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In October, the EU was paying three times as much for the same gas as it did on the eve of the war with Iran, and on January 1 it will shut off the Russian tap itself. The key to Europe's heating is increasingly sitting in Washington.

On October 28, the Dutch TTF contract, which sets the price for the entire European gas market, crossed the threshold of €100 per megawatt-hour. The last time that happened was in December 2022. At the end of February, on the eve of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, the same gas cost about €32.

In eight months, Europe received no extra gas. It received a bill. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the first major version of it on April 29 in Strasbourg: an additional €27 billion for fossil fuel imports in 60 days, "without a single additional molecule of energy." By September 16, by her own account, the sum had reached €90 billion.

November brought a pullback: on November 6, the contract fell to about €86, losing roughly 15 percent in a week. The market had bought into Qatari mediation between Washington and Tehran. So far, there is nothing to buy into. As of November 4, EU underground storage was 74.33 percent full, against a five-year average of about 90 percent; German storage stood at 61.03 percent on November 2, against a government target of 70 percent. Eurozone inflation hit 4 percent in October, and energy prices rose 20.8 percent year over year.

In terms of price, the current crisis falls far short of 2022: back then, in August, a megawatt-hour cost about €340. Its structure, however, is more dangerous. Four years ago, the trouble had a single address in Moscow and an obvious way out: get away from Moscow. Europe found that way out, did its homework, lined its coastline with new terminals, and discovered that its heating now depends on a narrow strait off the coast of Iran, on the weather in Tokyo, on maintenance at a Norwegian plant in Kollsnes, and on the mood of the man in the Oval Office.

Empty Storage Turned Out to Be a Sound Business Decision

By April 1, EU reserves had dropped to 28 percent. Then came the arithmetic that Brussels prefers not to recall. Materials from ENTSOG, the association of European gas transmission system operators, record the quotes for March 31: the summer contract cost €50.345, the winter contract €49.810. A trader injecting gas underground under those conditions pays for storage, ties up capital and ultimately sells for less than he paid. In August, the picture repeated itself: the front-month contract cost €60.68, €1.65 more than the winter one.

Injecting gas under such conditions is charity.

Brussels had softened the rules in advance. The 90 percent target may now be met at any point between October 1 and December 1, with a tolerance of 10 percentage points and another 5 through a delegated act. Six large German porous-rock storage sites, including Rehden, were given a threshold of just 45 percent. There was a logic to this leniency, and I acknowledge it: in 2022, strict rules forced Europe to fill its reservoirs at any price, at a cost of roughly €100 billion, whereas this year's injection, by the high-end estimate of the regulator ACER, cost up to €27 billion. The savings looked brilliant right up until the fall, when winter gas cost nearly twice the March quote.

Next comes a sixth-grade math problem. Storage currently holds just under 80 billion cubic meters. In each of the previous two winters, the EU withdrew 60 to 66 billion. The mild weather promised by El Niño will save 10 to 12 billion, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. In the favorable scenario, spring will begin with about 25 to 30 billion cubic meters underground. The International Energy Agency has modeled the unfavorable one: with cold weather and Hormuz closed, reserves will plunge below 10 percent of capacity by the end of March, and ENTSOG puts the figure at a similar 11 percent. Below the 30 percent mark, withdrawal rates fall, and physics begins to override finance.

Spring will open the next round. Oxford Institute analyst Jack Sharples has calculated that in the summer of 2027 Europe will need an additional 10 billion cubic meters to fill storage to 80 percent and 20 billion to reach the 90 percent the European Commission requires. Tom Marzec-Manser, head of European gas analytics at Wood Mackenzie, does not sugarcoat his forecast: "Even under the most optimistic scenario, with the conflict ending by the end of the year, we unfortunately expect gas prices to keep rising." Henning Gloystein of Eurasia Group says the same thing in the voice of a weary doctor: "We will have to go around this vicious circle for another full year, and the economy will have to suffer through elevated gas prices for another year."

The summer has already added its share to this balance. The heat raised gas consumption by power plants by 9 percent over the season and by 20 percent in August. Hungary shut down the third unit of the Paks nuclear plant because of the shallow Danube, and French plants ran into the same cooling problems.

Britain has already taken this exam. In 2017, it closed the Rough storage facility, which accounted for 70 percent of national capacity. The government deemed the loss tolerable, and on March 1, 2018, when the "Beast from the East" hit the British Isles, the operator National Grid issued its first gas deficit warning in eight years. The price for immediate delivery shot up to 350 pence per therm, compared with 63 a week earlier. The gap was closed in less than a day. The system held up; wallets did not. Remember the month: Europe's cold is most dangerous in March, when the least gas remains at the bottom of the reservoirs.

ENTSOG has also calculated the extreme case. A harsh winter combined with an outage on the largest offshore pipeline and a complete halt to Algerian supplies would leave a shortfall of 12 to 15 percent of demand. The scenario is unlikely. No one calls it impossible.

Peace Will Not Bring Back Qatari Gas

QatarEnergy halted LNG production at Ras Laffan on March 2 and declared force majeure two days later. Then Iranian missiles struck the complex itself. Two of its fourteen production trains were knocked out: 12.8 million tons a year, or 17 percent of the country's export capacity. Saad al-Kaabi, Qatar's minister of state for energy affairs and head of QatarEnergy, put the repair timeline at three to five years. The force majeure is being extended month by month and now runs through the end of 2026. There is no workaround, since Qatar has no export terminals outside the Gulf.

Estimates of the losses diverge, and the divergence is instructive. ACER counted a shortfall of nearly 50 billion cubic meters, offset by 36 billion: the United States added 14 billion, Canada 7 and Russia 5. The IEA records more than 60 billion in losses from Qatar and the UAE for March through October alone, against growth of more than 40 billion from other producers. The periods and methodologies differ, but the conclusion is the same: the world plugged roughly two-thirds of the hole, and a third remains open. Global LNG supply will shrink by 3 percent in 2026, by nearly 20 billion cubic meters, an annual decline unprecedented in the statistics.

Before February 28, the market expected the opposite: a fuel glut and two years of cheap gas. Now the IEA estimates cumulative losses for 2026–2030 at 150 billion cubic meters, or 15 percent of the new supply that had been expected. The war devoured the peak of the investment cycle that Europe had been quietly counting on.

October showed the mechanics of the crisis in their purest form. From October 1 to 28, European terminals received about 8 million tons of LNG, compared with 10.57 million for all of October last year. Over the winter, according to ENTSOG's calculations, the EU needs to buy 96 billion cubic meters to keep at least 30 percent in storage by the end of March. Regasification capacity is designed for about 145 billion per season. There are enough terminals. What is lacking are tankers willing to sail to Europe at the price offered, because on November 2 the Asian JKM benchmark stood at $33.90 per million BTU. According to estimates by industry consultants, Japan will overtake China this year to become the largest LNG importer once again, while Beijing, which stocked up in advance, calmly watches someone else's auction.

The IEA tallies the winter balance without any diplomacy. From November through March, new projects will add 18 billion cubic meters, and existing ones, primarily in Russia, Nigeria and Oman, another 3 billion. The bottom line is still negative: depending on what happens with Hormuz, global LNG supply this winter will be 10 to 25 billion cubic meters lower than last year. The agency expects prices to remain high at least until the summer of 2027. Europe's 96-billion order is almost double last winter's purchases, and it will have to be placed in a shrinking market.

Norway, the continent's main pipeline supplier, added to the jitters in October with unplanned outages at Kollsnes, Kårstø, Åsgard and Oseberg.

So far, diplomacy is working worse than Norwegian compressors. On the night of November 3, the day of the midterm elections, the Americans carried out strikes on Qeshm Island. In an interview with Fox News, U.S. President Donald Trump called the operation small and refused to consider it a war. Tehran found the American response to Iran's seven conditions for reopening the strait unconvincing. Qatar, meanwhile, is looking for a formula for a trade-off: Iran stops attacking ships, and the United States lifts its blockade of Iranian ports. Responsibility here is genuinely shared. Washington and Israel started the war; Tehran fired on Qatari plants and merchant ships. Europe is paying for both.

The War Paid Off, and the Check Was Written in Houston

American LNG already accounts for more than 60 percent of Europe's imports of this fuel and about 30 percent of all gas supplies to the EU. Cheniere, the largest U.S. exporter, shipped a record 188 cargoes in the third quarter, earned $1.2 billion in net income and raised its annual guidance for the third time in a row. On October 23, gas at the U.S. Henry Hub cost $2.60 per million BTU, while on the Dutch TTF it cost $30.80.

The twelvefold spread cannot be booked entirely as profit. Liquefaction and shipping costs must be subtracted, and part of the gain goes to European buyers themselves whose contracts are indexed to Henry Hub. What remains is still impressive.

On July 27, 2025, in Turnberry, Scotland, Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen agreed on purchases of $750 billion worth of American energy through the end of 2028. Brussels had imported €77 billion worth in 2024, so the deal required roughly tripling that figure, and the market greeted the number with open irony. The plan still looks unrealistic. The war, however, redirected physical flows in a way no trade deal could have. As early as last winter, amid Trump's threats to annex Greenland, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen himself admitted the concern: "We risk replacing one dependence with another."

Two recent decisions slipped past the broader public, even though they say more about the new balance of power than any declaration. The first concerns methane. Requirements for gas importers under the EU methane emissions regulation were supposed to take effect on January 1, 2027. The European Commission proposed a one-year delay, the European Parliament backed three years, and the final version has yet to be agreed with the Council of the EU. Formally, a climate rule is retreating in the face of winter. In reality, in my assessment, the main beneficiary will be the supplier of more than half of Europe's LNG.

The second decision was made in Washington. On September 18, Trump signed a law named after the late Senator Lindsey Graham. It authorizes tariffs of up to 100 percent on the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas and sanctions on vessels involved in the Russian LNG trade. The main measures were supposed to take effect on October 18. Two days before the deadline, the president signed a broad waiver of their application, and the published information does not make clear whether it covers all LNG carriers. The German organization Urgewald, whose figures I trust because they are built on shipping data, while taking its conclusions with allowance for its campaigning temperament, counted 134 vessels that have carried Russian gas since 2022, including 17 Arc7 ice-class LNG carriers. Its representative, Alexander Kirk, said that Trump gutted the law before its main sanctions even took effect. For Europe, something else matters more. Until the embargo takes effect, supplies from Yamal now depend on the decision of an American president who has the power to shut off Russian gas before Brussels does or to graciously let it keep flowing. In October, he chose the latter.

The Americans, it must be acknowledged, saved Europe from a genuine shortage. This gas is sold by many private companies, and no American equivalent of Gazprom takes orders from the White House. The difference from Moscow is real. But the president still holds export controls and emergency powers, and the Greenland experience has taught Europeans not to dismiss such scenarios as fantasy.

Moscow is profiting too. In nine months, the EU received a record 12.18 million tons from the Yamal LNG project and paid about €7.88 billion for it. European ports took in 85 percent of all the project's shipments. Russia supplied 15.3 percent of the EU's LNG imports, more than last year's 13.6 percent. The country Europe has been weaning itself off for four years is profiting from a crisis created by Europe's main ally.

January 1: Principle at the Winter Rate

Regulation (EU) 2026/261 was adopted on January 26 with the votes of 24 countries, two against and one abstention. Hungary and Slovakia were outmaneuvered elegantly: the ban was framed as a trade measure, which requires only a qualified majority, rather than as a sanction, which requires unanimity. Budapest filed a suit with the EU Court of Justice, and Bratislava announced its intention to do the same. Short-term LNG contracts were banned as of April 25, and short-term pipeline gas contracts as of June 17. Long-term LNG contracts end on January 1, 2027, and long-term pipeline contracts on September 30, or November 1 if storage levels are insufficient.

The interim ban worked poorly. In September, the EU received 792,440 tons of Yamal LNG, slightly more than a year earlier, because the bulk of the volumes is tied to long-term contracts. The real cutoff will come in seven and a half weeks, at the height of the withdrawal season.

Calls to wait have already been heard. Eni chief Claudio Descalzi asked for a delay in April, the Port of Bilbao authorities did so in June, and Belgium's prime minister spoke of a future return of cheap Russian gas. Jørgensen's answer is always the same. After a meeting of EU energy ministers on October 29, he declared, "This ban remains in force," adding that returning to Russian gas would put Europe back in the enemy's pocket.

I believe he is right, and I will not pretend that it comes free. The IEEFA institute estimates the lost volumes at about 7 billion cubic meters. The hidden problem is more serious than rerouting: the Arc7 ice-class fleet is small and the route from Yamal to Asia is longer, so total exports will likely decline, and the global market will lose some volumes that are worth their weight in gold today. The price of principle will show up noticeably in the bills.

The alternative is worse. The money for every Yamal tanker goes into the budget of a country that this fall continues to strike Ukrainian power plants. Moreover, a delay wrung out in the very first hard winter would show the Kremlin once and for all exactly what European principle is worth: one cold January.

The Factory Pays First, the Apartment Next

The IEA forecasts that global gas demand will fall by about 65 billion cubic meters in 2026, the third decline since 2020. About 90 percent of the drop comes from the power sector and industry, and fertilizers are hit hardest. The French price of urea reached €760 per ton in April, 51 percent above its prewar level. BASF raised prices for detergent components by about 30 percent. Germany's Ifo Institute warned that such increases only strengthen Chinese competitors.

ACER offers consolation: EU gas consumption is about 20 percent below its 2022 level, so every cubic meter in storage now carries more weight. The consolation is double-edged. Part of that percentage reflects gains in energy efficiency and renewable generation. Another part reflects shuttered production lines, whose absence from the statistics looks like resilience.

The wave has reached households only partially. Wholesale prices feed into bills with a lag, and Italy shows what happens when the lag ends: inflation there jumped from 4.2 to 5.6 percent in a single month, mainly because of utility bills. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is already asking Brussels for budget flexibility. Germany brought its rate down from 3.3 to 2.8 percent with a targeted tax cut, and this contrast will become the union's main internal conflict all winter: the rich will buy themselves lower inflation, and everyone else will be told to endure. Von der Leyen points out that in the last crisis more than €350 billion went to untargeted measures. Few budgets today can afford to repeat spending on that scale.

Electricity translates this story into the language of politics. In Italy, gas still often sets the price of electricity; in Spain and France, its influence is noticeably weaker. Countries that invested in wind, solar and nuclear are paying less. The lesson for the next decade is already printed on the utility bills.

A Pipeline from the Caspian: Small, but Without a Strait

Europe's import map shows one route that is indifferent to Hormuz, the Asian auction and the Atlantic alike. In January, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the country's exports had exceeded 25 billion cubic meters and could keep growing. Caspian gas now flows to 16 countries, 13 of them European. Germany and Austria joined the list in January, and Germany's state-owned SEFE has contracted volumes under a 10-year agreement ramping up to 1.5 billion cubic meters a year. Since it began operating, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline has delivered 61.4 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas to Europeans, and as of January 1 its long-term capacity increased by 1.2 billion cubic meters.

The scale, however, must be stated honestly, or the discussion loses its meaning. In the first nine months of 2026, Europe received 8.6 billion cubic meters from Azerbaijan, 8.5 percent less than a year earlier. Total exports rose 0.5 percent to 18.4 billion: 1.2 billion went to Syria, and Turkey received 7 billion. The Caspian will not replace lost Qatari supply or cover the winter's 96 billion cubic meters of LNG. The Southern Gas Corridor works as an insurance policy, and that policy is cheapest when bought in advance.

Doubling TAP's capacity to 20 billion cubic meters is technically feasible. The conditions are well known: market demand and regulatory approval, which in practice means long-term contracts. Baku is making its moves. At Energy Week in June, half of the future output from the second phase of Absheron went to Turkey under a 15-year contract, to a buyer that sees no ideological problem in long-term commitments. Is Brussels, which today pays €90 to €100 for spot gas, finally ready to sign twenty-year deals with a partner whose route does not pass through someone else's strait? I don't have an answer. Neither has Brussels given one yet.

The Optimists Have Already Been Off by Half

The Oxford Institute offers a reassuring scenario. Even if Hormuz remains blockaded until the next heating season, prices, according to its models, will not exceed October's €100, a decline will begin in the spring, and the Qatari losses will be offset by the end of 2028. The IEA takes a gloomier view: low reserves will require massive injections in the summer of 2027 and could prolong the strain into 2028, and the agency does not expect significant relief before the end of the decade. The stakes of this debate are high, and I side with the skeptics for a simple reason. In August, Germany's Uniper expected €50 to €60 for as long as Hormuz remained closed. At the same time, Commerzbank forecast €50 for the end of the year. As late as this fall, Goldman Sachs held a December target of around €50, with a caveat about the risk of €100. At the peak, the market went twice as high as these figures.

In fairness, neither Gloystein nor Sharples expects physical cutoffs to consumers this winter, and I will not argue with them. Bill Farren-Price of the Oxford Institute drew the line on his own optimism: "If you treat the loss of Hormuz as an isolated problem, the market will eventually cope with it." The second half of his statement matters more than the first: "If you treat it as a sign that we now live in an unstable world where unpredictable trouble systematically befalls energy, then we are in for more and more problems."

My bets are simple, and they are easy to check.

By January 31, 2027, QatarEnergy will extend force majeure for at least part of the first quarter. The ban on Russian LNG will take effect on January 1 without a delay, even though a couple of loud voices in national capitals will demand a review by then. This winter, the TTF front-month contract will not settle above €150: demand in Asia has already been broken by price and will cap the rise. By April 1, 2027, European storage will be less than 25 percent full, below last year's 28 percent. In the summer of that year, on July 1, TTF will remain above €60 unless traffic through Hormuz is fully restored by March.

A different turn is possible. A Qatar-brokered deal could knock €20 to €30 off the premium within weeks, since the undamaged trains at Ras Laffan are being kept ready for a quick restart. The Qataris promise to resume operations within weeks of the strait reopening. But the lost 17 percent will stay lost for years, and the empty storage will have to be refilled without a discount.

Europe learned the lesson of 2022 word for word: do not depend on a single dictator with a pipeline. The question it failed to ask itself was a different one: who will control its choices when the pipeline is replaced by the sea? The answer is in the numbers. More than 60 percent of its LNG comes from the country that started the war that made this LNG more expensive. The ally is selling water to fight a fire it set itself, and is sincerely offended when the conversation turns to price.

The most accurate picture of this fall came from a ceremony that went almost unnoticed amid the market reports. On October 22, in Doha, Saad al-Kaabi, whose plant stands idle with damaged trains behind a closed strait, signed alongside Cheniere chief Jack Fusco. The largest gas exporter in the Persian Gulf committed to buying 4 million tons a year of American LNG from Louisiana and Texas, with deliveries from 2031 to 2054 under a formula indexed to Henry Hub.

There are no European signatures on that contract.