Stalin cut consumption almost threefold, and Roosevelt took up to 94 percent of large incomes and all but banned consumer credit. Russia, in the fifth year of its war, spends a far smaller share of GDP on its military than the combatants of the world wars did, carefully preserves the showcase of normal life, and, judging by the evidence, has already surpassed America's death toll of 1941–1945.
On the second day of the war with Germany, June 23, 1941, the Soviet government barred savings bank depositors from withdrawing more than 200 rubles a month from their accounts. The wording of the decree was disarmingly honest: "for the purpose of reducing cash payments to the population." Eighty-five years later, on September 30, 2026, the Russian government submitted to the State Duma a 2027 budget that allocates 17.1 trillion rubles to national defense. There are no limits on cash withdrawals in it. No ration cards either. Instead, there is a tax on interest income from large deposits, VAT on purchases from foreign online marketplaces, a 100-ruble fee per parcel, and accelerated indexation of housing and utility rates: an 11 percent increase starting in July 2027 instead of the previous 8.7 percent.
The difference between these two documents explains Putin's war better than any speech about the battle to preserve Russia, its people and its culture. The Kremlin is waging the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945, yet it is financing it as though the country were going through a protracted crisis of moderate severity. The budget protects the illusion of peaceful life. What it spends is people.
A 7.3 Trillion Hole That No One Notices
At first glance, the figures with which Russia is approaching the end of 2026 look alarming. The federal budget deficit, according to the Finance Ministry's estimate, will reach 3.2 percent of GDP, or 7.3 trillion rubles, even though the budget law promised 1.6 percent. By the end of July alone, the gap between revenues and expenditures stood at 6.455 trillion rubles, 1.7 times the annual plan. The liquid portion of the National Wealth Fund has shrunk to 3.9 trillion rubles, compared with 8.78 trillion in February 2022: it is not enough to cover even this one year's deficit. Public debt will rise over twelve months from 19.9 to 21.7 percent of GDP, crossing the 20 percent mark that the financial authorities long considered a safe limit. Debt service in 2027 will cost 4.57 trillion rubles, almost one in every ten rubles of federal spending.
The obvious conclusion is that collapse is near. It is wrong.
The scale must be measured not against the Finance Ministry's plans from last year, but against genuinely large wars. Spending under the "National Defense" heading in 2027 is 17.1 trillion rubles, a third more than in 2026 and 27 percent more than was budgeted for 2027 only a year ago. With total spending of 48.8 trillion rubles, which by the government's own calculation will amount to 19.7 percent of GDP, the defense line comes to about 6.9 percent of GDP. Together with national security and law enforcement, the security bloc will receive 21.4 trillion rubles, about 44 percent of the federal budget and roughly 8.5 to 9 percent of GDP. Independent estimates that try to account for classified line items arrive at the same order of magnitude: about 9 percent of GDP already in 2026.
For comparison: in 1943–1944, the United States devoted about 37 percent of GDP to the war, and federal spending as a whole reached 44 percent of GDP. The Soviet Union, by various estimates, gave more than half of its national income to the front. Even by the most generous estimate, Russia's military burden is four times lighter than America's was and incomparable to the Soviet one.
In another column, however, the tally long ago stopped being merciful. As of the end of October 2026, about 285,000 Russian military dead have been identified by name, and if one relies on leaked Rosstat mortality data, the total number killed may reach 450,000. The United States lost about 407,000 people in World War II. Russia has apparently already passed that mark, in less than five years and on a single front. The domestic parallels are grimmer: the empire lost roughly as many soldiers in all its wars against Napoleon, from Austerlitz to the capture of Paris. In terms of bloodshed, only World War II, World War I and the Civil War surpass the current war in the country's history.
Between these two columns, money and lives, lies the political logic of the regime.
The Wallet Is Thinning Slowly but Surely
The material damage the war has done to ordinary Russians has turned out to be noticeably smaller than opposition commentators predicted in the spring of 2022. Official rhetoric, however, understates it just as much. The authorities try to shift the main burden onto business, but the economy follows its own laws: companies' rising costs come back to the consumer either through price tags or through falling profitability, which means through wages and the range of goods available.
Russian corporate profits have been declining for the third year in a row since their 2023 peak. Investment has been falling since 2025, which casts doubt on any recovery in profits in the foreseeable future. The wage bill is still growing, but without investment and profits such growth cannot last long. On January 1, 2026, the standard VAT rate rose from 20 to 22 percent, the VAT exemption threshold for small businesses on the simplified tax system was lowered, and the recycling and technology fees became a hidden tax on every imported car and smartphone. Since 2026, citizens of Eurasian Economic Union countries working in Russia pay income tax at the standard rates. Bank card acquiring and transfers through the Faster Payments System are also subject to VAT.
At the same time, the social portion of the budget is shrinking. In the draft 2027 budget, human capital, meaning social policy, health care and education combined, accounts for 21 percent of spending. The security bloc gets 44 percent. Simple arithmetic: for every ruble going to doctors, teachers and pensioners, two rubles go to the army, the police, the National Guard and the security services. Federal spending on housing and utilities is set to fall from 1.83 trillion rubles in 2027 to 1.23 trillion in 2029.
The ruble, meanwhile, retains the basic properties of money. Average inflation in 2022–2026 has been lower than during the era of rapid recovery growth in 2000–2008. On October 23, 2026, the Bank of Russia left its key rate at 14 percent and estimated annual inflation as of October 19 at 6.8 percent, with a year-end figure of 7.1 to 7.6 percent. Unpleasant, but not catastrophic. The M2 money supply grew by 24.4 percent in 2022, 19.6 percent in 2023, 19.2 percent in 2024 and 10.6 percent in 2025, and in 2026 it is growing at an annual rate of about 12.8 percent. Since the start of the war, the amount of rubles in the economy has increased roughly 2.1-fold.
The inconveniences are real: foreign online stores and payment systems have left, and many artificial intelligence services and new computer games can be accessed only through intermediaries. But none of this is commensurate with the intensity of official rhetoric. A state that calls the war existential behaves with pointed delicacy when it comes to the citizen's wallet.
To understand just how delicate, it is worth recalling what a truly mobilized economy looked like.
Stalin's Three Counters: A Showcase for Foreigners, a Line for Everyone Else
Stalin's economy was a command economy: resources were allocated by directives from the center. Money nevertheless circulated in it, and markets with free prices never disappeared. A city dweller received wages in rubles and spent them at prices set by the state. Gosplan determined a "market fund" for each product, the share that went to citizens through retail trade. For cotton fabrics, it was 44 percent in 1940 and just 8 percent in 1942.
On the eve of the war, three parallel worlds existed in Soviet cities. Ordinary state stores sold goods at prices kept, for political reasons, two to four times below market levels. Most retail turnover passed through them, and they were the source of shortages, lines, meager choice and poor quality, especially far from the capitals and the priority industrial centers.
The second world was the collective farm markets, permitted in 1932, when the state had already destroyed private trade of the NEP era and its own supply system threatened millions of people with starvation. City residents spent about a sixth of their outlays there. Prices were not regulated, incomes did not have to be declared, and the tax amounted to a fee for a stall. At the same time, "speculation," hired labor, interest-bearing loans and commercial leasing were criminally prosecuted. One could legally sell only personal belongings and things made by hand in one's spare time.
The third world was the commercial stores, the smallest by turnover and the most important for propaganda purposes. Like the ordinary stores, they were state-owned, but they sold goods at prices close to market levels and therefore knew no shortages. Their display windows in Moscow, Leningrad and the capitals of the union republics were meant to prove that Soviet abundance was no less than bourgeois abundance. For most visitors, a trip there was like an excursion to a museum.
This arrangement lasted from January 1935 to June 1941, the era of so-called open trade, when there were no ration cards in the cities. Even then, a crisis was brewing. Residents of poorly supplied small towns flocked to Moscow for clothing and manufactured goods, spoiling the showcase of prosperity with their lines, and the authorities responded by tightening the internal passport regime and staging raids at train stations and on trains. Anyone detained risked being sent to the Gulag as an exposed speculator.
200 Rubles a Month: The Day the Savings Banks Closed Their Doors
Hitler's invasion destroyed the fragile equilibrium within days. The 200-ruble withdrawal limit appeared as early as June 23. Compensation for unused vacation stopped being paid and was instead deposited in special accounts until the end of the war, and no vacations were granted during the war at all. Military personnel were urged to leave their pay in savings banks: you don't need money at the front, you'll collect it after Victory. About 30 percent never collected it. That money went into budget revenue.
The commercial stores were liquidated and, together with the ordinary ones, turned into ration distribution points. Rationing was introduced in Moscow and Leningrad on July 18, 1941, and in all major cities on November 1. Rationed food was not handed out for free; it was sold at frozen prewar prices that grew ever more detached from reality. The markets survived, and it was there that the ruble's inflation showed up.
Before the war, 19 billion rubles were in circulation. By January 1, 1942, there were 35 billion, and by May 1, 1945, 70 billion. The pace of money creation was catastrophic only until the spring of 1942; for all of 1943, the money supply grew by 25.3 percent. Today's Russia expanded its money supply in 2022 almost as much as Stalin's USSR did in 1943, and it is now printing rubles slightly faster than in 1944. The difference lies elsewhere: Soviet citizens received most of their goods through ration cards, and money mattered much less in their lives.
The ration card was the boundary between life and death. Allowances varied by region and category, many people were condemned to constant hunger by them, and losing a ration card usually meant death. What was allotted by the ration could not always be obtained. A heavy-industry worker in Moscow was entitled to 2.5 kilograms of meat and 900 grams of butter a month, but in August and September 1942, Muscovites received neither meat nor butter. Peasants fed themselves on what they grew and managed to hide from requisitions.
A city dweller spent about a third of his money on rationed goods, and two-thirds went to the market. In physical terms, the picture was reversed: ration prices were dozens of times lower than market prices, and the bulk of food came through rations. Until April 1942, market inflation ran at no less than 25 percent a month, and in January 1942 the Central Statistical Administration's index of 47 goods jumped by almost 45 percent. The ruble was losing even to barter: bread was exchanged for milk, potatoes for salt or vodka. According to an internal State Bank analytical memo, "On the State of Money Circulation in 1943," direct barter accounted for 21.5 percent of collective farm market turnover in 1942, 15 percent in 1943 and only 7.7 percent in the second half of 1943.
By January 1943, market prices were on average 17 times higher than before the war. Then came a retreat: the first general price decline was recorded in July 1942, and from 1944 deflation became the rule. In September 1944, prices were 9 times higher than before the war, and in 1945, 5.5 times higher. The averages conceal a chasm between cities. In Saratov, flour already cost 90 times its prewar price in 1942, and in Ufa 30 times, while in Moscow, Yaroslavl, Tula, Ryazan, Gorky, Kirov, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Novosibirsk it generally could not be bought at the market for any amount of money.
Vodka Versus the Printing Press: Who Really Paid for Victory
The Stalinist government made one deliberate exception to its policy of frozen prices. Vodka became 7.5 times more expensive, and the state monopoly turned into one of the budget's main sources of revenue. Vodka's share of retail sales in ordinary stores rose from 11.6 percent in 1940 to 26.7 percent in 1944.
This is where things get most interesting. Money creation over all the war years gave the state 50 billion rubles. Price increases on vodka, tobacco and perfume brought in 45 billion, almost as much. All nonmonetary instruments combined, meaning war taxes, loans, voluntary-compulsory contributions and increases in regulated prices, yielded 170 billion rubles. The printing press provided less than a quarter of the war's money.
People's Commissar of Finance Arseny Zverev and his staff remembered World War I, when the tsarist and then the Soviet ruble turned into worthless paper. The logic was cynical and precise: the people would sooner endure ration cards and forced loans than a chaotic surge in prices. Taxes and "voluntary" payments withheld from wages rose from 8.4 percent of the wage bill in 1940 to 26.7 percent. As one State Bank report put it, wage increases did not require a corresponding increase in cash payments because deductions had grown.
The price of this stability was measured in calories. Retail turnover in 1942 was 45 percent of the prewar level in current prices and just 35 percent in constant prices: real consumption fell almost threefold. Even in 1945, it reached only 57 percent of the prewar level, and most of it came through near-starvation rations. Yet the Soviet ruble did not become trash. The money supply grew roughly 3.5-fold over the war, and market prices 5.5-fold. For comparison, in post-Soviet Russia prices rose more than that in 1993 alone.
Restaurants Open Until 5 a.m.: Osobtorg for the Victors
As soon as the threat of military defeat receded, the Kremlin returned to the showcase of abundance. On March 18, 1944, Resolution No. 283 of the USSR Council of People's Commissars was issued: "On the Organization of Stores and Restaurants in Moscow to Serve Workers of Science, Technology, the Arts and Literature, as Well as the Senior Officer Corps of the Red Army." Thus Osobtorg, the special trade network, was born.
Starting April 15, 1944, Moscow opened 20 food stores, 8 of them delicatessens and 12 specialty shops, and 50 restaurants, including 20 "first-class night restaurants with music and stage performances by artists, open until 5 a.m." Strictly one restaurant per category was set aside for scientists, architects, writers, film workers, musicians, performers, officers and "workers in aviation and the aircraft industry." On May 15, the Central Department Store and four more manufactured-goods stores opened. Price lists were approved in classified annexes to the resolution.
Generals, academicians and People's Artists were meant to become people with money in a victorious empire and to spend it openly, without embarrassment about inequality. The financial calculation was no less important than the propaganda one. Osobtorg turned a profit and captured cash that would otherwise have flowed from the city to the countryside, to collective farmers selling at the markets. The Stalinist state viewed anyone who hoarded cash with suspicion and used every means to recover rubles it had once paid out.
Bonds Instead of Wages: A Twenty-Year Lottery
The second pump for draining money was war loans. Annual May campaigns from 1942 to 1945 raised 10, 12, 25 and again 25 billion rubles, 72 billion in all. Most of the bonds were lottery bonds: twice a year the state paid out 2 percent of face value, but not to every holder, rather through drawings. A winning bond was redeemed. The typical, unluckiest buyer was supposed to get his money back at face value after twenty years, with no return at all.
The voluntariness was nominal. Bonds were often simply issued in place of part of a worker's wages, usually one-twelfth.
The epilogue of this story is rarely mentioned in textbooks. In December 1947, a currency reform abolished ration cards and exchanged cash at a rate of ten old rubles for one new one, while bonds from earlier loans were converted into a new loan, as a general rule at three to one. In the spring of 1957, Nikita Khrushchev announced a twenty-year freeze on payments on the mass loans. Citizens who had lent to the state in the hungriest years paid for Victory at least twice.
A 94 Percent Tax and a Country Without War Millionaires
The most market-oriented of the warring powers acted no less harshly. U.S. federal spending rose from 10 to 44 percent of GDP, and almost tenfold in dollar terms. Over the first three years of the war, the deficit grew from $3 billion to $55 billion, from 3 to 30 percent of GDP. In 1943, spending of $78.6 billion exceeded revenues of $24 billion by a factor of 3.2, and the national debt rose 80 percent in a single year. Debt held by the public jumped from 44 percent of GDP before the war to 106 percent by the end of 1945.
Franklin Roosevelt's administration responded with an unprecedented tax squeeze. The top income tax rate was 81 percent in 1941, 88 percent in 1942–1943 and 94 percent from 1944 on incomes above $200,000 a year. The squeeze also hit the middle class. In 1939, married couples earning up to $2,500 and single people earning up to $1,000 were exempt from the tax; by 1944, the exemption had fallen to $1,000 and $500, respectively. The share of workers required to pay income tax rose from 7 to 64 percent. Starting in 1943, the tax was withheld directly from paychecks, and the tax return went from a privilege of the rich to a routine for every American.
The result was disappointing. The deficit shrank only from 30.3 percent of GDP in 1943 to 22.8 percent in 1944. The rest was covered with bonds: Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau turned the sale of war bonds into a national show, and about 85 million Americans bought roughly $185 billion worth.
Regulation W: An America Where You Could Neither Soar nor Fall
Most remarkable of all, this fiscal catastrophe barely affected the showcase. The dollar's peg to gold at $35 an ounce was formally maintained, although free convertibility within the country had been abolished back in the Great Depression, and from 1944–1945 only governments party to the Bretton Woods agreement could convert dollars into gold. Consumer prices rose 11 percent in 1942, 6 percent in 1943 and then about 2 percent a year. The yield on three-month Treasury bills was pinned at 0.375 percent a year throughout the war, and long-term yields at no more than 3 percent. The Federal Reserve under Marriner Eccles, by agreement with the Treasury, bought government securities in any quantity. This regime lasted until the Treasury–Fed Accord of March 1951.
The price of such stability was paid in freedom. The Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, created the Office of Price Administration (OPA), whose administrator, the first being Leon Henderson, was empowered to set price ceilings on manufactured goods and residential rents and to introduce rationing of scarce goods. From May 1942, it was prohibited to sell anything at a higher price than the same seller had charged for it in March. In the fall, controls were extended to agricultural products and wages, whose growth was capped at 15 percent above 1941 levels. Lowering quality while keeping the same price and forcing tie-in sales were prohibited. About 250,000 volunteers, mostly housewives and retirees, monitored compliance with the rules.
"Regulation W" effectively destroyed buying on credit and installment plans. Mandatory standardization nearly eliminated new varieties and brands. Profits above a fixed return on capital (8 percent a year for capital up to $5 million, 5 percent for capital over $200 million) or above the average level of 1936–1939 were taxed as "excess profits" at 90 percent from 1942 and 95 percent from 1943. Under the contract renegotiation law, military suppliers had their purchase prices cut retroactively if a board found they had earned "too much," even without breaking any rules. Exporting capital was prohibited.
Going bankrupt was as hard as getting rich. Guaranteed government orders provided a market for almost any enterprise, risky projects lost their point because of the confiscatory tax, expensive loans were effectively prohibited, and no one offered cheap ones. Bankruptcies fell to a historic low. Britain followed the same path, only more harshly: its excess profits tax reached 100 percent in 1940, the top marginal income tax rate reached 97.5 percent, and food rationing was finally abolished only in 1954.
When price controls were lifted in 1946, American consumer prices jumped almost 18 percent in a year. Suppressed inflation does not disappear. It waits.
Moscow Through an American's Eyes: An Egg for a Ruble and a Half
The two models are best seen in reflection. An American war correspondent who visited Moscow at the height of the war described his shock at the Central Market, where sellers, in his words, were subject to no price regulation and could ask whatever they could get. He saw fights over places in line and a customer who, having paid a ruble and a half for a single egg, drank it raw right at the counter. By his calculations, eggs at the free Moscow market cost about 60 times more than rationed eggs in the United States, beef 40 to 50 times more and milk 150 times more. Barter was prohibited, but a bottle of vodka was openly exchanged for a quarter of a bucket of potatoes, and the police did not intervene. Moscow enforced the ban on photographing lines as scrupulously as America enforced price controls.
During the war, the United States became a society of total control and firm social guarantees. The USSR became an arena of ruthless struggle for survival, where the authorities turned a blind eye to violations of their own laws. Both economies were a bizarre mix of market and socialism, and both are infinitely far from the Russia of 2026.
Credit at 40 Percent and Excess Profits on Display: Russia Is Like No One Else
Stalin and Roosevelt were terrified of inflation. Putin also understands its danger, but he fears a line for rations even more. The Federal Antimonopoly Service occasionally goes after sellers for "unjustified price increases," and next to the American OPA it looks like a pale shadow.
No one in today's Russia hides excess profits, even though aggregate business profits are falling. Personal bankruptcy has become a mass-market service. Consumer loans at 40 percent a year surprise no one, and the government borrows on the domestic market at double-digit rates: domestic borrowing in 2027 is planned at 7.7 trillion rubles, 2.3 trillion more than previously planned. Taxes, as in the 1940s, are rising, but they are a very long way from America's 90 percent on excess profits or Stalin's suffocating taxes on household plots.
The main instrument of current fiscal policy is rewriting the rules, not mobilizing resources. The cutoff price under the budget rule is being lowered to $50 a barrel, scrapping the previous "staircase" starting at $59 in 2026. The spending cap under the rule has been suspended until 2029. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov promises to keep the deficit at around 2 percent of GDP in 2027–2029, but the 2026 promise of 1.6 percent turned out to be off by exactly half.
Who benefits from this arrangement is evident from the structure of the budget. Defense enterprises get orders, and contract soldiers and their families get payments that dwarf civilian wages in depressed regions. The losers are small businesses, which have been stripped of their VAT exemptions; depositors, whose interest is now taxed; regional budgets, whose combined deficit the finance minister was prepared to allow to approach 2 trillion rubles in 2026; and patients, for whom spending on clinics has been cut for the sake of the front.
How the Illusion Ends: Scenarios Through 2028
War does not kill money right away. The more the military budget demands, the harder it is to collect: every tax system has a limit beyond which raising rates no longer increases revenue, and economic life moves into the shadows. Tax inspectors, customs officers, police and judges begin to be bribed or intimidated on a mass scale. That is why most governments crushed by military spending ultimately rely on the inflation tax and disguised confiscations, most often in the form of forced loans. The inflation tax is convenient: the state does not need to chase taxpayers; it is enough to create money slightly faster than the public expects. The trouble is that no one knows in advance at what pace of money creation citizens will start fleeing the national currency. If that happens, the government turns to measures more destructive than any tax: it punishes transactions in foreign currency, freezes prices, nationalizes industries, closes borders and bans movement between regions, and in the end runs the printing press at full speed.
Russia is still far from that line. The baseline scenario for 2027 is creeping compression. Taxes rise in small steps, utility rates are indexed faster than inflation, social spending is cut in real terms, and the deficit is covered by domestic borrowing. My forecast: the budgeted deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP will not survive 2027, and by fall the parameters will again be revised upward, as happened in 2026.
The stress scenario begins with oil. The Ministry of Economic Development assumes $53 a barrel for 2027, while state bankers allow for $41 in a stress scenario. At a price below the new $50 cutoff, the National Wealth Fund ceases to be a cushion: 3.9 trillion liquid rubles will not cover even one year of the current deficit. The Kremlin would then have to choose between open money printing and American-style financial repression: mandatory placement of federal bonds with banks and pension funds and heavy pressure on capital outflows. I am betting on the latter: repression is quieter than inflation and does not create lines.
The third scenario, a mobilization economy with price ceilings and rations, remains the least likely. I am prepared to state it plainly: there will be no nationwide food rationing in Russia before the end of 2028, even if oil falls below $45. The regime has already shown that it would rather sacrifice reserves, social spending and the regions than accept a visible symbol of wartime poverty.
The explanation is simple. The top leadership apparently considers political stability fragile and does not dare impose on its subjects a burden comparable to that of the 1940s. The regime's rank-and-file functionaries remain loyal in large part because they have not yet had to make noticeable material sacrifices. Stalin could afford to cut consumption threefold because he was fighting a war of annihilation on his own soil. Roosevelt could take 94 percent of large incomes because America after Pearl Harbor believed in a common cause. The Kremlin has neither of these sources of legitimacy. All it has left is the showcase.
Conclusion: The Bill That Is Never Published
After the war, 30 percent of Soviet servicemen never came to the savings banks to collect the pay they had left there. The treasury quietly booked that money as revenue. The Stalinist state was merciless, but it kept its books: it knew exactly how many rubles it had taken and how much vodka it had sold.
The current government prefers neither to know nor to show. Actual military spending has been classified since 2022. The number of dead has not been officially reported since the fall of 2022; it is reconstructed from obituaries and leaks. A Russian in 2026 can take out a loan at 40 percent, file for bankruptcy, buy a new video game through an intermediary and complain about higher utility bills. What he cannot do is learn from open government documents how much this war has cost him in rubles and how much in lives.
Stalin took money from the living. Putin's system lets the living keep their money and takes the living themselves.