Six years ago, Azerbaijan and Armenia were at war. On November 12, their leaders discussed connecting their power grids in the Irish capital, London upgraded its relations with Baku to a strategic partnership, and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev held talks with eight European leaders in a single day and left Brussels with homework on gas.
On November 8, Azerbaijan marked the sixth anniversary of its Victory in the Patriotic War. Four days later, on the evening of November 12, at the Convention Centre Dublin, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discussed a subject that in 2019 would have gotten an Armenian politician branded a traitor at home and an Azerbaijani one dismissed as a dreamer: the future interconnection of the two countries' power grids. That same evening, the President of Azerbaijan and British Prime Minister Andy Burnham signed a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the two countries.
An entire era fits between those two dates.
The meeting with Pashinyan took place on the sidelines of the 9th summit of the European Political Community, which Ireland convened under the motto "A Strong, Secure and Connected Europe." Heads of state and government from nearly fifty countries gathered in Dublin. The official readout of the meeting between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia is written in dry diplomatic language: advancing the peace agenda on the basis of the Washington Joint Declaration of August 8, 2025, transit, trade, border delimitation, confidence-building measures, transboundary rivers, and the design of the rail and road sections of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, known by its English acronym TRIPP.
The dryness itself is the sensation. Peace between Baku and Yerevan is no longer a subject for bargaining. It has become a matter of logistics. Official Baku spent six years getting here on its own timetable, in which peace followed the restoration of sovereignty, and roads followed peace.
I entered journalism in the late 1980s, when the word "blockade" never left the front pages and Nakhchivan looked like an island on newsroom maps, unreachable from Baku by land. More than thirty years later, the most powerful lines of the Dublin communiqué are measured in tons.
A Number No One Will Cite in Strasbourg
Since November 2025, 105,000 tons of cargo have been transported to Armenia through Azerbaijani territory. The leaders noted transit in both directions as a positive development, and behind that cautious formula lies a trend that is hard to dispute.
On May 4, 2026, speaking by video link at the 8th EPC summit in Yerevan, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev cited a different figure: 28,000 tons. In six months, the volume grew almost fourfold. At that time, the head of state also announced that Azerbaijan had, for the first time in history, begun supplying gasoline and diesel fuel to Armenia, with petroleum product exports reaching 12,000 tons by May.
Baku itself set the mechanism in motion. After Washington, Azerbaijan unilaterally lifted all restrictions on transit to Armenia that had been imposed in the early 1990s. No one issued ultimatums. Yerevan paid no reciprocal concessions for it.
Why did Baku voluntarily give up leverage that classical diplomacy usually guards until the final round of negotiations? The answer lies in the Azerbaijani philosophy of peace, which official Baku has consistently set out since November 2020. A signature on a treaty records peace; economic benefit is what sustains it. An Armenian trucking company running freight through Azerbaijani territory lobbies for peace more effectively than any human rights advocate. A driver in Gyumri or Vanadzor filling his tank with Azerbaijani diesel will think twice before voting for those who promise revenge.
Now compare this with another European approach. From May 2021 to April 30, 2026, the European Parliament adopted 14 resolutions against Azerbaijan. In Yerevan, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev gave this series an apt definition: "Fourteen resolutions in five years is a kind of obsession." Strasbourg adopted its latest document four days before the Yerevan summit. On May 1, the Milli Majlis suspended cooperation with the European Parliament in all areas and launched the procedure for withdrawing from the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
Not one of the fourteen resolutions delivered a single ton of cargo to Armenia. Azerbaijani transit delivered one hundred five thousand.
The 42 Kilometers That Got Washington to Open Its Wallet
The most discussed line of the Dublin communiqué concerns TRIPP. The leaders reviewed progress in the planning and design of the route's rail and road components and the prospects for transit along it.
Arithmetic conveys the scale of the project best. In August 2026, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev noted that the route runs only 42 kilometers through Armenian territory, while a 194-kilometer section is under construction in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Azerbaijan is building from scratch or upgrading roughly another 400 kilometers on the way from Baku to the Armenian border, including the Horadiz–Aghband line. As a result, more than 93 percent of the 636-kilometer through route from Baku to Nakhchivan lies on Azerbaijani territory.
In other words, Armenia gains transit revenue and access to a new trunk line while investing less in it than any other party. Baku accepts this asymmetry deliberately.
Washington entered the project with money and people. On August 8, 2026, the first anniversary of the Washington summit, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the start of engineering work on the Armenian section of the railway. At the same time, the Americans launched a $201 million Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund. In its anniversary statement, the State Department noted that Azerbaijan had nearly completed construction of the road and railway up to the Armenian border. The TRIPP Development Company is being set up as a joint venture between the U.S. and Armenian governments. A feasibility study is expected by the end of 2026 or early 2027, and construction of the railway itself, by American estimates, will take at least 18 months because of Zangezur's difficult mountainous terrain.
Judging by recent signals, Yerevan has also picked up the pace. On November 2, at a joint session of parliamentary standing committees discussing the 2027 budget, Nikol Pashinyan said the Armenian government would, on its own initiative, commission the design of the rail and road sections along with power transmission lines without waiting for the management company to be established, "so as not to lose time." Ten days later, in Dublin, he was reporting on progress to the leader of the very state that the Armenian opposition still portrays as Armenia's main threat.
For Europe, the stakes here are quite tangible. The route is becoming part of the Middle Corridor, which links China and Central Asia with European markets via the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. In 2025, cargo volume on the Azerbaijani section of the East–West corridor reached 16.9 million tons. As early as January 2026, the European Union, Azerbaijan and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to launch a feasibility study for the Nakhchivan railway, and investment attracted to Azerbaijan under the Global Gateway program has exceeded €130 million.
A Power Outlet Instead of a Checkpoint: Why Grids Came Up in Dublin
The energy item on the Dublin agenda sounded modest: the parties exchanged views on a possible future interconnection of their power grids. Behind that wording lies an idea that changes the very nature of relations between the two states.
For decades, Armenia's power system has depended on Russian gas and the Metsamor nuclear plant, whose second unit was commissioned back in 1980. Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated on international platforms that the aging plant, located in a seismically active zone, poses a threat to the entire region. A shared grid gives Yerevan what decades of warnings did not: a real alternative. Azerbaijan is expanding generation, developing solar and wind projects and preparing to export green electricity to Europe via a cable under the Black Sea. Interconnected grids turn former adversaries into participants in a common market where cutting off a neighbor's power means hitting your own revenue.
The Irish capital is better suited to such a conversation than any other place in Europe. In April 1998, the negotiations that produced the Good Friday Agreement concluded. Nine years later, on November 1, 2007, the Single Electricity Market for the island of Ireland was launched, uniting the Republic and Northern Ireland. Power lines did as much for peace on the island as diplomats did.
Europe also knows an earlier precedent. On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman proposed pooling the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, and on April 18, 1951, six countries signed the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Six years passed between the end of the war and that treaty. Exactly the same span separates the 2020 Patriotic War from the Dublin conversation about shared grids.
The water issue deserves special attention. The leaders welcomed the creation of working groups on the management of transboundary rivers. For Baku, the issue is long overdue: for years, the Okhchuchay, which flows from Armenian territory into the Zangilan district, received waste from the Zangezur mining enterprises, and the Azerbaijani side repeatedly raised the problem of its pollution on international platforms. Moving this topic from the genre of mutual accusations to the format of a working group is a quiet but significant victory for Azerbaijani diplomacy.
Delimitation is also proceeding according to the Azerbaijani scenario: step by step, without mediators. In April 2024, the two countries' state commissions agreed on the border along a roughly 12.7-kilometer section between Azerbaijan's Gazakh district and Armenia's Tavush province, and by May Azerbaijan had regained control of four villages. Four months later, the parties signed regulations on the joint work of the commissions. The principle established then still holds: decisions are made by Baku and Yerevan themselves.
London's Signature: How Britain Embraced the Azerbaijani Formula for Peace
Baku signed the main document of the Dublin day with a country that left the European Union almost seven years ago. The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was drawn up in two originals, in Azerbaijani and English, both equally authentic.
The lines that matter most to Baku are in the preamble. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the UN Charter, the norms of international law, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders. For three decades, Azerbaijani diplomacy sought to have these words appear in Western partners' documents without caveats and without the disingenuous formula of "self-determination" that was used in the 1990s to cover up the occupation. Even back then, London did not question Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, and Baku remembers that.
The second key line concerns Armenia. The United Kingdom expressed support for normalizing relations between Baku and Yerevan and for achieving lasting peace in the region on the basis of the Washington Declaration of August 8, 2025, and the parties' bilateral dialogue. The text names no guarantors. No mediators, either. The British prime minister signed it in the capital of the country with which London, nearly three decades ago, served as a guarantor of the Irish settlement, built with active outside mediation. Peace in the South Caucasus is structured differently, and the United Kingdom acknowledged this in writing.
The foundation of the document was laid long ago. The preamble refers to the 1994 Joint Declaration on Friendship and Cooperation, signed during National Leader Heydar Aliyev's official visit to London on February 22–25, 1994, and to the 1998 Joint Declaration on Friendly Relations and Partnership. Seven months after that first visit, on September 20, 1994, the Contract of the Century was signed at Baku's Gulustan Palace, and Britain's BP became the operator, a position it holds to this day. The United Kingdom remains the largest foreign investor in Azerbaijan's economy: total British investment has exceeded $39.9 billion. In Dublin, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, recalling more than thirty years of energy cooperation, called the United Kingdom the country's largest European investor.
The path from intention to signature took about fifteen months. On August 25, 2025, two and a half weeks after Washington, Minister for Europe Stephen Doughty announced in Baku the transition to a strategic partnership. At the same time, London announced the complete lifting of the arms embargo that had applied to Azerbaijan and Armenia since the early 1990s. That spring, a permanent British defense attaché took up his post in Baku for the first time, and at a meeting of the intergovernmental commission, the government export credit agency UK Export Finance announced its readiness to provide £5 billion in guarantees for priority projects in Azerbaijan. In December 2025, Minister of State for Defence Lord Vernon Coaker spoke of a new page in defense relations after meeting with the President of Azerbaijan.
The text of the declaration was negotiated under Keir Starmer. It was signed by Andy Burnham, who took over the government in July 2026. The change of occupant at Downing Street had no effect on the timetable.
The document is built on three pillars. The first is defense and security: joint training, capacity building, interoperability, the search for joint projects in the defense industry, and cooperation among border, law enforcement and judicial agencies. For a country that unveiled its own strike drones for the first time at ADEX 2026, industrial cooperation with a permanent member of the UN Security Council means moving from procurement to joint production.
The second pillar is devoted to trade, investment and growth. Renewable energy, infrastructure, services, transport and logistics, along with support for the Middle Corridor, are named as priorities. Green finance, low-carbon technologies, dialogue between financial regulators and support for small and medium-sized businesses are spelled out separately. The Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation is designated as the main platform for this work. The third pillar covers education and innovation, from higher and vocational education to partnerships between universities and companies in artificial intelligence, digital governance and the life sciences. The parties will review progress at annual meetings held under the strategic partnership.
The comparison suggests itself. London, having left the European institutions, speaks to Baku in the language of interests and signs a declaration on strategic partnership. Strasbourg, which stayed inside, speaks in the language of resolutions and gets suspended cooperation along with Azerbaijan's withdrawal from Euronest.
Granada, Yerevan, Dublin: How Baku Outplayed the European Parliament Without Raising Its Voice
It is useful to reconstruct the path to Azerbaijan's current standing in the EPC date by date. On October 6, 2022, in Prague, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev took part in the community's founding summit. A year later, in October 2023, he declined to travel to Granada, Spain, citing the anti-Azerbaijani atmosphere that had taken hold after local anti-terrorist measures in Karabakh restored Azerbaijan's sovereignty over its entire territory. Baku insisted at the time on the obvious: if France and Germany take part in a negotiating format, Turkey should be at the table too.
To many in European capitals, that refusal looked like a mistake on Baku's part. Today it is clear that they were the ones who were mistaken.
In May 2025, in Tirana, European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asked the Azerbaijani leader for his opinion on holding the 2026 summit in Armenia. The head of state supported the idea and asked, for balance, that one of the following summits be held in Azerbaijan. The proposal was accepted, and Armenia supported Baku's candidacy. On May 4, 2026, taking part for the first time in an event held in Armenia, albeit online, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev invited EPC members to Baku in May 2028 and said a sentence that describes the moment more precisely than any analytical memo: "We have been living in peace for only nine months, and we are learning to live in peace."
That same day, Nikol Pashinyan noted that for two years neither side had suffered any casualties, something that had never happened in all the years of independence, and expressed hope that he would travel to Azerbaijan for the 2028 summit. The President of the European Council called the Yerevan meeting historic and stressed that it had become possible only thanks to the agreement between Baku and Yerevan. Europe, in effect, acknowledged that the most successful peace process on its eastern periphery had been built by the parties themselves, without European mediators.
The same Yerevan summit exposed a split within the European institutions. The President of Azerbaijan publicly thanked the European Commission for its position on the peace process and just as publicly called the European Parliament and PACE purveyors of double standards. Recall that the powers of the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE were restricted in January 2024, four months after the country itself implemented four 1993 UN Security Council resolutions that had remained on paper for thirty years.
Baku's strategy proved flawless. Azerbaijan talks to Europe's executive branch, which is responsible for gas, money, security and enlargement, and wastes no time on parliamentary noise for which no one bears responsibility. The result is visible in the calendar of visits. In 2025, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos visited Baku. They were followed in March 2026 by António Costa and Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen. Six months ago, Yerevan listened to the Azerbaijani leader via video link; now Dublin received him in person.
Gas Arithmetic Brussels Cannot Solve Without Baku
During the day, the President of Azerbaijan took part in a roundtable titled "Building a Competitive Europe: Innovation, Connectivity and Affordable Energy." The title of the discussion reads like a brief presentation of what Azerbaijan offers Europe. Affordable energy means Caspian gas today and Caspian wind tomorrow. Connectivity means the Middle Corridor and TRIPP. European industry, which lost cheap pipeline gas from the east after 2022 and still pays considerably more for electricity than its American and Chinese competitors, is looking for exactly this combination. Almost no one else at the Dublin table could offer it in full.
The meeting with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis looked routine at first glance. In fact, it touched the most sensitive nerve of European energy.
Greece is the first EU country on the route of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline. TAP receives Azerbaijani gas at Kipoi on the Greek-Turkish border, carries it through Greece and Albania, and then along the floor of the Adriatic to Italy. In Dublin, the parties emphasized Azerbaijan's contribution to the energy security of Europe and Greece and stated the key point: Baku has additional capacity to increase gas exports to Europe, and for that the European Union needs to revise its own financial and procedural mechanisms.
This formula deserves decoding. On July 18, 2022, in Baku, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Ursula von der Leyen signed a memorandum on a strategic partnership in energy that provides for doubling Azerbaijani gas supplies to the EU to 20 billion cubic meters a year by 2027. Azerbaijan is fulfilling its part. In 2025, supplies to EU countries amounted to 12.5 billion cubic meters, 53.8 percent above the 2021 level. Today, 16 countries receive Azerbaijani gas, 10 of them EU members. Sales to Germany and Austria began in early 2026: a ten-year contract with Germany's SEFE provides for ramping up to about 1.5 billion cubic meters a year.
In fairness, I should cite another estimate as well. According to official export statistics, supplies to Europe as a whole in 2025 amounted to 12.8 billion cubic meters, compared with 12.9 billion a year earlier. The discrepancy with the first figure is explained by the scope of the count, and the plateau in volumes is not Baku's doing at all. The pipeline is running at full capacity. In January 2026, TAP's capacity was increased by 1.2 billion cubic meters a year, and Italy immediately took a billion of that increase. Reaching the nominal 20 billion requires new compressor stations in Greece and Albania.
This is where Europe's problem begins. In November 2019, the European Investment Bank decided to stop financing fossil fuel projects from the end of 2021. Brussels wants more Azerbaijani gas, but its own bank refuses to lend for the pipelines that would carry it. Baku has made its move: in March 2026, at a meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor Advisory Council, which brought together 27 governments and about 60 international organizations and companies, the President of Azerbaijan stated that planned production profiles would make it possible to supply an additional 10 to 15 billion cubic meters of gas at peak. The resource is there. What is needed are long-term contracts and political will in Brussels to put up the money.
Mitsotakis understands this arithmetic better than most. Greece is turning itself into a gas hub for southeastern Europe: the floating terminal at Alexandroupolis, the Vertical Corridor to the north, the interconnector with Bulgaria and TAP itself. Without the Azerbaijani molecule, much of this infrastructure loses its purpose.
The oil side of the same arithmetic was evident at the meeting with Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, where trade and investment were discussed. According to Babiš himself, Azerbaijan accounted for 42 percent of the Czech Republic's oil imports in 2025. In late April 2026, the Czech prime minister came to Gabala, and the parties signed six documents, including on defense industry cooperation and joint production. Prague, which Brussels often counts among its difficult capitals, votes for Baku with its imports.
The Black Sea Knot: Sofia and Bucharest Line Up for the Caspian Kilowatt
The meeting with Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev began with a human gesture. The President of Azerbaijan once again expressed condolences over the loss of life in a serious traffic accident in Bulgaria a few days earlier. The day before, on November 11, the Azerbaijani head of state had sent a message of condolence to Bulgarian President Iliana Iotova. Radev thanked him for his support and solidarity.
The figure of his interlocutor is remarkable in itself. A former military pilot who headed the state for nine years, Radev in January 2026 became the first person in Bulgaria's post-communist history to voluntarily resign the presidency in order to run for prime minister. His party, Progressive Bulgaria, won the April 19 election comfortably, the eighth in five years, and on May 8 parliament confirmed him as head of government. European commentators often label Radev a Euroskeptic. All the more telling, then, that the Bulgarian pragmatist and the Azerbaijani leader spoke in Dublin in a language everyone in the EU understands: energy and connectivity.
Bulgaria has received Azerbaijani gas since the last day of 2020 under a contract for 1 billion cubic meters a year, and since the fall of 2022 via the Greece–Bulgaria interconnector. In Dublin, the parties discussed creating an electricity corridor between the two countries. For Sofia, this is a chance to plug into the transit of green energy from the Caspian; for Baku, another point of entry into the European market.
Relations between the two countries are those of a strategic partnership, and in Dublin the parties reaffirmed the high level of their political ties. Azerbaijani diplomacy builds relations with the Bulgarian state regardless of who occupies the offices in Sofia. President Radev was Baku's partner, and Prime Minister Radev remains one.
The same Black Sea storyline continued at the meeting with Romanian President Nicușor Dan. It was in Bucharest, on December 17, 2022, that Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary signed an agreement on a strategic partnership in green energy that provides for a submarine cable along the floor of the Black Sea. In this scheme, Romania is where the Caspian kilowatt comes ashore in Europe. Bulgaria's interest in the same architecture is understandable: the country does not want to be left on the sidelines of a corridor that will run along its coast.
Kyiv, Chișinău, Baku: A Club of Those Who Know the Price of Sovereignty
The first bilateral meeting of the day was with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. It was followed by a meeting with Moldovan President Maia Sandu. In 1997, both countries, together with Azerbaijan and Georgia, founded the GUAM organization, and in Dublin that old affinity made itself felt once again.
Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova have gone through the same trauma: separatism backed from outside and the loss of control over part of their territory. Baku is the only one of the three to have resolved the problem definitively, by its own efforts and within the framework of international law. That is why the Azerbaijani position on territorial integrity rings true in Kyiv and Chișinău: Baku has never demanded for itself what it denied to others.
Relations with Kyiv have reached a new level over the past year. On April 25, 2026, Zelensky made his first visit to Azerbaijan, and the parties signed six bilateral documents in Gabala. In Yerevan, the Ukrainian president wished peace to Armenia and Azerbaijan, addressing President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev specifically. Moldova, for its part, has repeatedly thanked Baku for its support during periods of energy crisis.
A Vienna on the Caspian: Four Summits, One Strategy
It would be easy to read Dublin as an isolated episode. It is more accurate to read it as a link in a chain.
The President of Azerbaijan flew to Ireland after a visit to Turkey, where on November 11 he took part in the COP31 leaders' summit in Antalya. Two years earlier, Baku itself hosted COP29 and steered through negotiations a new collective goal on climate finance, at least $300 billion a year by 2035, along with agreements on carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Before that, Azerbaijan chaired the Non-Aligned Movement for more than four years starting in October 2019.
Now look at the calendar ahead. On October 15, 2026, Baku hosted the 7th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, and the member states extended Azerbaijan's chairmanship until 2028. In 2027, Baku will host the 16th summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the country will take over its chairmanship. A year earlier, in November 2025 in Tashkent, Azerbaijan became a full participant in the Consultative Meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia, and on October 8, 2026, in Turkmenbashi, it was announced that Baku would chair this format for the first time in 2027. In May 2028, Azerbaijan will host the summit of the European Political Community.
No other capital in the space from Istanbul to Almaty simultaneously holds Asian, Islamic, Central Asian and European agendas. Baku does. Hence the talk of Baku as a new Vienna or a new Geneva, a venue where those who find it hard to meet anywhere else can meet. One detail is easy to miss: in May 2028, the Azerbaijani capital will host the leaders of states whose members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg have for years voted for anti-Azerbaijani resolutions.
The Era of Mediators Is Over: Who Was Left Outside the Dublin Door
Official Baku does not divide the region into winners and losers. The new transport architecture is open to all neighbors, and the Azerbaijani side repeats this at every venue. Still, every peace has those who bet on its absence, and an honest analysis must name them.
The first to become a thing of the past was the model of outside mediation itself. The OSCE Minsk Group imitated a settlement for almost three decades and in 2025, at the joint request of Baku and Yerevan, was consigned to the archives. The trilateral statement of November 10, 2020, provided for the opening of communications and placed oversight of transport links through Armenia under the Border Service of Russia's FSB. For five years, Yerevan did not implement that provision. The Washington Declaration settled the issue: the route will run under Armenian sovereignty and will be managed by an Armenian-American company. Moscow, like any capital in the region, will be able to use the new roads. The role of indispensable arbiter no longer belongs to it, because the parties no longer need an arbiter.
To Tehran, which for years warned against any changes on the Armenian-Iranian border, Baku offers a calm argument. The border is not changing, the route runs under Armenian sovereignty, and the parallel road to Nakhchivan along the Araz through Iranian territory is not going anywhere. In October 2023, Azerbaijan and Iran laid the foundation for a road bridge over the Araz near Aghband. Multivector policy, Azerbaijani-style, means a backup route for every route.
The losers include revanchist forces in Armenia itself, which oppose TRIPP and continue to trade in fear. While Pashinyan's government advances legislation to establish the management company, the opposition keeps insisting on unresolved questions about the route's security and operating model. Every ton of Azerbaijani transit works against them.
Finally, the European Parliament lost. An institution that could have taken part in a historic reconciliation chose the role of chronic accuser and wrote itself out of the process. London, which does not have a single member in Strasbourg, wrote itself into the South Caucasus agenda that same day with one signature.
A Test for Yerevan
Risks remain, and they must be named without illusions. The peace treaty has been initialed but not yet signed. Baku's position is unchanged and logical: signing is possible once Armenia's Constitution is purged of territorial claims against Azerbaijan, embedded through its reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenian authorities have promised to publish a draft of the new constitution in November 2026. Ankara, for its part, links the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border to the signing of the peace treaty.
Will Armenian voters approve a constitution with no claims against their neighbor? Today no one in Baku or in Yerevan has the answer to that question.
My forecast is as follows. Construction work on the Armenian section of TRIPP will begin no later than mid-2027. The peace treaty will be signed before the end of 2027, and Nikol Pashinyan, if he remains in office, will come to the Baku EPC summit in May 2028 as the prime minister of a country that has signed peace. The first annual meeting under the Azerbaijani-British strategic partnership will take place before the end of 2027, and its agenda will include a specific joint project in the defense industry. Annual transit volume through Azerbaijan to Armenia will exceed 300,000 tons by May 2028.
The last train from Baku to Nakhchivan via Meghri ran more than three decades ago. Today surveyors are at work along that track, and in Dublin it was discussed in the language of cost estimates and schedules. One hundred five thousand tons have already traveled along Azerbaijani roads to Armenia. The next hundred five thousand will move faster.