Russian and Chinese military support for Iran is gradually changing. Moscow and Beijing have moved beyond fulfilling previously signed contracts to supplying systems, components, technologies, and intelligence capabilities that can directly affect the resilience of Iranian air defenses, the accuracy of strikes, and the duration of the conflict. Yet neither Russia nor China is prepared, at least for now, to turn its support for Tehran into a direct military confrontation with the United States.
The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, has revealed two opposing trends.
The first is obvious: the United States retains overwhelming superiority over Iran in airpower, space-based intelligence, long-range strike capabilities, missile defense, operational command and control, and financial resources.
The second is less obvious but strategically more important in assessing how long the conflict can continue: U.S. military superiority has so far failed to eliminate Iran’s ability to keep fighting.
By August 2026, the U.S. campaign had been underway for nearly six months. According to Financial Times estimates, direct U.S. operational expenditures had reached approximately $37.5 billion, while the cost of subsequently replenishing depleted weapons stockpiles was estimated at another roughly $67 billion. U.S. forces had carried out more than 13,000 strikes. Eighteen U.S. service members had been killed and more than 600 wounded.
These figures are particularly revealing when compared with Iran’s own military budget.
According to SIPRI, Iran’s military spending in 2025 amounted to about $7.4 billion. By comparison, the United States spent $954 billion, China $336 billion, and Russia $190 billion. Global military spending reached $2.887 trillion.
In other words, the cost of just several months of U.S. operations has already exceeded Iran’s annual military expenditure many times over.
Russian and Chinese support for Tehran must be viewed precisely through the prism of this resource asymmetry.
Moscow and Beijing cannot eliminate U.S. military superiority and, judging by their actions, are not trying to do so. Their assistance is primarily intended to preserve four critical Iranian capabilities: air defense in selected sectors, the production and deployment of drones, reliable targeting, and the ability to threaten maritime lines of communication.
Antonio Giustozzi’s source material identifies an important shift. During the first months of the war, Russia and China were primarily fulfilling existing contracts. By the summer, however, their assistance had become more technologically sensitive. According to the author’s sources, Moscow began supplying upgraded components for drones and missiles, China expanded intelligence cooperation, and Tehran sharply accelerated its procurement of air defense systems.
Iran’s Fundamental Problem: Domestic Production Can No Longer Offset the Technology Gap
Before the war, Iran was not a major arms importer.
According to SIPRI, between 2021 and 2025 Iran accounted for only 0.2 percent of major arms imports by Middle Eastern countries and less than 0.05 percent of global imports. Over the past decade, Russia remained Iran’s only supplier of major weapons systems.
At the same time, the six Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf accounted for nearly 20 percent of all global arms imports between 2021 and 2025. Overall, 94 percent of the weapons imported by Middle Eastern countries came from the United States and European states. The United States alone accounted for 54 percent of regional deliveries.
For decades, Iran compensated for its restricted access to foreign arms markets by developing its own missile and drone industries.
That model proved effective in producing ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, but performed far worse in three areas: modern combat aviation, integrated air defense, and space-based intelligence.
The 2025 war with Israel had already exposed the vulnerability of Iranian air defenses. The 2026 campaign intensified the problem.
As a result, Tehran’s procurement structure changed after the war began. Iran no longer needed merely new weapons systems. It needed equipment that could be rapidly integrated into existing structures.
This explains Tehran’s increased interest in man-portable systems, electronic protection technologies, satellite data, and individual drone components.
Russia’s Verba Contract: 500 Launchers and 2,500 Missiles
One of the best-documented projects in Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation involves the Verba man-portable air defense system.
Based on Russian documents it obtained, the Financial Times reported that Iran signed a contract with Russia in December 2025 worth approximately €495 million.
The contract calls for 500 portable Verba launchers.
It also covers 2,500 9M336 missiles.
Another 500 Mowgli-2 night sights are included.
Deliveries are scheduled in three stages between 2027 and 2029.
According to the documents, the export price of a single missile was about €170,000, while a launcher cost approximately €40,000. Negotiations were conducted between Rosoboronexport and representatives of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Reuters did not independently verify the documents.
Giustozzi’s source material provides additional information. According to his sources within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Russia agreed to accelerate implementation of the contract, and immediately before the U.S. strikes on February 28, Iran allegedly received about 50 launchers along with missiles.
There has been no independent confirmation that precisely 50 launchers were delivered before the war began. However, the Financial Times also suggested that a small number of systems may have been transferred to Iran ahead of the contractual schedule.
The military significance of such a delivery must be assessed correctly.
The Verba cannot replace the S-300, S-400, or another layered air defense system. It is a short-range, man-portable system designed primarily to engage helicopters, drones, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft.
But it is precisely the lack of complex infrastructure requirements that makes man-portable air defense systems useful to Iran.
Operating an S-400 battery requires radars, command posts, launchers, trained crews, secure communications, and integration into an overarching command-and-control network.
A man-portable air defense system can be operated by a small crew. It can be rapidly redeployed and concealed. Destroying a centralized air defense network therefore does not eliminate weapons of this kind.
The Russian contract indicates that Iran is shifting toward a more dispersed air defense model.
China’s Contract: Another 300 to 400 Systems for $60 to $70 Million
The second element involves Chinese man-portable air defense systems.
On July 29, Reuters reported, citing three informed sources, that Iran had reached an agreement to acquire between 300 and 400 Chinese QW-12 and FN-16 man-portable air defense systems.
The total value was estimated at $60 million to $70 million.
The intermediary was Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, a company registered in Hong Kong. The initial delivery route was expected to run from Urumqi through Pakistan.
China officially dismissed the report as baseless. Pakistan also rejected claims that weapons would transit its territory.
The source material adds further detail. According to sources within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, deliveries of older Chinese FN-6 systems may have begun as early as May. The author suggests that some of these systems may have come from existing stockpiles because the FN-6 is no longer among China’s most advanced systems. Deliveries of QW-12 and FN-16 systems were expected in August.
Viewed together, the Russian and Chinese projects become more significant in scale.
Russia’s announced long-term procurement program alone covers 500 launchers. The Chinese contract could add another 300 to 400.
This does not restore a fully integrated Iranian air defense network, but it could potentially create hundreds of additional mobile firing positions.
For U.S. aviation, this primarily means greater risk in low-altitude operations, helicopter missions, and the use of certain categories of drones.
S-400, HQ-9C, and HQ-16B: Why Heavy Air Defense Remains Secondary for Now
At the same time, Tehran is seeking much more sophisticated systems.
According to Giustozzi’s sources, Iran discussed the possible purchase of Russian S-400 systems, Chinese HQ-9C systems, and medium-range HQ-16B systems.
The S-400 presents major constraints.
Citing current and former Western officials, the Financial Times reported that Russia has so far refused to meet Iran’s request for the S-400.
The main problem is not merely political.
A sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missile system requires prolonged crew training and integration into a command-and-control network. If Russian specialists were to participate in operating such a system during wartime, there would be a risk that Russian military personnel would effectively become directly involved in guiding weapons against U.S. aircraft.
For Moscow, that would represent an entirely different level of escalation.
The preference for man-portable air defense systems, electronic warfare components, and drone technology is therefore logical. They provide Iran with additional capabilities while significantly reducing the probability of direct Russian-American combat.
There is still no reliable evidence that Chinese HQ-9C or HQ-16B systems have actually been delivered.
The source material explicitly states that no deliveries have been confirmed.
Su-35: Military Value Depends on Infrastructure
Another Russian-Iranian project involves the Su-35.
In January 2025, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official Ali Shadmani officially confirmed Iran’s acquisition of Russian Su-35 fighter jets, but did not specify the number of aircraft or say whether they had already been delivered.
Giustozzi’s source material provides a more specific figure: 20 aircraft ordered as early as 2023.
According to his information, Russia was prepared to deliver them in the second half of July 2026, but Iran decided to postpone accepting the aircraft because of the ongoing war.
This highlights a fundamental problem with acquiring sophisticated weapons during an intensive air campaign.
Delivering an aircraft is only the first step.
It also requires a protected airfield, maintenance personnel, spare engines and components, missiles, communications equipment, ground-support systems, trained pilots, and an operational command structure.
If the enemy maintains persistent air superiority and continuous satellite surveillance, newly delivered aircraft can become expensive targets before reaching full combat readiness.
For Tehran, keeping completed Su-35s in Russia may therefore be more rational than transferring them immediately.
According to the source study, aircraft maintenance equipment has already begun arriving in Iran.
Mi-28: A Less Significant Element of Modernization
Russia has also supplied Iran with Mi-28 attack helicopters.
As early as 2023, Tehran announced that agreements had been finalized for the purchase of Su-35 fighters, Mi-28 helicopters, and Yak-130 combat trainers. Reuters confirmed the existence of those agreements.
The Financial Times reported that Iran may have received as many as six Mi-28s by early 2026.
The source material likewise states that six aircraft were delivered in February.
Their impact in the current war, however, is limited. An attack helicopter is primarily effective in operations against ground targets and requires a sufficiently secure air environment. In a confrontation with the United States, it does not address the central weakness of Iranian air defenses.
Russian Drone Technology Matters More Than Delivering New Aircraft
The most significant Russian assistance may lie elsewhere.
Iran developed the Shahed family of drones, but Russian manufacturers substantially modified the original designs while localizing and mass-producing Iranian technology for use in the war against Ukraine.
Russian Geran drones incorporated more advanced navigation solutions, anti-jamming systems, new engines, and other technical modifications.
According to the Financial Times, after the 2026 war began, Moscow discussed supplying Iran with upgraded drones. Tehran was interested less in receiving additional airframes than in gaining access to Russian improvements to technologies that had originally been developed in Iran.
The source material provides specific details.
According to sources within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, throughout the first phase of the war Iran asked Russia to transfer technologies used in the Geran-2 and Geran-3. Moscow allegedly refused until mid-June.
The situation changed after intensive fighting resumed.
According to the author’s sources, Russia began supplying upgraded missile and drone components, including the Kometa-M satellite-navigation anti-jamming system. Integration reportedly took only several days.
Reuters independently established that U.S. intelligence agencies were investigating a possible Russian role in improving the effectiveness of Iranian strikes.
After attacks on facilities linked to the CIA, U.S. specialists examined the possibility that Russia had transferred technology and targeting data. The Kometa-M system was among the factors under consideration.
U.S. intelligence, however, has not reached a definitive conclusion.
That distinction is crucial.
Russian-Iranian cooperation in drone technology is well documented.
Direct Russian involvement in selecting specific targets has not yet been conclusively established.
Electronic Warfare Does Not Increase the Number of Missiles, but It Can Increase Their Chances of Getting Through
The source material contains another significant claim: Russia allegedly supplied Iran with electronic countermeasure systems for ballistic missiles designed to complicate the operation of U.S. and allied missile defenses.
There is no independent confirmation of the specific configuration of these systems.
From a military standpoint, however, this type of assistance could potentially be far more important than supplying individual batches of missiles.
In a ballistic missile or drone campaign, what matters is not simply the number of weapons launched, but the proportion that retain navigation, overcome electronic warfare, evade interception, and reach their designated targets.
Even a modest increase in penetration probability during mass attacks can significantly increase the burden on missile defense systems.
This is directly linked to another U.S. problem: interceptor depletion.
The United States Used 65 Percent of Some Patriot Interceptor Stockpiles in Five Months
According to Reuters, between February and July 2026 the United States used approximately 65 percent of its stockpile of certain Patriot interceptors.
By early August, fewer than 850 missiles remained in U.S. inventories.
A single PAC-3 MSE interceptor is estimated to cost approximately $4 million to $5 million.
At the same time, Lockheed Martin received a U.S. Army contract with a potential maximum value of $58.6 billion to expand production of the relevant systems.
The Pentagon is simultaneously demanding that defense companies accelerate production of other types of munitions. The Associated Press reported that THAAD inventories had also declined by approximately 38 percent since the conflict began.
Russian assistance to Iranian drones and missiles therefore cannot be assessed solely by counting the number of U.S. facilities successfully struck.
It affects the economics of missile defense.
Iran uses relatively inexpensive missiles and drones against defensive systems in which each interception can cost millions of dollars.
Even a successfully repelled attack consumes a finite resource.
For the United States, this problem simultaneously affects the Middle East, Ukraine, and the need to preserve substantial inventories for a potential crisis in the Indo-Pacific.
Chinese Support Focuses on Intelligence and Targeting
If Russia’s specialization within this system lies primarily in electronic warfare, navigation, and drone modernization, Chinese assistance, according to the source study, is concentrated on intelligence.
The author reports an agreement between Beijing and Tehran to expand Iranian access to China’s BeiDou navigation system and to share satellite intelligence.
Sources within Iran’s military leadership claimed that China had provided information on the locations of U.S. facilities in the Persian Gulf.
The most controversial claim in the material concerns the temporary transfer of a Chinese military satellite to Iran.
According to the author’s sources, this enabled Iran to monitor developments across the region in near real time and shorten the interval between target detection and a strike.
There has been no independent confirmation that a Chinese military satellite was specifically transferred to Iran.
Another important fact, however, has already been established.
Based on leaked Iranian documents, the Financial Times reported that as early as late 2024 the aerospace forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps obtained the TEE-01B Chinese satellite operated by Earth Eye.
According to the investigation, Iran used it to monitor U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Iraq. In March 2026, the satellite photographed Prince Sultan Air Base before and after Iranian strikes.
Iran also gained access to ground infrastructure operated by the Chinese company Emposat, allowing it to control the satellite. Reuters did not independently verify the Financial Times documents. China rejected the report.
The fundamental significance lies in shortening Iran’s intelligence-to-strike cycle.
Accurate ballistic missile employment requires more than knowing the coordinates of a fixed military base. Current information is needed on the location of aircraft, ships, military units, and air defense systems.
Access to satellite intelligence substantially improves targeting quality even without the transfer of additional missiles.
CM-302 Poses a Separate Threat to the U.S. Fleet
Before the war began, Iran also intensified negotiations with China over the acquisition of CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles.
On February 24, Reuters reported, citing six sources, that the deal was in its final stages.
The CM-302 has a stated range of approximately 290 kilometers. The missile is designed to fly at high speed and low altitude in order to complicate shipborne interception.
The source material claims that the first batch of CM-302 missiles was delivered to Iran in mid-April, before the U.S. blockade was extended to ports on the Indian Ocean.
There is no independent confirmation that the April delivery actually took place.
But the logic behind the purchase itself is clear.
Man-portable air defense systems increase the risks of air operations over Iran.
The CM-302 is intended for a different theater: the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
If such systems are deployed with mobile coastal units, the U.S. Navy will have to account for an additional layer of anti-ship defenses while enforcing the blockade.
On August 13, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said the U.S. Navy could sustain the blockade of Iranian ports indefinitely through ship rotations.
But an indefinite blockade also requires the permanent presence of a substantial number of ships, aircraft, intelligence assets, and missile defense systems.
Hormuz Has Turned China from an Observer into an Economically Invested Party
China’s motives cannot be explained solely by geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
China is the world’s largest oil importer and is extremely sensitive to disruptions in supplies from the Persian Gulf.
In 2025, China purchased an average of about 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil per day and received more than 80 percent of Iran’s seaborne oil exports.
At the same time, approximately half of all Chinese oil imports came from the Middle East.
The war changed the situation dramatically.
In March 2026, China was still importing 11.77 million barrels of oil per day because a significant share of those cargoes had been loaded before the conflict began.
By June, imports had fallen to 7.12 million barrels per day, the lowest level in nearly a decade. Imports of Iranian oil dropped by more than 40 percent in a single month and fell below 800,000 barrels per day.
Average Chinese oil imports in June and July stood at 7.78 million barrels per day, compared with a prewar level of about 11.99 million.
China therefore has a simultaneous interest in preserving the Iranian state and ending the war.
A complete military defeat of Iran would strengthen the position of the United States.
A prolonged disruption of the Strait of Hormuz harms the Chinese economy.
For Beijing, the optimal outcome is therefore neither an Iranian military victory nor the continuation of the war, but the preservation of a sufficiently strong Tehran followed by a political settlement.
The Scale of Disruption Through Hormuz Shows the Cost of the Conflict for Beijing
Before the war, approximately 130 to 140 vessels passed through Hormuz each day.
On August 11, Reuters recorded only six vessels over a 24-hour period.
According to the International Energy Agency, the conflict prompted a 4.3-million-barrel-per-day reduction in its forecast for global oil production in 2026.
Expected production stood at approximately 102.02 million barrels per day, with a projected shortfall relative to demand of about 1.27 million barrels per day.
Production in the Persian Gulf states remained approximately 8.3 million barrels per day below prewar levels.
By August 14, Brent crude was trading at approximately $87.97 per barrel, while West Texas Intermediate stood at about $82.16.
Chinese policy therefore faces a clear economic constraint: an endless war is not in Beijing’s interest.
Russia Views Iran Through the Lens of the War in Ukraine
Russia’s motives are different.
In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
The document provides for defense cooperation, joint exercises, consultations on military threats, and the development of military-technical cooperation.
However, the treaty does not contain an obligation to automatically enter a war on behalf of the other party.
For Moscow, this is critical.
Russia can supply weapons, intelligence, technology, and equipment without assuming a legal obligation to defend Iran with military force.
At the same time, Russian-Iranian relations have developed a two-way military-industrial dimension since 2022.
Iran supplied Russia with unmanned systems, and Russian industry later localized and substantially upgraded Iranian designs.
In February 2024, Reuters also reported that Iran had transferred approximately 400 ballistic missiles of various Fateh-110 family modifications to Russia.
Current Russian assistance to Iran is therefore partly a reverse flow of technology within an already established system of military-industrial exchange.
Moscow Tried to Link Iran and Ukraine in a Single Negotiating Package
Intelligence cooperation is particularly revealing.
In March 2026, reports emerged that Moscow had offered to stop providing Iran with intelligence on U.S. military facilities in exchange for Washington ending its provision of intelligence to Ukraine.
According to media reports, the proposal was discussed by Russian representative Kirill Dmitriev with Trump administration officials Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The Russian side denied the reports.
On March 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told Reuters that Ukrainian intelligence possessed information indicating that Russia was continuing to provide intelligence support to Iran.
Giustozzi’s source material also treats this factor as one of Moscow’s principal possible motives: support for Iran can be used to raise the negotiating cost of continued U.S. support for Ukraine.
This allows for a more precise assessment of Russia’s strategy.
For Moscow, Iran is not a separate theater completely detached from Ukraine, but an additional instrument for exerting pressure on the allocation of U.S. military resources.
The Limits of Russian and Chinese Assistance Are Defined by the Risk of Direct Confrontation with the United States
Both Russia and China have gradually expanded their support for Tehran.
But the structure of that assistance reveals clear limits.
Moscow is prepared to provide man-portable air defense systems, drone technology, electronic warfare components, and intelligence.
It is considerably more cautious about the S-400 and other systems whose operation could require Russian specialists to be physically present in the combat zone.
China permits the expansion of satellite and navigation cooperation and, according to source reports, the sale of man-portable air defense systems and anti-ship missiles.
But Beijing has not deployed its own armed forces in Iran and officially denies the most sensitive reports about weapons deliveries.
This means that a full-fledged Russian-Chinese-Iranian military alliance is not currently taking shape.
A more accurate description would be a coordinated military-technical partnership with differing levels of involvement.
What Russia and China Have Actually Changed
By August 2026, four areas could be identified in which Russian and Chinese assistance potentially has a measurable impact.
The first is dispersed air defense.
Russian Verba systems and Chinese FN-6, FN-16, and QW-12 systems cannot seal Iran’s airspace, but they increase the number of mobile threats to low-flying targets.
The second is the resilience of drones against electronic suppression.
The transfer of Russian technologies such as Kometa-M could increase the probability that drones retain navigation under intensive electronic warfare conditions.
The third is intelligence and targeting.
Chinese satellite resources, BeiDou, and possible access to additional intelligence shorten the interval between target detection and weapons employment.
The fourth is the anti-ship component.
Possible deliveries of CM-302 missiles increase the risks facing U.S. warships enforcing the blockade and conducting operations in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
None of these capabilities, taken separately, changes the overall balance of power.
Taken together, however, they increase Iran’s ability to preserve part of its military potential even after the systematic destruction of major fixed facilities.
The Main Result Is a Change in the Cost of Continuing the War
The principal analytical error in assessing Russian and Chinese assistance is to ask whether Moscow and Beijing can secure an Iranian military victory.
The available evidence does not support that conclusion.
The United States retains its advantage in aviation, long-range strikes, intelligence, and operational command and control.
But achieving a strategic result requires more than destroying targets. It also requires accomplishing the political objectives of the war.
By August, the United States had already spent tens of billions of dollars, consumed a substantial share of its stocks of advanced interceptors, suffered hundreds of casualties, and continued to maintain a naval blockade.
At the same time, Iran has preserved missile and drone capabilities, continues to receive selected types of weapons and technologies, and retains the ability to affect shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Russia and China are not eliminating the military asymmetry between the United States and Iran.
They are altering a different equation: the relationship between the cost of U.S. pressure and Iran’s ability to continue resisting.
For China, the ultimate objective is most likely to prevent Iran’s defeat and subsequently stabilize energy routes.
For Russia, continued limited support simultaneously strengthens relations with Tehran and creates an additional instrument of pressure on Washington over Ukraine.
For Iran, Russian and Chinese supplies provide time to transition from centralized and vulnerable systems toward a more distributed architecture of defense and strike capabilities.
The further development of the conflict will therefore depend less on the appearance of any single new Russian or Chinese weapons system than on three indicators: the pace at which Iran restores its missile and drone capabilities, the rate at which U.S. interceptor inventories are depleted and replenished, and the willingness of Moscow and Beijing to expand intelligence and technological support without crossing the threshold into direct participation in the war.
For now, the actual conduct of both powers points to precisely this model: Iran is being given enough resources to increase its resilience, but not a military umbrella that would automatically transform a U.S.-Iranian conflict into a direct war between the United States and Russia or China.