There is an old diplomatic proverb suggesting that silence at a historical turning point is also a choice - and often the worst one possible. In the current military conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, Saudi Arabia is demonstrating exactly such a stance: a performative restraint that Riyadh prefers to call "strategic discretion," while external observers label it paralysis.
Meanwhile, the region is ablaze. Iranian ballistic missiles periodically reach Saudi territory. The Strait of Hormuz - an artery through which 17 to 21 million barrels of oil flow daily, accounting for about 21 percent of global consumption - faces a tangible threat of closure. Oil prices are experiencing sharp volatility: Brent crude climbed above 110 dollars per barrel in certain weeks before retracing amid uncertainty over the conflict's duration. The "Vision 2030" program, designed to transform Saudi Arabia into a post-oil economy with a diversified GDP, is fraying at the seams. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the man who staked the kingdom’s entire political capital on this transformation - publicly maintains an air of exemplary composure, while leaked data from private negotiations suggests a starkly different reality.
This is not merely a story about a specific war. It is a narrative about the limits of ambition, the gap between the rhetoric of power and actual capabilities, and how the world’s largest oil exporter became a hostage to the decisions of others in its own backyard.
Vision 2030 as a Hostage of War
To understand Riyadh’s logic, one must grasp the scale of the wager Saudi Arabia has placed on peaceful development. Vision 2030 is not just an economic program; it is an existential project for the royal family. It involves restructuring an economy that is more than 70 percent dependent on hydrocarbons into a diversified system featuring robust tourism, high-tech manufacturing, financial services, and renewable energy.
The figures are staggering. The Public Investment Fund (PIF) manages assets valued at approximately 700 billion dollars. More than 500 billion dollars is slated for investment in Neom - the futuristic linear city on the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. Total investment under the Vision 2030 framework exceeds one trillion dollars. Saudi Arabia aimed to host 150 million tourists annually by 2030 and reduce oil’s share of GDP to 50 percent.
War systematically dismantles this logic. Foreign investors are anxious: no serious capital flows into a region where tankers cannot traverse the Strait of Hormuz without the risk of attack. The construction of Neom, already behind schedule, now faces further delays - the PIF has officially announced a "realignment of priorities" toward alternative energy, water resources, and logistics. The Crown Prince’s golf tournament is being shuttered. A seventy percent stake in Al-Hilal - the most prominent Saudi football brand - has been sold. These are not minor sacrifices; they are symptoms of a deeper malaise: an economy built to attract peace is being forced to adapt to war.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s fiscal situation is far from brilliant. The kingdom’s fiscal break-even price - according to various IMF estimates - is around 78–80 dollars per barrel. With oil prices fluctuating between 85 and 110 dollars, the situation remains manageable. However, any prolonged destabilization of the Strait of Hormuz threatens a paradoxical outcome: oil prices rise, but Saudi exports are physically obstructed. Insurance rates for transit through Hormuz have already surged multiple times over, making exports de facto more expensive.
The Reputation Trap: When Denial Becomes Strategy
The most painful episode for Riyadh’s image occurred with February reports claiming Mohammed bin Salman lobbied President Trump for a strike against Iran. The Saudis denied it. This was followed by an April story regarding pressure to prevent a premature cessation of hostilities. The Saudis denied it again.
The problem is that diplomatic denial in the age of leaks and investigative journalism operates fundamentally differently than in the past. If the information is credible - and repeated by different publications with varied sources - public denial only exacerbates the situation. Riyadh finds itself trapped: admitting the allegations means political vulnerability domestically and within the Arab world; denying them makes the kingdom appear insincere to Western partners.
This reputation trap reflects a deeper contradiction in Saudi policy. On one hand, Riyadh publicly supported rapprochement with Tehran: the 2023 Chinese-mediated agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was presented as a breakthrough capable of shifting regional dynamics. On the other hand, the Crown Prince’s private expectations seemingly diverged fundamentally from his public rhetoric.
This is a classic double-game scenario, which is difficult to maintain long-term - especially under the conditions of a war that is rapidly forcing everything into perspective.
Three Scenarios and None Are Ideal
Analysts in Riyadh have likely developed three working scenarios for the conflict's outcome - and none are indisputably favorable for the kingdom.
Stalemate is the most probable short-term outcome. Trump declares "victory," American troops remain in the region, and sanctions against Iran persist, but Tehran’s military potential remains intact. For Saudi Arabia, this means continued life under the threat of Iranian missile and drone strikes - exactly the same situation that emerged after the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in September 2019. At that time, half of Saudi oil capacity was knocked offline - temporarily, but the impact was significant. Approximately 5.7 million barrels per day were removed from production. That episode vividly demonstrated how vulnerable Saudi oil infrastructure truly is. A stalemate scenario means this vulnerability is here to stay.
A genuine US victory would be the best outcome for Riyadh. An Iran stripped of its nuclear ambitions and the ability to project power through proxies would create a region where Saudi Arabia could truly claim the role of hegemon. Iran's GDP in 2023 was about 366 billion dollars - roughly half of Saudi Arabia’s (approximately 1.06 trillion dollars). If the Iranian military factor were neutralized, the balance of power would shift radically. Yet, this is the scenario in which Riyadh itself seems to have the least faith.
An Iranian victory would be a catastrophe. The lifting of sanctions, the strengthening of the regime, control over the Strait of Hormuz, and a US withdrawal from the region. While the first scenario is a chronic headache, the third is an existential threat - not only to Vision 2030 but to the monarchy itself.
Saudi Arabia’s behavior - evasive, cautious, and lacking a clear position - suggests that Riyadh views the second and third scenarios as roughly equal in probability. This explains everything: the denial of involvement in starting the war, the lack of a military response to Iranian strikes, and the phrasing "reserving the right to respond" - a diplomatic construct that obligates them to nothing.
Arab Geopolitics: Allies Who Are Not Allies
A structural factor in Saudi passivity is the kingdom’s catastrophic isolation within the Arab world - an isolation that Riyadh largely created itself.
The UAE - formally the closest economic partner - has long pursued an independent policy. Abu Dhabi normalized relations with Israel under the 2020 Abraham Accords ahead of Saudi Arabia. Dubai has evolved into a global financial hub, competing directly with Riyadh. Regarding the response to the Iranian threat, the UAE follows its own logic, which does not always align with Saudi interests.
Egypt, the most populous Arab nation, is mired in domestic economic woes: the country's debt exceeds 92 percent of GDP, and inflation in 2023–2024 topped 30 percent. Cairo is physically incapable of significant military involvement.
Jordan balances between economic dependence on Western donors and a massive Palestinian population, making any overt support for a US-Israeli operation politically impossible.
Iraq is a separate matter. It is a state with a Shia parliamentary majority deeply integrated into the Iranian sphere of influence, featuring a significant military presence of pro-Iranian groups. The fact that Iraqi proxies attack Saudi territory is a logical consequence of this reality.
In other words, Saudi Arabia lacks a reliable Arab coalition rear. The Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991 united a broad coalition; the current conflict does not. This is a fundamental constraint that no rhetorical statements about the "right to return fire" can overcome.
Military Potential: A Colossus on Clay Feet?
Saudi Arabia is among the top five global military spenders. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the kingdom's military budget in 2023 exceeded 75 billion dollars - roughly 6 percent of GDP and the eighth largest in the world in absolute volume. The army numbers around 250,000 personnel, and the kingdom possesses modern F-15 fighters, Patriot missile systems, and Typhoons.
However, the recent military history of the Saudis paints a different picture. The Yemen campaign, launched in 2015 with highly optimistic projections - "the operation will last a few weeks" - turned into a multi-year quagmire. By various estimates, Saudi Arabia's direct military expenditures in Yemen ranged from 5 to 6 billion dollars annually. The result: the Houthis are not destroyed, territorial control is only partially restored, and Aden remains unstable. It was the Houthis who struck Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019 - meaning Iran’s proxies on the kingdom’s southern borders proved capable of attacking the heart of the country's oil infrastructure.
This implies that while Saudi Arabia’s military potential is significant on paper, its operational effectiveness raises serious questions. An army that failed to defeat irregular Houthi forces over nine years is not an army capable of fighting Iran independently.
Herein lies the fundamental contradiction of Saudi security strategy. The kingdom spends gargantuan sums on arms procurement - over the last decade, Saudi Arabia has been the world's largest or second-largest arms importer - yet it does not invest properly in combat training, military doctrine, and operational integration. Western weapons in the hands of an army that has not adopted a corresponding military culture do not automatically transform into an effective fighting force.
The Hormuz Paradox: When Your Own Oil Becomes a Weapon Against You
The Strait of Hormuz is not just a geographic point; it is the central nervous system of the global energy grid. Approximately 20–21 percent of world oil consumption passes through it, including roughly 76–80 percent of the oil exports from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq.
If Iran closes or substantially obstructs transit through Hormuz, it immediately strikes Saudi Arabia itself. Riyadh has an alternative route - the East-West Pipeline with a capacity of about 5 million barrels per day, terminating at the Red Sea. But this accounts for only about half of total Saudi exports. The rest must go through Hormuz.
This is why the issue of naval security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is not abstract; it is a direct Saudi economic interest. However, participating in it publicly would mean de facto entering the war on the side of the US and Israel, bringing a set of political risks that Riyadh is desperate to avoid.
This paradox perfectly describes the kingdom’s baseline dilemma: its primary economic interest requires participation in military actions that its political logic demands it avoid.
The USA and Israel: Allies Who Do Not Ask
A distinct narrative has emerged in Riyadh regarding the last twenty years of American policy in the Middle East. This narrative, for all its polemical nature, contains a significant degree of analytical truth.
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq destroyed the primary Sunni counterweight to Iran - Saddam Hussein. The result: Iraq turned into a theater of Iranian influence, with the IRGC and its affiliated structures gaining a permanent presence on the Saudi borders. From Riyadh’s perspective, the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) signaled the legitimization of Iran as a regional player and a partial lifting of sanction pressure - without any structural limitations on Iranian regional ambitions. The lack of a firm American response to the 2019 strikes on Abqaiq and Khurais was interpreted in Riyadh as a signal: the United States would not fight for Saudi oil.
Now comes Operation "Epic Fury" - a decision made without systematic consultation with Riyadh that has radically altered the regional balance. Mohammed bin Salman might have agreed with the objective - the weakening of Iran - but he had every reason to doubt the methodology. A strike on Iran without a clear plan for the post-war regional order is precisely the type of "ill-conceived venture" that Riyadh has learned to recognize.
This raises a fundamental question about the nature of the US-Saudi alliance. Formally, the relationship was built on the "oil for security" formula, established during the February 1945 meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud aboard a warship. However, this formula has long since eroded. The shale revolution made the US the world’s largest oil producer - approximately 13 million barrels per day. Washington's energy dependence on Riyadh has decreased fundamentally. Consequently, the nature of their mutual obligations has changed as well.
For the Saudis, this brings the bitter realization that American support is conditional, situational, and dictated by interests that do not always align with those of the kingdom.
The China Factor: The Silent Beneficiary
One circumstance that seriously complicates the Saudi position cannot be ignored. China is the largest purchaser of Saudi oil: approximately 20–22 percent of the kingdom’s exports go to the PRC. Economic relations between the two countries have developed rapidly, with trade turnover in 2023 totaling about 107 billion dollars.
It was Beijing that acted as the mediator in the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 - an unprecedented move that showcased Chinese ambitions in the region. For Riyadh, China represents an alternative source of investment, technology, and diplomatic cover, allowing it to avoid exclusive dependence on Western partners.
Active participation in the US-Israeli war against Iran would inevitably strain Saudi-Chinese relations. Beijing maintains a neutral public stance but is de facto close to Tehran on key issues: sanctions against Iran, the nuclear program, and the American military presence. This represents another structural constraint on Saudi activism.
When Strategic Discretion Becomes Strategic Weakness
There is a fundamental difference between caution dictated by a realistic risk assessment and passivity dictated by an inability to make a choice. The former is a virtue; the latter is a vulnerability.
For several months of this conflict, Saudi Arabia has been balancing on the edge between these two states. The version of events suggesting the latter is increasingly persuasive.
Consider the concrete facts. Iranian forces have attacked Saudi territory - more than once. Riyadh declared its "right to return fire." No return fire followed. This is not just a signal of weakness; it is an invitation to further escalation. In the strategic logic of the Middle East, where deterrence is built on the demonstration of force, silence in response to a strike is perceived as permission to continue.
The comparison with other regional players is telling. Israel - a country with a population of 9.7 million and a GDP of about 522 billion dollars - is waging war simultaneously against Iran, the Houthis, and Iraqi proxies. One may or may not like the decisions made by Tel Aviv, but no one doubts the readiness of the Israeli leadership to act. Iran - a country of 89 million people, strangled by sanctions, with a GDP of around 366 billion dollars - is fighting against a powerful military coalition and refuses to capitulate. Saudi Arabia - a country with a GDP of over a trillion dollars, massive military spending, and the rhetoric of a regional power - does nothing.
This discrepancy is what needs to be addressed directly.
What Real Leadership Would Mean
A clear Saudi position on this conflict would not necessarily mean entering the war. It would mean something else: accepting responsibility for its own interests.
The concrete steps Riyadh could take without entering a direct military conflict are numerous. Participation in international naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz would not only protect Saudi oil exports but also position the kingdom as a responsible actor. A symmetrical response to Iranian strikes - not necessarily massive, but clear and proportional - would restore deterrence. Publicly articulating a position - that Iran attacked Saudi Arabia, and they are responding to their own interests rather than supporting the wars of others - would diffuse the reputation trap.
Such an approach would align with the rhetoric Riyadh has carefully constructed in recent years. Vision 2030 is not merely an economic program; it is a political narrative of Saudi Arabia as a modernizing, self-assured, sovereign power. But a sovereign power that does not react to direct strikes on its territory is an oxymoron.
The problem is not a lack of resources. No country in the region, with the possible exception of Israel, possesses comparable financial capabilities to conduct an active security policy. The problem is the lack of political will to make a choice in the face of uncertainty.
Historical Echoes: Lessons Riyadh Has Failed to Learn
The history of Saudi foreign policy contains periods of genuine strategic thinking. The 1973 decision to utilize the oil embargo as a political weapon - however controversial - demonstrated a readiness to act asymmetrically. The support for the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s - despite all the long-term consequences - showed an understanding that influence is built through active engagement.
The subsequent decades were marked by a gradual shift from an active foreign policy to a reactive one. Saudi Arabia grew accustomed to the role of "stabilizer" - a country that purchases stability through financial infusions rather than projecting power through action. This model functioned as long as the United States served as a reliable guarantor of regional security. It ceases to function when American predictability is called into question.
Mohammed bin Salman ascended to power with the rhetoric of breaking from this passive tradition. The Yemen campaign, regardless of one's view of it, was precisely such a gesture - a demonstration that a new generation of Saudi leadership was not afraid to take risks. However, the Yemeni experience proved so painful that it has seemingly instilled in the Crown Prince a persistent distrust of military ventures.
While this is psychologically understandable, it is strategically dangerous. The space between the "Yemeni quagmire" and an "Iranian war" is wide enough for an active yet balanced security policy. Riyadh has not yet found this point of equilibrium.
The Post-War Future: Who Will Build the New Middle East?
Regardless of the outcome of the current conflict, the Middle East will look different after the war. New security arrangements, new economic ties, and new spheres of influence will emerge. The question is: who will be at the negotiating table when these agreements are forged?
The United States - certainly. Israel - in one form or another. Iran - depending on the war's outcome. China - as an economic heavyweight. Turkey - as a regional power with its own ambitions.
Saudi Arabia? Under its current policy, at best, it will be a passive recipient of the decisions of others. A country that does not participate in the formation of the regional order has no right to a voice in its construction. This is not pessimism; it is the logic of international relations.
Riyadh must make a choice. Not between war and peace - that choice has already been made without its input - but between being the object of another's policy and the subject of its own. A trillion-dollar economic program, rapidly developing diplomacy, and massive military expenditures create the necessary conditions for the latter. Necessary - but not sufficient.
The sufficient condition is will. The will to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, to bear responsibility for them, and to pay the price for them. It is this will that distinguishes powers that shape history from those that merely endure it.
Saudi Arabia stands before this choice right now. And time is rapidly running out.
The question is not whether Riyadh has sufficient resources for an active policy. It has more than enough. The question is whether it has enough resolve to stop pretending that one can win a historical game without making any moves.