In October 2025 the city of Gabala served not just as a picturesque backdrop for yet another summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) — it became the first visible arena in which a new geopolitical map was sketched: from Ankara to Samarkand, from Baku to Astana, contours of a self‑standing Eurasian power centre took form. Amid the protracted war in Eastern Europe, U.S.–China competition, sanctions warfare and a reshaping global energy system, this modest Caucasus city materialised a compelling vision: not an empire, not a military bloc, not an ideological alliance — but a network of sovereign states leveraging cultural kinship and transport‑energy connectivity to build strategic autonomy.
The central research question of this article can be formulated as follows: Can the Turkic world over the next two decades transform from a primarily cultural‑civilisational space into a stable politico‑economic union, comparable in influence to other regional blocs—and what conditions are critical for this transition?
The answer is far from obvious. On one hand, the combined nominal GDP of the OTS member‑states is approaching US$2 trillion and their population exceeds 160 million — dimensions that already put the grouping in the league of significant regional economies. In 2022‑2024 intra‑OTS trade has grown at a rate noticeably ahead of global averages, and freight flows along the Middle Corridor through the Caspian are doubling, turning the “Turkic belt” into a key land bridge between China and Europe.
On the other hand, we are dealing with a deeply heterogenous construct: authoritarian and semi‑democratic regimes, divergent economic models, competing regional ambitions, overlapping external influence lines from Russia, China, the EU, the U.S., Iran and Arab states. The Turkic world remains “sandwiched” between great powers, while 20th‑century historical traumas make any supranational project politically sensitive.
This article treats Turkic integration not as a mere set of ceremonial declarations, but as a forming structure in a shifting Eurasian architecture. We proceed sequentially to:
reconstruct the historical‑political evolution of the idea of Turkic unity from pre‑revolutionary pan‑Turkism to the institutionalisation of the OTS;
analyse the key geopolitical impulses driving rapprochement among Ankara, Baku, Astana, Tashkent and Bishkek;
examine the economic substrate of integration – from trade and investment to Middle Corridor projects and the gas agenda;
assess the cultural‑identity dimension of the Turkic project as a long‑term resilience factor;
unpack external and internal constraints, including competition from external power centres and internal asymmetries within the Turkic world;
propose scenarios through to 2040 and articulate targeted recommendations for policymakers and strategists.
The somewhat surprising—but well‑argued—conclusion is that Turkic integration has already transcended “cultural nostalgia” and is being converted into one of the key instruments in resetting the Eurasian balance. Crucially, this is not about creating a “Turkic superpower”, but rather a more subtle architecture: a flexible, networked alliance of sovereign states, which, with prudent management, could deliver for OTS countries a markedly different level of strategic autonomy, without tearing up existing international regimes.
Historical‑Political Background: From early Turkism to the Organization of Turkic States
Turkic integration did not emerge “out of nothing” after the collapse of the USSR. Its intellectual foundation was laid already in the late 19th–early 20th centuries, when figures such as Ismail Gasprinsky, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp articulated the slogan “unity of language, thought and deed” for the Turkic peoples of the Ottoman and Russian empires. Early pan‑Turkism was conceived as a cultural and educational revival project, later evolving into a political answer to the collapse of empires and colonial pressures.
The first wave of political materialisation of this idea occurred in 1918‑1920: the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, short‑lived republics and autonomies in the Volga region, North Caucasus and Turkestan, projects like the Alash Orda in Kazakhstan — all these were attempts to channel Turkic self‑consciousness into the format of statehood. These attempts were crushed by the Soviet project: the Turkic peoples were divided among union republics and autonomies, and the idea of pan‑Turkism was declared “bourgeois‑nationalist”.
Soviet national policy deliberately “stitched apart” the unitary space: administrative boundaries in Central Asia and the Caucasus were drawn to create lines of friction — including the Zangezur corridor that cut Azerbaijan off from the rest of the Turkic area in the east. After the 1930s repressions the Turkic question in the USSR retreated into the shadows, while the Turkish Republic, forged by the Kemalists, embraced its own national project and reduced pan‑Turkism to cultural dimensions.
A cardinal shift occurred in 1991. The independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan created a qualitatively new reality: for the first time in history, a “fan” of sovereign Turkic states emerged from the Mediterranean (Turkey) to the Ferghana valley. This window of possibility almost automatically relaunched early Turkist concepts — but in a different packaging: no longer as a single state, but as an inter‑state cooperation platform.
The first post‑Soviet phase of Turkic rapprochement (the 1990s) was largely symbolic and cultural. On Ankara’s initiative in 1992 the first summit of Turkic‑state leaders took place, cultural mechanisms (TURKSOY, educational programmes, scholarships) began to operate. The formula of Heydar Aliyev “one nation – two states” set the framework for special Turkish‑Azerbaijani relations and became the matrix for the broader slogan “one nation – many states”.
But structural constraints were obvious: the young republics were preoccupied with internal state‑building, and Moscow and Beijing watched any Turkic rapprochement as a potential challenge to their influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the 1990s Turkey itself was in deep economic and political difficulty and could not offer a full institutional framework.
The transition from symbolism to institutionalisation occurred in 2009 with the signing of the Nakhchivan Agreement and the creation of the Council of Cooperation of Turkic‑Speaking States, later transformed into the OTS. The key feature of this format was the combination of three levels:
political‑diplomatic (regular summits of heads of state, meetings of ministers);
economic (coordination of transport, trade and energy policy);
humanitarian‑identity (TURKSOY, Turkic Academy, standardising alphabets and textbooks).
By the mid‑2020s the OTS, uniting Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (with Turkmenistan, Hungary and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as observers), had moved from being a “club of common values” to a structure aspiring to the role of an independent geostrategic actor.
Thus the historical‑political background of Turkic integration may be described as the evolution from a suppressed cultural idea to institutional realisation. This is an important point: today’s integration is not an artificial political construct, but a late institutionalisation of a long historical trend, upon which a new geopolitical conjuncture is now superimposed.
Geopolitical Impulses: The Turkic World Between Russia, China and the West
In the second half of the 2010s and especially during the 2020s the global system of power began to shift in fundamental ways:
Russia’s war against Ukraine and its confrontation with the collective West;
the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China;
an accelerated decarbonisation push and an energy‑transition wave;
the rising importance of regional blocs and “minilateral” groupings (AUKUS, I2U2, the India–Middle East–Europe format, among others).
For the Turkic states these trends created several external shocks at once — shocks that made collective action a rational choice.
First: the changing role of Russia. For decades Moscow functioned as the key security provider and economic infrastructural hub for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and in part Azerbaijan. Membership in the CSTO and the EAEU was regarded as a foundational layer of foreign policy. But the war in Ukraine, the sanctions blow to Russia’s economy and increasing rhetoric about the “artificiality” of post‑Soviet borders have been received with unease in Astana and other capitals.
At the same time the institutional architecture of the EAEU concretely embeds economic asymmetry: Russia collects about 85 % of the union’s customs revenues while Kazakhstan accounts for only ~7%, despite rising import volumes through Kazakhstan after 2022. This imbalance, combined with the risk of secondary sanctions, spurs a search for alternatives — and Turkic integration becomes one of those instruments of gradual diversification.
Second: the China factor. Over two decades the People’s Republic of China has become the major trading partner and creditor for Central Asia. The Belt & Road Initiative turned the region into a vital link of China’s overland routes. However, growing dependency on Beijing (including indebtedness, infrastructure‑project concentration, and sensitivity to China’s internal agenda such as the Uyghur issue) introduces long‑term risks for Central Asian elites.
In this environment coordination under the umbrella of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) offers a pathway to a more balanced strategy: by acting not solo, but as a cluster of transit states, they can negotiate better terms, advance alternative routes (via the Caspian and Caucasus), and reduce their political vulnerability by leaning not only on China but also on Turkey, the EU and the Middle East.
Third: the West’s response to the war in Europe and the energy crisis. The 2022 memorandum of strategic energy partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan — envisioning Azerbaijani gas supplies to Europe of at least 20 billion m³ by 2027 — marks a concrete institutional anchor for the new role of the Southern Gas Corridor. This in turn reinforces the importance of Azerbaijan and Turkey as energy‑transit nodes for Europe.
In effect the EU is “plugging in” part of the Turkic bloc into its strategy of reducing dependency on Russian energy supplies. This gives Baku and Ankara additional leverage with Brussels and simultaneously prompts Central Asian states to see Turkic integration as a route into European markets — bypassing sanction‑affected, politically toxic, or vulnerable pathways through Russia.
Finally: on the southern flank the integration directly affects the balance with Iran and the Arab world. The Turkish‑Azerbaijani alliance, Azerbaijan’s post‑conflict control over Karabah, the question of the Zangezur corridor, and Turkey’s expanding footprint in Syria and Iraq alarm Tehran — but also push it into adjusting to the new reality.
Altogether these factors establish a clear logic:
If Turkic states act individually, they inevitably become mere “variables” in other actors’ equations — Russian, Chinese, Western, Iranian.
In a coordinated format they gain the potential to act as a “third vector” — not antagonistic to the major powers, but autonomous in setting their priorities.
It is precisely for this reason that in OTS documents and leader speeches we increasingly see the argument of the Turkic states as a “new geopolitical centre” of Eurasia.
Economic Base: Growth of Intra‑zone Trade, the Middle Corridor and Investment Mechanisms
Political subjectivity of a regional bloc without a robust economic base turns into mere rhetoric. In the case of Turkic integration the economic dimension is advancing faster than many expect.
According to the latest estimates the combined nominal GDP of OTS countries stands around US$1.8‑2 trillion, and at purchasing‑power parity exceeds US$5 trillion. They represent approximately 1.5‑2 % of global GDP and a comparable share of world population — but a higher share in exports of oil, gas, uranium, grain and certain metals.
A key shift in recent years is the trend in mutual trade. In 2023 the external trade turnover of OTS states reached about US$1.5 trillion, and intra‑member trade rose from US$30.9 billion in 2022 to US$38.3 billion in 2023 (nearly +25 % in a single year); for 2024 the forecast exceeds US$45 billion. While this still constitutes only 5‑7 % of total trade, the growth trend is evident — closely tied to the transport‑logistics restructuring.
The so‑called “Middle Corridor” (Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route, TITR) represents the most important material backbone of the Turkic integration. After 2022, when sanctions and military risk sharply reduced the attractiveness of the northern route through Russia, freight flows on the Middle Corridor multiplied. In 2023 the volume transported via TITR reached about 2.7 million tonnes — up ~65 % compared with 2022.
In practical terms this means:
The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway has linked the Caucasus and Turkey networks, enabling the route China → Kazakhstan → Caspian → Azerbaijan → Georgia → Turkey → Europe.
Ports such as Aktau and Kuryk in Kazakhstan, Aliat in Azerbaijan and Turkish Black Sea / Mediterranean ports have become nodes in a single logistics chain.
OTS states have begun unifying tariff policy and procedures, creating a “single window” for shippers.
In parallel the energy dimension is evolving. The Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey into Europe, after the EU–Azerbaijan agreement, now has a clear vector for expansion to 20 billion m³ for Europe by 2027.
For the Turkic world this implies:
Azerbaijan’s role as a gas supplier not only to Turkey and neighbours, but also to European markets is being consolidated.
Turkey, as the transit country and consumer, becomes institutionally embedded in the Caspian–Europe link.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan hold the medium‑term potential to join via oil and gas export projects bypassing Russia.
Another important element is the Turkic Investment Fund, established in 2023 with stated capital of US$500 million and subsequently raised authorised capital to US$600 million. The fund is designed as a specialised financial institution of the OTS, tasked with:
Financing infrastructure and production projects that have integrative effect;
Reducing risks for private investors;
Partially performing the role of a “mini‑development bank” for the Turkic space.
While its scale remains modest relative to global institutions, its creation is principled — the first step toward forming an independent financial circuit, reducing dependence on external financial centres and sanction‑sensitive channels.
Moreover, sectoral cooperation must be noted: Turkish business holds firm positions in construction, textiles and engineering in Central Asia; Azerbaijani capital is actively present in Turkish energy and logistics; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan invest in joint industrial zones and agro‑projects.
In aggregate this is the embryonic formation of a “Turkic economic zone” — not yet a single customs space, but with growing density of mutual ties and infrastructural stitching. Looking ahead to 2040, if current growth rates hold and announced projects are realised, the share of intra‑OTS trade may double, approaching 15‑20 % of external trade turnover — at which point it will be comparable with some phases in the evolution of ASEAN.
Cultural‑Identity Dimension: Soft Power from Within
Unlike most regional blocs, the Turkic project rests on a powerful “intangible asset”: deep cultural kinship, linguistic proximity and overlapping historical memory. In an era where global politics increasingly turns on competing value‑narratives and identities, this resource becomes not a mere add‑on but at times the deciding factor.
On the level of “hard tools” of identity integration key steps have already been taken:
The shift from Cyrillic to Latin scripts in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (and soon in Kazakhstan) creates a foundational visual unification of written language.
The Turkic Academy (Astana) and TÜRKSOY coordinate research and cultural programmes, producing a shared panorama of Turkic history and culture.
Annual designation of a “Cultural Capital of the Turkic World” and the hosting of festivals, exhibitions and conferences provide a stable calendar of joint events.
On the level of “soft‑practice” integration one sees:
Large numbers of students from Central Asia and the Caucasus pursuing studies in Turkish universities under state scholarship schemes;
Academic and educational exchanges between Baku, Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek and Ankara;
Increased presence of Turkish and Azerbaijani media‑products (TV‑series, music, news channels) in the media‑space of Central Asia.
These practices are shaping a generation of young elites for whom “the Turkic world” stops being an abstraction and becomes a lived experience: study‑abroad, work‑ties, personal and professional networks across Turkic countries. Over the long term these horizontal networks are the bedrock of integration’s resilience — even if political cycles change.
Crucially, in official discourse Turkic identity is framed not as a closed ethnocentric project but as an open, supra‑national framework compatible with internal diversity. For instance, Kazakhstan continues to present itself as a multi‑ethnic state with a Turkic core, and Azerbaijan emphasizes a tradition of religious and ethnoconfessional tolerance. This reduces the risk of alienating non‑Turkic minorities and weakens the ability of external actors to exploit domestic fears.
At the same time, the identity‑front carries important challenges: competing national historical narratives, risk of one country “monopolising” shared heritage, debates over the status of certain historical figures and periods. That’s precisely why efforts to develop joint history textbooks, common canonical narratives and Pan‑Turkic symbols (without attempting to “privatise” the past) matter less for show and more for strategic durability.
Restrictions and Risks: Asymmetry, External Pressure and Institutional Incompleteness
Even with impressive progress, by 2025 the Turkic integration project remains unfinished—for several reasons.
First: asymmetry of power and interests within the bloc. Turkey is the largest economy and military actor in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and has its own regional ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa. This makes it a natural but delicate leader. Other members — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan — have their own regional priorities and are not ready to become “junior partners”.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assert leadership in Central Asia;
Azerbaijan is becoming a logistic hub between Turkey and Central Asia and seeks to monetise that role;
Turkey wants Turkic integration to strengthen its negotiating position with the EU, U.S., Russia and Arab countries.
Managing this multi‑layered competition requires a finely tuned system of balances and procedures — absent that, integration may stall.
Second: institutional incompleteness. The OTS is as yet neither a customs union nor an economic union, much less a defence bloc.
There is no comprehensive free‑trade regime among all members;
There is no unified arbitration mechanism for economic disputes;
Military cooperation remains bilateral and irregular;
External‑policy coordination mechanisms are largely consultative.
On one hand this flexible architecture accommodates sovereign sensitivities and limits risk of sharp conflict of interests. On the other it slows the pace and depth of integration, leaving OTS vulnerable to external pressure: any member’s dissent can block joint initiatives.
Third: structural external pressure. Russia, China, Iran and in different forms parts of Europe keep close watch on the Turkic project, attempting to:
integrate it into their own architectures (SCO, EAEU, “EU‑Central Asia” formats);
minimise influence of its most sensitive components (energy transit bypassing Russia/Iran, Uyghur question for China, military dimension for Russia and Iran).
The more tangible the potential of a Turkic alliance becomes, the greater the likelihood that external powers will seek to “stretch” or “divide” it, offering individual states attractive bilateral deals to temper integration initiatives.
Finally: domestic political risks. Varying levels of political stability, differences in regime types, government turnover and reform pace create risk of fragmentation in moments of crisis. Political turbulence in one member (e.g., a sudden power transition or large‑scale protest) can not only slow national contribution to integration but also open a channel for external intervention that undermines the whole construct.
Advanced Integration Scenario: “Eurasian ASEAN Plus”
In this variant the tipping point emerges from a combination of factors:
sustained economic growth in the OTS countries while maintaining demographic potential;
successful delivery of major infrastructure projects (scaling the Middle Corridor, adding new energy capacities, securing digital “interlinking”);
political will among leaders to codify achievements through new agreements.
By 2040 under this scenario:
a free‑trade zone of the OTS is formed, gradually moving toward partial tariff‑policy harmonisation vis‑à‑vis third countries;
the Turkic Investment Fund transforms into a full‑fledged “development bank” for the Turkic space, capitalised at $5‑10 billion and attracting external financing lines;
a durable mechanism for foreign‑policy coordination emerges — not a uniform position on all issues, but agreed practices on key regional agendas (Karabah, Zangezur, Afghanistan, energy);
military cooperation takes shape through regular joint exercises, procurement coordination and intelligence‑sharing — yet without a formal defence bloc.
In this scenario the Turkic world becomes the “Eurasian ASEAN”: a flexible block that doesn’t pit itself against any global player but negotiates effectively for the group.
Negative Scenario: Fragmentation Under Crisis
Here integration stalls or rolls back under the weight of:
a major external conflict touching one or more OTS states (e.g., escalation in the South Caucasus or Central Asia);
deep domestic political instability in a key member;
sharp economic downturn prompting protectionism and retreat from integration commitments.
In that case the Turkic project returns to being a “symbolic framework”, where declarations of unity are not matched by resources. Real decisions are taken inside alternative groupings — the EAEU, the SCO, bilateral deals with China, Russia, the EU or the U.S.
At present the baseline scenario appears to be the first one, with a tendency toward partial drift into the second. Elite interest in preserving and deepening integration is significantly higher than it was in the 1990s:
- For Azerbaijan, Turkic integration has become a tool to consolidate results in Karabah and raise its role in energy and transit;
- For Kazakhstan, it is a way to diversify dependencies and embed its “multi‑vector” policy into a more resilient regional structure;
- For Uzbekistan, it offers a channel to new markets and infrastructure without surrendering sovereignty;
- For Turkey, it is a lever to enhance its status as an “irreplaceable” actor between Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia.
Recommendations for Policymakers and Strategists in Turkic States
Based on the analysis of trends, opportunities and risks, the following priority actions merit focus:
Institutional “densification” of the OTS without forcing supranational forms.
- Elevate the permanent secretariat from coordination hub to full project‑centre with resources and a mandate to oversee infrastructure, economic and humanitarian initiatives;
- Create specialised permanent sub‑structures (transport, energy, digital agenda, climate, risk‑management) rather than ad‑hoc summit‑to‑summit bodies;
- Formalise monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to move away from “summit declarations” only.
Strategic focus on logistics and transit as the “common denominator.”
- Prioritise joint investment in bottlenecks of the Middle Corridor (ports, trans‑shipment nodes, digitalisation of procedures);
- Align long‑term tariff policy for key routes, modelling competitive alternatives to Russia’s northern corridor or southern routes;
- Coordinate engagement with external partners (EU, international financial institutions) from collective interest perspective, not intra‑state competition.
Building a joint energy strategy.
- Synchronise plans to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, bring Central Asian potential suppliers into the discussion and coordinate positions with the EU;
- Use the OTS as a platform for joint “green energy” development and cross‑border grids, including a “green corridor” from the Caspian/Central Asia into Europe;
- Strengthen coordinated positions in global energy forums and specialist international organisations with a unified agenda.
Transforming the Turkic Investment Fund into the financial core of integration.
- Raise its capital to a level comparable with regional development banks via additional contributions, external partners and bond issuance;
- Focus its mandate on high‑impact trans‑border projects (infrastructure, digital networks, industrial parks, educational clusters);
- Pilot financing in national currencies within the bloc to develop a de‑dollarised practice.
Cautious but steady development of defence and security dimension.
- Enhance coordination in cybersecurity, counter‑terrorism, narcotics trafficking and irregular migration;
- Conduct regular joint drills around natural/techno‑catastrophe response, peacekeeping operations and critical infrastructure defence;
- Develop an officer‑exchange practice and joint training without a formal mutual‑defence obligation, thereby avoiding provocation of neighbours.
Deepening educational and humanitarian integration.
- Expand academic‑exchange programmes and joint master’s degrees, creating a “Pan‑Turkic educational circuit”;
- Develop and introduce agreed textbooks covering Turkic peoples’ history with experts from all OTS countries plus external reviewers to minimise nationalist bias;
- Support independent media platforms and analytic centres focusing on Turkic issues, including joint research networks.
Managing neighbours’ perceived risks.
- Establish systematic dialogue with Russia, China, Iran and the EU emphasising that Turkic integration is not aimed at undermining their legitimate interests but institutionalising natural regional cooperation;
- Avoid rhetoric of a “historic mission” framed in ways that could be interpreted as revisionism toward neighbours;
- Propose an “OTS Plus” format for external‑partner engagement (in transport, energy, security), thus lowering anxiety while reinforcing the bloc’s agency.
Developing systemic scenario planning.
- Regularly commission and publish analytical reports of the “Turkic World – 2030/2040” type in leading think‑tanks of OTS countries, modelling alternative global‐development scenarios and their impact on member interests;
- Use these documents as the basis for inter‑governmental strategic sessions, not just academic studies.
Conclusion
Turkic integration in 2025 is no longer a collection of symbols or the intellectual dream of early 20th‑century thinkers. It is becoming a reality, supported by infrastructure, trade, energy flows and an emerging shared identity.
Its strength lies in the ability to combine historical kinship with pragmatism — avoiding extremes of ethno‑nationalist romanticism or faceless technocratic “regionalism”.
Its vulnerability lies in asymmetries and the multiplicity of external influences, which under unfavourable conditions could unravel the growing network of ties and push the region back into “every state for itself”.
For Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan the key strategic choice is not to “take on” anyone — but to harness fully their position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, North and South, tradition and modernisation. In that sense Turkic integration is not an alternative to other formats but a tool to increase manoeuvrability and the “degree of freedom” in a world where dependence on a single power centre is a strategic risk.
If the elites of the Turkic states are able to use this instrument consistently — through infrastructure projects, coordinated reforms, institutional innovation and thoughtful identity‑work — by mid‑21st century the Turkic world is quite capable of placing itself among mature regional blocs influencing the global agenda.
Not as a new empire — but as a connected yet diverse Eurasian pole that speaks the language of interests, not grievances; of numbers, not slogans.
And in that context analytical centres like the Baku Network, able to combine Azerbaijan’s national perspective with a broad Pan‑Turkic and global lens, become not peripheral commentators but one of the key tools of strategic thinking in the new Turkic century.