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On November 19, 2026, three men capable of changing the rules of world politics are scheduled to sit down at the same table in Shenzhen, China. U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin intend to discuss strategic stability, nuclear weapons and international security. But behind the official agenda lies a far broader question: what will the world order look like if Washington, Beijing and Moscow find a new formula for coexistence? For Central Asia, this is no abstract diplomatic debate. At stake is the future of its economy, its security, its transport links and its political independence. And for the first time in many decades, the states of the region have an opportunity not merely to adapt to the decisions of the great powers, but to influence their calculations.

World politics is going through a curious paradox. The fiercer the rivalry among the largest powers becomes, the more insistently their leaders seek to agree at least on the rules of that rivalry. Trump wants to halt trends that could cost the United States its strategic superiority. Xi Jinping intends to cement China's transformation into an equal center of global power. Putin seeks recognition of Russia as a state without whose participation no key question of international security can be resolved. Each has his own goals, his own constraints and his own idea of what concessions are acceptable. Yet on one point their interests objectively converge: neither Washington, nor Beijing, nor Moscow has any interest in an uncontrolled clash whose consequences cannot be calculated.

That is why the meeting scheduled for November 19 at the Kylin Villa hotel complex in Shenzhen may prove more important than its immediate results. According to the U.S. president's published schedule, talks are due to begin at 2:30 p.m. China time. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has also confirmed the trilateral summit. Preliminary information about the substance of the talks suggests a deliberate effort by the parties to focus on topics that allow for limited consensus. According to press reports, the war in Ukraine and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are not considered central items on the agreed agenda. This decision reflects not the secondary importance of these conflicts but the depth of the existing disagreements. The three powers are trying to find an area where cooperation is possible without an immediate revision of their fundamental political positions.

And this is where the main question for Central Asia arises: what will happen to the states that sit at the intersection of Russian, Chinese, American, European and Turkish interests if the largest centers of power begin setting new rules for their relations with one another?

Three Leaders, Three Strategies: Why Everyone at the Table Will Be Playing Against the Others

Trump's negotiating position is defined by a contradiction that runs through virtually all of contemporary American foreign policy. The United States wants to contain China's rise, limit Russia's strategic capabilities and, at the same time, avoid the costs and risks of confronting several major powers at once. Washington understands perfectly well that cooperation between Moscow and Beijing complicates both tasks. Russia possesses an enormous nuclear arsenal, vast natural resources and military-industrial capabilities. China has industrial might, financial resources, a technological base and the largest production chains. Their partnership is not a full-fledged military-political alliance, but it allows both powers to partially offset U.S. pressure.

For Trump, the ideal outcome would be the emergence of some distance between Moscow and Beijing. But the American president faces an unpleasant reality: Russia is objectively interested in the Chinese market, technologies and financial resources, while China is interested in Russian energy and in maintaining a friendly strategic space to its north. Putin, for his part, seeks to avoid becoming Beijing's junior partner. For Moscow, direct dialogue with Washington has value in its own right, because it confirms Russia's status as one of the world's centers of power.

Xi Jinping sees the situation differently. China wants the United States to recognize the existence of a new balance of capabilities and to stop treating its own global leadership as an unquestioned political norm. Beijing has no intention of sacrificing its relations with Moscow for the sake of vague American promises, but neither does it intend to let Russian interests become an obstacle to economic cooperation with the West.

This is the fundamental feature of the Shenzhen triangle: each participant is interested in dialogue with the other two, but none is prepared to grant them a freedom of action that would limit its own strategic options. A stable trilateral alliance, therefore, should not be expected. Far more realistic is the formation of a system of limited agreements in which rivalry coexists with cooperation. It is precisely such a system that could directly affect Central Asia, since the region is economically tied to all three powers but has no comparable ability to influence their policies.

The Nuclear Deal of the Century or a Diplomatic Show? The Real Reason for the Shenzhen Meeting

On February 5, 2026, the New START treaty expired. It had been the last bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States imposing binding numerical limits on strategic nuclear weapons. The world found itself in a situation where the two largest nuclear powers are no longer bound by any such treaty in force.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in January 2026 the world's total nuclear arsenal stood at approximately 12,187 warheads, including retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Russia's total arsenal was estimated at about 5,420, America's at 5,042 and China's at 620. Military stockpiles, meaning warheads kept for potential use, were smaller: about 4,400 for Russia and 3,700 for the United States.

These figures reveal the central contradiction of future negotiations. Washington wants new limits to apply to China, whose nuclear capabilities continue to grow. Beijing objects to attempts to bind it to the same treaty terms as states with incomparably larger arsenals. Moscow, for its part, insists on taking into account a broader set of strategic security factors, including missile defense and precision-guided weapons. The prospects for a quick agreement limiting the number of nuclear warheads therefore look quite modest.

This is where artificial intelligence comes in; according to the South China Morning Post, it may become one of the areas of possible agreement. The three powers could affirm the principle of maintaining human control over decisions to use nuclear weapons. This approach was already reflected in U.S.-Chinese understandings in 2024, but Russia's participation would give it new political significance.

The problem is that a declaration and a full-fledged control mechanism are entirely different things. Artificial intelligence can be used not only for direct decision-making but also for analyzing attack warnings, identifying threats and preparing response options. Even if the final decision formally remains with a human being, algorithms can shape that person's perception of the situation.

For Central Asia, where the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing in Kazakhstan remain part of historical memory, this debate is especially important. The five states of the region created a nuclear-weapon-free zone enshrined in the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty. Their interest in strengthening international strategic stability is therefore not only economic but also directly historical and political.

Is Russia Losing Central Asia? A Dangerous Illusion Refuted by Billions of Dollars

In recent years it has become fashionable to claim that Russia is gradually ceding Central Asia to China. This assessment is attractive in its simplicity but poorly reflects reality. Russian influence is indeed shrinking in some areas, and the Central Asian states are more actively seeking alternative partners. But the economic and social interdependence built up over decades still matters enormously.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to participate in the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military facilities and security cooperation mechanisms. Russian educational institutions, the Russian labor market, banking ties and energy projects remain important elements of life in the region.

The situation with labor migration is especially telling. According to World Bank materials published in 2026, net remittances to Tajikistan in 2025 amounted to about 46 percent of the country's GDP. Uzbekistan received approximately $18.9 billion in remittances, 78 percent of which came from Russia. Remittances to Kyrgyzstan reached about $3.5 billion, more than 90 percent of which originated in Russia.

These figures mean that changes in Russia's economic situation directly affect millions of Central Asian families. A drop in Russian demand for labor, tighter migration laws or sharp swings in the ruble can alter the socioeconomic situation in individual states of the region.

A similar dependence exists in energy and transport. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium remains the main export route for Kazakh oil, and it runs through Russian territory. In nuclear energy, Russian technologies and companies also maintain a significant presence. Moscow's influence therefore cannot be measured solely by the number of official visits or the intensity of political rhetoric. Its foundation consists of infrastructure, institutional commitments, production ties and human relationships.

At the same time, it is precisely this deep dependence that pushes the states of the region toward diversification. Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek and Dushanbe seek additional options that would reduce their vulnerability to the decisions of a single partner. For Russia, this means not the inevitable loss of Central Asia but the need to compete for its trust on new terms. The old model, based primarily on historical closeness and established commitments, no longer guarantees an automatic political advantage.

Chinese Expansion: Why $106 Billion May Cost More Than It Seems

If Russia retains influence thanks to historically established ties, China is creating a new economic reality through trade, industry, lending and transport infrastructure. In 2025, China's trade with the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion, up 12 percent. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, Chinese exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion and imports $35.1 billion. For the first time, Beijing became the Central Asian states' largest trading partner by total trade volume.

But behind the impressive statistics lies a structural problem. China sells the region far more finished goods than it buys from it. The Central Asian states, with rich deposits of oil, gas, uranium, copper and other resources, risk becoming locked into the role of raw material suppliers and buyers of Chinese industrial equipment. Such a model can deliver growth in trade without guaranteeing a comparable increase in their own technological independence.

The problem is especially evident in infrastructure projects. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, construction of which officially began in December 2024, is estimated at approximately $4.7 billion. At the end of 2025, a financing agreement involving Chinese banks was concluded. About $2.3 billion is to be raised in the form of long-term loans. The Chinese side owns 51 percent of the joint project company, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hold 24.5 percent each.

For Bishkek and Tashkent, the railway represents a serious opportunity to expand transport links and create new logistics hubs. But a question arises that is rarely heard in ceremonial statements: who will control tariff policy, revenue distribution and the most profitable segments of the transport chain?

Building a railway does not in itself mean economic independence. If the region receives transit fees while the main production and financial operations remain under the control of foreign partners, dependence simply takes on a more modern form. Real benefits will come when infrastructure creates conditions for developing domestic engineering, raw material processing, logistics companies and exports of finished goods. That is what Central Asia must negotiate with Beijing for.

Washington Returns for Big Money: What Trump Is Really Looking for in Central Asia

American policy toward Central Asia is gradually undergoing a significant change. For many years, the region was viewed mainly through the lens of security in Afghanistan, counterterrorism, energy interests and relations with Russia. Now a new task has been added to these: securing strategically important raw materials for the United States and building alternative supply chains.

On November 6, 2025, Trump met in Washington with the leaders of the five Central Asian states in the C5+1 format. The U.S. Commerce Department announced commercial agreements and deals worth more than $25 billion. An important caveat: this was the announced value of the deals, not the amount of investment actually received. But the political meaning of the event is clear. Washington intends to compete for an economic presence in a region that Beijing regards as an important element of its Eurasian strategy and Moscow as a space of traditional interests.

American interest in critical minerals is especially telling. In November 2025, a project to develop the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan with the participation of the American firm Cove Capital was announced. The project's estimated value was $1.1 billion. Tungsten is of strategic importance for the production of high-strength materials and a range of high-tech products. Kazakhstan also remains the largest producer of natural uranium, accounting for about 39 percent of global output in 2024.

For the United States, these resources are of interest not only as commercial commodities but also as elements of industrial and technological security. China holds strong positions in many international chains for the extraction and processing of critical minerals. Washington seeks to reduce that dependence. Competition for Central Asian deposits will therefore intensify regardless of how the Shenzhen talks turn out.

For Astana and other capitals, this creates room for bargaining. But the main task is not to attract as many foreign companies as possible; it is to secure terms of cooperation that provide for the development of local processing, technology transfer, training of specialists and a fair distribution of revenue. Otherwise, the region risks replacing dependence on one buyer of raw materials with dependence on another without changing its own economic model.

The Middle Corridor: How a Single Transport Artery Can Change the Strategic Calculations of Moscow and Beijing

A change is taking place on the geopolitical map of Eurasia that is easier to detect in freight statistics than in diplomatic statements. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, running through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia and on toward Turkey and Europe, is gradually becoming an important tool for diversifying trade between Asia and European markets.

After the start of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, interest in routes that bypass Russia grew markedly. Yet the actual picture is more complex than the widespread claims that the Middle Corridor is rapidly becoming the continent's main trade route. In 2024, freight volume along it reached approximately 4.48 million tons, and in 2025 it fell to 4.12 million. At the same time, container traffic continued to grow, approaching 77,000 twenty-foot equivalent units. This shows both the route's growing attractiveness for certain categories of cargo and the persistence of serious structural constraints.

The Middle Corridor needs additional port capacity, harmonized rail tariffs, modernized border crossings, digitized documentation and effective coordination among carriers. The World Bank has pointed to the possibility of a substantial increase in freight volumes and shorter delivery times, provided the necessary investments and reforms are carried out.

Geopolitically, the route's significance is not limited to additional transit revenue. It gives the Central Asian states an alternative and reduces their potential vulnerability to the political decisions of individual countries. For Russia, the development of the Middle Corridor means a gradual erosion of the northern routes' monopoly on certain types of Eurasian transit. For China, it offers an additional path to European markets. For the European Union, it is a tool for diversifying supplies. And for the Central Asian states, it could become a cornerstone of economic sovereignty.

But there is a fundamental condition: transport independence must be accompanied by industrial modernization. A country through which millions of tons of foreign goods pass does not necessarily become rich. Wealth arises where technologies, enterprises, logistics services and added value are created.

Baku Redraws the Geopolitical Map: Why Five Capitals Are No Longer Enough for Central Asia

On November 16, 2025, an event took place in Tashkent that deserves far more international attention. At the seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, a decision was made to admit Azerbaijan to the format as a full participant.

This decision goes far beyond traditional regional diplomacy. For decades, Central Asia was perceived as a geographically and politically self-contained space of five states. Azerbaijan's accession lays the groundwork for a broader cooperation mechanism uniting Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Unlike formal declarations of friendship, there is a very concrete economic foundation here. Azerbaijan occupies a crucial position on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, has well-developed transport infrastructure and connects trans-Caspian routes with the Georgian, Turkish and European directions. For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, cooperation with Baku takes on added importance as they seek to expand export opportunities and reduce dependence on individual transport routes.

There is also a political dimension. Including Azerbaijan in Central Asia's consultative mechanism makes it possible to build regional cooperation not only around the interests of external centers of power but also on the basis of the region's own complementary capabilities.

The TRIPP project, which involves developing transport links through Armenian territory, including between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, is of particular importance. After the Washington meeting of August 8, 2025, the United States and Armenia steadily advanced documents for implementing the project. On June 4, 2026, a framework agreement was signed providing for the creation of an infrastructure development mechanism with an envisaged American controlling stake. And on November 7, the United States, Azerbaijan and Armenia announced the creation of trilateral technical working groups on transport and electricity transmission.

This does not yet mean that construction is complete or that all political and technical obstacles have been removed. But the very fact that the project is advancing institutionally shows that Washington is beginning to view transport connectivity in the South Caucasus as part of a broader Eurasian strategy. For Azerbaijan, this opens an opportunity to strengthen its position not merely as a transit state but as one of the key organizers of economic interaction between Central Asia and external markets. In the long run, it is the ability to link transport, energy, financial and diplomatic infrastructure that will determine Baku's real weight in the expanding regional format.

Five States, Five Interests: Why Central Asia Cannot Be Bought with a Single Agreement

One of the most common mistakes made by outside observers is treating Central Asia as a single political organism. In practice, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have markedly different economic capabilities and foreign policy priorities.

Kazakhstan has the region's largest economy, significant reserves of hydrocarbons and uranium, a well-developed system of international investment relations and direct borders with Russia and China. Its multivector diplomacy is an attempt to turn a complicated geographic position into an advantage. But the dependence of its oil exports on specific infrastructure routes remains a serious constraint.

Uzbekistan has a large domestic market, a growing population and significant potential for industrial development. Tashkent seeks to maintain wide freedom of international maneuver while cooperating with Moscow, Beijing, Washington, Ankara and European capitals. Its key challenge is creating enough jobs, ensuring energy stability and raising economic productivity.

Kyrgyzstan stands to benefit from the construction of new rail routes but faces questions of external financing, debt burden and limited resources of its own. Tajikistan remains especially sensitive to changes in the Russian labor market and to the security situation on the Afghan border. Turkmenistan, relying on vast gas resources and a policy of permanent neutrality, is interested above all in expanding its energy export options.

The differences among the five states mean that the consequences of a possible rapprochement between the United States, China and Russia will not be the same for all of them. Kazakhstan could gain additional advantages in critical minerals and transit. Uzbekistan could widen its room to attract investment and modernize industry. Kyrgyzstan could accelerate infrastructure development. Tajikistan could attract resources for energy and social projects. Turkmenistan could step up negotiations on new gas routes.

But each of these advantages depends on the ability of national governments to maintain independent decision-making. Neither geographic position nor natural wealth guarantees favorable international agreements. The main resource becomes the quality of state institutions and negotiating strategy.

The Most Dangerous Deal: Could the Three Powers Strike a Bargain Behind Central Asia's Back?

International politics follows an unpleasant pattern: great powers often begin talking about strategic stability precisely when they want to set more predictable rules for their own rivalry. For small and medium-sized states, this creates an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, reduced tension between the United States, Russia and China could have a positive effect on international trade, financial markets and the investment climate. On the other, any informal understandings about regional priorities could narrow the political choices available to third countries.

So far, there is no basis for claiming that the participants in the Shenzhen summit are preparing a new division of spheres of influence. Such assumptions would be speculation. But the possibility of limited mutual concessions cannot be ruled out entirely either. The history of international relations shows that strategic compromises can be accompanied by policy adjustments in particular regions.

For Central Asia, this prospect is especially sensitive. Moscow wants to preserve its military-political and economic presence. Beijing seeks to secure its overland routes and the stability of resource supplies. Washington intends to expand access to strategic raw materials and build alternative trade routes. If the parties reach some kind of understanding, not all of its consequences will automatically serve the interests of the regional states.

What Central Asia needs, therefore, is not just multivector diplomacy but the ability to formulate common positions on transport, investment, environmental security, water resources and international trade rules. Strengthening trust within the region is particularly important. A telling example was the border agreement between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in March 2025 and the subsequent trilateral border agreements involving Uzbekistan. These decisions demonstrated that the states of the region are capable of resolving on their own the thorniest problems that had complicated their relations for decades.

The more successful such cooperation is, the harder it will be for outside powers to exploit disagreements among individual countries to strengthen their own influence. Genuine regional independence begins not with loud declarations of sovereignty but with eliminating the internal vulnerabilities that outside players can exploit.

Turkey and Europe Enter the Game: Why World Politics Is Not Limited to Three Capitals

The upcoming summit may create the impression that Eurasia's future is determined solely by decisions made in Washington, Moscow and Beijing. In reality, the number of interested players is much larger.

The European Union seeks to expand its economic presence in Central Asia, viewing the region at once as a source of critical resources, a potential market and an important element of an alternative transport system. At the first EU–Central Asia summit, held in Samarkand on April 4, 2025, relations were elevated to the level of a strategic partnership. The European side presented a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package. Of course, announced financing should not be equated with investments already made. But the political trend is clear: Brussels intends to strengthen its presence in the region.

Turkey operates on a different basis. Its relations with the Turkic states of Central Asia rest on historical kinship, cultural ties, political cooperation and gradually expanding economic interests. The Organization of Turkic States is becoming one of the mechanisms of institutional interaction, although its capabilities cannot yet be compared with the economic scale of Chinese projects or the depth of traditional Russian ties.

For Ankara, the top priority remains developing transport and industrial connectivity with Azerbaijan and the states of Central Asia. It is here that the interests of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan acquire an additional strategic commonality. But turning that commonality into a full-fledged economic advantage requires moving from political declarations to concrete production projects, coordinated investment mechanisms and reliable transport links.

In the long run, the combination of Turkish industrial capacity, Azerbaijani infrastructure and Central Asian resources could create an economic space less dependent on the decisions of individual outside powers. But the success of such cooperation is not predetermined. It will be shaped by logistics costs, the competitiveness of enterprises, the availability of financial instruments and the political consistency of the participating states.

Central Asia's main advantage, therefore, is not the ability to replace Russia with China or China with the United States, but the ability to build a wide enough circle of partnerships that none of them turns into an exclusive dependence.

After Shenzhen: Four Scenarios That Will Change the Balance of Power

The upcoming talks allow for several fundamentally different outcomes.

The most likely appears to be a limited political agreement in which the leaders reaffirm their interest in strategic stability, set out common principles of human control over nuclear decisions and instruct the relevant agencies to continue consultations. Such an outcome would not resolve fundamental contradictions, but it would demonstrate the three powers' capacity for dialogue.

The second scenario involves launching a longer negotiating process on nuclear weapons and new technologies. Carrying it out would require reconciling fundamentally different approaches to the strategic balance and would therefore inevitably take considerable time.

The third scenario involves a possible broader détente, in which limited security agreements are accompanied by easing of certain economic or political tensions. For Central Asia, this would potentially mean better conditions for international trade, reduced sanctions risks and greater opportunities to attract capital. However, the opposite effect is also possible if the major powers begin coordinating their own regional priorities without the full participation of the states concerned.

Finally, the fourth scenario is the absence of any substantive results. In that case, the meeting would remain a largely symbolic diplomatic event, and rivalry among the United States, China and Russia would continue with the same intensity.

None of these options guarantees Central Asia an automatic win. Moreover, building a national strategy solely on predicting the outcome of great-power negotiations would be a serious mistake. The region's sustainable development depends above all on domestic economic reforms, the quality of governance, transport diversification and the ability to pursue a coordinated regional policy. Cooperation with Azerbaijan takes on special importance, since it broadens the geography of the Central Asian states' international ties and creates additional routes to European markets.

The potential consequences of Shenzhen should therefore be assessed not through the simplistic formula of one power's victory over another, but through the change in the concrete conditions under which the states of the region will make their own decisions.

The Main Outcome of the Great Game: Central Asia No Longer Wants to Be a Territory of Other People's Interests

For most of modern history, the major powers viewed Central Asia primarily as a space of strategic competition, a source of natural resources and a territory needed to ensure the security of neighboring states. Russian imperial expansion, the Soviet system, the subsequent collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent republics created a complex historical reality in which external ties invariably had an enormous influence on internal development.

Today, however, a qualitative change is under way. The states of Central Asia are gradually learning to use competition among outside players to their own advantage. They are expanding diplomatic formats, attracting investment from a variety of sources, developing transport links and seeking to strengthen regional cooperation. Azerbaijan's accession to Central Asia's consultative mechanism signals a search for a new model of interaction that goes beyond old geographic and political notions.

But a historic opportunity does not in itself guarantee success. Turning the region into an independent economic center requires far deeper transformations. The states of Central Asia will need to reduce their dependence on raw material exports, develop processing industries, ensure the transparency of investment agreements, strengthen financial institutions and build their own technological capabilities. The priority must be to create interconnected production and transport systems in which regional economies complement one another.

Special attention should be paid to water and energy, since these are precisely the issues that could become sources of new tensions as climate conditions change and consumption rises. Finally, an independent diplomatic strategy is needed, one that makes it possible to cooperate with the major powers without accepting the logic of exclusive spheres of influence.

Central Asia does not have to choose between Moscow, Beijing and Washington. But it does have to understand the real cost of every agreement, every loan, every infrastructure project and every political commitment. State independence is measured not by the number of foreign partners, but by the ability to make decisions guided by one's own long-term interests.

The Great Powers May Reach Agreement Among Themselves. But the Right to Decide Central Asia's Fate Does Not Belong to Them

The meeting of Trump, Xi Jinping and Putin in Shenzhen could mark the beginning of a new stage in international relations. Perhaps the leaders will manage to develop common principles of strategic stability. Perhaps they will create a mechanism for an ongoing trilateral dialogue. It is also possible that the talks will be limited to cautious statements and a symbolic affirmation of their willingness to talk.

But regardless of the immediate outcome, the summit reflects a deeper historical trend: the global system is gradually moving from a period of relative American dominance to a far more complex model of power distribution. In this model, influence is determined not only by military capabilities but also by control over technology, industry, raw materials, finance and transport links.

Central Asia sits at the very center of these processes. Its resources attract the largest economies, its transport capabilities can change the direction of Eurasian trade, and its political decisions directly affect the strategic calculations of neighboring powers. But the main difference between today's situation and the past is that the states of the region have acquired far more tools for independent action.

Russia no longer has exclusive economic leverage. China is not the only source of investment. The United States is stepping up its presence. The European Union and Turkey offer additional avenues of cooperation. Azerbaijan is becoming the key link between Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It is the combination of these factors that creates an opportunity to forge a new regional balance. The question is whether the states of the region will manage to use it before the next round of international competition creates new dependencies.

The history of the great powers teaches one unpleasant truth: no one voluntarily gives up opportunities for influence if they can be retained. Moscow will defend its traditional positions. Beijing will continue to expand its economic presence. Washington will try to gain a foothold in strategically important sectors. Each capital will have convincing explanations for its policies, but none of them is obliged to put Central Asia's interests above its own.

That is why the region must abandon the dangerous habit of assessing its future through the prism of relations between outside centers of power. It does not matter much who proves more persuasive at the Shenzhen talks. What matters far more is who will control the transport routes twenty years from now, who will earn the revenue from processing natural resources, who will build new industrial enterprises and who will be able to set the terms of international cooperation independently. These are questions that neither Trump, nor Xi Jinping, nor Putin will answer. The answers must be found in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Ashgabat and Baku.

On November 19, three world powers may begin negotiating the rules of a new era. But the main geopolitical lesson for Central Asia lies elsewhere: if a state is unable to determine its own future, sooner or later that future becomes the subject of other people's negotiations. The great powers may divide influence. They may reach agreements on security, trade and strategic limits. But they must not gain the ability to dispose of the political fate of a region that has its own states, resources, interests and ambitions. Shenzhen will show how ready the three world powers are to negotiate with one another. The coming years will show something more important: how ready Central Asia is to stop being the object of those negotiations.