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Gadi Eisenkot received the mandate thanks to parties he had promised not to bring into his coalition. He has 42 days to decide whose ballot counts in full in Israel.

On the evening of November 8, Israeli President Isaac Herzog handed Gadi Eisenkot the mandate to form a government, and the entire solemnity of the ceremony rested on one inconvenient number. The leader of the Yashar party was recommended by 67 of the Knesset's 120 members. Nineteen of them represent two Arab factions that neither Eisenkot nor his allies had promised to bring into the coalition. The majority exists only until someone has to say it out loud.

In the October 27 election, the Joint List won 11 seats and Mansour Abbas's Ra'am won eight. That is a record in the history of the Knesset, where the previous term had ten members from Arab parties. Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc, which had controlled 68 seats, shrank to 53, the opposition gathered 48, and no one reached the coveted 61. I tested the "stolen victory" accusation with a simple recount: with Arab turnout at its 2022 level, the Arab lists would have won about 13 seats, the prime minister's camp about 56 and his opponents about 51. The calculation is rough, but it shows the main point. Even without the Arab record, Netanyahu would not have had a majority.

Arab voters, who had been persuaded for decades to stay home, showed up and broke the familiar arithmetic. Now Israeli politics is preoccupied with a single task: finding a way to use the result without acknowledging who produced it.

77 Percent: The Voters Everyone Wrote Off Flipped the Table

The Israel Democracy Institute estimated turnout in Arab and Druze localities at roughly 77 percent, compared with 53.2 percent in 2022. International summaries are circulating a figure of about 80. I trust the lower one: the institute counts by specific localities and states explicitly that mixed cities were excluded from the sample, while the rounded-off 80 migrates from article to article with no methodology at all. Even the cautious estimate puts 2026 alongside the 79.3 percent of 1996 and nearly brings the Arab street level with the country as a whole, where overall turnout was 77.98 percent.

In Sakhnin, more than 87 percent of voters cast ballots, the highest rate in Israel. The Bedouin city of Rahat jumped from 60.6 to 84.8 percent, and Kuseife from 55.6 to 85.8 percent. Of the votes cast in Arab localities, 94.8 percent went to Ra'am and the Joint List. Zionist parties all but vanished in these communities.

The reason is not hard to find. In 2025, 252 Arab citizens were killed by criminals, the deadliest year since the Abraham Initiatives began keeping records. By August 30, 2026, the toll had reached 184. Police solve about 15 percent of murders in Arab communities, compared with 65 percent in Jewish ones, and for crimes committed between January and June 26, indictments were filed in only 16 cases, or 12.3 percent. The curve breaks at a specific point: 116 victims in 2022 and 245 in 2023, Itamar Ben-Gvir's first full year in charge of the police ministry.

Blaming it all on one minister would be unfair. The clans and the illegal weapons grew long before him, and 2021 had already set a then-record of 126 deaths. The difference lies elsewhere: Ben-Gvir turned other people's misfortune into a political career, and voters in the Galilee and the Negev remembered his name.

In May, 75 percent of Arab respondents named crime as their main problem. A December 2025 survey captured an even heavier mood: only 13 percent felt free to express themselves on social media, only 47 percent were comfortable speaking Arabic around Jews, and 85 percent feared for their physical safety. A Moshe Dayan Center survey demolishes the right's favorite bogeyman: 13.5 percent named Palestinian identity as their primary one, 27.7 percent named Israeli citizenship, and 53.3 percent feel a strong sense of belonging to the state.

You cannot build a fifth column out of numbers like these. What they do describe precisely is a voter who demands protection from his own state.

"Stolen Elections": How Record Turnout Became a Shin Bet Case

A day after the vote, Likud accused the Arab parties of stealing the election through bribery, threats, violence, forgery and prohibited voter mobilization programs. On October 29, the chairman of the Central Elections Committee, Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg, instructed Shin Bet chief David Zini to look into suspicions of foreign funding. Israeli television immediately named Qatar, then Turkey came up; both countries deny any involvement.

The suspicions cannot be dismissed as pure fabrication, and an honest discussion of this election has to begin with that concession. Three activists were detained in a bribery case, and on November 4 the Shin Bet informed the Central Elections Committee of foreign-funded activity that may have affected thousands of people, cautioning that the real scale had yet to be determined.

From there, the case began to crumble. The police stated that they had no investigative or intelligence evidence supporting Likud's version. The Shin Bet clarified that its review was limited in scope. According to Israeli television, the materials handed to the police did not mention Qatar at all. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara refused to allow Zini to question Arab lawmakers and then stated that the investigations had found nothing capable of even remotely affecting the outcome. Sohlberg spoke in the same vein and condemned the branding of Arab voters.

Likud is nonetheless preparing an appeal to the Jerusalem District Court, citing 700 complaints from its poll watchers about illegal monitoring of voters. A civic group that monitored the election named Likud itself as the main violator of that prohibition.

The plot is old and well rehearsed. On March 17, 2015, Netanyahu recorded a video warning that Arabs were heading to the polls in droves, and in April 2019 his party equipped more than a thousand poll watchers in Arab localities with hidden cameras. In the spring of 2021, the same Netanyahu sought Mansour Abbas's support and lost it only because of Bezalel Smotrich's veto. Today, Abbas is listed among supporters of terrorism. What changed was not Ra'am's platform but the direction of its votes.

On November 7, in a video address on the eve of the mandate ceremony, the prime minister put it bluntly: "With such a government, Israel simply will not survive." The effect of this campaign has gone beyond backroom calculations. Eisenkot's campaign staff now say in earnest that after such an assault on trust in the process, a repeat election might be impossible to hold fairly. Demonstrators gathered outside the Yashar leader's home in Herzliya to protest a Jewish-Arab government, and on the night of November 9 in Lod, after a far-right "sovereignty march" through an Arab neighborhood, police detained 11 people.

Six Votes Decide Everything, and No One Can Admit It

Summing up his consultations, Herzog spoke of "mutual vetoes between the blocs and within the blocs themselves," and it would be hard to describe the situation more precisely. Eisenkot set four conditions for partners: recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, loyalty to the values of the Declaration of Independence, mandatory service for all, and recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be destroyed. The candidate himself promised to look for "creative and unconventional" solutions and warned his allies that some promises would have to be abandoned.

The first condition runs into the 2018 Basic Law on Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which reserved the right to self-determination exclusively for Jews and gave Arabic a "special status." Even the Druze, many of whom serve in the army, protested against it. An Arab lawmaker is being asked to sign on to the very formula that drove his voters into the streets. At a meeting of the bloc's leaders on November 3, Yair Golan asked whether the decision not to cooperate with the Arab parties was final. According to the Israeli press, Liberman answered yes, and Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett nodded. That same day, Golan met with Jabareen and Ahmad Tibi.

To swear in a government, the law requires only that votes in favor outnumber votes against: the Bennett-Lapid cabinet passed in 2021 by a vote of 60 to 59. The "change bloc's" 48 seats face 53 seats in Netanyahu's camp, which for now still includes United Torah Judaism's seven lawmakers. Six Arab votes are enough to tip the balance, and Ra'am alone, with its eight, settles the matter. If the ultra-Orthodox abstain, the count becomes 48 to 46, and the Arabs need only refrain from voting against. The Israeli press reported that Eisenkot ordered a review of exactly this scenario, with United Torah Judaism and Ra'am abstaining. Such a cabinet can be toppled only by a constructive no-confidence vote, which requires 61 votes for a specific successor, and Netanyahu does not have them.

One man wrecks the entire structure. On November 8, Avigdor Liberman threatened to vote against and declared: "Supporting a minority government means handing Netanyahu the prime minister's chair." His seven seats move to the other side. With the ultra-Orthodox abstaining, the starting count is 41 to 53, and 13 Arab votes are needed, which is impossible without the Joint List. If the Haredim vote against as well, even all 19 Arab lawmakers produce 60 to 60, and a tie means no government.

Abbas made his move on November 8: a Ra'am source said the party would support an Eisenkot cabinet even without a coalition agreement, without budget guarantees and without legislative commitments. The logic is clear: with no signed document, Netanyahu has nothing to wave in front of the cameras. The price is equally clear. In Israeli politics, a promise without a document is worth exactly as much as a campaign pledge.

The first test is set for November 10, when the 26th Knesset is sworn in. Four parties in the bloc have demanded the immediate replacement of Speaker Amir Ohana, a Netanyahu ally, in order to gain control over the agenda and launch a state commission of inquiry into the failure of October 7, 2023. Ohana replied that he would allow an early vote if 61 signatures are gathered, and the Supreme Court's 2020 ruling in the Edelstein case requires the speaker to convene the plenum when a majority of lawmakers demand it.

Forty-eight plus thirteen. Without the ultra-Orthodox, those signatures can come only from the Arab factions, and the man collecting them is Avigdor Liberman, who swore on November 2 that he would not depend on Arabs even in the form of outside support. A fallback option discussed within the bloc envisions Liberman's party abstaining so that a simple majority in the chamber would suffice. Likud, meanwhile, is working on individual lawmakers, urging them not to take part in the effort if it relies on Arab votes. Israel will likely get a new speaker thanks to the very people no one is allowed to sit at the same table with.

Liberman Burned His Own Banner: Fear of Arabs Proved Costlier Than the Army

The most telling episode of these two weeks came on November 6. A man who had spent seven years building his career on a war against exempting the ultra-Orthodox from military service agreed to what he himself called painful compromises, just to form a government without Netanyahu and without the Arabs. Israeli television promptly reported that a back channel between Liberman's circle and the Haredim had operated for months through Jerusalem Mayor Moshe Lion and adviser Avi Abuhatzeira, including at the height of the mutual campaign-season curses.

The 2018 bill that Liberman now points to was written before October 7, contains no personal sanctions for draft dodgers and sets more modest conscription targets. The Supreme Court dismantled the system of blanket exemptions back in 2024. The Bank of Israel calculated that full conscription of young Haredim would ease the burden on reservists and save the economy at least 9 billion shekels, or 0.4 percent of GDP, every year. The IMF explicitly calls the low employment of Haredi men and Arab women a macroeconomic risk.

The ultra-Orthodox scenario works arithmetically: 48 seats plus seven from United Torah Judaism plus six from Shas make exactly 61. Sources in the Council of Torah Sages hint that Shas will not go against the decision of allied rabbis; the party itself calls such reports fake, and Netanyahu is pressuring Aryeh Deri with everything he has left.

Allies suspect Liberman of a longer game: if both Eisenkot and Netanyahu fail, 61 lawmakers could nominate a third candidate, including with Haredi support. He insists he is no longer seeking the premiership. At the ceremony, Eisenkot responded without naming names, but the target was clear: whoever tries to torpedo the formation of a government "for personal rather than substantive reasons" will go down in history as the man who failed to save Israel in its hour of danger. The two politicians are scheduled to meet on November 9.

Now look at Eisenkot's conditions through an accountant's eyes. The Arab parties fail the tests on the Jewish character of the state and on Hamas. The ultra-Orthodox fail the test on mandatory service, and in a country at war, that test carries no less weight. Negotiations are being conducted with only one side. On November 6, Eisenkot reaffirmed his commitment to universal service, and Yair Golan promised the Haredim no blank checks, which deserves respect until the day of the vote. The Israeli logic is simple: according to February data, 71 percent of Jewish voters are wary of or hostile to cooperation with Arab parties, so 13 lawmakers who refuse to send their sons to the army look more acceptable than 19 who represent a fifth of the population.

Netanyahu has responded to this threat with an unexpected turn toward "national unity." On October 27 he was still promising a strong right-wing government; on November 2 he began talking about a broad national one; and on November 7 he demanded unity with the mandatory participation of Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and the Haredim. Eisenkot invited Likud and Religious Zionism into his coalition on his own terms and did not mention the prime minister's name at the ceremony.

Rabin Took Their Votes and Kept Them Out of the Cabinet: A 34-Year-Old Trick

The Israeli tradition of using Arab votes is older than the current players. In the 1950s and 1960s, MAPAI's satellite lists brought more than half of the Arab electorate into the Knesset, dutifully voted with the ruling party and never received ministerial posts. The last of them disappeared after the 1981 election.

The classic episode dates to 1992. Yitzhak Rabin received the recommendations of Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party, refused to include them in the coalition, made a deal with Shas and won a confidence vote 67 to 53. When Shas left the coalition in September 1993 and the prime minister was left with 56 seats, five Arab lawmakers became a condition for the government's survival and secured passage of the Oslo Accords. Two years later, Oslo II passed the Knesset 61 to 59, which gave the right-wing camp its slogan about the absence of a Jewish majority. That was the slogan under which the country entered November 1995, when Rabin was shot dead in a Tel Aviv square. In all those years, the Arab parties never saw a single ministerial portfolio.

October 2000 showed the other side of the coin: police killed 13 Arab citizens, and in the February 2001 election for prime minister, most Arab voters stayed away from the polls.

In March 2020, all 15 members of the united Joint List recommended Benny Gantz. He took the mandate and joined a government with Netanyahu.

It was then that Mansour Abbas drew the conclusion that became the main intellectual innovation of Arab politics in half a century. He pulled Ra'am out of the joint bloc, declared his readiness to bargain with either camp and, on June 2, 2021, signed a coalition agreement. Four seats brought Arab society more than fifteen had: a five-year development program worth 30 billion shekels and a 2.5-billion-shekel plan to fight crime. The coalition agreement also provided for the recognition of three Bedouin villages in the Negev. Even then, Ra'am did not receive a portfolio, and it never filled the deputy minister post.

Today, Abbas has twice as many lawmakers, and the second slot on his list belongs to Yoav Segalovitz, a Jew and a Zionist, a former senior police officer and deputy minister of internal security. The choice of this man reads as a direct bid for Ben-Gvir's ministry. According to available information, Abbas is prepared to join the cabinet precisely if he receives that portfolio.

The Money Runs Out on December 31: The Real Price of the Arab Seats

Behind the talk of the state's Jewish character lies a concrete accounting document. Government Resolution 550 expires on December 31, 2026. Eisenkot's final deadline, including the 14-day extension, falls on December 20. Eleven days separate those two dates, and no party is talking about them publicly.

Netanyahu's coalition methodically dismantled the program. The initial proposals by Social Equality Minister May Golan and by Ben-Gvir envisioned taking between 2.5 and 3 billion shekels out of it, according to various estimates. The government cut less, but in installments: 220.7 million shekels at one go, about half a billion in July 2026, with the money flowing to the Shin Bet for the first time. Development turned into a security operation: funds intended for employment and education went to an intelligence agency operating in the very same towns. A coalition of Arab mayors and civic organizations has been preparing proposals for the 2027–2031 five-year plan since May, knowing that without a government there is no one to sign them.

The fiscal backdrop makes matters worse. The deadline for submitting the 2027 budget has already passed. The 2026 budget amounted to about 699 billion shekels, while under interim funding, according to Israeli economists' estimates, spending will be capped at about 642 billion, or 57 billion less. The IMF expects a deficit of 6.2 percent of GDP in 2026 and public debt at 70.1 percent. Under such conditions, the weakest budget lines are the first to go under the knife.

This is what the real menu for Jabareen and Abbas looks like: fighting crime, halting home demolitions, budgets. A fourth item, the resumption of a political process with the Palestinians, is not being discussed in today's Israel by any of the contenders for the premiership. Donald Trump said on November 8 that Eisenkot and Netanyahu are very similar on policy, and that remark contains more accuracy than the change bloc's left flank would like. A change of prime minister will not end operations in the West Bank, where the army was active in Nablus on November 8, and the condition of destroying Hamas is written into Eisenkot's own platform.

Iran, the Blockade and Fear: War as the Main Argument Against the Arab Ballot

Netanyahu is selling unity through Iran. In the same November 7 video, he promised that a national unity government would "permanently eliminate the nuclear threat from Iran." The backdrop for such rhetoric is real. The IRGC has announced it is lifting its self-imposed limit on the range of ballistic missiles, and on November 7 the U.S. military disabled a vessel attempting to break the blockade of Iran. Secretary of State Marco Rubio calls Tehran's demands in the negotiations outrageous and ridiculous, while Trump considers a new offensive highly unlikely, adding that much depends on how the talks proceed. The Israeli press also reported on an operation against Iran that the prime minister had prepared with Mossad chief Roman Gofman ahead of the election, which was called off when the Americans accidentally learned of it. There is no confirmation, and I regard this as a version, not a fact.

Eisenkot describes the same threat but draws the opposite conclusion: on November 8 he called the country's situation a "complex and fateful state of emergency" and spoke of the risk of reaching a point of no return. The prime minister's formula is simpler. In his words, "a government that depends on Hamas supporters will not fight Hamas."

This argument has already been tested in practice. The cabinet that relied on Ra'am's votes launched a large-scale operation against militants in the West Bank in the spring of 2022. Amid clashes on the Temple Mount, Ra'am froze its participation in the coalition but did not bring down the government, and the operation continued. Only a politician who has run out of other arguments would dare accuse a former chief of staff, whose son Gal was killed in Gaza in December 2023, of being soft.

Washington, meanwhile, has changed the scenery. The Democrats won the midterm elections, Trump, according to the Israeli press, is pressing Netanyahu to advance the Gaza plan, and Britain, Jerusalem claims, is rallying countries behind a statement on easing restrictions on the Strip before winter. The next cabinet will have to deal with a very different Congress. Arab partners could serve it as a useful argument, but that thought has not been voiced even once in the Israeli campaign.

"Leave Me Some Room": The One Word Abbas Cannot Say

On November 5, during televised consultations, Herzog asked Abbas directly whether he considers Hamas a terrorist organization. The Ra'am leader demanded that the group be disarmed and removed from power, condemned terrorism, called on all armed groups to lay down their weapons, and did not say the word. His request to the president went like this: "Leave me a little room to protect myself and my family."

Eisenkot's demand does not look arbitrary. The country lived through October 7, and a government partner who cannot call the organizer of the massacre by its name raises legitimate questions. At the same time, Abbas condemned the attack and demanded the release of the hostages, and the attorney general and the state attorney opposed disqualifying Ra'am from the election. The meaning of his words becomes clearer against the statistics cited above: this is a politician living in a community where 184 people had been killed by the end of August and where weapons are available to anyone.

The Joint List is locked in even more tightly. Youssef Jabareen, who replaced Ayman Odeh in May, announced that as long as the occupation of the West Bank continues, "we cannot be part of the government," and he will agree only to outside support. Balad demands that Israel become a state of all its citizens and is formally unable to accept Eisenkot's first condition. Party chairman Sami Abou Shahadeh withdrew his candidacy after the judges signaled that they were leaning toward disqualifying him over an article dated October 8, 2023.

The leadership of the Arab parties, however, lags behind its own street. According to a May poll, 77.2 percent of Arab respondents support an Arab party joining the coalition, including 95.4 percent of Ra'am supporters and 67.6 percent of Balad supporters. Balad's voters turned out to be more moderate than Balad itself. A similar gap is visible on the question of service: according to a Tel Aviv University study, 75 percent of Arab citizens support voluntary civilian service, and Eisenkot's formula of military, national or civilian service leaves an opening for dialogue here. Only 39.7 percent of respondents believe their Jewish fellow citizens are ready for partnership.

In Skopje, Albanians Sit in the Government; in Jerusalem, Arabs Wait Outside the Door

Defenders of the Israeli model like to point out that Freedom House finds no democracies among the Arab countries proper. The claim is accurate and useless. A citizen of Sakhnin compares his rights with those of his neighbor in a Jewish town, not with the situation of someone living in Cairo.

The Balkans offer a far less comfortable comparison. In North Macedonia, whose parliament also has 120 seats, Albanian coalitions won 32 seats in the 2024 election, and VLEN sits in the government, even though the country went through an armed conflict in 2001. In October 2026, Bosniak Armin Hodžić became deputy speaker of the Croatian parliament. Montenegro and Serbia seat Bosniak parties in their parliaments without any drama.

A concession is necessary: none of these minorities is bound by kinship to an adversary waging war against the state on several fronts. Bulgarian history, however, reminds Eisenkot of something else. In 1991, the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms backed Filip Dimitrov's government from the outside, and in the fall of 1992 it brought that same government down. A minority's outside support always works like a leash, and whoever supplies the votes holds it. Liberman understands this, which is why he insists on a majority without the Arabs.

A 42-Day Calendar: Four Bets That Are Easy to Check

My bets are specific, and they can be checked against the calendar.

Eisenkot will not present a government by December 6 and will ask Herzog for an extension. No member of Ra'am or the Joint List will receive a ministerial portfolio by December 31. Likud's appeal will not change the allocation of a single seat. A new five-year program for Arab society will not be approved by March 31, 2027.

If a government is sworn in by December 20, it will rest on the ultra-Orthodox. Arab votes will still be in demand for procedural victories such as replacing the speaker and establishing the October 7 commission, where they are useful and do not require appearing in the group photo. If Eisenkot fails, a 28-day window will open for Netanyahu, running until about January 17, followed by 21 days to find a third candidate with 61 signatures, until about February 7, after which the country heads to new elections in the spring.

One question remains that none of the players has yet answered: what will Arab voters, who turned out at 77 percent in 2026, do if they are used once again and once again left outside the door? The answer lies in 2001.

Israeli politics has discovered that an Arab citizen can bring down a prime minister, and it has not yet decided whether he can appoint a minister. Eisenkot said on November 8 that "we will all have to compromise." The phrase is addressed to all the players, but the bill has already been presented to only one of them.

On November 10, 120 lawmakers will take the same oath of allegiance to the State of Israel, and it contains no words about the state's Jewish character. Nineteen of them will take it on behalf of the voters of Sakhnin, Rahat and Kuseife. In 51 days, the 30-billion-shekel program will expire, and those towns will learn what their ballots were worth.