Washington expected a swift demonstration of force. Instead, it has found itself facing a prolonged crisis: the Strait of Hormuz, an energy shock, depleted arsenals, irritated allies, and an Iran that does not look defeated.
The war against Iran was supposed to become, for President Trump, a display of strength, iron will, and the ability to swiftly reshape the political architecture of the Middle East. In Washington’s design, it looked almost classical: decapitate Iran’s leadership, destroy its nuclear and missile infrastructure, break Tehran’s will, and force regional players once again to acknowledge American military hegemony. But nearly three months after the strikes began, the picture looks very different. The tactical power of the United States and Israel has not disappeared, but the strategic result has turned out to be far more questionable: Iran has not capitulated, the Strait of Hormuz remains its main lever of pressure, the global economy is paying a growing price, and Washington is sinking deeper into a conflict it had expected to end on its own terms. Reuters reported that on February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched the largest attack on Iranian targets in decades, killing Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Iran called the strikes illegal and responded with missile attacks on Israel and regional states hosting American bases.
The strike was powerful, but not decisive
The first strategic miscalculation was that Washington and Tel Aviv overestimated the political effect of killing Khamenei. In the logic of the operation’s architects, the elimination of the supreme leader was supposed to paralyze the government, split the elites, and possibly trigger an internal explosion. But the Iranian system, for all its rigidity, corruption, and repressive nature, turned out not to be a personalist stage set, but an institutionalized security machine. Reuters wrote that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu actively urged Trump to authorize the strike, while the American side viewed a possible “decapitation” strike as an opportunity to alter the regime balance in Tehran. Yet after the war began, the forecast of Iran’s rapid destabilization did not come true.
The United States and Israel inflicted severe damage on Iran. Nuclear infrastructure sites, missile launch areas, command centers, energy facilities, and military-industrial nodes were hit. But the war exposed the difference between destroying objects and achieving a political objective. Concrete, metal, hangars, and laboratories can be destroyed far more quickly than a state can be forced to abandon what it regards as the foundation of its survival. That is precisely what is happening now: Tehran has lost part of its infrastructure, but it has preserved its main levers - missile capability, nuclear material, control over Hormuz, and the ability to inflict painful blows on America’s regional network.
Hormuz became Iran’s answer to American airpower
The main turning point of the war was the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz from a geographic chokepoint into a political weapon. Before the war, about 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through this narrow maritime corridor every day, roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. In addition, about 93 percent of Qatari and 96 percent of Emirati LNG exports passed through the strait, accounting for around 19 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade. These are not merely energy statistics. They are the nerve center of the global economy, tied to prices for fuel, fertilizers, aviation, freight, electricity, and food.
Iran understood the central point: it does not have to defeat the United States in the conventional military sense. It only has to make an American victory economically, politically, and diplomatically unacceptably expensive. If Washington destroys Iranian infrastructure from the air, Tehran responds asymmetrically - by closing the artery that feeds the world economy. This is the strategic paradox: the United States retains overwhelming superiority in aviation, naval power, intelligence, and long-range weapons, but it cannot quickly restore normal traffic through the strait without risking full-scale escalation.
Reuters wrote on May 18 that three months after the start of the American-Israeli attack, a dangerous stalemate had emerged: the United States is blockading Iranian ports, Tehran is holding on to its leverage over Hormuz, economic pain is rising, and the risk of a new round of war is intensifying. The same assessment emphasized that Washington is demanding a twenty-year halt to Iranian uranium enrichment and the removal of stockpiles, while Tehran is demanding an end to the strikes, security guarantees, compensation, and recognition of its special role in Hormuz.
American power ran into geography
The main lesson of the current crisis is simple: aircraft carriers do not abolish geography. The United States can strike Iranian facilities, but it cannot change the fact that Iran sits on the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, and that a significant share of the Persian Gulf’s energy exports depends on passage through this corridor. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have alternative routes, though limited ones. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq are far more vulnerable. The IEA notes that alternative routes allow only 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day to be redirected, while nearly 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products passed through Hormuz in 2025.
That is why the crisis quickly moved beyond the framework of an American-Iranian confrontation. It hit Asia, Europe, petrochemicals, logistics, air travel, and agriculture. In its April review, the IEA stated that global oil supply in March fell by 10.1 million barrels per day, down to 97 million barrels per day, and that restrictions on tanker movement through Hormuz became the largest disruption in the history of the oil market. This is no longer a regional conflict. It is a global price shock.
The cost of war is no longer measured only in missiles
The military campaign that was supposed to demonstrate Washington’s control over escalation has begun to expose the vulnerability of the American war machine itself. In April, CSIS wrote that over 39 days of the air and missile campaign, the United States intensively used seven key types of munitions. For four of them, expenditure may have exceeded half of prewar stockpiles, while replenishment will take from one to four years. This is especially important against the backdrop of a possible confrontation with China in the western Pacific.
Washington, of course, has not run out of weapons. But the question is no longer whether the Pentagon can continue striking Iran. It can. The question is different: how much it will cost, which stockpiles will be depleted, which obligations to allies will have to be reduced, and how this will affect Ukraine, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the entire system of American security guarantees. The war with Iran has become a test not only of American power, but also of the resilience of the American strategic balance.
The Washington Post, analyzing satellite imagery, reported that Iranian strikes damaged or destroyed at least 228 facilities or pieces of equipment at American military sites in the Middle East. According to the newspaper, these included hangars, barracks, fuel facilities, aircraft, radars, communications systems, and air defense assets. It also reported deaths and hundreds of wounded service members. Even if these losses did not paralyze the American campaign, they shattered the myth of the complete invulnerability of America’s regional infrastructure.
Allies saw not strength, but the absence of a plan
Washington’s second major failure was diplomatic. The United States expected its allies to automatically support military pressure on Iran and join efforts to secure freedom of navigation. But European NATO allies refused to join the blockade of Iranian ports, saying they were prepared to participate only after the end of hostilities. Reuters reported on April 13 that this refusal increased tension inside the alliance and became a painful signal for the Trump administration.
The meaning of Europe’s position is obvious. Paris, Berlin, London, and other capitals understand that participation in an operation to force open Hormuz could drag them into a war with no clear endpoint. Europe is already facing a price shock, inflationary risks, and industrial pressure. Entering a direct military confrontation with Iran in order to fix the consequences of an American-Israeli operation is a politically dangerous decision. That is why the allies prefer to keep their distance: supporting de-escalation, but refusing to become accomplices in further escalation.
Irritation is also growing inside the United States. The Washington Post wrote that Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine faced criticism in Congress from members of both parties. Lawmakers demanded explanations of the war’s cost, the exit strategy, and the plan for restoring navigation through Hormuz. Costs of more than 29 billion dollars were cited.
The economy takes revenge faster than diplomacy
The global economy has become the main battlefield. In its April World Economic Outlook, the IMF directly linked the worsening global forecast to the war in the Middle East: under a limited-conflict scenario, global growth in 2026 is projected at 3.1 percent and at 3.2 percent in 2027. Under an adverse scenario, growth could fall to 2.5 percent, and under a severe one, to 2 percent, with inflation above 6 percent.
This means that the war against Iran is no longer only a security issue. It has become a factor in global inflation. Prices are rising for oil, gas, diesel, jet fuel, fertilizers, aluminum, helium, and petrochemical feedstock. Higher energy costs immediately flow into transport, manufacturing, food, and consumer goods. Reuters reported on May 18 that, according to an analysis of corporate statements, the war has already cost global companies at least 25 billion dollars. At least 279 companies have announced defensive measures, including price increases, production cuts, fuel surcharges, dividend suspensions, and requests for government support.
Even more dangerous is the speed at which the oil market is burning through reserves. IEA head Fatih Birol said on May 18 that commercial oil inventories are being rapidly depleted and that only a few weeks remain. Strategic reserves have already added 2.5 million barrels per day to the market, but they are not infinite. The IEA also reported a record decline in observed oil inventories of 246 million barrels in March and April.
Qatar became the symbol of rich states’ vulnerability
The crisis has hit Qatar particularly hard. For decades, the country built the model of an ultra-wealthy gas state based on LNG exports through Hormuz. But with the strait effectively closed, that model has become geographically trapped. The Business Times, citing IMF assessments, wrote that Qatar’s economy could shrink by 8.6 percent in 2026. Because of the closure of Hormuz, almost all of the country’s gas exports have been blocked, while strikes on Ras Laffan facilities caused additional damage to production capacity.
This is an important signal for all Gulf monarchies. Money, sovereign wealth funds, skyscrapers, airlines, sporting tournaments, and global brands do not erase a basic vulnerability: if the export artery is blocked, the state model begins to come under pressure within weeks. Reuters noted that the UAE is more resilient than many of its neighbors because of the pipeline to Fujairah, while Saudi Arabia can export a significant share of its oil through the Red Sea. But Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq are far more tightly dependent on Hormuz.
Fertilizers, helium, and food: the invisible side of the war
The most underestimated part of the crisis is not oil, but everything that follows oil. Energy is not the only thing moving through Hormuz. UNCTAD indicates that the strait carries significant volumes of LNG and fertilizers, while disruptions increase the cost of energy, freight, insurance, and food, especially for vulnerable economies.
The Carnegie Endowment noted that about a third of global seaborne fertilizer trade normally passes through Hormuz. Disruptions in gas and raw material supplies are already affecting fertilizer production in countries dependent on Qatari LNG. This means the war can move into the food dimension: first gas becomes more expensive, then ammonia and urea, then fertilizers, then crops, and finally bread, rice, vegetables, and animal feed.
A separate blow has fallen on the helium market. Reuters wrote that Qatar produced about 63 million cubic meters of helium in 2025, roughly a third of global supply. Because helium is extracted as a byproduct of natural gas processing, the stoppage of LNG immediately affects supplies for medicine, semiconductors, fiber optics, and aerospace. This is no longer a Middle Eastern conflict. It is a crisis of high-tech supply chains.
China Is in No Hurry to Rescue Trump
Trump tried to draw China into pressuring Iran. But Beijing is acting cautiously. Reuters reported on May 16 that President Trump claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping had agreed on the need to open Hormuz, but China showed no sign that it was prepared to intervene in any real way or exert direct pressure on Tehran.
China is gaining several advantages from this situation. First, it sees the United States spending resources, attention, and diplomatic capital in the Middle East. Second, it can demand concessions on Taiwan, trade, or sanctions in exchange for a more active role. Third, it is showing the Global South that American power politics creates chaos, while China offers the image of a colder, more calculating mediator. Even if Beijing is interested in reopening Hormuz, it is not obliged to do so free of charge or in Trump’s interest.
Russia Also Gains Room for Maneuver
Moscow does not formally control the crisis, but it benefits from it. Rising oil prices, diverted American attention, pressure on Western arsenals, and Europe’s energy anxiety strengthen Russia’s negotiating position. Reuters reported that the United States extended a temporary waiver for purchases of Russian seaborne oil, explaining the move by the need to help vulnerable countries amid supply shortages caused by the war with Iran and the closure of Hormuz.
This is another paradox of Trump’s campaign: a war that was supposed to strengthen American pressure on Iran is indirectly weakening the sanctions regime against Russia. When the global market faces shortages, Washington has to think not only about punishing adversaries, but also about the physical availability of oil on the market. Geopolitical morality quickly gives way to energy arithmetic.
The Nuclear Problem Has Not Been Solved
The most dangerous part of the war is that it has not resolved the nuclear issue. Even before the February escalation, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. The agency and Western countries believed that most of this material had survived, while Washington demanded that Tehran give it up.
This means that the strikes may have destroyed facilities, but they did not eliminate the strategic problem. Moreover, the war strengthened the arguments of Iran’s security hardliners, who claim that only nuclear capability and the missile program can protect the country from external destruction. If before the war part of the Iranian establishment could discuss limited compromises, then after the killing of the supreme leader and large-scale strikes, the space for concessions became politically toxic.
Reuters wrote on May 18 that Iranian sources allow for the possibility of a preliminary deal: opening Hormuz under Iranian supervision in exchange for lifting the American blockade, while leaving the more difficult issues - sanctions, enrichment, and nuclear material - for later negotiations. But the United States is demanding the unconditional opening of the strait, without fees, vetoes, or any new Iranian role. This is not a technical dispute over a maritime regime. It is a dispute over who will be seen as the winner.
Trump Is Looking for a Way Out, but Cannot Call It a Retreat
On May 18, President Trump said he had postponed a planned major strike on Iran after appeals from allies in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, who asked him to give diplomacy a few more days. AP reported that Trump ordered the military to be ready for a full-scale strike if the deal failed, while at the same time acknowledging that serious negotiations were taking place. Oil prices briefly fell after his statement, but remained above 107 dollars per barrel.
This looks like an attempt to save face. Trump cannot simply admit that the war has reached a dead end. He needs an image of victory: Iran weakened, the nuclear program restricted, Hormuz opened, allies grateful, prices stabilized. But reality resists political theater. Iran does not want to look as if it has capitulated. China does not want to rescue Washington for free. Europe does not want to fight. The Gulf wants calm, but fears both Tehran and American unpredictability. Markets want oil, gas, fertilizers, and vessel insurance, not declarations of strength.
Why This Could Become Trump’s Biggest Failure
Failure is measured not by the number of bombs dropped, but by the gap between the objective and the outcome. If the goal was to kill Khamenei, that goal was achieved. If the goal was to damage Iran’s military infrastructure, it was partially achieved. If the goal was to force Iran to capitulate, give up its nuclear leverage, open Hormuz without conditions, and accept American diktat, that has not happened.
Moreover, the war has created a new strategic reality. Iran has proved that it can absorb strikes and damage America’s network of bases. Hormuz has become not an abstract threat, but a real mechanism of pressure. The global economy has suffered an energy and raw materials shock. U.S. allies have begun to distance themselves. China and Russia have gained room for bargaining. And Trump himself now faces a choice: either accept a compromise that will look like a concession to Tehran, or expand the war and risk turning the Middle Eastern campaign into an American strategic nightmare.
That is precisely why the Iranian crisis could become Trump’s biggest foreign policy failure. Not because the United States is weaker than Iran. It is not. The United States is far stronger. But power without precise political calculation becomes an expensive instrument of self-depletion. America can destroy, but it cannot always impose order after destruction. It can strike a state, but it cannot abolish its geography, historical memory, ideological rigidity, or capacity to exploit the vulnerabilities of the global economy.
The war against Iran was conceived as a spectacle of American superiority. It now increasingly resembles a strategic trap, where every new missile does not bring victory closer, but raises the price of exit. And if Trump fails to find a political formula that opens Hormuz, limits the nuclear risk, and prevents compromise from turning into public humiliation, this war will be remembered not as a demonstration of strength, but as an example of how a superpower can win the opening strikes and lose the very logic of the conflict.