Is the revival of the Syrian–Israeli negotiation track an attempt at de-escalation—or, on the contrary, a way to formalize a new kind of regional rivalry, where security serves as the legitimizing language for redistributing influence, and Syria itself is reduced to an arena for the collision of Turkish and Israeli strategic projections?
Diplomacy as a Façade for Structural Conflict
The Paris round of Syrian–Israeli talks, conducted with active U.S. mediation, can easily be read at first glance as a return to dialogue after a long hiatus. A closer look, however, suggests something very different: not the revival of a classic peace process, but a symptom of a much deeper transformation in the region’s security architecture.
The formulas rolled out after the meeting—“a working atmosphere,” “constructive dialogue,” “readiness to continue contacts”—are standard diplomatic euphemisms, usually deployed when there is little of substance to report. On none of the core issues did the parties move closer to compromise: territorial parameters, security arrangements in southern Syria, the role of third actors, and, most critically, the Turkish factor.
The systemic problem is that these talks are unfolding not in a context of stabilization, but amid a structural power vacuum that emerged after the collapse of the old Syrian regime. That vacuum has not become a window for peace. It has become a competitive arena for regional actors with fundamentally incompatible strategic objectives.
From Bilateral Dialogue to a Multi-Layered Clash of Interests
Historically, the Syrian–Israeli track revolved around a relatively clear agenda: the Golan Heights, ceasefire regimes, force separation, and incident-prevention mechanisms. Even the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, limited as it was, produced a baseline of predictability.
Today’s format is fundamentally different. It is no longer confined to the Damascus–Jerusalem axis, but embedded in a far broader configuration involving the United States, Turkey, Iran, the Kurdish question, the Druze card, and the post-Assad transformation of Syrian statehood.
That is why Israeli demands now extend well beyond traditional security logic. Control over high ground, the demilitarization of southern Syria, the creation of a “security corridor” toward Jabal al-Druze—these are not temporary stabilization measures. They are elements of a deeper strategic projection.
From Ankara’s perspective, this framing points to an Israeli effort to institutionalize its de facto military presence on Syrian territory under the cover of negotiations—turning tactical advantages into long-term geopolitical positions.
Demilitarization as a Model of Asymmetric Sovereignty
Israel’s demand for the demilitarization of southern Syria, extending deep toward Damascus, is more than a hardline negotiating stance. It is an attempt to impose a model of asymmetric sovereignty: formal statehood preserved, but real control over defense and external partnerships sharply constrained.
International practice offers precedents—postwar Japan, Cold War–era Germany, contemporary cases of limited sovereignty under external management. The Syrian case, however, differs in one crucial respect: there is no consensus among external actors, only overlapping and often hostile interests.
For Turkey, such a scenario is unacceptable for several reasons.
First, demilitarizing southern Syria would automatically create a security imbalance, leaving the north—where Turkey wields influence—under constant strategic pressure from the south.
Second, weakening central authority in Damascus objectively fuels separatist and autonomist tendencies, including the Kurdish factor, directly threatening Turkish national interests.
Third, locking demilitarization into legally binding arrangements would effectively block Syria from developing полноценные defense partnerships, including cooperation with Turkey itself.
The Turkish Factor at the Core of Israeli Concerns
A central element of Israel’s position is its demand to prevent the deployment of Turkish military infrastructure on Syrian territory. Unlike other points, this one is strategic rather than tactical.
For Jerusalem, the presence of Turkish air bases, radar systems, and air-defense assets would fundamentally alter the balance of power. Turkey is not just another actor: it has a mature defense industry, integration into Western security systems, and an autonomous strategic culture.
From Israel’s standpoint, Syria under these conditions ceases to function as a buffer zone and instead becomes an Ankara-backed forward platform—severely constraining Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian airspace and in operations against Iran and its allies.
For Turkey, however, such restrictions would amount to accepting an external veto over its regional policy—something that runs counter both to Ankara’s doctrine of strategic autonomy and to the logic of its engagement in Syria after Assad’s fall.
The Collapse of the Old Regime and a New Conflict Logic
The overthrow of the old Syrian regime in late 2024 marked a watershed moment. Turkey, which had bet on dismantling an ineffective and hostile power configuration in Damascus, achieved what it viewed as a core condition of its own security.
Israel, by contrast, had favored managed stagnation: a weakened but predictable regime that allowed near-unrestricted operational freedom without the emergence of a new center of power.
The resulting vacuum prompted Israel to expand its freedom of action in the air and on the ground, carving out corridors for strikes against regional adversaries. Turkey, meanwhile, saw an opening to construct a new architecture of influence, combining military presence with institutional and economic penetration.
It is here that a systemic Turkish–Israeli rivalry takes shape—one that extends far beyond Syria and touches the foundations of the regional balance.
The Paris talks are not a step toward peace in the classical sense. They are a mechanism of managed uncertainty, through which each side seeks to lock in favorable parameters of a future order, without possessing either the resources or the political will for a final settlement.
For Turkey, the core objective is not to derail negotiations, but to prevent them from becoming a vehicle for institutionalizing Israeli unilateral advantages.
The Military-Technological Dimension: Asymmetry Without Guaranteed Supremacy
One of the key factors shaping the current dynamics of Turkish–Israeli competition in Syria is the fundamentally different structure of their military capabilities. A superficial reading suggests Israel enjoys overwhelming superiority thanks to advanced intelligence systems, precision-strike capabilities, and a deeply integrated intelligence–strike complex. That assessment, however, oversimplifies reality and overlooks the structural limits of Israel’s military model in a prolonged, multi-front confrontation.
Israeli doctrine has historically prioritized short, high-intensity campaigns built around air dominance, intelligence superiority, and rapid decision-making. This approach has proven effective against non-state actors and in limited conflicts with clearly defined objectives. The Syrian theater in its current form is something else entirely.
First, it is an environment crowded with external actors, where any escalation instantly becomes multi-layered. Second, the presence of Turkey—a state with a full-spectrum army, deep strategic depth, and an autonomous defense industry—radically alters risk calculations.
Over the past fifteen years, Turkey has systematically transformed its military model. Domestic production now accounts for roughly three-quarters of its defense needs, reducing vulnerability to external pressure and sanctions. The mass deployment of unmanned systems, the development of network-centric command capabilities, and the modernization of naval and ground forces have created a scalability effect that the Israeli military lacks.
The key difference lies not so much in the level of technology, but in the ability to sustain a prolonged confrontation without critical resource exhaustion. On that metric, Turkey holds a structural advantage—especially if the conflict does not take the form of a lightning campaign.
Syria’s Airspace as a Strategic Bargaining Chip
Control over Syrian airspace has become one of the central battlegrounds of the confrontation. For Israel, it is a critical instrument of power projection, enabling strikes against regional adversaries—above all Iranian targets and allied infrastructure. Freedom of action in the air is the cornerstone of Israel’s deterrence strategy.
For Turkey, by contrast, the restoration and use of Syrian airfields is framed as part of long-term stabilization and support for the new leadership in Damascus. This is not merely a military issue. It also concerns control over logistics, humanitarian flows, and the broader process of institutional reconstruction.
Israeli airstrikes on facilities Ankara had planned to activate were perceived in Turkey not as isolated tactical episodes, but as an attempt to impose unilateral rules of the game. That perception sharply narrowed the space for compromise and reinforced the belief that Israel is using the negotiation track in parallel with coercive pressure.
As a result, Syrian airspace has become a litmus test of real intentions, a domain where diplomacy and military practice increasingly collide rather than reinforce one another.
Alliance Systems: Expansion Versus Deepening
Equally significant is the divergence in how the two states approach alliance-building. Turkey operates through a model of expanded network diplomacy, drawing on its NATO membership, pragmatic engagement with Washington, active channels with Gulf states, and growing influence across the Turkic and Muslim worlds.
This model avoids rigid bloc discipline, but gives Ankara flexibility and room to maneuver. In the Syrian context, it allows Turkey to act simultaneously as security guarantor, political broker, and economic sponsor of the new leadership in Damascus.
Israel’s strategy, by contrast, is defined by the deepening of a relatively narrow circle of partnerships. Intensified cooperation with Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration reflects an effort to build a regional counterweight to Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. Yet this configuration has limited power-projection capacity beyond the maritime theater and translates poorly into the Syrian reality.
At the same time, the aftermath of recent operations in Gaza and the confrontation with Iran has complicated Israel’s relations with a number of Western partners. This does not amount to a loss of support, but it does reduce allies’ willingness to automatically legitimize every use of Israeli force.
Economic Resilience as a Strategic Variable
The economic dimension of the rivalry is often underestimated, yet in a prolonged confrontation it can become decisive. Israel’s economy, despite its technological sophistication, remains sensitive to external shocks. Declining tourism revenues, rising security expenditures, labor shortages, and the high-tech sector’s dependence on foreign investment all increase vulnerability.
Turkey, for its part, grapples with chronic macroeconomic problems, including high inflation and structural imbalances. Yet the Turkish economy retains a significant capacity for adaptation thanks to its scale, diversified industrial base, and labor resources.
In a drawn-out conflict, the ability to reallocate resources and sustain military production without triggering a critical socio-economic breakdown may prove decisive. In this respect, Turkey appears the more resilient actor, despite its current economic strains.
Scenario Logic: From Managed Rivalry to a Point of No Return
An analysis of current dynamics points to three basic scenarios.
The first is managed rivalry. Here, the sides continue competing for influence in Syria while avoiding direct confrontation. The negotiation track serves as a channel for de-escalation and signaling, while military activity is limited to demonstrative actions and pinpoint strikes. This scenario requires a high degree of rational restraint and sustained external mediation, primarily by the United States.
The second scenario is limited military escalation. This would involve incidents between Turkish and Israeli forces that stop short of full-scale conflict but sharply deteriorate relations. The danger lies in cumulative effects, where each new escalation lowers the threshold for the use of force.
The third scenario is direct confrontation, even if confined geographically. Its probability remains relatively low, but the consequences would be systemic—extending beyond Syria to a redistribution of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, a reconfiguration of relations within NATO, and a reassessment of the region’s security architecture.
Turkish–Israeli rivalry in Syria is not a byproduct of the Syrian crisis; it is its new systemic phase. Negotiations like the Paris round do not remove the root causes of conflict. They merely impose a temporary structure on it.
For Turkey, the core challenge is to preserve strategic initiative without being drawn into premature escalation. That requires a careful blend of military restraint, institutional presence, and active diplomacy.
Syria as a Testing Ground for a New Regional Architecture
The key mistake of most superficial interpretations is treating Syria solely as an object of external influence. In reality, Syrian space has evolved into a structural node where the interests of states with incompatible views of security, sovereignty, and the permissible limits of military presence intersect.
After the fall of the old regime, Syria ceased to be a centralized actor—but it also ceased to be a passive periphery. The new leadership in Damascus has been embedded in a competitive environment where every form of support automatically acquires geopolitical significance. In this context, Syrian–Israeli negotiations are not a mechanism for settlement, but part of a struggle to define the rules of a future order.
For Turkey, this means the Syrian file can no longer be treated as a temporary crisis agenda. It becomes a long-term strategic priority, comparable in importance to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea region.
Security as a Language of Pressure and a Tool of Legitimization
Israel’s negotiating strategy displays a clear pattern: security is used not as a subject of compromise, but as a universal argument to justify the expansion of de facto control. Demilitarization demands, restrictions on third-party presence, and the creation of security corridors all contribute to a new norm in which sovereignty becomes conditional and subject to constant external verification.
From Ankara’s perspective, this logic carries systemic risks. Accepting it in the Syrian case would set a dangerous precedent, applicable to other regions where Turkey pursues an active foreign policy. At stake is an attempt to entrench a regional hierarchy in which certain states claim the right to define acceptable forms of security for their neighbors.
That is why it is critical for Turkey to prevent the negotiation process from being transformed into a mechanism for legitimizing unilateral Israeli demands—even when those demands are wrapped in the language of diplomacy.
Turkey as a System-Shaping Actor, Not a Party to the Conflict
One of Ankara’s key strategic advantages lies in its ability to operate not as a reactive player, but as a system-shaping actor. Turkey’s presence in Syria cannot be reduced to military bases or security arrangements. It encompasses institution-building, economic integration, infrastructure reconstruction, and the cultivation of administrative cadres.
This comprehensive approach fundamentally distinguishes the Turkish strategy from Israel’s, which remains largely centered on coercive deterrence and intelligence dominance. Over the long term, it is the capacity to build durable administrative and economic structures—not episodic military superiority—that determines real influence on the ground.
For Ankara, it is strategically advantageous to entrench an image of a guarantor of stability rather than an agent of escalation. That posture strengthens Turkey’s negotiating position not only in Syria, but also in its dialogue with the United States, European governments, and regional partners.
The United States: Mediation Without Strategic Dominance
Washington’s mediating role in the Paris round reflects a broader shift in the American approach to the Middle East. The United States no longer seeks to directly manage regional processes, instead limiting itself to the role of moderator and crisis manager.
For Turkey, this creates both opportunities and constraints. On the one hand, the erosion of U.S. strategic dominance expands the space for autonomous action. On the other, it reduces the likelihood of firm external arbitration capable of rapidly halting escalation.
In this environment, Ankara is forced to construct its own conflict-prevention mechanisms, without relying on automatic intervention by allies.
Long-Term Trajectories: What Is at Stake
In the long run, Turkish–Israeli rivalry in Syria reaches far beyond control over individual territories or facilities. At stake are:
– the model of regional order, whether based on a balance of influence or a hierarchy of security;
– the acceptable forms of military presence beyond national borders;
– the role of middle powers amid the fragmentation of global governance;
– the limits of allied autonomy within Western structures.
For Turkey, it is essential that the emerging order does not institutionalize regional exceptionalism for select actors or undermine the foundations of multipolarity.
Strategic Recommendations from a Turkish Perspective
- Preserve and deepen institutional presence in Syria
Turkey should continue strengthening institutional ties with the new Syrian leadership, prioritizing long-term state-building over reliance on purely military tools. - Reject the formalization of external vetoes
Any attempt to legally codify restrictions on Turkish presence must be treated as unacceptable, regardless of format or intermediaries. - Practice controlled military restraint
Ankara benefits from avoiding direct clashes while maintaining the capacity for rapid and decisive force if its interests are threatened. - Expand diplomatic formats
Turkey should push for multilateral frameworks on Syrian security, diluting the bilateral logic that currently favors Israel. - Leverage economic integration as influence
Infrastructure reconstruction, trade networks, and energy projects can anchor Turkish influence far more reliably than any military base.
Final Assessment
Syrian–Israeli negotiations in their current form are not a pathway to peace. They are a mechanism for structuring rivalry amid the collapse of the old regional order. For Turkey, the central task is not to “win” a particular round of talks, but to prevent the emergence of rules that run counter to its long-term interests.
Ankara is entering a new phase of Middle Eastern politics not as a peripheral participant, but as one of the architects of the future regional balance. The outcome of the Syrian knot will test Turkey’s ability to convert military, economic, and diplomatic power into sustained strategic influence.