Europe is looking for the enemy in the mosque, in the left-wing underground and in migrant camps. The numbers point to a different address: a rented room where rent eats up almost the entire paycheck, and a smartphone that within a matter of weeks turns a grievance into a plan of attack.
On the evening of October 17, the city hall in Limoges was on fire. The blaze nearly destroyed the 19th-century building, a crowd briefly stormed the town hall in Marseille, and the French government counted at least 3,000 stores vandalized and looted. It had all started in September with a fairly narrow labor dispute in Créteil, a suburb southeast of Paris: teachers at a local high school went on strike over staff shortages, and students blockaded the building in solidarity. Within days, the blockades had spread to schools across the country, and a dispute over the teacher shortage turned into a protest against fuel prices and the cost of living. By the last weekend of October, the wave had reached Zurich. There, teenagers chanting "We've had enough, even in Switzerland" set fire to barricades and a car, and police responded with water cannons and rubber bullets.
Meanwhile, a second story was unfolding in intelligence reports, one the public barely connects with the first. According to the Global Terrorism Index, published on March 19, 2026, the number of deaths from terrorist attacks worldwide fell by 28 percent in 2025, to 5,582, the lowest level since 2007. In Western countries, the same figure rose by 280 percent, to 57 deaths. Young people and minors figured in 42 percent of all terrorism-related investigations in Europe and North America. That share has tripled since 2021.
Riots in European cities and teenagers in the dock on terrorism charges look like separate stories. In fact, they are a single process split between two agencies: the first goes to public order police, the second to counterintelligence. Ideology is secondary in it. What comes first is precarity. And it is amplified many times over by an algorithm that finds a lonely sixteen-year-old before any teacher or social worker does.
The Sixth-Grade Terrorist: Numbers Europe Long Refused to Add Up
I will start with dry statistics, because this topic attracts far too much journalistic exaggeration. Popular retellings circulate the claim that children commit half of all terrorist attacks in the West. The claim is false. The 42 percent figure describes the share of young people among those named in investigations, not among the perpetrators of attacks. The distinction is fundamental, and from here on I stick strictly to primary sources.
In its TE-SAT report, released on June 24, 2025, Europol reported that of the 449 people arrested in the European Union on terrorism charges in 2024, 133 were between the ages of 12 and 20. Almost one in three. The youngest was 12, arrested for plotting an attack. The next report, published on July 13, 2026, recorded 486 arrests in 21 EU countries and 45 terrorist attacks, including 22 completed and 20 foiled. Suspects aged 18 and under numbered 130, and the youngest was once again 12. The average age of those arrested was 27. The report contains an observation I would post in every education ministry in Europe: many young suspects have only a superficial understanding of the ideology in whose name they were prepared to kill.
In France, the picture is even starker. A few years ago, the National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office (PNAT) could count minor defendants on the fingers of one hand: in 2022 they accounted for about 1 percent of those charged with criminal terrorist conspiracy. In 2023, charges were brought against 15 teenagers, and in 2024 against 18. Later tallies for that year give 19, and the discrepancy reflects the date of the count, not an error. In 2025, there were 22 such cases. PNAT head Olivier Christen noted at the end of January 2026 that minors now accounted for a third of all proceedings opened by his office over the year. At the same time, 87 percent of its cases are still linked to jihadism.
The British data require an honest caveat. The UK Home Office recorded 43 arrests of teenagers under 18 in 2023, 40 in 2024 (the initial report listed 39) and 39 in 2025. There is no explosive growth here; the curve has plateaued. What is alarming is the structure, not the trend. As early as October 2024, minors accounted for 13 percent of all MI5 operational work, three times more than at the start of 2021. Prevent, the radicalization prevention program, received a record 8,778 referrals in the reporting year that ended on March 31, 2025, up 27 percent from the year before. For the first time, the largest age group was children aged 11 to 15, at 36 percent of all cases.
The terrorism index also contains a figure that optimists like to cite. From 2022 to 2025, security services intercepted 97 percent of plots involving minors, compared with 68 percent for purely adult groups. Teenagers are inexperienced and leave traces in chats. It is cold comfort. When the funnel draws in hundreds of people, even a 3 percent gap ends in funerals. The index's authors add a detail that explains why the security services find this so difficult: lone actors carried out 93 percent of fatal terrorist attacks in the West in recent years and are three times more likely to see an attack through than groups of two or more.
Looking in the Wrong Place: The Inconvenient Arithmetic of European Extremism
The public still associates extremism in Europe with Islamic fundamentalism. The numbers significantly correct that picture. Estimates of the Muslim population in the EU vary: lower estimates put it at about 19 million, while demographers who include countries outside the Union arrive at nearly 26 million. Under any methodology, the share of those with any connection at all to radical structures does not exceed 1 percent of the community, and the overwhelming majority of that 1 percent never turns to violence.
Radicalization researchers distinguish between two phenomena. Cognitive radicalization means adopting exclusionary, fundamentalist beliefs. Behavioral radicalization means taking part in violence or directly supporting it. There is no rigid link between them: in the vast majority of cases, the first does not lead to the second. A 2021 survey of some 8,000 seventeen-year-olds in Switzerland found that teenagers agreed less often with Islamist statements than with far-right and far-left slogans. The authors concluded that terrorist behavior cannot be predicted from views alone.
The terrorism index has long recorded a shift to the right. The 2020 edition showed a 250 percent increase in far-right terrorism in the West over 2014–2019. In the 2024 edition, the authors noted that politically motivated attacks in the West outnumbered religiously motivated ones fivefold, and that the number of religious attacks had fallen by 82 percent in a year. Britain's Prevent confirms the trend: among referrals in 2024/25, far-right motives appeared in 21 percent of cases (1,798), Islamist ones in 10 percent (870). Far-right referrals rose by 37 percent. In 34 percent of cases, no ideology could be identified at all.
In fairness, there is another side to this, and it would be dishonest to gloss over it. Jihadism remains the deadliest form of terrorism in the EU: according to Europol, it claimed five lives and injured 81 people in 2025, while far-right attacks resulted in one death. In France, jihadist cases dominate overwhelmingly. The conclusion is simple: the geography of the threat is uneven. London fears the teenager with neo-Nazi memes, Paris the teenager enthralled by "Islamic State" figures. The mechanics are the same.
Three Weeks from Meme to Knife
Ten years ago, recruitment looked different. The Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point military academy described the system the "Islamic State" used to draw in teenagers at the height of its military activity. The group made the children's own mothers accomplices in their radicalization. Its propaganda portrayed fighters as both ruthless and tender, offering young men a seductive image of masculinity. Execution videos and frontline footage were presented as entertainment. According to analysts, ISIS curricula for children were professionally designed, with a pedagogy close to Western methods, but themes of violence and apocalypse were methodically woven into ordinary school subjects.
Today, such infrastructure is barely needed. According to the index, the path from first exposure to extremist material to full radicalization took an average of 18 months in 2005 and 13 months in 2016. Now a few weeks are enough. Extremist networks use a funnel: a person is hooked on platforms with algorithmic feeds such as TikTok and YouTube Shorts, led toward increasingly hard-core content, and then moved into encrypted messaging apps, where concrete planning is discussed.
A New York think tank that studies terrorism and armed conflict stressed in a 2025 review that the acceleration affects all directions at once. The far right, the far left, Islamists and nihilists who practice "a little bit of everything" extremism all work with teenagers through the same social networks. Europol describes the phenomenon in even darker terms: online communities deliberately seek out vulnerable children between the ages of roughly 8 and 17 and push them toward violence against others or against themselves. The ideological baggage of these groups is a blend of jihadism, neo-Nazism, occultism and Satanism.
Why are teenagers so susceptible? A Singaporean terrorism researcher points to physiology: the brain's emotional centers mature faster than the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for impulse control and rational judgment. Teenagers go through a phase of hungrily seeking absolute certainty. An extremist worldview, with its clear enemies and simple answers, gives them exactly that. Belonging to a group that faces discrimination amplifies the effect many times over.
The clearest and most horrifying example of recent years comes from Southport, England. On July 29, 2024, seventeen-year-old Axel Rudakubana, born in Cardiff to a family of Rwandan origin, attacked a children's dance class with a knife and killed three girls aged six, seven and nine. He had previously been referred to Prevent three times. Specialists never identified a consistent ideology in him, although a search turned up an Al-Qaeda manual and traces of attempts to produce ricin. In January 2025, the court sentenced him to life in prison with a minimum term of 52 years. Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the time described the new threat as violence committed by "loners, misfits, young men in their bedrooms."
British law did not classify the killing itself as terrorism: there was no ideological motive. A state accustomed to sorting threats into ideological categories was confronted with a killer who fit none of them.
Orphans with Living Parents
If you set the security services aside for a moment and ask social psychologists what pushes a person toward extremism in the first place, the picture turns out to be almost embarrassingly mundane. It barely depends on which faith or doctrine is involved.
In 2013, Dutch researchers published a study based on surveys of young Dutch Muslims. The main factor turned out to be personal uncertainty about one's life. Added to it were a sense of injustice and a feeling that one's group was under threat. These variables give rise to a belief in the exceptional nature of one's own community, and with it, distrust of authority. From there, the ladder leads downward. First a person justifies violence by "his own," then he begins to imagine committing it himself.
The 2026 Global Terrorism Index adds a biographical dimension to this scheme. According to its authors, 87 percent of radicalized minors in the West had a history of parental neglect or psychological abuse, and 77 percent had experienced abandonment. British statistics add the medical side: at least one mental health condition or neurodivergence was recorded in 34 percent of Prevent referrals in 2024/25.
In a 2018 review, a Dutch social psychologist concluded that in-group and intergroup dynamics, including online ones, influence radicalization more strongly than religion does. The religious knowledge of radicals is often meager or acquired very recently. Many supporters of Islamist movements attended secular schools, and some grew up in Christian families. Seen through this lens, fundamentalism is a symptom of radicalization, not its cause.
Having lived through the collapse of the Soviet system, I know this mechanism from experience, not from monographs. When the familiar order crumbles, seventeen-year-olds are the first to look for solid ground beneath their feet. Some find it in sports or in their studies. Others grab hold of any doctrine that will declare them right and the world guilty.
Mirror-Image Enemies: How the Islamophobe and the Islamist Breed Each Other
The perception that society is hostile is among the strongest drivers of radicalization. That leads to an uncomfortable conclusion: the rise of anti-Islamic rhetoric in the West works both as a reaction to the radicalization of Muslim youth and as one of its causes.
In 2021, a Turkish sociologist conducted 160 in-depth interviews with young Muslims and members of far-right movements in Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. In both groups, similar factors led to radicalization. What proved decisive was socioeconomic and psychological alienation compounded by distrust of politics, not civilizational differences at all. Both groups express their discontent in the language available to them. For Muslims, that is the language of honor and religion; for native Europeans, the language of nationalism and xenophobia. The researcher called the dynamic between them co-radicalization: the conflict develops through cycles of mutual threats and violence.
A later study he co-authored, published in 2023, surveyed young Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Paris and Lyon. They described the xenophobia of conservative politicians and the press as an anti-Islamic agenda imposed from above and detached from their real lives. The authors defined Islamic radicalism as a response to nationalism rather than as a self-contained religious phenomenon.
Southport demonstrated this mechanism in real time. Within hours of the killings, social media spread the lie that the attacker was a Muslim and an illegal migrant. On July 30, 2024, a mob attacked a mosque in Southport, and in the first days of August riots engulfed more than two dozen towns in England and Northern Ireland, where rioters attacked hotels housing asylum seekers and set police cars on fire; police ultimately arrested more than a thousand people. The killer had nothing to do with Islam or with migrant boats. The rioters did not care.
The fall of 2026 reproduced the same pattern on a continental scale. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that roughly half of the 330 people detained in Milan were of foreign origin and that the youngest was 11. Milan police cite a different figure: 271 arrested over two days of unrest, most of them minors, with 14 officers injured. The discrepancy is telling. The politician rounds up and immediately adds an ethnic frame; the police record age. Education Minister Giuseppe Valditara explained that in France the protest had spun out of control because of problems integrating second-generation migrants, while in Italy the situation was different. During the Milan riots, the minister himself narrowly dodged a thrown rock.
Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar saw the French riots as proof that a tough migration policy was right. Donald Tusk wrote that Poland would not repeat the mistakes of other European countries and pay for them. U.S. President Donald Trump declared on his social media platform that migrants had taken over France. French authorities, by contrast, did not blame migrants for the riots: in a rare televised address, President Emmanuel Macron placed responsibility on far-left activists and promised that looters would pay for the damage.
In the Netherlands, shop owners boarded up their windows, and soccer fans went into central The Hague to, in their words, defend the city. Palestinian flags and keffiyehs appeared at demonstrations in France and Italy, Israeli and American flags were burned in Lyon, and the Central Council of Jews in Germany warned of an elevated level of risk at the protests. Each side gets from the other exactly the proof it was missing. The far-right activist sees a migrant with a rock. The young Muslim sees fans patrolling the streets and a politician calling him a threat. The circle closes.
Rent Instead of a Recruiter
The real engine of the protest is hidden in the accounts ledger, not in the mosque. European youth increasingly find themselves in the precariat, a class for which low pay is the lesser of its troubles. Worse is the chronic instability of income and the feeling of being a second-class worker who can be let go at the end of any quarter.
According to available data, in the "old" EU member states, the share of temporary contracts among working people aged 15 to 24 rose from a quarter in 1990 to about 48 percent in 2024. Almost every other young worker does not know whether he will have a job a year from now. Even in the 15 to 29 age group, about a third of employees work on fixed-term contracts.
Housing has become the main symbol of generational injustice. According to Eurostat, from 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2024, house prices in the EU rose by 55.4 percent and rents by 26.7 percent. In Hungary, prices soared by 234 percent, in Estonia by 228 percent. The growth has not stopped: in the third quarter of 2025, housing prices rose another 5.5 percent year over year. According to researchers' estimates, the share of young homeowner households fell by roughly a fifth between 2005 and 2018, even though homeownership across all age groups barely changed. The older generations managed to buy. The younger ones pay them rent.
Spain has taken this arithmetic to the point of absurdity. The country's minimum wage is €1,221, while the average rent for an 80-square-meter apartment, according to calculations by the Spanish business press, is about €1,130. Unemployment among Spaniards under 25 reached 22.8 percent in September 2026, with 449,000 young people out of work. Across the EU, youth unemployment rose to 15.5 percent, and overall unemployment in the eurozone stands at 6.5 percent, the highest since February 2024. In Italy, inflation reached 4.2 percent in September, against a eurozone average of 3.8 percent.
The symbol of the Spanish protest became 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal. She was carried out on a stretcher from the Madrid apartment where she had lived since 1956, and she died two weeks after the eviction. A tent camp in the Puerta del Sol stood for weeks, and similar camps sprang up in Lisbon and Porto under the slogan "Can't pay the rent? Bring a tent." Parliament voted down the government's housing measures, and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap election for November 29. Unions have called the first general strike in 14 years for November 11.
Economic pessimism does not necessarily hit a person directly. Growing inequality, even when it does not affect a particular family, breeds a sense of injustice, and that, research shows, increases the tendency to believe conspiracy theories and vote for the far right. A twenty-year-old waitress from the Madrid camp told reporters that almost her entire paycheck goes to rent and that most of her peers live the same way. Ready-made raw material for any recruiter, from a neo-Nazi to a preacher of the caliphate.
Muhammad, Jesus and Hitler in the Same Feed
The factors described above work the same way outside the Muslim community. In 2021, Swiss researchers found that Christian religious affiliation contributes to some extent to the formation of far-right views. The explanation lies in history: the postwar rhetoric of the "Christian West" turned faith into a marker of national identity. The Alternative for Germany, which promises to protect Christian civilization from Islam, eagerly draws on this narrative.
In the United States, a 2017 study described "nostalgic deprivation," a sense of loss stemming from the collapse of a remembered, or entirely imagined, social order of the past. The American far right presents demographic and cultural change as a threat to national identity. A mirror-image mechanism operates among Muslim youth, who seek themselves in the "revival" of an idealized, purified version of their own group against a backdrop of disillusionment with the present.
The "great replacement" theory tied these fears into a single narrative and armed them. On March 15, 2019, a gunman in Christchurch, New Zealand, killed 51 people in two mosques, leaving behind a manifesto with references to "replacement." On May 14, 2022, an eighteen-year-old gunman in Buffalo, New York, killed ten Black shoppers at a supermarket, drawing on the same construct. In that same feed, incels with their cult of revenge against women sit side by side with nihilists for whom violence has become an aesthetic. Specialists coined the term "salad bar extremism" for this: a teenager assembles a worldview out of scraps, like a playlist.
Why did all this happen now? Over the past decade, the deindustrialized cities of Europe have produced a large cohort of young people experiencing a decline in social status and the identity crisis that comes with it. At precisely the same time, the smartphone with an algorithmic feed became an essential item. On top of this, rhetoric of exclusive victimhood and civilizational threat, previously kept on the fringe, entered the political mainstream. All these lines converged on a single generation, and they converged at once.
The psychological path to radical beliefs through uncertainty and a sense of injustice is practically identical whether a young man quotes the Koran, the Bible, incel forums or the manifestos of "great replacement" adherents. The difference lies in how society sees it. Some grievances are recognized as a legitimate political problem, while others are immediately handed over to the security agencies. In the Turkish sociologist's interviews, a Rotterdam resident angry that refugees get housing first and a Parisian woman tired of the press seeing her hijab as a threat describe what is essentially the same experience. The first is called a concerned voter. The second, a potential extremist.
Who Reaps the Harvest from Someone Else's Fire
Every wave of violence has its beneficiaries. In France, far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon backed the protest, while Marine Le Pen, with her demand to restore law and order, may become the main beneficiary of the chaos. Meloni's government sent an additional 500 troops to Milan and got the perfect picture for its migration agenda. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama declared that students who had joined the anti-corruption "Flamingo" movement were ideologically indoctrinated and radicalized "antifa" supporters. Belgian Interior Minister Bernard Quintin called what was happening violence in its purest form, organized to destabilize society, and went looking for the roots of the unrest in France.
Blaming migrants or far-left provocateurs is convenient for the authorities for one reason. It is cheaper. Police and deradicalization programs cost the budget incomparably less than building social housing and hiring teachers. A line about migrants taking over France costs not a single euro. The politician who says it collects votes, and the teenager from the suburbs receives yet another confirmation that he is not wanted here.
Twenty years ago, France had already been through this lesson. On October 27, 2005, in Clichy-sous-Bois, two teenagers, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré, died while hiding from police in an electrical substation. The riots lasted three weeks. Around nine thousand cars were burned, and on November 8 the government declared a state of emergency. The state responded with multibillion-euro programs to renovate suburban neighborhoods. The demand of the Créteil high school students in the fall of 2026, more teachers in schools in poor neighborhoods, is direct evidence that concrete replaced people but did not solve the problem.
The difference between 2005 and 2026 is fundamental. Back then, the revolt remained French. Now, 27 youth and student organizations from 11 countries met in Paris on October 17–18 to coordinate an international youth strike on November 20, and the first call for it was issued back in June in Cologne. The strike's slogan, "Fight for our future, not their wars," refers to the widening conflict around Iran, which the authors of the terrorism index named one of the main risk factors of 2026. In Germany, the "Gen Z regelt!" movement brought people into the streets in more than 30 cities on October 31. Most of the protests were peaceful, but by evening downtown Frankfurt had become a riot zone, with looted storefronts and Molotov cocktails flying at police officers.
The organizers swear they are planning only peaceful actions. The gap between their assurances and the reality on the streets grows with every weekend. This is where the two stories I began with converge. Collective rage takes to the square and smashes storefronts. Solitary rage retreats into an encrypted chat and looks for a target. They share the same source; only the number of people around changes.
Five Hundred Soldiers Instead of One Teacher
Europe treats the symptoms agency by agency. The riots go to the interior ministries, teenagers with attack plans go to anti-terrorism prosecutors, and housing and the labor market remain the subject of endless negotiations in parliaments, which, as the Spanish example showed, are capable of voting down even minimal measures while young voters sleep in tents on the capital's main square. Each agency honestly reports on its own patch. No one sees the whole.
My forecast can be checked. In the summer of 2027, Europol's next TE-SAT report will count more than 130 suspects aged 18 and under, that is, more than for 2025. In the Global Terrorism Index due out in March 2027, the share of young people in investigations in the West will exceed the current 42 percent. If even one of these figures goes down, I will be the first to admit that Europe found a cure faster than I expected.
One question remains that I cannot answer. Who will be the first to offer a teenager from Créteil a future: the state, or a recruiter from an encrypted chat?
The demand with which it all began in September was a modest one: more teachers. France responded with curfews in several cities. Italy responded with five hundred additional soldiers on the streets of Milan. Teachers are not on that list.