The signed agreement opens a market worth tens of billions of dollars to American companies, brings Riyadh closer to its own nuclear fuel cycle, and confronts Israel with a threat that cannot be eliminated even through diplomatic recognition.
The United States is waging a war against Iranian nuclear infrastructure, framing it as a necessity to prevent the emergence of another nuclear power in the Middle East. At the same time, Washington is signing an agreement that could bring Saudi Arabia closer to uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies.
The main intrigue of new American policy lies in this contradiction.
US President Trump's administration is attempting to prove that the Saudi nuclear program will be peaceful, controlled, and safe. However, the issue of nuclear nonproliferation has never been limited to the intentions of current leadership. It is built around capabilities, infrastructure, and technologies that could one day fall under the control of entirely different people.
Saudi Arabia is not an adversary of Israel today. Furthermore, Riyadh and Jerusalem share a common interest in containing Iran. But a nuclear power plant is built for 60 to 80 years, an agreement is concluded for decades, and political alliances in the Middle East sometimes collapse in a matter of months.
Therefore, Israel looks beyond Mohammed bin Salman. It looks at the Saudi Arabia of the 2040s and 2050s—a country that could possess an industrial nuclear infrastructure, trained specialists, uranium reserves, and the right to make independent decisions regarding fuel cycle development.
This is precisely why an agreement presented as a major energy deal has the potential to alter the entire strategic architecture of the region.
The Agreement Is Signed. But the Real Battle Is Just Beginning
On July 22, 2026, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed an agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Alongside it, a separate document on bilateral guarantees and control measures was executed.
The US Department of Energy characterized the deal as a Section 123 agreement under the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Washington officially speaks of a multi-billion-dollar, multi-year partnership, access for American companies to the Saudi nuclear program, job creation, and the strengthening of US supply chains. Riyadh emphasizes energy diversification, technology transfer, and compliance with international safety and nonproliferation standards.
This is not a memorandum of intent nor a political declaration. A legal foundation has been signed without which American companies could not supply Saudi Arabia with large reactors, nuclear fuel, critical components, or certain categories of technology.
However, the agreement has not yet entered into force.
The administration must transmit it to Congress along with an assessment of nuclear proliferation risks, views of relevant agencies, and a presidential determination that the cooperation does not pose an unacceptable threat to US national defense and security. A 90-day period of continuous congressional session for review then begins.
If the agreement does not contain exceptions to the mandatory requirements of Section 123, it can enter into force after this period concludes, provided Congress does not pass a joint resolution of disapproval. In the event of a presidential veto, opponents of the deal would require a supermajority to override it.
Consequently, the phrasing that Congress must approve the agreement is not entirely accurate. Under standard procedure, lawmakers do not need to pass it by a majority vote; rather, they must actively move to block it. This significantly strengthens the position of the White House, particularly with Republicans controlling both chambers.
Yet the political price of such a vote will be high. Lawmakers will have to decide what is more dangerous: granting Riyadh access to sensitive technologies under American supervision, or pushing Saudi Arabia toward China, Russia, and other suppliers capable of offering less stringent conditions.
This is the exact choice the Trump administration intends to force upon Congress.
The Main Text Is Concealed, and the White House Is Already Contradicting Itself
The most troubling aspect of the agreement is the absence of a published text.
Official statements from the US and Saudi Arabia contain general language regarding the peaceful nature of the program, high safety standards, and the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime. They do not clarify whether Riyadh has the right to enrich uranium, reprocess spent fuel, construct relevant facilities, or pursue such rights in the future.
According to reports from Reuters, the Associated Press, and the American press, the agreement is designed for roughly 30 years, opens the path to constructing US-designed reactors, and provides for a two-year feasibility study on establishing uranium enrichment capacity in Saudi Arabia. Some reports assert that the deal also omits any obligation for Riyadh to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The day after the signing, US President Trump stated the exact opposite: there will be no enrichment, cooperation pertains exclusively to peaceful and non-enriched nuclear facilities, and the entry into force of the agreement depends entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and recognizing Israel.
The White House reinforced this stance. Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that without the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the deal will not happen. Riyadh has not publicly confirmed that it accepted such a condition.
Three possible explanations emerge.
First: the leaks are inaccurate, and the signed text genuinely prohibits all enrichment.
Second: the agreement does not permit enrichment immediately, but establishes a mechanism under which, following a two-year study, the parties could conclude a supplemental agreement or introduce amendments. In that case, Trump's words describe the initial stage without excluding a future Saudi fuel cycle.
Third: faced with a sharp reaction from Israel and American nonproliferation hardliners, the president attempted to politically redefine a document that had already been signed.
The final scenario cannot be ruled out. In the initial statement by the US Department of Energy, the condition regarding recognition of Israel was not mentioned. The Saudi state news agency similarly made no report that implementation of the deal depended on joining the Abraham Accords. The issue entered the public sphere only after critical publications and warnings of a regional nuclear arms race.
This results in a highly unusual legal structure: two ministers sign an intergovernmental agreement, after which the president of one party announces an additional political condition absent from the official announcement of the signing.
Until the full text is published, it is impossible to determine whether normalization with Israel is a legal obligation, a condition for presidential submission of the document to Congress, or a leverage tool that Trump might later relax.
It is precisely this discrepancy between the treaty, the leaks, and presidential statements that is currently more dangerous than any public assurances.
Section 123: Robust Control, but Not a Bar to the Nuclear Threshold
A Section 123 agreement does not hand Saudi Arabia a nuclear bomb, nor does it authorize a military program. It establishes a legal framework for civilian cooperation.
The US Atomic Energy Act requires such agreements to adhere to nine nonproliferation criteria. Transferred materials and equipment must remain under safeguards, cannot be used for a nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose, and cannot be transferred to third parties without US consent. Washington retains rights of oversight over the use of American technology and, under specific circumstances, can demand the return of materials and equipment.
However, Section 123 itself does not legally obligate a partner to permanently renounce uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
Such a renunciation belongs to a stricter policy benchmark known as the gold standard. Its model became the 2009 US-Emirati agreement. The United Arab Emirates voluntarily foreswore national enrichment and reprocessing. The US retained the right to terminate cooperation if Abu Dhabi created sensitive nuclear infrastructure. The Emirates also signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, which entered into force in December 2010.
Saudi Arabia has not agreed to such restrictions.
Riyadh is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and maintains a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In 2024, the kingdom rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol and transitioned to a full safeguards regime for declared facilities. This was a necessary step prior to developing large-scale nuclear power.
However, a full safeguards regime is insufficient for detecting all undeclared activities.
The Additional Protocol expands the scope of information a state must provide to the IAEA and grants inspectors broader access rights to facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Having both comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol concurrently allows the agency to draw a more credible conclusion not only regarding the non-diversion of declared material, but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Saudi Arabia has not implemented the Additional Protocol.
US legislation accounts for this issue. According to an updated study by the Congressional Research Service, the absence of the Additional Protocol complicates the submission of a proliferation assessment to Congress, though the administration can bypass the limitation via a special national security report. In other words, it is a political and procedural barrier, not an insurmountable legal prohibition.
Therefore, the dispute is not about whether the Saudi program will be subject to oversight. Oversight will exist.
The question is whether it will be deep enough for a country whose leadership has openly tied its own nuclear decisions to the behavior of Iran.
Riyadh Needs More Than Just Megawatts
Saudi Arabia possesses compelling economic justifications for developing nuclear energy.
In 2023, the country generated approximately 453 terawatt-hours of electricity. Roughly 62 percent was derived from natural gas, 38 percent from oil and petroleum products, and less than one percent from renewable sources. Consumption continued to rise, and in June 2024, domestic usage of crude oil and fuel oil for generation reached approximately 1.419 million barrels per day.
For the world's largest oil exporter, burning such quantities of hydrocarbons domestically represents lost export revenue. Nuclear power plants can supply baseline power, freeing gas and oil for export, petrochemicals, and industry.
Added to this are the growing demands of megaprojects, metallurgy, mining, water desalination, digital infrastructure, and future data centers. The Saudi development model requires vast amounts of stable electricity that cannot be guaranteed solely through solar plants without large-scale energy storage and backup capacities.
Yet energy explains only part of Saudi persistence.
If Riyadh required only electricity, it could have agreed to the Emirati model: import finished fuel, operate reactors, and forgo enrichment. This is precisely how the four power units of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE operate, with a total net capacity of around 5.35 gigawatts.
Saudi Arabia wants more—full industrial sovereignty.
As early as 2019, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman spoke of the intent to develop the entire nuclear cycle, including uranium mining and enrichment. In 2023, he reiterated plans to utilize domestic uranium resources to produce low-enriched fuel.
This position exists on three levels.
The first is economic. Domestic extraction, processing, and enrichment allow for the creation of new industries, jobs, and technological competencies.
The second is political. The kingdom refuses to accept harsher restrictions than other parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Riyadh believes it should not permanently forfeit rights held by Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, and several other non-nuclear states.
The third is strategic. A national fuel cycle creates what is known as threshold capability: the state does not possess nuclear weapons, but maintains the personnel, equipment, and materials to drastically shorten the timeline required to build them following a political decision.
In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated that Saudi Arabia does not seek a nuclear bomb, but would acquire one as quickly as possible if Iran developed nuclear weapons. This formula is not proof of an active military program. But it demonstrates that Saudi leadership views the nuclear choice as more than just an energy issue.
Why Washington Agreed to What It Rejected for Years
American logic is grounded in the principle of controlled engagement.
Saudi Arabia intends to develop nuclear energy regardless of Washington's decision. If the US refuses, Riyadh can turn to China, Russia, South Korea, or France. An American absence will not stop the program, but it will deprive Washington of a commercial presence, access to information, and political leverage.
From this perspective, the Section 123 agreement is not a gift to Saudi Arabia, but an attempt to anchor its nuclear infrastructure to American technologies, fuel, licenses, and standards.
The US Department of Energy explicitly lists among the agreement's goals the expansion of US nuclear exports, industry support, the creation of high-paying jobs, and the restoration of competitive US standing in the global reactor technology market.
According to Reuters, this could involve Westinghouse AP1000 reactors and projects valued in the tens of billions of dollars. Westinghouse is owned by Canada's Cameco and investment firm Brookfield, but remains the primary owner of American technology for large pressurized water reactors.
For Washington, this is part of a broader struggle.
Russia uses the construction of nuclear power plants as an instrument of long-term influence: a reactor binds the customer to the supplier for decades through fuel, maintenance, workforce training, and waste management. China seeks to replicate this model in the Middle East, offering financing, infrastructure, and fewer political conditions.
If American companies secure the Saudi market, the US gains a presence within one of the kingdom's most sensitive technological sectors. If competitors claim it, Washington will be left watching the program's development from the outside.
Here lies the strongest argument for proponents of the deal.
Yet it also reveals its core weakness: the threat of Saudi Arabia departing toward China or Russia becomes a tool of leverage against the nonproliferation regime. The more persistently a potential customer demands enrichment rights, the more the American administration fears losing the contract.
Commercial competition begins to dictate the boundaries of acceptable nuclear risk.
Israel Fears Not a Saudi Bomb Today, but Irreversible Technology Tomorrow
Israeli anxiety stems not from an assumption that Saudi Arabia will immediately begin producing nuclear weapons. Such a scenario is improbable.
Reactors are not bombs. Low-enriched uranium is not weapon-grade material. Creating a warhead requires further enrichment, warhead physics design, miniaturization, component testing, and delivery system adaptation.
However, the most complex political line is crossed earlier—the moment a state acquires national enrichment infrastructure.
The very same centrifuges can produce fuel for a power plant or material of significantly higher enrichment. The difference lies in cascade configuration, operational duration, and political decision-making.
Once a sufficient stock of low-enriched uranium is accumulated, the technical pathway to weapon-grade material is shortened. This is precisely why Israel has for decades opposed the emergence of enrichment facilities in regional states, regardless of their current relations with Jerusalem.
Israeli strategy is built upon preserving a qualitative military edge and preventing the emergence of hostile nuclear infrastructure in the region. Israel does not officially confirm or deny possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely considered the sole nuclear power in the Middle East.
This ambiguity maintains deterrence without forcing Arab states to formally respond to a declared Israeli nuclear status.
Saudi enrichment threatens to dismantle this construct.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett termed the agreement a major strategic failure and warned of a loss of control over regional nuclear dynamics. Former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman stated that a civilian program could culminate in weaponization. Former Defense Minister Benny Gantz emphasized that Saudi nuclear capabilities without the establishment of a stable regional alliance do not serve Israel's security interests.
Benjamin Netanyahu's government adopted a more cautious line. It welcomed Trump's demand for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords, framing normalization as a historic step toward peace.
Yet diplomatic recognition does not resolve the technological issue.
The Abraham Accords can establish embassies, open airspace, expand trade, and institutionalize cooperation. They cannot guarantee that relations will remain unchanged 20 or 40 years from now.
The history of Iran itself serves as a warning to Israel. Under the Shah, Iran was a strategic partner of the West and maintained covert ties with Israel. Its civilian nuclear program developed with American backing. Following the 1979 revolution, the infrastructure built by an allied regime passed to a state that declared Israel an adversary.
No normalization treaty can eliminate a dynastic crisis, an internal coup, a shift in ideology, or the emergence of a new Saudi leadership.
A reactor can be placed under safeguards. Future political history cannot.
Trump Demands Israel's Recognition, Which Riyadh Cannot Currently Offer
Tying the nuclear agreement to the Abraham Accords appears to be a logical diplomatic exchange: Saudi Arabia gains access to American technology, Israel receives historic recognition from the preeminent Arab power, and the United States achieves a major strategic victory.
This was precisely the grand bargain the Joe Biden administration attempted to assemble. It was designed to encompass the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations, American security guarantees, defense cooperation, and support for the kingdom's civilian nuclear program.
However, following the war in Gaza, the political price of recognizing Israel rose sharply for Riyadh.
The Saudi position remains firm: normalization is possible only alongside a credible, irreversible pathway toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The Netanyahu government rejects such a prospect.
Trump has effectively linked two processes moving in opposite directions.
The more forcefully Israel opposes Palestinian statehood, the harder it becomes for Saudi Arabia to recognize Israel. The longer Riyadh holds back from normalization, the weaker the political rationale for the nuclear deal becomes in Washington and Jerusalem.
As a result, the nuclear arrangement turns into a mechanism of leverage directed at both sides simultaneously.
Trump can demand diplomatic recognition of Israel from Mohammed bin Salman. At the same time, the very prospect of a Saudi atomic project allows Washington to pressure Netanyahu: without minimal concessions on the Palestinian question, historic normalization will remain out of reach.
Yet this leverage carries significant danger. If Riyadh concludes that the United States is incapable of delivering on its promises, it may intensify negotiations with alternative suppliers. In that scenario, Washington would lose the political bargain, the commercial contract, and the ability to shape the oversight regime.
The Domino Effect: Turkey, Egypt, and Iran Will Demand Equal Rights
The primary risk of the Saudi agreement extends far beyond bilateral relations between Riyadh and Israel.
If a leading Arab power acquires the right to pursue enrichment, explaining to other regional states why they must permanently forgo the same capabilities becomes exceedingly difficult.
The United Arab Emirates could demand a revision of its 2009 agreement. Abu Dhabi voluntarily accepted the most stringent restrictions under the expectation that the gold standard would serve as the regional model. Softer terms for Saudi Arabia would appear as a penalty for Emirati compliance.
Egypt is already constructing four power units at the El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant with a total net capacity of roughly 4.4 gigawatts. Turkey is building four power units at the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Both nations possess large economies, regional ambitions, and developed scientific-technical bases.
Ankara could argue that a US NATO ally should not hold fewer rights than Saudi Arabia. Cairo could contend that the largest Arab country cannot remain dependent on fuel imports if Riyadh is permitted a national infrastructure.
The most dangerous reaction would emanate from Tehran.
Washington has asserted for decades that Iranian enrichment represents a threat because it creates the capacity for a rapid transition to weapons-grade material. If the US agrees to similar infrastructure in Saudi Arabia without the IAEA Additional Protocol, Iran will gain a potent political argument: the issue is not the technology, but the alliance status of the state.
This does not justify a potential Iranian military program, but it severely undermines the universality of the American posture.
Tehran could present the Saudi deal as proof of a double standard: Washington's allies are permitted what adversaries are sanctioned and struck for.
Even more perilous is the strategic reaction. If Iranian leadership believes Saudi Arabia is moving toward threshold status, it gains an additional incentive to accelerate its own program. Riyadh, watching Iran, would respond by expanding its own infrastructure. Turkey and Egypt would begin hedging their risks.
Thus emerges a new type of nuclear race.
States may not manufacture warheads, remaining in formal compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, they will accumulate threshold capabilities: centrifuges, stockpiles of low-enriched uranium, technical personnel, research centers, and delivery systems.
The region would become populated by countries, each capable of altering its status relatively quickly following a crisis.
Such a system is far more volatile than stable nuclear deterrence. Decisions within it would be driven by rumors, intelligence assessments, and the fear of falling behind.
The Pakistan Factor Heightens Suspicion, but Does Not Prove a Ready Bomb
In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense agreement stipulating that an attack on one country is treated as an attack on both.
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and its military cooperation with Riyadh spans decades. This inevitably sparked speculation that Saudi security might be linked to Pakistani nuclear capabilities.
However, no public evidence exists that Islamabad has committed to transfer warheads to Saudi Arabia or station them on the kingdom's territory. The full text of the defense agreement remains unpublished, and official statements do not codify an explicit mechanism of nuclear extended deterrence.
Nonetheless, the Pakistani factor alters strategic calculations.
It demonstrates that Riyadh is actively diversifying its security guarantees rather than relying entirely on the United States. An indigenous nuclear infrastructure combined with a close alliance with Pakistan enhances the kingdom's strategic autonomy, even short of developing a national bomb.
For Israel, this is yet another reason to demand the strictest possible limitations: a future crisis could fuse Saudi financial and industrial resources with Pakistani military expertise.
Four Scenarios: From a Grand Bargain to Regional Atomic Breakdown
The first scenario is the Grand Bargain.
Saudi Arabia agrees to join the Abraham Accords after securing definitive assurances regarding the Palestinian issue. Congress does not block the agreement. Riyadh adopts the IAEA Additional Protocol, agrees not to operate an enrichment facility independently, or accepts an American black box operational model in which sensitive technology remains under direct US control.
This represents the safest outcome. Washington retains Saudi Arabia within the American technological framework, Israel gains recognition, and proliferation risks are contained through enhanced inspections.
However, realizing this scenario requires a political compromise that does not currently exist.
The second scenario is Reactors Without Recognition.
Trump relaxes the demand regarding the Abraham Accords, deeming incremental steps sufficient: opening representative offices, permitting direct flights, expanding trade ties, or participating in a regional security framework.
The agreement enters into force, but normalization remains incomplete. Israel receives not a diplomatic breakthrough, but a state with a developing nuclear infrastructure and unresolved future rights regarding enrichment.
This scenario would be the most difficult for Netanyahu to accept.
The third scenario is Congressional Safeguards.
Lawmakers do not reject the agreement outright, but impose mandatory conditions: a prohibition on enrichment and reprocessing, compulsory adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, continuous remote monitoring, American control over nuclear fuel, and automatic termination of cooperation in the event of non-compliance.
This structure would bring the treaty closer to the Emirati gold standard, but it could prove unacceptable to Riyadh. The Saudi leadership has defended its right to a complete fuel cycle for years and is unlikely to abandon it easily after signing a more advantageous document.
The fourth scenario is Atomic Rupture.
The agreement is blocked or frozen due to Saudi Arabia's refusal to recognize Israel. Riyadh turns to alternative suppliers, acquiring reactors without American political conditions. Washington loses both the market and oversight capabilities, while Israel faces a far less transparent program.
This variant illustrates the core paradox of the deal: overly lenient terms elevate proliferation risks, while excessively rigid demands push Saudi Arabia out of the American sphere.
The Real Price of the Agreement Will Not Be Understood at Reactor Startup
The Trump administration is attempting to resolve four objectives simultaneously: sell American reactors, prevent Saudi Arabia from drawing closer to China and Russia, compel Riyadh to recognize Israel, and demonstrate that Washington can control the spread of sensitive technology.
Each objective is rational in isolation. Together, they form an exceptionally unstable structure.
Commercial interests demand concessions to Saudi Arabia. Nonproliferation demands restrictions. Israel demands normalization. Riyadh demands a Palestinian state and technological sovereignty. Trump seeks to capture every benefit at once without paying the full political price on any single front.
Diplomacy in the nuclear sphere rarely functions this way.
The central question is not whether Saudi Arabia will construct a nuclear bomb. There is no evidence of such a decision.
The central question is whether the United States will establish an infrastructure that makes executing such a decision significantly easier should the choice ever be made.
Nuclear agreements must not be evaluated based on the personal rapport of current leaders or declarations of peaceful intent. They are evaluated against the worst-case scenario: what happens if the regime shifts, the alliance fractures, inspectors lose access, and the region enters a state of war.
Trump is offering Israel diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia in exchange for accepting long-term technological risk. Yet recognition can be revoked, embassies can be closed, and peace treaties can be broken.
Centrifuges, once built, do not simply disappear.
This is precisely why the Saudi accord may enter history not as the dawn of an American nuclear renaissance, nor as the expansion of the Abraham Accords, but as the moment the Middle East ceased to be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear states.
Instead, it began dividing into those that already possess the bomb, and those positioning themselves to build one rapidly enough when the time comes.