After signing the memorandum of understanding with Iran and announcing new negotiations, Washington formally paused the war. Trump, as usual, chose the language of a victorious TV show rather than diplomacy. On his social media network, he wrote, "YOU’RE WELCOME!" and listed what he considers the results of his policy: oil is flowing again, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon, stock markets are rising, jobs are at records, prices are falling, and the country is stronger, safer, and more respected than ever.
This is beautiful packaging. Inside, however, lies heavy strategic accounting.
More than 100 days of conflict. 13 dead American service members. More than 7,500 civilian deaths in the region. About 40 billion dollars in direct Pentagon expenses. A request for another 80 billion dollars in supplemental funding. A sharp rise in gasoline and diesel prices. Pressure on weapon stockpiles. Depletion of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to its lowest level since 1983. Inflation above 4 percent for the first time in three years. A frozen housing market. A drop in the president's approval rating. And a negotiation process in which Iran, having survived the blow, is now trying to dictate the price of peace itself.
Trump calls this a victory. The US economy, energy sector, Pentagon, and political system call it a bill due.
40 Billion Dollars for a War That Did Not Solve the Main Problem
A preliminary assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies indicates approximately 40 billion dollars in direct war costs for the US Department of Defense. This amount includes ammunition, destroyed equipment, and damage to American bases. However, it does not include operational expenses already budgeted into the US defense budget for the 2026 fiscal year - a budget of more than 1 trillion dollars.
This is an important detail. The official price of war is always lower than its real price. The military machine writes off part of the expenses as already planned, transfers part to future budgets, and hides part in infrastructure repairs, restocking, medical payments, logistics, compensation, troop deployments, and base maintenance.
Therefore, 40 billion is not the final bill. It is the first page of the invoice.
The Pentagon has already requested 80 billion dollars in supplemental funding. According to two sources in the US government, less than 20 billion of this amount is directly related to immediate post-war needs with Iran. Yet even this figure excludes many future expenses: facility repairs, restoration of basic US infrastructure in the region, reinforcement of military presence, replenishment of warehouses, and long-term compensation for worn-out systems.
A military victory, if it truly is a victory, should buy a strategic result. Here, the result looks different so far: Iran has not capitulated, its nuclear program has not been dismantled, stockpiles of enriched uranium remain a subject for future negotiations, and Tehran is already using the truce as a new tool of leverage.
A Thousand Tomahawks: How America Burned Expensive Missiles Faster Than It Could Count
The heaviest expense item is ammunition. According to an estimate by Mark Cancian of CSIS, about 26 billion dollars was spent on it. The war was fought with long-range, technologically complex, and extremely expensive weapons.
A single Tomahawk cruise missile system costs approximately 2.5 million dollars. The US, by Cancian's estimate, used about a thousand of these missiles. This item alone turns into a sum of roughly 2.5 billion dollars. But the Tomahawk is only part of the arsenal. The conflict also consumed other high-precision munitions, air defense systems, interceptor missiles, aircraft ammunition, logistical resources, and components whose production cannot be quickly scaled up without government pressure on the defense industry.
This is precisely why Trump invoked the Defense Production Act in June to compel companies to produce more weapons. This is no longer the rhetoric of strength. It is an acknowledgment of tension within the American military inventory.
The first 100 hours of the war cost 3.7 billion dollars. By the 12th day, the cumulative cost reached approximately 16.5 billion. Afterward, the daily price decreased because the intensity of strikes diminished and the use of the most expensive weapons became less frequent. But strategic damage had already been done: Washington demonstrated not only power, but also the rate of consumption of its expensive arsenal.
For the US, this is particularly painful against the backdrop of Russia's war against Ukraine, tensions around Taiwan, crises in the Middle East, and the need to maintain reserves for multiple theaters at once. The war with Iran did not remain just a regional conflict. It became a test of American military endurance.
The Price of War Extended Beyond the Pentagon
A military conflict rarely stays inside the defense budget. The war with Iran hit other American departments as well. According to preliminary CSIS estimates, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other agencies incurred expenses of about 1 billion dollars. Of this, about 165 million is related to rising fuel prices.
This looks like a small amount against the background of the Pentagon's 40 billion. Politically, however, it is precisely these expenses that show how war seeps into the everyday life of the state. It requires facility protection, strengthening domestic security, medical care, compensation, transfers, risk control, threat response, and support for those returning from the conflict zone.
The war that the White House wants to present as a successful foreign policy operation turns into a network of small but constant expenses at home. Each of them alone does not break the budget. Together, they create an effect of financial fatigue.
Gasoline Became a Political Weapon Against Trump Himself
Trump built a significant part of his economic and energy rhetoric on the cult of fossil fuels. America must drill more, produce more, depend less, and pay less. But the war with Iran showed the limits of this formula.
The US has remained the largest producer of oil and gas for many years. However, the price of gasoline is determined not only by American production. It depends on the global market, maritime routes, insurance risks, trader behavior, stockpiles, expectations, and the fear of key transport arteries being blocked.
Before the war, the average price of gasoline in the US was below 3 dollars per gallon. During the conflict, it rose well above 4 dollars. By the Friday after the truce, the average price was 3.97 dollars per gallon. The day before, it dropped below 4 dollars for the first time since March 30.
Formally, this gives the White House a reason to speak of stabilization. But American families have already paid an extra price. According to data from the Brown University energy tracker, US households spent over 253 dollars more than they would have paid without the war.
For a wealthy investor, this is not a catastrophe. For a family living paycheck to paycheck, it is a blow. For a president who promised lower prices, it is a political problem.
Diesel More Expensive Than Gasoline: The Blow Hit Farmers, Logistics, and Food
Every driver sees gasoline. The entire economy sees diesel.
Before the war, the average price of diesel fuel was around 3.80 dollars per gallon. By June 15, it exceeded 5 dollars, although it had already decreased from the peaks inside the conflict. According to an estimate by Brown University, the additional expenses of Americans due to the rise in diesel prices reached nearly 27.1 billion dollars.
Diesel means trucks, farm machinery, logistics, delivery, warehouses, construction, agriculture, and retail chains. When diesel becomes more expensive, almost everything that moves across the country becomes more expensive. Food, building materials, packages, fuel for the agricultural sector, and maintenance of ports and cargo terminals all receive a war premium.
A separate risk is fertilizers. The war raised their cost as well. This is no longer just a problem for today's bill at the gas station. It is a potential blow to the future agricultural cycle, production costs, and food prices.
Thus, the conflict with Iran did not just become a military operation. It became an inflationary mechanism.
The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve Has Emptied to 1983 Levels
The most alarming energy figure is not the price of gasoline or even the price of diesel. The most alarming figure is the state of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
The American emergency oil stockpile, stored in salt caverns along the Gulf of Mexico coast, is at its lowest level since 1983, when it was still being filled under the Ronald Reagan administration. The reserve was depleted by two major crises in a row: under the Biden administration due to the consequences of Russia's war against Ukraine, and under the Trump administration due to the war with Iran.
This creates a dangerous strategic situation. The reserve does not exist for beautiful statistics. It is needed in case of an energy shock, route blockades, a sharp drop in supplies, war, a natural disaster, or a systemic market failure. When the reserve is depleted, the president has less room to maneuver.
Trump himself acknowledged the scale of the risk at the G7 summit in Versailles. He said, "Want to see chaos? We will run out of reserves in about four weeks."
This phrase is more dangerous than any statement by Iranian generals. It shows that the world's largest economy turned out to be closer to an energy breaking point than it would like to admit publicly.
1.15 Billion Barrels Vanished from the Market: The World Searched for Oil Everywhere
According to Kpler data, the global market lost 1.15 billion barrels of oil supply over the course of the war. For nearly four months, oil failed to flow from the Middle East in a normal regime. The world was forced to search for crude everywhere.
Venezuela and Brazil ramped up production. The United States shipped massive volumes of aviation fuel to Europe and diesel to Australia. The Trump administration lifted sanction restrictions from hundreds of millions of barrels of Russian and Iranian oil. Thirty-two countries coordinated the largest release of emergency oil stockpiles in history.
This still proved insufficient. Oil companies began drawing crude from their own commercial inventories to fulfill obligations to clients.
Here lies the central paradox of the war with Iran. The US entered the conflict as a superpower capable of dictating terms. However, energy geography forced Washington to depend on the decisions of countries, companies, and stockpiles it does not always control. The war demonstrated that the Strait of Hormuz remains more than just a maritime route. It is a lever that can pressure the American consumer, the European importer, the Asian industrialist, and the American president simultaneously.
Cushing as a Warning: Oil Is There, but Getting It Out Becomes Harder
The oil hub in Cushing, Oklahoma, is a critical node in the American energy system. Through it, fuel is distributed across the country. According to data from the US Energy Information Administration, only 20 million barrels of oil remained in Cushing's tanks last week.
This is not simply a low level. This is a level of operational stress. When too little oil remains in a reservoir, part of the liquid at the bottom becomes technically problematic: there is sediment, heavy impurities, and unusable residues. Pressure in the system drops, pumping becomes complicated, and market flexibility diminishes.
For an ordinary person, this sounds like a technical detail. For energy professionals, it is an alarm signal: the system is still running, but it is already losing its margin of safety.
Inflation Ate the Paycheck: The War Entered the Family Budget
Annual inflation in the US exceeded 4 percent for the first time in three years. The primary driver was energy prices. This is less than the peaks of the Covid period, but twice the level that the Federal Reserve considers comfortable before cutting rates.
This is precisely why the Fed refused to lower rates, even though Trump wanted it to. Furthermore, the Fed is now led by his appointee, Kevin Warsh. Yet even a loyal chairman cannot rewrite arithmetic: if energy pushes prices up, a rate cut could amplify inflationary pressure.
There is an even more painful indicator. In April and May, prices rose faster than the average American wage over the past year. In other words, inflation ate the wage increase. This occurred for the first time since 2023.
For a president, this is a killer political formula. He can speak of victory, markets, and greatness. But the voter looks at the receipt, the gas station, the mortgage, groceries, and the credit card. There, victory looks different.
The Consumer Revived Slightly, but Confidence Is Still in a Pit
In June, the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index rose after three months of decline. The White House may use this as proof of stabilization. However, the indicator remains significantly below historical averages.
The problem runs deeper than the war with Iran. Since 2020, Americans have endured a chain of shocks: a pandemic, price surges, logistical disruptions, high inflation, expensive credit, political polarization, and geopolitical crises. Society has not had a long period of quiet recovery.
The war with Iran layered on top of an already accumulated fatigue. It did not create the entire crisis of confidence, but it intensified it. The American consumer has become more cautious, more irritated, and less inclined to believe promises of rapid relief.
The Stock Market Is Rising, but It Does Not Save the President
Trump can indeed talk about the growth of stock indices. Following an initial drop at the start of the war, markets recovered and continued to hit new records. Investors remain active. Major IPOs, including SpaceX and companies in the artificial intelligence sector, sustained the optimism.
But the stock market does not equal the country. Those who possess a 401(k) retirement account may feel better. Those who own no assets see only expensive gasoline, an expensive mortgage, expensive food, and expensive credit.
This is a classic trap of American politics. The president looks at indices and sees success. The voter looks at expenses and sees deterioration. The war with Iran widened this gap.
Bonds Collapsed, Mortgages Froze, and the American Dream Moved Further Away
Rising inflationary expectations hit the bond market. The yield on 10-year US Treasury notes climbed to a more than one-year high in May before easing slightly. However, the damage had already spread through the financial system.
The yield on 10-year notes influences consumer loans, auto loans, credit cards, and mortgages. The average rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage edged down to 6.47 percent after hitting 6.52 percent a week earlier, but the previous level was close to a one-year peak.
This keeps the housing market in a frozen state. Millions of Americans are not selling homes because they do not want to trade an old, cheap mortgage for a new, expensive one. Young families are not buying homes because the payments are unaffordable. The construction sector is losing momentum. The American Dream is postponed once again.
The market now expects that the Fed may raise rates later this year. If this happens, mortgages could become even more expensive.
Trump's Approval Rating: The War Did Not Crash the President Because He Was Already Low
The political damage from the war with Iran manifests not as a sharp collapse, but as a solidification of weakness. Trump's approval rating was low even before the war began. In February, only 38 percent of Americans approved of his job performance. By June 15, the figure stood at 37 percent, according to CNN's aggregate assessment.
This is not a catastrophic drop. But it is a symptom. Trump has a solid core of supporters, yet the majority of the country disapproves of his work.
Worse for the White House are the issue-specific ratings. According to a Fox News poll, only 31 percent of registered voters approve of his economic policy, and 35 percent approve of his actions on Iran.
This is where the war becomes politically hazardous. A foreign policy conflict can be survived if the economy provides a sense of strength. Economic difficulties can be survived if foreign policy looks convincing. Trump faces problems in both arenas simultaneously.
Peace with Iran Proved No Easier Than War
Trump's biggest problem right now is not that the war was costly. The main problem is that peace will be costly too.
Initial attempts by Vice President JD Vance to secure the memorandum in Switzerland have already entered a danger zone. The document signed in France halted hostilities, opened the Strait of Hormuz, and offered Iran economic incentives in exchange for a promise never to develop nuclear weapons. However, the most critical issues were left for 60 days of negotiations: the future of the nuclear program, the fate of enriched uranium stockpiles, the verification mechanism, the sanctions regime, the role of regional allies, and the limits of Iranian influence through proxy groups.
Philip Gordon, a former high-ranking US national security official, believes the truce has a chance to hold because it benefits both sides. Iran can once again receive millions of dollars a day from oil revenues. The US does not want to return to war.
Co-mediators Qatar and Pakistan stated that the talks proceeded in a positive and constructive atmosphere, and the parties agreed on a roadmap to reach a final deal within 60 days.
But diplomatic language often masks a harsh reality. All sides have already begun testing the boundaries of the agreement.
Iran Survived the Blow - and Is Now Bargaining Like a Surviving Victor
Iran is not acting like a defeated party. Tehran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, effectively defying the memorandum. This is not just a violation of the spirit of the agreement. It is a demonstration of a new lever of pressure.
Trump responded with a threat to take control of the strait independently. Yet it was precisely the immense cost of such an operation that deterred the US from this step during the war. Therefore, Tehran may doubt the reality of the threat. The Iranians understand another thing: Trump is in a hurry. He needs the economic and political effect of a peace deal before the midterm elections in November.
Chief Iranian negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf publicly mocked American threats, asking if the Americans fail to understand that if their threats worked, they would not find themselves in their current desperate position.
This is not the language of capitulation. It is the language of a regime that believes it withstood the blow of a superpower and gained a new bargaining price.
Lebanon Could Blow Up the Deal Faster Than Uranium
The paradox of the negotiations is that they could be derailed not only by the nuclear program. They could be derailed by Lebanon.
Iran demanded a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon following Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz was a signal: Tehran wants to force Trump to control Israel and halt attacks against its allies.
This is a pivotal moment. Iran has no intention of abandoning its regional architecture of influence. Hezbollah, the Lebanese front, proxy groups, pressure on Israel, and influence in the Persian Gulf all remain part of its strategy.
Trump and Vance sharply criticized Israel, but the US president simultaneously warned Iran that he would strike it "very hard" if it did not restrain Hezbollah. The result is a dangerous double game: Washington pressures Israel, pressures Iras, but does not fully control either of the key players.
Israel, as history shows, often continues operations right up to a ceasefire and even after it, to demonstrate that it will not outsource national security matters to external management. Israel struck Hezbollah targets in Lebanon on Friday and Saturday. At the start of the talks in Switzerland, the ceasefire regime already looked fragile.
Netanyahu found himself caught between pressure from Trump and resistance from a portion of Israeli society to the American deal. Lebanon has once again become a country through which other people's wars can destroy other people's peace.
Washington Wants to Change Iran, but Iran Has Spent Nearly 50 Years Building Itself as an Anti-American Regime
Vance addressed the Iranian people with an ambitious message: if Iran’s leadership is ready to abandon its role as a source of regional instability and its long-term nuclear ambitions, the United States is prepared to fundamentally change relations with the country.
This sounds like a strategic dream. However, history makes it almost unbelievable.
For nearly 50 years, the revolutionary power of Iran has defined itself through opposition to America. Anti-Americanism was not a foreign policy slogan, but a core component of the regime's domestic legitimacy. Enmity with the US helped justify repression, mobilize security forces, maintain ideological control, and explain economic problems as an external threat.
Economic opening could bring the regime money, but it could also weaken its control. The more trade, investment, contacts, and expectations a society has, the harder it becomes to hold the country within a closed revolutionary model.
Therefore, Washington's bet is risky. The US wants Iran to take the money and change its behavior. Yet the Iranian system might take the money, maintain its behavior, and use the breathing room to rebuild its strength.
Washington Explodes with Rare Bipartisan Skepticism
The memorandum provoked dissatisfaction in both parties simultaneously. For Washington, this is a rare situation: Democrats and Republicans may hate each other, but they doubt the exact same deal at the same time.
Among the controversial points are the temporary lifting of sanctions on Iranian energy and pharmaceutical exports for the duration of the 60-day negotiations, as well as a 300 billion dollar fund to revitalize the Iranian economy, which, according to the American version, should be financed by regional powers.
Critics believe that Trump effectively paid for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and squandered leverage before the most critical negotiations on the nuclear program.
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, a hawk and ally of the president, defended the diplomatic path but without much faith in success. His logic is simple: if there is no diplomatic path, what remains is war or another form of coercion. Therefore, in his words, diplomacy must be tried. However, he believes it will most likely fail.
Democrat Cory Booker called the agreement a catastrophic failure created by Trump himself and an actual capitulation. His argument is even harsher: Iran receives billions, America incurs losses, and US citizens pay the price with rising prices.
Against this backdrop, other lines of tension already exist within the Republican Party: the dispute over the appointment of Bill Pulte as acting director of national intelligence, and Trump's pressure on the Republican majority to alter voting rules before the midterm elections. The Iran deal became not the only, but a highly toxic element of a general political crisis.
Trump's Main Error: He Began a War from Which There Is No Beautiful Exit
The war was supposed to give Trump the image of a decisive leader. It was meant to show that the US dictates the rules once again. It was supposed to break Iran, protect Israel, calm markets, demonstrate strength, and return the political initiative to the president.
In practice, a different structure emerged.
The Pentagon spent tens of billions. Arsenals faced a heavy strain. The oil market endured a shock. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve depleted to early 1980s levels. Gasoline and diesel hit families, farmers, and logistics. Inflation rose. The Fed refused to cut rates. Mortgages remained expensive. The president's approval rating did not recover. Iran was not strategically broken. Israel did not become fully manageable. Lebanon remained a mine beneath the negotiations. The Strait of Hormuz demonstrated once again that a small stretch of water can hold the global economy by the throat.
Now Trump is trying to turn the pause into a victory. But a pause is not a victory. A memorandum is not peace. Iran’s promise is not the dismantling of its nuclear program. The opening of the strait is not the end of the energy crisis. The growth of the stock market is not an improvement in the lives of most Americans. A future reduction in inflation is not a drop in prices today.
The political tragedy for Trump is that he sold the war as strength, and now he is forced to sell the peace as a triumph. Yet both war and peace depend on players he does not fully control: Iran, Israel, Hezbollah, the oil market, the Fed, Congress, the voter, and his own party.
The war with Iran demonstrated the limit of American power not on the battlefield, but in the ledger book, at the gas pump, in the mortgage agreement, in the missile warehouse, in the oil reservoir, and in the negotiating room.
Trump wrote to Americans: "YOU'RE WELCOME!"
But the true phrase of this war sounds different: the bill is not yet settled.