A strange and painful moment has arrived in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Political language is changing faster than reality itself. In university classrooms, in American cities, in human rights circles, in the Jewish diaspora, in the US Congress, and even within Western government structures, it is no longer possible to speak about Palestine in the language that was considered almost mandatory ten or fifteen years ago. The old formulas no longer work. Automatic support for Israel has ceased to be an unquestioned political reflex. The question of Palestinian rights has moved out of the margins and become part of the central discussion on international law, humanitarian responsibility, and the future of American diplomacy.
But the main paradox lies elsewhere. Public opinion is shifting, diplomatic formulas are fracturing, and Western capitals speak increasingly of recognizing a Palestinian state, yet the life of the average Palestinian on the ground barely improves. Moreover, in many places, it is becoming even harder. A Quinnipiac poll in August 2025 showed that half of registered US voters consider Israel's actions in Gaza to be genocide; among Democrats, this figure was even higher. In April 2026, 40 out of 47 Democratic senators in the US Senate voted to block the transfer of military bulldozers to Israel—something that until recently looked almost like political science fiction.
However, the political shift in Washington has not yet translated into freedom of movement for a Palestinian in the West Bank. It has not become a rebuilt home in Gaza. It has not become a guarantee that Palestinian tax revenues will not be withheld, cut, or turned into an instrument of pressure. It has not become an opportunity for Palestinian society to elect a legitimate leadership. It has not become real state sovereignty.
A truce is formally in place in Gaza, but it remains extremely fragile. At the end of April 2026, the UN explicitly warned that the ceasefire was becoming increasingly fragile due to Israeli strikes and the actions of armed groups. Reuters reported that since the establishment of the US-backed truce in October 2025, approximately 850 Palestinians and four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza.
Meanwhile, another war continues in the West Bank—less visible on global screens but no less destructive. It is a war of settlement pressure, checkpoints, outposts, administrative bans, home demolitions, financial strangulation, and the gradual displacement of Palestinians from the space of normal life. According to OCHA, the West Bank recorded the highest average monthly displacement due to home demolitions in 2026 in more than 17 years of observations.
Therefore, the question is no longer whether one should sympathize with the Palestinians. The question is what concrete mechanisms can change the situation on the ground. Not in resolutions. Not in slogans. Not in another beautiful phrase about "two states." But in real legal, institutional, and political steps.
And there are at least three such steps.
Step One: Break the American Legal Cage
Washington likes to speak of its role as a mediator. But a mediator who cannot talk normally with one of the parties to the conflict is no longer a mediator. They are either an observer or an advocate for the other side. In the case of US-Palestinian relations, the problem is not just political will. The problem lies in the legislative architecture that the US itself built over recent decades.
American legislation related to the Palestine Liberation Organization was created under the slogan of fighting terrorism. The very goal of combating violence is legitimate and necessary. But the problem is that over time, these norms turned not into a security tool, but into an instrument of diplomatic self-amputation. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 effectively prohibits the PLO from maintaining offices and conducting activities in the US. The official legal position of the US Department of Justice also indicated that relevant restrictions hinder the functioning of the PLO office in Washington.
This is precisely where the absurdity begins. The US wants to influence Palestinian politics but simultaneously limits its own ability to maintain a normal dialogue with the Palestinian political representation. Washington wants reforms in the Palestinian Authority but does not create a sustainable diplomatic channel. The US speaks of the need for moderate Palestinian leadership but has worked for decades as if the Palestinian political entity should exist only through the filter of the Israeli agenda.
The closure of the PLO office in Washington in 2018 was not just an administrative measure. It was a symbolic blow to the very idea of a US-Palestinian diplomatic channel. In 2025, the administration of US President Trump went even further, merging the Palestinian Affairs Unit with the US Embassy in Israel, which effectively eliminated Washington's separate line of communication with the Palestinians.
This is not strength. This is strategic blindness.
If the US wants to truly influence the situation, Congress must review the legal restrictions that block normal diplomatic relations with the Palestinian leadership. This is not about romanticizing the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, or any other structure. This is about basic diplomatic logic: one must have a direct channel of communication with a political entity on whose decisions war, peace, security, reforms, and the lives of millions of people depend.
The first thing Washington must do is restore the possibility of Palestinian representation in the US. The second is to return an independent American diplomatic channel for the Palestinian direction, not subordinated to the logic of the US Embassy in Israel. The third is to create a legal mechanism that will allow everyday work with Palestinian institutions without the constant threat of legislative paralysis.
The recognition of a Palestinian state can also no longer be viewed as an exotic idea. After new European and Western states recognized Palestine in 2024–2025, including Ireland, Spain, Norway, Slovenia, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, the American position began to look not like caution, but like diplomatic lag.
Yes, recognition will not create a state with a single stroke of a pen. It will not eliminate the occupation. It will not rebuild Gaza. It will not dismantle settlement infrastructure. But it will change the status of the conversation. It will allow the US to appoint an ambassador to Palestine, and the Palestinians to have a full representative in Washington. Even if embassies do not physically open immediately, diplomatic teams will be able to work in a transitional format. This will no longer be an imitation, but the beginning of normalizing Palestinian statehood.
Without this, any talk of a "peace process" will remain theater. One cannot build peace while simultaneously denying the political visibility of one of the nations.
Step Two: Dismantle the Oslo Trap
Oslo went down in history as a symbol of hope. In 1993, the handshake on the White House lawn looked like the beginning of a new era. But three decades later, it became obvious: the temporary architecture turned into a permanent system of dependence. What was presented as a transitional mechanism to statehood became, in practice, a mechanism of managed unfreedom.
The main defect of Oslo was that it did not eliminate the imbalance of power, but legally formalized it. The Palestinian side received limited self-governance but did not gain real control over territory, borders, resources, taxes, economic policy, security, and the movement of people. Israel retained the levers of control that allow it to affect the viability of Palestinian institutions at any moment.
The 1994 Paris Protocol, which regulates economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians, became one of the key parts of this system. Under it, a significant portion of Palestinian import taxes and customs duties passes through the Israeli clearance mechanism. Formally, this is a technical scheme. In fact, it is a lever of political pressure. The World Bank noted that clearance revenues remain the main source of funds for the Palestinian Authority, and in the first half of 2025, Israel continued to make significant deductions from these revenues.
When one side controls the money of the other side, it is not a partnership. It is dependence.
When one side controls the external crossings through which the other side enters the world, it is not a peace process. It is a managed space.
When one side controls the frequencies, equipment, communication infrastructure, and technological development of the other side, it is not a temporary regime. It is structural subordination. Palestinian digital and telecommunications restrictions, entrenched in the post-Oslo system, have long become an independent factor of economic stagnation.
Therefore, the second step should be aimed not at decorating Oslo, but at its deep revision. The Palestinian economy cannot develop if its tax system depends on the political decision of the Israeli cabinet. The Palestinian Authority cannot become an effective state core if its budget can be cut at any moment. Palestinian society cannot believe in diplomacy if diplomacy reproduces a model of dependence for decades.
What needs to be done?
First, revise the Paris Protocol so that Palestinians receive a direct mechanism for collecting import taxes and customs revenues. Even if this requires international monitoring, a transitional period, and technical support, the principle must be clear: Palestinian money must not be held hostage to the Israeli political calendar.
Second, create an internationally guaranteed mechanism to protect Palestinian revenues. If the funds belong to the Palestinian Authority, they must not be withheld as an instrument of pressure. Disputes should be resolved through arbitration, not through unilateral financial strangulation.
Third, give Palestinians more independence in managing payment systems, digital infrastructure, banking channels, and the technology sector. The discussion about a Palestinian digital currency or a digital payment circuit may seem technical, but it is actually about sovereignty. In the modern world, statehood does not begin only with a flag and an anthem. It begins with control over data, payments, taxes, registries, communications, and infrastructure.
Fourth, it is necessary to restore freedom of movement as a political, economic, and humanitarian category. Palestinians must be able to move within the West Bank, between the West Bank and Gaza, and to the outside world without a constant regime of humiliation and unpredictability. Without movement, there is no economy. Without an economy, there is no dignity. Without dignity, there is no sustainable peace.
The biggest lie of recent decades was that one could demand efficiency from Palestinian institutions while simultaneously depriving them of basic management tools. One cannot demand an administration to be a state if it is not given the main attributes of statehood. One cannot demand moderation from a society if moderation looks every day like capitulation without a result.
Step Three: Return the Palestinian Right to Elect Leadership
Palestinian politics is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. This is neither a secret nor a propaganda talking point. It is a central problem of the Palestinian political system itself. Without a renewed mandate, without elections, without representation, and without accountability, any leadership gradually transforms into an administration of survival rather than a national political center.
Palestinians need nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections. Not symbolic. Not partial. Not decorative. They need elections that will provide society with an opportunity to redefine who speaks in its name, what the political course should be, and how to reform institutions.
In April 2026, municipal elections were held in the West Bank and in one area of Gaza—the first elections of any level in Gaza in nearly two decades. The Central Elections Commission of Palestine confirmed the results of the 2026 local elections, and international observers noted the organization of the voting under challenging conditions. This demonstrates an important reality: the technical capacity to hold elections exists. The problem is not the ballots; the problem is the political authorization.
The US must stop treating Palestinian elections as a threat best avoided. Israel must stop viewing Palestinian voting as an event permissible only under a pre-arranged, convenient outcome. The Palestinian elites must stop fearing their own society.
Yes, elections carry risks. Yes, there is the problem of Hamas. Yes, there is the issue of armed groups, external influence, political violence, and the rift between Gaza and the West Bank. But the absence of elections carries an even greater risk. It destroys legitimacy. It preserves old elites. It makes reforms impossible. It hands over the political energy of the street to those who speak the language of anger rather than institutional building.
The solution is not to postpone elections indefinitely. The solution is to establish clear rules of participation. Political forces and candidates must commit to rejecting armed violence within the political process, recognizing democratic procedures, respecting basic rights, and not turning elections into a bridge to dictatorship. Post-World War II Germany built a model to protect the "free democratic basic order," preventing anti-democratic forces from using democracy as a one-time ladder to its destruction. The Palestinian system also needs a similar logic—not as a replica, but as a principle.
However, this principle must not be applied selectively. If Palestinian parties are required to renounce violence and racism, then Israel must also more strictly apply its own restrictions against political forces that openly preach ethnic supremacy, expulsion, segregation, or the erasure of Palestinian statehood. One cannot demand political purity from only one side while the other side legalizes extremism under the guise of parliamentary politics.
Elections must take place in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. If Israel restricts voting in areas under its control, Palestinians should still move forward wherever possible, recording every obstacle as a political fact. Sometimes imperfect elections are better than an endless absence of choice. The political energy of society must receive an institutional outlet.
Palestinian freedom cannot be gifted from the outside. But external players can either block it or stop interfering with its institutional formation. In this sense, Washington is obligated to change its own role. Not to dictate leadership to the Palestinians. Not to appoint "convenient" representatives. Not to substitute internal legitimacy with external approval. Instead, it must create conditions under which Palestinian society can renew its political system on its own.
Why This Matters More Than Loud Gestures
These three steps do not look spectacular. They do not provide a beautiful image for a televised summit. They do not resemble an iconic handshake that can be showcased on front pages. Reforming American legislation, revising economic protocols, restoring Palestinian elections—all of this sounds dry, bureaucratic, almost boring.
But real power hides precisely in such things.
Conflicts are rarely sustained by hatred alone. They are maintained by access regimes, permits, budgets, laws, checkpoints, tax mechanisms, police powers, maps, registries, frequencies, stamps, and protocols. Where an ordinary observer sees a "political impasse," a specialist sees a system of concrete restrictions, each of which has an author, a legal form, and a beneficiary.
Palestinian unfreedom is not an abstraction. It is not just occupation as a political concept. It is a daily engineering of dependence. Who controls the tax? Who controls the road? Who issues the permit? Who opens the crossing? Who detains the cargo? Who determines whether a person can travel to see relatives, for study, for medical treatment, or for work? Who decides whether the administration will have a payroll fund? Who manages communication frequencies? Who is recognized as a partner, and who is excluded from the diplomatic space?
The answers to these questions form the true map of the conflict.
This is precisely why declarations are no longer sufficient. The two-state formula without dismantling the mechanisms of dependence turns into a diplomatic mantra. The recognition of Palestine without financial and administrative sovereignty remains a gesture. Talk of reforming the Palestinian Authority without elections becomes empty. Calls for peace without freedom of movement look cynical. Security demands without a political horizon turn into endless crisis management.
Washington must understand: the status quo is no longer stability. It is a factory of future explosions. The longer Palestinians remain without normal representation, without economic autonomy, without freedom of movement, and without a renewed, legitimate authority, the less space remains for moderate politics. Radicalism feeds not only on ideology. It feeds on helplessness.
America Must Choose: Diplomacy or Self-Deception
The US still possesses instruments of influence. Not absolute, but significant. It remains Israel's main external partner, its key military donor, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the state without which any major diplomatic formula in the Middle East remains incomplete. Therefore, Washington cannot portray an outside commentator.
If the US wants a just and sustainable solution, it must stop speaking of the Palestinians as a security problem and start treating them as a political people. This does not mean agreeing with all Palestinian leaders. This does not mean ignoring Israeli security. This does not mean justifying violence. It means recognizing the obvious: Israel's security cannot be built on the permanent unfreedom of Palestinians.
The first step is to reform the American laws that block normal dialogue with the Palestinians.
The second step is to review the post-Oslo system of economic and administrative dependence.
The third step is to support nationwide Palestinian elections as a mechanism for renewing legitimacy.
None of these steps will bring freedom overnight. None will immediately resolve the problem of Gaza, settlers, Jerusalem, refugees, security, and borders. But without them, there will not even be a road to a solution. There will only be another cycle: war, truce, diplomatic spectacle, disappointment, and a new explosion.
Palestinian freedom does not begin with a beautiful statement. It begins with the dismantling of specific mechanisms of unfreedom. With a law that no longer prohibits dialogue. With a protocol that no longer turns the economy into a hostage. With elections that return a voice to society. With the recognition that peace is impossible where one people possesses all the instruments of power while the other is forced to beg for permission for their own life.
This is precisely why concrete steps, rather than abstract promises, are needed today. Without them, Washington will continue to speak of peace while servicing the very architecture that makes this peace impossible.