Armenia approaches the parliamentary elections on June 7, not as a typical post-Soviet republic experiencing a routine shift in the political season. This time, the stakes involve far more than the composition of parliament, the fate of Nikol Pashinyan, or the ability of the ruling Civil Contract party to retain power. Armenia faces a much sharper question: will the country remain in the reality that emerged after the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan's final restoration of its sovereignty, or will it once again attempt to retreat into a world of political myths, revanchist illusions, and Russian tutelage?
Formally, Armenian citizens will elect the National Assembly. In reality, they will vote for a model of the future: a peace treaty with Azerbaijan or a return to the rhetoric of historical grievance; the unblocking of communications or the continuation of regional self-isolation; a cautious exit from dependence on Moscow or a new immersion in the Eurasian system of political control. According to IFES data, on June 7, 2026, Armenia will hold its first regular parliamentary elections since 2017. Nineteen party lists are participating, 2,482,872 voters are registered, 2,005 polling stations will open, and the parliament must include at least 101 deputies.
For this reason, these elections cannot be viewed through the traditional prism of Pashinyan versus the opposition. That frame is too narrow for what is unfolding. Armenia is witnessing a clash, not merely between parties, but between two incompatible political logics. The first is to accept a reality that, while painful for Armenian society, is inescapable: Karabakh is Azerbaijan, borders must be recognized, communications must be opened, and a peace treaty must be signed. The second is to continue living in the logic of defeat, failing to acknowledge its causes, refusing to draw conclusions, and shifting responsibility to Pashinyan, the West, Russia, or alleged betrayals - rather than addressing the country’s own long-standing strategic errors.
Pashinyan Is No Friend of Azerbaijan, But He Has Become a Hostage to Reality
Nikol Pashinyan was not, and is not, a politician inherently friendly to Azerbaijan. His path to power was marked by populism, emotional slogans, and attempts to exploit nationalist sentiment. His infamous past statements regarding Karabakh became part of the political madness that ultimately led Armenia to the catastrophe of 2020. Yet, after the defeat, he became the first Armenian leader forced to publicly confront the reality that his predecessors had spent decades fleeing.
Kocharyan and Sargsyan built Armenia’s state ideology upon the occupation status quo. They sold the public a myth of invincibility, of an eternal defensive line, of strategic depth, and of the notion that time was supposedly working against Azerbaijan. Pashinyan inherited this structure just as it was undergoing internal decay. After 2020, and subsequently after the definitive closure of the Karabakh issue, he faced a choice: continue feeding society the same poison or begin a cautious, painful, contradictory, but inevitable departure from the revanchist agenda.
From Baku’s perspective, Pashinyan’s value lies not in his sympathies, but in his forced rationality. He has understood what the old Armenian elite refuses to say aloud: Azerbaijan has changed, Turkey has strengthened, Russia has weakened as a guarantor of Armenian illusions, and the West is not prepared to fight for an Armenian revenge. In this new coordinate system, Armenia can only survive as a state that has recognized its borders, abandoned territorial claims, and integrated into the regional economy.
The Old Opposition Offers Armenia Not a Future, But a Political Morgue
Pashinyan’s main rivals are not so much politicians of the future as they are returning figures of the past. Robert Kocharyan, Samvel Karapetyan, Gagik Tsarukyan, and other representatives of the old or semi-old system are attempting, in various forms, to sell the same product to the Armenian voter: revenge without resources, pride without an army, dignity without an economy, and external support without real guarantees.
Kocharyan represents an era when Armenia considered occupation the norm and dependence on Moscow an insurance policy. That era has ended. It did not end in Armenian television studios or at rallies in Yerevan, but on the battlefield, in diplomatic documents, in new transport projects, and in the shifted balance of power in the South Caucasus. The return of Kocharyan or his political line would not signify the restoration of a strong Armenia, but an attempt to restore a scheme that already led the country to defeat.
Samvel Karapetyan is another version of that same past: money, Russian connections, diaspora resources, and corporate political ambition. His Strong Armenia bloc attempts to speak the language of order, stability, and the protection of traditional values. Yet, behind this packaging lies a simple geopolitical formula: return Armenia to a space where key decisions are made not in Yerevan, but in Moscow. Reuters reported on statements from Western intelligence and government sources suggesting that Moscow has intensified covert efforts against Pashinyan, including disinformation campaigns and discussions regarding a scheme to transport tens of thousands of Armenians from Russia; the Russian side denies these allegations.
Gagik Tsarukyan, in turn, symbolizes not an ideology, but Armenian oligarchic politics in its classic form: money, networks of influence, patronage obligations, and social populism. His return to big politics is not a reform project, but an attempt to redistribute power within the old class. He does not offer Armenia strategic modernization. He offers a familiar, convenient, but long-exhausted model: the state as a club for influential groups.
Moscow Is Nervous Because It Is Losing Its Levers
The most significant external factor in these elections is Russia. Moscow perceives the events in Armenia not as an internal democratic process, but as a matter of maintaining its imperial perimeter. For the Kremlin, Armenia was for decades less of an ally and more of a military, energy, and political asset. The Russian base, participation in the CSTO, dependence on Russian gas, control over communication and energy hubs, and influence over the Armenian elite were all part of a single system.
After 2020, this system began to fracture. Armenian society saw that Russia would not guarantee the impossible. The Kremlin did not return what Armenia had lost. Russian peacekeepers did not become an instrument for the permanent preservation of Armenian control over Karabakh. The CSTO did not turn into a sword with which Yerevan could threaten Baku. As a result, Pashinyan began a pivot - not lightning-fast, not definitive, and not without internal contradictions, but significant enough for Moscow to feel threatened.
This explains Russia’s nervous reaction to Yerevan’s rapprochement with the EU and the United States. Moscow warned that Armenia could lose preferential supplies of oil, gas, and diamonds if it continued its course toward European integration. It was specifically noted that in 2025, Armenia imported 82 percent of its gas from Russia, and that Russian gas cost Yerevan significantly less than European market prices.
This is the classic logic of imperial blackmail: You are free, but only if you remain with us. Russia does not tell Armenia that it offers a competitive model of development. It says: if you try to leave, we will strike at your prices, goods, exports, energy sector, and markets. Even before the elections, Moscow imposed restrictions on Armenian agricultural goods, flowers, mineral water, and brandy, citing phytosanitary claims.
For Azerbaijan, there is no surprise here. Baku has long known the price of Russian alliance-building in the post-Soviet space: it is always conditional, always instrumental, and always subordinate to the interests of Russia itself. The only difference is that Armenian society is now beginning to understand this as well.
The U.S. Has Entered the Game Not as an Observer, But as an Architect of the Route
Another critical variable is the United States. Following Donald Trump’s return to the White House, Washington sharply increased its activity in the South Caucasus. A key moment was the Washington meeting on August 8, 2025, when the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, and the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, with the participation of U.S. President Trump, signed a joint declaration that solidified the logic of further peace settlement.
The political photo from Washington is not the only thing of principle here. More important is that the U.S. offered the region not just a diplomatic text, but infrastructure geopolitics. The TRIPP project - Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity - became an attempt to turn the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement from a set of mutual grievances into a transport and economic construction. According to the framework agreement between Armenia and the U.S., TRIPP is intended to foster regional stability, trade, transport connectivity, and the connection of Azerbaijan’s mainland with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, with the document emphasizing Armenia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction over the project territories.
For Baku, this opens a path to a direct connection with Nakhchivan and Turkey. For Ankara, it leads to the strengthening of the Turkic transport arc. For the U.S., it creates a route that reduces the region’s dependence on Russia and Iran. For Armenia, it offers a historic chance to escape the impasse of land isolation. However, this is precisely why the project causes fury among revanchists and anxiety in Moscow. It breaks the old map, on which Armenia was an outpost rather than a transit state.
The paradox is that Pashinyan is attempting to sell the Armenian public the very project that was recently considered a political taboo in Yerevan: open communications, transit through southern Armenia, integration with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the abandonment of perpetual confrontation. To a portion of Armenian society, this sounds like capitulation. To the more rational part, it sounds like a chance to survive.
Turkey Opens a Window, But the Key Remains in the Peace Treaty
Significant shifts have also occurred on the Turkish track. Ankara and Yerevan have been engaged in a normalization process since 2022. It is moving slowly and cautiously, with due regard for Azerbaijan’s position, but it is no longer stagnant. On May 13, 2026, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that the bureaucratic preparations for the start of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia were completed on May 11, while technical and bureaucratic work on opening the shared border continues.
This is not a minor detail, but an indication that Armenia’s regional blockade can only be lifted through peace with Azerbaijan. Turkey does not intend to decouple the Armenian direction from the Azerbaijani one. Ankara clearly understands that normalization with Yerevan must strengthen regional peace, rather than create the illusion in Armenian politics that one can obtain open borders, trade, and communications without closing the issue of territorial claims against Azerbaijan.
For Armenia, this is a moment of truth. For decades, it complained about the blockade while simultaneously supporting the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. It spoke of closed borders but refused to see the reasons for their closure. Now, Yerevan has the opportunity to emerge from isolation, but the price of this opportunity is simple: recognition of reality, renunciation of revenge, a legally sound peace treaty, and the constitutional elimination of any ambiguities that could be interpreted as territorial claims against Azerbaijan.
It is here that the June 7 elections take on strategic significance. The victory of forces prepared to move toward peace will not automatically solve every problem. But the defeat of this line could freeze the process, restore the rhetoric of grievance, and once again turn Armenia into a problem for itself.
Polls Show the Ruling Party Leading, But Do Not Guarantee Calm
According to public polls, the ruling party maintains a lead; however, Armenian politics is too fragmented for the result to be considered a foregone conclusion. Reuters reported that recent polls gave Pashinyan’s party about 30 percent support, while Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia received about 6 percent in one study. Other measurements showed different figures: according to an April Gallup International Association poll, Civil Contract received 26.7 percent, Strong Armenia 14.1 percent, and the Armenia bloc 8.2 percent.
But numbers in Armenia do not always tell the whole story. The percentage of undecided voters is too high, social fatigue is too deep, external information flows are too intense, and old elite networks are working too actively. The Armenian voter simultaneously fears war, poverty, Russian pressure, Western uncertainty, and internal instability. In such a state, society is capable of voting not for a program, but out of fear. And fear is the main political resource of the Armenian opposition.
Revanchists cannot honestly tell the voter: we will return Karabakh. They understand it is impossible. They cannot honestly say: we will force Azerbaijan to retreat. They know there is no army, no ally, and no international support for such a move. Therefore, they speak differently: Pashinyan has humiliated Armenia, Pashinyan has surrendered national interests, Pashinyan is leading the country into a Turkish-Azerbaijani trap, Pashinyan is destroying the church, traditions, and the alliance with Russia. This is not a program. This is the political psychotherapy of a defeated society.
Pashinyan, in turn, plays on a different fear: if the old guard returns, war, isolation, dependence, and corruption will return as well. His argument is also built not only on hope, but on threat. Therefore, the Armenian elections are becoming not a contest of projects, but a competition of fears. One fear pulls backward toward revenge. The other fear pushes forward toward peace, because the alternative may prove even more dangerous.
Azerbaijan Does Not Need Armenia’s Favorite Leader, But a Rational Interlocutor
From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the primary mistake would be to personalize the issue. Baku must not think in categories of whether Pashinyan is good or bad. For the state, a different question is more important: who in Yerevan is capable of signing and fulfilling a treaty, recognizing borders, terminating legal and political ambiguities, opening communications, and ensuring that internal Armenian trauma does not transform into a new regional threat?
Pashinyan is not ideal. He frequently maneuvers, tells different audiences what they want to hear, fears an internal explosion, and attempts to simultaneously please the West, avoid burning bridges with Russia, pave a path toward Turkey, and appease the discontented segments of society. However, he at least understands that Armenian policy can no longer dictate terms to the region. The old opposition does not understand this, or chooses to pretend it does not.
For Baku, what is fundamentally important is not who wins in Yerevan, but whether the new Armenian parliament recognizes the irreversibility of the post-war reality. Azerbaijan has restored its territorial integrity. The Karabakh question is closed. Any Armenian government that attempts to call this into question will face not a diplomatic discussion, but a new level of political isolation and strategic pressure. This is not a threat, but a description of the balance of power.
The Main Intrigue: Does Armenia Have the Courage to Stop Being a Prisoner of the Past?
At the heart of the Armenian elections lies a psychological problem, not a partisan one. Armenia must decide whether it is prepared to cease being a state built around loss and grievance. For decades, its political identity was fueled by conflict. Karabakh was not only a territorial issue but the foundation of post-Soviet Armenian mythology. Following its definitive return to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, this mythology has collapsed. However, societies rarely part with myths easily, especially when careers, parties, media, diaspora structures, church narratives, and external dependencies have been built around them.
Pashinyan proposes an unpleasant formula to the Armenians: the state is more important than the myth. The opposition proposes the opposite: the myth is more important than the state. This is the essence of the elections.
If Pashinyan’s line prevails, Armenia will have a chance to continue moving toward a peace treaty, the opening of communications, cautious normalization with Turkey, participation in new transport routes, and a gradual reduction of dependence on Moscow. This does not mean rapid prosperity. It does not mean the disappearance of all risks. But it does mean moving in the direction of reality.
If the revanchist line prevails, Armenia will most likely not achieve revenge. It will receive prolonged political paralysis, a deterioration of relations with the West, increased Russian tutelage, a slowing of the peace process, distrust from Azerbaijan and Turkey, and yet another cycle of internal disillusionment when it becomes clear that loud slogans do not restore lost positions.
The Last Choice of the Old Armenia
On June 7, Armenia will not just be voting for a parliament. It will be voting on whether it recognizes the end of an old era. An era in which one could occupy the lands of others and simultaneously demand sympathy. An era in which one could rely on Russia and consider oneself an independent player. An era in which one could block peace and complain about isolation. An era in which political myth replaced strategy.
For Azerbaijan, these elections are important but not fateful. The fate of Azerbaijan has already been changed on the battlefield, in diplomacy, in energy, in transport policy, and in the regional balance. Baku does not expect favors from Yerevan. However, Baku is interested in having as a neighbor not a hysterical, revanchist, externally managed Armenia, but a predictable state capable of finally understanding: peace is not a gift to Azerbaijan, but Armenia’s own last chance.
The main question on June 7 is simple: will Armenian society have the courage to choose the state over the myth? If yes, the South Caucasus will gain a chance for a new architecture. If no, Armenia will remain trapped in its own history - with loud speeches, old faces, Russian leverage, and empty promises of a revenge that will never come.