium, missiles, proxy networks, Hormuz, energy routes, and diplomatic channels become.
The Price of Miscalculation: When Aviation Fails to Solve a Political Objective
Washington and Tel Aviv, judging by the development of the crisis, overestimated the impact of military shock. They assumed that a demonstration of force would lead to a rapid political result. Yet, Iran did not collapse. Hormuz did not reopen automatically. The oil market did not calm down. The Arab monarchies refused to become disposable material for someone else's escalation. Negotiations did not vanish; instead, they grew even more complex.
This is the strategic trap. If the US launches large-scale strikes again, it risks completely derailing the negotiations, triggering new attacks on allied bases and infrastructure, exacerbating the energy crisis, and facing an uptick in anti-war sentiment. If the US compromises, Trump will face accusations of weakness, particularly from those who demanded to "finish off" Iran. If the US drags its feet, the markets will continue to operate under a regime of high uncertainty.
Iran is not unconstrained either. A closed or semi-closed Hormuz hurts not only the West, but also the region, Asian buyers, Iran itself, China, India, and other importers. A prolonged blockade could transform Tehran's tactical leverage into a source of diplomatic fatigue, even among those who do not support the American line.
What Will Be the Subject of the Deal
A future agreement, if it becomes possible at all, will likely not be a grand peace treaty, but a multi-tiered package of mutual restrictions.
The first building block is Hormuz. Iran will need a way to save face and show that it did not simply open the strait under pressure. The US will require a formula where the passage of vessels is restored without recognizing Iranian control over an international maritime route. An intermediary model is possible: international escort, technical coordination, an Omani channel, limited participation of third parties, or a temporary security mechanism.
The second building block is sanctions. Tehran will demand payment for de-escalation: the unfreezing of a portion of its assets, exemptions for humanitarian trade, energy licenses, banking channels, or a temporary easing of secondary sanctions. Washington will resist the word "lifting," but may agree to "limited exemptions," "technical licenses," and "temporary humanitarian mechanisms."
The third building block is the nuclear program. Here, the options include a freeze on enrichment above a certain level, expanded IAEA access, an inventory of stockpiles, the export or dilution of a portion of highly enriched material, control over centrifuges, and a ban on reconstructing specific facilities without prior notification.
The fourth building block is regional security. The US will want restrictions on attacks against allied bases, shipping, and infrastructure. Iran will demand an end to strikes on its territory and the containment of Israel. This is the most complex element, because each side has allies, proxies, partners, and structures that do not always align with a diplomatic schedule.
The Main Takeaway: Iran Did Not Win the War, but It Derailed Someone Else's Script
The current crisis cannot be described by the primitive formula "the US is stronger, therefore Iran lost." US military power is incomparable to Iran's. Israel possesses immense technological and intelligence superiority. But politics cannot be reduced solely to the number of aircraft, missiles, and ships.
Iran did not defeat the US. But it disrupted the script of a rapid capitulation. It transformed Hormuz into a lever of pressure. It forced the markets to count barrels, insurance companies to recalculate risk, the Gulf monarchies to think about their own vulnerability, and the White White House to seek a diplomatic exit from a war that cannot be declared won without opening the strait.
President Trump must now achieve what aviation failed to secure: a sustainable political result. But Tehran will not deliver this result for free. It will demand a price. And the longer the crisis drags on, the higher that price becomes.
In the Middle East, the loser is often not the one with fewer weapons, but the one who misjudges the limits of the other side's resilience. The US and Israel struck Iran as the objective of a military operation. But Iran responded as a state that has spent decades preparing not for victory, but for survival.
That is precisely why Hormuz has become more than just a strait today. It has become a mirror of a new reality: in a world where energy, logistics, finance, and security are fused into a single system, even a superpower can find itself hostage to a narrow strip of water between the mountains of Iran and the shores of Oman.