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A new Ifop poll for the American Jewish Committee and Fondapol shows that antisemitism in France is no longer a statistical anomaly but a permanent fixture of political life. Months before the 2027 elections, it is splitting the country into two camps of accusers, and they are accusing different people.

Sixty-nine percent of French Jews say they would consider leaving the country if Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins the 2027 presidential election. With Marine Le Pen in power, 31 percent are prepared to leave. The difference is more than twofold, and it shatters the familiar narrative in which the threat to the Jewish community comes from a far-right politician with a reputation for xenophobia. By the end of 2026, that narrative no longer describes French reality.

The Ifop institute, commissioned by the American Jewish Committee and the Fondapol foundation, has published its latest "Radiography of Antisemitism in France," a study the three organizations have conducted since 2014. The previous wave, in 2024, showed an unprecedented spike in hostility toward Jews after the Palestinian movement Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The new figures confirm that what seemed a temporary surge has become a lasting condition of society. France has also recorded a quantitative increase: in the first half of 2026, there were 532 antisemitic incidents in the country, compared with 335 in all of 2016.

The panic no longer looks like panic. It looks like statistics.

Numbers That Are Hard to Dismiss

Seventy-nine percent of French people believe antisemitism has increased over the past decade, two points more than in 2024 and 77 percent more than immediately after October 7, 2023. Among French Jews, 93 percent agree. A quarter of the country's population still shares traditional antisemitic stereotypes about wealth and hidden influence over the media, a level that has barely changed since the first survey in 2014. The only notable exception is the notion that Jews "exploit their status as Holocaust victims": this figure has fallen by nine points and now stands at 26 percent nationwide.

The average, however, conceals a sharp variation by news source. Among those who get their news mainly from YouTube, 36 percent agree with this claim. Among those who describe themselves as "pro-Russian," the figure rises to 51 percent, practically every other person. The information ecosystem matters as much as party affiliation: the algorithmic feed and sympathy for Russia's foreign policy agenda prove to be stronger predictors of antisemitic prejudice than how someone voted in the last election.

The most alarming figures come from young people. Half of French people aged 18 to 24, 49 percent, seven points more than before, believe that Israel treats the Palestinians the way the Nazis treated the Jews. More than a third of young people believe that the very creation of Israel was a racist project. For a country where Holocaust education has been part of the school curriculum for almost three decades, this is not a statistical error but a sign that historical memory and current politics have drifted so far apart that they no longer reinforce each other.

A separate fault line runs through France's Muslims. Forty-five percent of them believe French Jews are more loyal to Israel than to France, compared with 24 percent of the population as a whole. Twenty-four percent hold French Jews responsible for Israel's policies, compared with 9 percent nationwide. Both figures are declining year after year but remain well above average. At the same time, French Muslims also express more sympathy for Jews than the population as a whole: 40 percent versus 37 percent. These numbers do not support a simple "Muslims versus Jews" narrative; they reveal a combination of prejudice at the level of collective perceptions with personal goodwill.

From the Dreyfus Affair to the Present: The Long Memory of Short-Lived Panic

French antisemitism has a long history: the Dreyfus affair at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, deportations under the Vichy regime, the outbreak after the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, the murder of Ilan Halimi by the "Gang of Barbarians" in 2006, and the terrorist attacks in Toulouse in 2012 and at the Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket in Paris in 2015. In February 2026, on the twentieth anniversary of Halimi's death, the same Ifop institute, commissioned by the Union of Jewish Students of France, separately measured the persistence of prejudice among young people and obtained a result no less alarming than the main "Radiography."

Each wave left its mark on legislation and public consciousness, but between waves the anxiety usually subsided. The 2026 poll records something different: the anxiety is not subsiding, it is accumulating. The 70 percent consensus that antisemitism is on the rise has held for a third consecutive election cycle and no longer depends on any particular news event.

Forty-six percent of French people say they have heard hostile remarks about Jews among the people around them. That is the lowest figure since 2014, but it is still high. Two-thirds of respondents, 67 percent, believe that "Jews are very close-knit." Such notions of clannishness and hidden influence have remained virtually unchanged for twelve years running. The weak spot in this stable picture shows up in another question: only 44 to 46 percent of respondents call a boycott of concerts and performances featuring artists suspected of sympathizing with Israel antisemitic. The prejudice about "Jewish cohesion" lives a life of its own, while the willingness to call specific actions antisemitic drops sharply when Israel is involved.

The Extremes Converge, but Suffer from Different Ailments

The most significant political shift in this poll is parity between the far left and the far right as sources of antisemitism. Twenty-five percent of French people name far-left ideas as the cause of rising hostility toward Jews, and exactly the same share name far-right ideas. In 2022, the gap was huge: 13 percent versus 36 percent, with the far right blamed far more. In four years, French public opinion has effectively put Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen on equal footing on this issue: two political poles that for decades competed for the title of chief threat to the republican consensus and now share a reputation as a breeding ground for Judeophobia.

Perceptions differ by camp. French Jews identify the far left as a source of threat far more often than the far right: 39 percent versus 15 percent. France's Muslims see the exact opposite: 38 percent versus 7 percent. Supporters of Mélenchon's France Unbowed party blame the far right in two-thirds of cases, while Le Pen's supporters blame the far left and, tellingly, Islamism, at 48 percent.

Behind this formal equality lie two different ailments. Among supporters of Le Pen's National Rally, classic, biologized antisemitism persists: 37 percent believe Jews are richer than the average French person, compared with 29 percent nationwide. But this figure has been slowly declining since 2022, and anti-Zionist arguments find no resonance in this milieu. Supporters of France Unbowed, by contrast, have overtaken Le Pen's voters on almost every traditional stereotype, starting with the belief in Jewish influence over the media, at 50 percent, up 21 points since 2022, and over politics, at 43 percent, up 20 points.

Anti-Zionism here does not replace the old prejudices. It reactivates them and gives them new legitimacy, no longer racial but seemingly political. The difference is fundamental. In one camp, the old language of blood and money is slowly dying. In the other, it is returning through the back door of criticism of Israel, which is why sociologists increasingly describe anti-Zionism not as an alternative to classic antisemitism but as its new packaging.

Mélenchon Under Greater Suspicion Than Le Pen

Fifty-eight percent of French people believe Jean-Luc Mélenchon contributes to the rise of antisemitism, 35 percent of them unreservedly. That puts him ahead of Éric Zemmour (53 percent), Marine Le Pen (47 percent) and Ecologists leader Marine Tondelier (30 percent). Among French Jews, the gap becomes a chasm: 86 percent hold Mélenchon responsible. The distrust also extends to politicians formally allied with Mélenchon on the left: Tondelier at 68 percent, Socialist First Secretary Olivier Faure at 62, Communist leader Fabien Roussel at 56 and lawmaker François Ruffin at 50. All four rank above both Le Pen, at 36 percent, and Zemmour, at 33.

Behind the 86 percent figure lies not abstract sociology but concrete electoral arithmetic. Mélenchon has already been officially declared France Unbowed's candidate for the 2027 election. On November 6 he presented an updated 1,069-point program, "A Shared Future," and the next day his campaign said he drew 20,000 people to a rally at Le Bourget. Some Communist lawmakers have publicly switched to his side, abandoning their party colleague Roussel. According to a September Toluna Harris Interactive poll for the TV channels M6 and RTL, a Le Pen–Mélenchon runoff in the spring of 2027 looks like one of the most likely scenarios, although a number of other pollsters put Prime Minister Édouard Philippe in second place.

For 86 percent of French Jews, this is not an abstract political choice but a matter of personal safety: 69 percent of them are prepared to discuss leaving if Mélenchon wins. That is higher than the 57 percent who in 2024 said they were ready to leave if any France Unbowed candidate won.

Israel as Amplifier and as Alibi

The French name hostility toward Israel, not Islamism or conspiracy theories, as the main cause of antisemitism: 49 percent, versus 33 percent for Islamism and 26 percent for conspiracy theories. French Jews put the same cause first even more emphatically, at 62 percent. Comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany rose seven points in a year to 39 percent nationwide and to 68 percent among French Muslims.

In the conflict pitting the United States and Israel against Iran, 70 percent of French people take no side: 10 percent support Israel, 13 percent the United States and 7 percent Iran. This neutrality does not mean warm feelings toward Tehran; antipathy toward Iran remains at 47 percent. It reflects two converging trends: sympathy for Israel has fallen to 18 percent from 23 percent in 2024, while the image of America under President Donald Trump continues to deteriorate in French public opinion.

At the same time, 76 percent of French people, including 93 percent of French Jews, believe that intensive media coverage of the Israeli-Iranian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is fueling the rise of antisemitism at home. The result is a double loop: Israel's foreign policy reduces French sympathy for it, while the media tension surrounding that policy hits not Jerusalem but the Jewish communities of Paris and Marseille.

This leads to the most uncomfortable finding of the entire study. Only 46 percent of French people are willing to call a boycott of performances featuring artists suspected of pro-Israel sympathies antisemitic. Twenty-three percent openly consider it justified when French citizens of Jewish origin are harassed for real or presumed support of the Israeli government. Nine percent hold French Jews responsible for Israel's policies, yet 79 percent of French Jews themselves say they have already felt blamed for the actions of an Israeli government they did not elect and do not control.

School, Street, Feed: The Geography of Everyday Fear

Eighty-two percent of French Jews have been the victim of an antisemitic act at least once in their lives. Sixty percent report insults, up six points in two years; 35 percent report threats of physical violence, up 11 points; and 24 percent report theft or vandalism of property, up six. Most often this happens at school, in 64 percent of cases, followed by the street (45 percent) and social media (44 percent). The school, by definition the institution of republican equality, has become the most dangerous public space of all those listed for French Jews.

Social media, which ranks third on this list, deserves separate discussion. Short-video algorithms, which rank feeds by engagement rather than reliability, are equally happy to promote eyewitness accounts of the Middle East conflict and openly conspiratorial clips about "hidden influence." For the 18-to-24 generation, which produces the highest rates of comparing Israel with Nazi Germany, it is this feed, not a history textbook or the evening news, that serves as the main source of ideas about Jews and Israel. Three minutes of emotional video with no editorial context compete with years of school curriculum, and judging by the poll's trends, they are winning for now.

Two-thirds of French people, 66 percent, acknowledge that France is not a safe country for Jews. Trust in the political class as protection against this threat has virtually collapsed: no candidate in the 2027 election convinces even half of French Jews, except Bruno Retailleau, leader of the Republicans (57 percent), and Éric Zemmour (50 percent), while support for Mélenchon drops to 17 percent. Nationwide, no politician reaches even 40 percent trust on this issue. Against this backdrop, going to the police looks more like a formality than a form of protection: only 22 percent of victims file a complaint, eight points more than before, and 41 percent of the rest say outright that they do not believe the case will lead anywhere.

Mezuzah Removed, Kippah Put Away: What Retreat Looks Like

Seventy-nine percent of French Jews say they have felt isolated since French society's reaction to the events of October 7, 2023. Sixty-nine percent use avoidance strategies: 48 percent have stopped wearing visible religious symbols, up four points, and 29 percent have taken the mezuzah off their doorpost, up ten points. At the same time, 72 percent say their Jewish identity has only grown stronger during this period: the retreat from public space is accompanied not by a weakening of self-awareness but by its sealing off within a private circle.

Sixty-four percent of French Jews are considering leaving France, 12 points more than in 2024. Israel is named as the top destination (65 percent), followed by the United States (41 percent). The poll does not measure how many will actually leave. The wording reflects a mood looking ahead to the period after the 2027 elections, not documented migration. Still, the very willingness to discuss leaving as a realistic option is a measure of the erosion of trust in the republican model, which historically promised its citizens protection regardless of origin or religion.

Majority Fatigue: When Sympathy Becomes an Obligation

Here the poll records the most troubling shift for French Jews, not in the antisemitism figures themselves but in the rest of society's willingness to empathize with them. Seventy-one percent of French people still consider antisemitism a problem for society as a whole, but that is five points lower than before and the lowest level since 2019. A record 11 percent believe it is a problem exclusively for Jews themselves. Two-thirds of French people, 67 percent, believe antisemitism is talked about "enough" or even "too much." Willingness to join demonstrations against antisemitic acts has fallen to 38 percent from 46 percent in 2024.

The paradox is that recognition of the problem and willingness to address it are diverging more than at any time in twelve years of observation. Seventy-six percent call antisemitism "widespread," 12 points more than in 2022, and by every formal measure this indicates a public consensus. But consensus on recognizing a fact and consensus on the need to act are two different things. The gap between them is widening precisely when, according to the same poll, the number of incidents is growing.

Prison Instead of a History Lesson

Asked about the most effective way to fight antisemitism, the French answer with predictable harshness: 64 percent of respondents name tougher penalties, 42 percent of them as their first choice. Behind this demand lies a palpable sense of impunity: 75 percent believe the courts do not punish those responsible for antisemitic acts severely enough, and 70 percent believe the justice system is poor at recognizing the antisemitic nature of crimes. Educational measures, such as Holocaust lessons, are named as the top priority by only 12 percent, trailing the fight against Islamism (18 percent), conspiracy theories (15 percent) and foreign interference (13 percent). The French are noticeably more eager to punish antisemitism than to explain its origins, and this hierarchy of priorities is itself a diagnosis.

The Diplomatic Cost and the Brain Drain

France, like a number of other European countries, formally endorses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's working definition of antisemitism and maintains a dedicated interministerial body to combat antisemitism and racism. On paper, this looks like a toolkit comparable to Germany's. In practice, the German model rests on the unconditional diplomatic primacy of Holocaust memory, while the French model rests on a balance between that memory and the long tradition of French diplomacy of recognizing Palestinian statehood, reinforced by the country's Muslim population of several million.

This balance explains the ambivalence the poll records: France is willing to acknowledge the rise of antisemitism and at the same time willing to justify the harassment of specific people for supporting Israel. Berlin cannot afford such ambivalence. Paris, for now, can, and readily uses it in its Middle East policy.

This ambivalence also carries a direct economic cost that politicians usually do not mention out loud. France's Jewish community is, by various estimates, the largest in Europe and the third largest in the world after Israel and the United States. It is traditionally overrepresented in medicine, law, finance and academic research. The departure of even a third of the 64 percent who say they are willing to consider relocating would mean a measurable, not symbolic, loss of skilled workers for the French economy, and precisely in sectors where France already complains of a shortage of doctors and engineers.

Israel has spent years building immigration programs for exactly this scenario: expedited recognition of diplomas, language courses and financial support for relocation. For Jerusalem, French anxiety is both a humanitarian concern and a demographic resource. Washington, named by 41 percent of potential emigrants as their second destination, barely competes here: the American immigration system has no equivalent of Israeli aliyah tailored specifically to French Jews.

France is not alone in this, but its case is more acute than that of most of its neighbors. In Germany, the rise in antisemitic sentiment in recent years has been linked primarily to the growing strength of the Alternative for Germany party and to reactions against migration policy, not to a split within the traditional left. Britain's political anxiety in recent years, in turn, centered on the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, not on the governing coalition. The French case is unique in that it combines both classic vectors, the old right and the new left, in a single election cycle and a single opinion poll. This combination makes the French "Radiography" a benchmark for researchers in other European capitals trying to understand what their own next survey will look like.

Three Scenarios Before the Runoff

The first round of France's presidential election will be held on April 18, 2027, and the second on May 2. If the polls showing a Le Pen–Mélenchon runoff are borne out by spring, French Jews will face a choice with no acceptable option: one candidate is associated with their historical fear of far-right xenophobia, the other with a rapidly growing left-wing anti-Zionism that they themselves consider more dangerous. Retailleau and his Republicans are trying to organize a center-right primary by early February 2027 precisely in order to offer a third option, but Édouard Philippe is blocking that primary for now, and Retailleau's own ratings as of November 2026 look weak even within his own party coalition.

The second scenario concerns not the election but the public mood. If the share of French people who consider the topic of antisemitism "exhausted" or overdiscussed continues to grow at its current pace, then by the next wave of the poll, presumably in 2028, the 11 percent who see antisemitism as a "purely Jewish" problem risks doubling. Such a shift would mean not fewer incidents but less willingness on the part of society to recognize them as a shared problem: division without any reduction in the phenomenon itself.

The third scenario is demographic, and it is already partly under way. If even a third of the 64 percent of French Jews who are considering leaving follow through within five to seven years after the 2027 election, France risks repeating, on a smaller scale and for different reasons, the exodus that Jewish communities in several European capitals already experienced in the 20th century. Israel and the United States, named in the poll as the main destinations, would receive not a random influx but a ready-made, economically active segment of the French middle class.

The Ifop-AJC-Fondapol poll records not a flare-up but a shift of tectonic plates: a prejudice that could once be dismissed as a marginal subculture has become part of mainstream political competition between two poles, each of which sincerely believes the other is to blame. Neither intends to give ground. Each sees the problem exclusively in its rival's electorate, never in its own. That is why the conversation about antisemitism in France in 2026 is so hard to separate from the conversation about the 2027 election: the former is almost entirely subordinate to the latter.

While French parties argue over whose electorate is more dangerous to Jews, Jews themselves increasingly answer that argument not with a counterargument but with a suitcase. Eighty-two percent of them have already experienced antisemitism personally. Sixty-four percent keep a backup airport in mind, Tel Aviv or New York, in case the runoff in the spring of 2027 does not produce the result they hope for. For the country that more than two hundred years ago became the first in Europe to grant its citizens equal rights regardless of religion, this is the most uncomfortable conclusion an opinion poll could have produced.