Is Turkiye’s anticipated role in the disarmament of Hamas a genuine stabilizing mechanism for the Gaza Strip - or part of a larger reconfiguration of the security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East?
The central premise is that Hamas’s disarmament is not a technical or isolated process reducible to arms control or demobilization. Rather, it represents a strategic transition - from the logic of asymmetric resistance to one of institutional reintegration of Gaza into a regional governance framework. In this new structure, Turkiye is positioned not as a traditional diplomatic mediator but as a guarantor of political transformation in an environment where few other actors possess even limited legitimacy.
In this sense, the disarmament of Hamas is not the goal itself, but a byproduct of a shifting balance of interests, threats, and security guarantees.
From Military Exhaustion to Managed Transformation
By October 2025, the armed conflict that erupted after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack had reached its systemic limit. Israel achieved significant tactical dominance but failed to secure its strategic objective - the dismantling of Hamas as a political actor. At the same time, Hamas, stripped of infrastructure, command structure, and resources, found itself unable to sustain even minimal governance in Gaza through continued confrontation.
The ceasefire brokered by the United States in the fall of 2025 did not mark a compromise so much as a recognition of mutual exhaustion. In this context, the Trump administration, guided by a transactional approach to foreign policy, prioritized not ideological transformation but the redistribution of responsibility for stabilization.
For the first time in two decades, the question of Hamas’s disarmament was embedded in a multilateral institutional framework - rather than framed as a unilateral Israeli demand. That shift opened a window for Turkiye.
Why Turkiye: The Institutional Asymmetry of Trust
Turkiye’s emergence as a key player stems less from political sympathy and more from the structural deficit of trust among all other stakeholders.
For Israel, Turkiye is a difficult but rational partner: Ankara is not seen as Hamas’s military patron (unlike Iran) yet also not dismissed as a passive echo of Israeli positions, a perception that dogs most European institutions. For Hamas, Turkiye retains a unique status - not as a sponsor, but as a political channel that does not demand surrender as the price of dialogue.
For Washington, Turkiye serves as a regional subcontractor for stabilization - capable of absorbing political risk without committing U.S. troops or resources. The Trump administration’s approach fits neatly into a broader trend of outsourcing crisis management to “middle powers.”
For Egypt and Qatar - longtime mediators in Gaza - the current phase marks the end of their monopoly. Their roles were vital in brokering ceasefires and negotiating hostage exchanges, but proved insufficient for managing the post-conflict landscape.
Disarmament as Process: Turkiye’s Step-by-Step Doctrine
Ankara’s position diverges sharply from the Israeli and American view of disarmament as a precondition or a one-off event. Turkiye’s approach, articulated by its foreign minister, is built around reciprocity and synchronization.
From Turkiye’s perspective, Hamas’s disarmament is only possible if four key conditions are met simultaneously:
Establishment of a Palestinian civil administration in Gaza with internal legitimacy.
Creation of Palestinian public security forces unaffiliated with any faction.
Deployment of an international presence with a limited but guaranteed mandate.
A phased Israeli withdrawal and the dismantling of the permanent threat regime.
This approach contrasts starkly with Israel’s “security first, politics later” doctrine. Ankara argues the opposite: without a political architecture, security is unsustainable - and disarmament without guarantees merely institutionalizes imbalance.
The Political Economy of Disarmament: Hamas’s Interests and Constraints
For Hamas, disarmament is not merely a security issue - it’s an existential political choice that cuts across three dimensions.
First, symbolic capital. Armed resistance has been the core of the movement’s legitimacy since its inception. To lose weapons without gaining political status is to risk marginalization.
Second, institutional control. Over the years, Hamas built a parallel state in Gaza - complete with fiscal, social, and quasi-judicial structures. Disarmament without preserving some administrative role would mean dismantling that system entirely.
Third, regional positioning. Despite strained ties with some actors, Hamas remains embedded in the wider Palestinian and Middle Eastern mosaic. Its decisions are seen by others as precedents.
This is why Turkiye’s gradualist model offers Hamas an off-ramp: a way to convert military loss into political capital rather than capitulation.
Embedding the Process in a New Regional Configuration
The unfolding process cannot be understood in isolation from broader regional shifts. The Eastern Mediterranean is entering a phase of managed multipolarity, in which middle powers - Turkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - are assuming roles once reserved for global centers of influence.
Within this framework, Turkiye’s involvement in Hamas’s disarmament becomes a test of its ability to act not merely as a crisis responder, but as an architect of regional security. The success or failure of this case will directly affect Ankara’s standing across other theaters - from Syria to the Red Sea.
In its current form, Hamas’s disarmament is neither a technical operation nor an act of coercion. It is a layered process of political re-engineering in which Turkiye is not a guarantor for Hamas or an advocate for Israel, but a mechanism for translating conflict from the military to the administrative domain.
Israel’s Position: Strategic Objectives, Tactical Limits
Israel’s second-phase Gaza strategy centers on one uncompromising imperative: to eliminate any chance of Hamas reemerging as a military actor. Israeli leadership harbors no illusion of fully dismantling the movement; its pragmatic goal is to destroy Hamas’s capacity for organized armed resistance.
But this approach exposes a core contradiction. Israel enjoys overwhelming military superiority but lacks both the institutional and political tools to sustain long-term governance in Gaza. Any attempt to maintain an extended military presence inevitably multiplies direct costs and reputational damage. Strategically, the most advantageous path for Israel is to externalize post-conflict management - to offload responsibility beyond its own structures.
This explains Israel’s ambivalent stance toward Turkiye. On one hand, Ankara is viewed as a problematic player with influence channels into Hamas. On the other, it’s seen as the only actor capable of ensuring a minimum level of manageability without Israel’s direct involvement. That duality has gradually softened Israeli rhetoric - from outright rejection to cautious acceptance of Turkish participation in the political, though not the military, dimension of the process.
It’s important to note that Israel’s resistance to the involvement of Turkish troops or security personnel in any international mission is not mere obstinacy. It reflects a deeper anxiety over losing control of how “security” itself is defined. Even formally non-combat structures, in Israel’s view, could evolve into political levers over time.
The American Logic: Transactional Management of Instability
The Trump administration’s approach to Gaza differs sharply from earlier American doctrines. This is not liberal peacebuilding - it’s pragmatic instability management at minimal cost.
Washington’s inclusion of Turkiye, Qatar, and Egypt in the Hamas disarmament process serves three main purposes:
– to minimize direct U.S. involvement;
– to distribute political risk;
– and to avoid institutional commitments that might constrain future flexibility.
For the United States, Hamas’s disarmament is not an end in itself but a barometer of how well the region’s delegated stabilization model can function. This explains Washington’s tolerance for gradualism, ambiguity, and conditionality - so long as one red line remains intact: Hamas must not reconstitute itself as an armed actor.
Tellingly, the U.S. has refrained from imposing rigid timelines. American officials understand that accelerated disarmament without political conversion would not yield stability - it would breed fragmentation and radicalization. In that sense, Washington’s position is closer to Ankara’s than to Israel’s, despite the stark difference in tone.
The International Contingent and the Mandate Problem
One of the most fragile components of the second phase of the Gaza arrangement remains the question of international presence. Formally, the discussion revolves around stabilization forces; in practice, it’s about filling the security vacuum that emerges once Israeli troops begin to withdraw and Hamas starts the disarmament process.
The core dilemma centers on three unresolved issues:
– the source of the mandate’s legitimacy;
– the scope of permissible force;
– and the mechanisms of accountability and decision-making.
Israel insists on strict limits and priority access to its own intelligence data. The Palestinian side, meanwhile, fears that an international presence could morph into a tool of external control. The United States, for its part, wants to avoid a traditional U.N.-style mission, favoring hybrid, less bureaucratic structures.
In this emerging architecture, Turkiye is envisioned as a political interface - bridging contradictions but not deploying troops. This arrangement fits Ankara’s strategic calculus: participation without direct military engagement reduces risk while preserving diplomatic maneuvering room.
The Intra-Palestinian Dimension: A Crisis of Legitimacy and the Search for Balance
No disarmament scenario for Hamas can be implemented without factoring in the internal Palestinian equation. Efforts to establish new governance in Gaza face deep distrust, institutional fragmentation, and the absence of a unifying political figure.
A mechanical return of the Ramallah-based administration - without renegotiating authority and resource distribution - would be seen as externally imposed. Yet maintaining Hamas’s dominance in civil governance undermines the very premise of disarmament.
Turkish diplomacy is betting on hybrid governance models that blend local self-administration, technocratic management, and limited international oversight. This approach doesn’t instantly solve the legitimacy problem, but it helps reframe identity-based conflict into an administrative one - containing tensions and preventing another spiral of escalation.
Possible Scenarios
In the medium term, three core trajectories are conceivable, each shaped by different interactions among political, institutional, and security dynamics.
1. Controlled Transformation. Hamas’s gradual disarmament proceeds in tandem with the creation of a new civilian administration, international monitoring, and a phased - but limited - Israeli withdrawal. Turkiye emerges as the central coordinator and architect of the political process, synchronizing the players and minimizing disruptions. The system remains fragile but functional - a reversible yet tangible step toward political normalization.
2. Institutional Collapse. Disarmament unfolds piecemeal, without credible guarantees or internal Palestinian consensus. The resulting power vacuum and administrative failure fuel the rise of local armed factions, criminalized economies, and renewed cycles of chaotic escalation. This outcome would signify the breakdown of international mediation and the erosion of trust in Turkiye’s initiative.
3. Frozen Instability. The process stalls. Hamas retains covert military networks and political leverage, while international presence remains weak and constrained by a nominal mandate. The conflict doesn’t reignite into full-scale warfare but persists as a chronic source of volatility, punctuated by periodic flare-ups.
Strategic Takeaway
Hamas’s disarmament is less a technical measure than a litmus test for the Middle East’s shift from a war-centric paradigm to a model of governance over complex political ecosystems. Turkiye’s role in this process reflects not so much ambition as necessity - the absence of viable alternatives.
If Ankara manages to balance the competing interests of Israel, the U.S., and Palestinian factions, the Gaza case could set a precedent for a new regional security framework built on delegated responsibility and institutional interdependence. If not, Gaza risks remaining a space of perpetual instability - where disarmament becomes not a milestone toward peace, but merely an intermission between cycles of violence.
Ultimately, Hamas’s disarmament must be seen as part of a broader political transformation, not an isolated technical task. Gradualism and mutual guarantees are not concessions - they are prerequisites for a durable postwar settlement. Turkiye functions as an institutional broker rather than a security guarantor; its influence derives from flexibility, not coercion. The United States treats Gaza as a test case for the viability of delegated conflict management by middle powers. Israel, meanwhile, seeks to minimize costs while maintaining control over security parameters - without assuming direct governance of the territory.