Eurasia is entering another era in which the fate of entire regions is shaped not only by armies, diplomatic notes, and summit declarations, but also by railway lines, border terminals, dry ports, tariff agreements, and transport hubs. Where empires once drew borders with bayonets, states now lay tracks, build logistics centers, and fight for the right to become an indispensable link between North and South, East and West.
The Trans-Afghan Railway is one of those projects that may look, at first glance, like an ordinary infrastructure initiative. Yet behind the dry language of mileage, feasibility studies, terminals, and routes lies a far larger geopolitical picture. This is an attempt to reconnect Central Asia with South Asia, give Uzbekistan access to Indian Ocean ports, turn Afghanistan into a transit territory, increase the importance of Pakistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, and integrate Russia and the Caspian region into a new overland architecture of Eurasia.
Afghanistan is no longer viewed only as a symbol of instability. It is again becoming a space where the competing interests of regional and global players intersect. This time, however, the issue is not military control. It is control over routes, freight flows, and the future economic geography of the continent.
Uzbekistan: Southern Access as a Strategic Necessity
For Uzbekistan, the Trans-Afghan Railway is not an exercise in political romanticism. It is a matter of national economic logic. The country is landlocked, and for that reason access to southern ports remains one of Tashkent’s central strategic priorities.
Since 2018, Uzbekistan has consistently promoted the idea of a railway outlet through Afghanistan toward Pakistan. Initially, the project was most often described as the Termez - Mazar-i-Sharif - Kabul - Peshawar route. That formula became familiar in expert circles and political commentary. In its later and more technically refined configuration, however, the line is discussed as Termez - Naibabad - Maidan Shahr - Logar - Kharlachi, with further connection to Pakistan’s transport system.
This distinction matters because the details of the route show that the project has long since moved beyond broad declarations and entered the realm of concrete engineering and diplomatic work. Uzbekistan is not merely talking about the need to reach the sea. It is building a route that should shorten the distance to Pakistani ports, expand the country’s export opportunities, and strengthen its role as a central transport hub in the region.
At the same time, real facts must be separated from erroneous or premature claims. One formulation occasionally found in public discussion says that by 2020 the project had already received support from Qatar and the UAE, and that the ADL-Ulanish joint venture had been created. That timeline is incorrect. ADL-Ulanish was created later, in 2023, as a joint structure involving AD Ports Group and SEG ENERA Group. Linking that venture to 2020 is therefore inaccurate.
Qatar’s role also requires precise wording. Qatar became actively involved in discussions on the Trans-Afghan Railway in 2024, when a meeting was held in Tashkent with the participation of Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Qatar. The parties discussed the financial, technical, and organizational aspects of the future railway. The UAE, for its part, is present in this field through the logistics and investment dimension, including AD Ports Group. But it would be wrong to claim that Qatar and the UAE had already formalized support for the project in its current form back in 2020.
After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, the project slowed down. That was inevitable. The change of power, the lack of international recognition of the new authorities in Kabul, security concerns, and financing risks could not help but affect the pace of implementation. Yet Uzbekistan did not close the Afghan track. On the contrary, Tashkent continued to work with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities, understanding that without Kabul, not a single kilometer of the Trans-Afghan railway can be built.
In February 2025, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar visited Tashkent. Following the visit, the Afghan side announced an agreement to conduct preliminary studies on extending the railway from Hairatan toward Herat, with the initial costs to be covered by the Uzbek side. Here, too, caution is necessary. This does not mean that Uzbekistan abandoned the Kabul corridor or fully shifted toward the Kandahar route. It is more accurate to say that Tashkent is trying to keep several southern options open at the same time.
One route through Kabul and Kharlachi offers access to Pakistan’s transport system. Another, through Herat, Dilaram, Kandahar, and Chaman, could provide Uzbekistan with an additional west-south link to Pakistan and Iran. For a landlocked country, this kind of multi-vector approach is not a luxury. It is strategic insurance.
This is where the maturity of Uzbekistan’s approach becomes clear. Tashkent is not putting everything on one track. It is trying to create a system of routes in which each corridor strengthens the others. The Kabul route offers the shortest logic of access to Pakistan. The Herat-Kandahar route expands room for maneuver, connecting Uzbekistan with western Afghanistan, the Iranian direction, and southern ports.
For that reason, any serious analysis should exclude the unverified claim that Uzbekistan allocated $115 million for feasibility studies of the Kabul and Kandahar routes, including $35 million jointly with the UAE. No such amount is confirmed in open official data. It is more accurate to speak of feasibility studies, intergovernmental consultations, the participation of ADL-Ulanish, and Uzbekistan’s willingness to finance preliminary studies of individual sections. But turning the unverified figure of $115 million into an established fact is unacceptable.
Turkmenistan: The Western Branch and the Politics of Cautious Activity
Alongside Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan is playing its own game. Ashgabat is focusing on the western direction, Torghundi - Herat, which could eventually become part of a broader Herat - Kandahar - Spin Boldak line. This branch matters not only for Turkmenistan, but also for the entire transport configuration of Central Asia.
Turkmenistan traditionally acts with caution, avoiding sharp political alliances and preserving neutrality as the foundation of its foreign policy. But Ashgabat’s neutrality does not mean passivity. On the contrary, Turkmenistan has consistently developed transport, energy, and trade links, trying to turn its geography into an economic asset.
The western route through Torghundi and Herat creates an opportunity to connect Turkmenistan with Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. In September 2024, work began on the Torghundi - Herat section. That step showed that Ashgabat does not intend to remain a bystander in the new transport game. Turkmenistan wants to be not the periphery of Trans-Afghan projects, but an independent participant in the southern logistics arc.
At first glance, the Uzbek and Turkmen initiatives may look like competing projects. Uzbekistan looks at Afghanistan through Termez, Kabul, and Pakistan. Turkmenistan looks through Torghundi, Herat, and the western-southern Afghan axis. In strategic perspective, however, these routes may not contradict each other. They may complement each other. If Tashkent and Ashgabat can synchronize their approaches, Central Asia will gain not one vulnerable corridor, but an entire network of interconnected directions.
Russia: The Southern Route as an Answer to Sanctions Geography
For a long time, Russia viewed the Afghan direction primarily as a zone of instability. But after 2022, Moscow’s transport logic changed. Sanctions pressure, restrictions on Western markets, and the growing importance of Iran, India, and Central Asian states forced Russia to look more actively for southern routes.
For Moscow, the Trans-Afghan Railway is important not in isolation, but as part of a broader system. It could become an additional branch of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia with Iran, the Caspian region, and India. If the Iranian route gives Russia access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean through the Caspian and Iran, the Afghan route opens the possibility of a more flexible overland connection through Central Asia.
Moscow is acting pragmatically. It understands that one route cannot solve every problem. Under sanctions, military turbulence, and instability in global maritime shipping, Russia needs alternatives. That is why its interest in Afghanistan does not replace the importance of Iran. It complements it. The more routes there are, the less dependence on a single bottleneck.
The links with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are especially important here. Through Uzbekistan, Russia can connect to the eastern Trans-Afghan direction. Through Turkmenistan, it can connect to the western Afghan axis and then to Iran and Pakistan. In both cases, the goal is to expand strategic room for maneuver.
Afghanistan: Risk, Transit, and Kabul’s New Role
Afghanistan remains the central question in the entire structure. Without it, the project is impossible. But it also carries the main risks: security, recognition of the authorities, financing, cargo insurance, the legal regime, protection of infrastructure, and the ability of the central government to control the routes.
After 2021, the Taliban became the de facto negotiating party on all major transport initiatives inside Afghanistan. Kabul understands that transit could become one of its few sources of external economic legitimacy and revenue. That is why the Afghan authorities are actively offering neighboring countries participation in projects, while demonstrating readiness to ensure security and simplify procedures.
But political will does not erase reality. Balochistan, southern Afghanistan, Pakistan’s border areas, and certain sections in Helmand and Kandahar remain high-risk zones. Attacks on infrastructure, threats to contractors, and the activity of radical and separatist groups can slow down or disrupt individual stages of construction.
Still, Afghanistan has been given a rare opportunity. If the country can become a transit bridge between Central and South Asia, it will gain not only economic revenue, but also a new political function. Transit will not solve all of Afghanistan’s internal problems, but it can create a web of pragmatic interests around the country, helping prevent a complete regional rupture.
Pakistan, Iran, and India: The Southern Triangle of Interests
Pakistan is interested in becoming Central Asia’s main gateway to the sea. For Islamabad, the route through Afghanistan is an opportunity to strengthen its own importance, attract transit cargo, revive the ports of Karachi and Gwadar, and improve its position in competition with India and Iran.
But Pakistan faces serious constraints. Its relations with Afghanistan remain tense. Border incidents, mutual accusations, the problem of the Pakistani Taliban, and instability in Balochistan make the Pakistani direction economically attractive but politically vulnerable.
Iran, in turn, is advancing its own logic. For Tehran, Chabahar, Zahedan, Dilaram, Herat, and the connection with Central Asia are all crucial. Iran wants to prove that its territory can become a reliable outlet for Central Asian cargo heading toward the Indian Ocean. Chabahar is especially important for India because it allows New Delhi to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.
India views the Trans-Afghan routes through the prism of strategic bypasses. For New Delhi, access to Central Asia through Pakistan remains politically blocked. That is why India is interested in the development of Chabahar, Iranian infrastructure, and routes that could connect it with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and other countries of the region.
As a result, the Trans-Afghan Corridor is not surrounded by one single line, but by several intersecting geo-economic projects. Pakistan wants to become Central Asia’s gateway to the Arabian Sea. Iran is trying to offer an alternative through Chabahar. India is looking for a route into Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Afghanistan is trying to turn its difficult geography from a curse into an asset.
The Link to the North-South Corridor
The Trans-Afghan Railway does not exist in a vacuum. Its significance grows precisely because it can be linked to the wider Eurasian system, including the International North-South Transport Corridor.
That corridor connects Russia, the Caspian region, Iran, and India. Within its logic, Caspian ports, Iranian railway lines, the Astara - Rasht route, access to Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, and the ability of regional states to coordinate tariffs, customs procedures, and infrastructure standards all matter.
If the Trans-Afghan Corridor is integrated with the North-South route, Afghanistan could become not merely a southern extension of Central Asian logistics, but part of a larger Eurasian arc. Cargo from Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan would then be able to move along several directions, through Iran, through Afghanistan, through Pakistan, and through Caspian and southern ports.
In this configuration, the importance of Azerbaijan rises sharply.
Azerbaijan: The Caspian Hub of a New Eurasian Logistics System
For Azerbaijan, the development of the Trans-Afghan Railway is not a distant subject. On the contrary, this project is directly connected to Baku’s future role in Eurasian logistics. Azerbaijan already occupies a key position between the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and Central Asia. If southern routes through Afghanistan develop, the value of that position will only grow.
Baku can become one of the key junctions linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Iran, and South Asia. Across the Caspian, Azerbaijan is connected with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Through Astara and Rasht, it is connected with the Iranian direction. Through the Baku - Tbilisi - Kars railway, it is linked to Turkey and European markets. This geography allows Azerbaijan not merely to observe the development of the Trans-Afghan Corridor, but to become part of it as a logistics, energy, and transit partner.
Cooperation with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is especially significant. Uzbekistan is looking for reliable access to external markets. Turkmenistan is developing a western-southern transport axis and has a direct Caspian link with Azerbaijan. If Baku, Tashkent, and Ashgabat can synchronize their transport policies, a new Eurasian framework could emerge: Central Asia - the Caspian - the South Caucasus - Iran - South Asia.
For Azerbaijan, this is not only an economic opportunity. It is also a political resource. The more routes pass through Azerbaijani infrastructure, the greater the country’s strategic importance. In a world where logistics has become part of geopolitics, a transit hub turns into an instrument of influence.
Development Scenarios
The most favorable scenario is route consolidation. In this case, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan do not turn their initiatives into rigid competition, but coordinate them. Afghanistan receives several interconnected directions. Pakistan and Iran become not only rivals, but alternative outlets to the southern seas. Russia and the Caspian states connect to the system through the North-South Corridor. Azerbaijan strengthens its role as a Caspian and South Caucasian hub.
The second scenario is fragmentation. Each state develops its own route separately. Uzbekistan focuses on the Kabul corridor. Turkmenistan focuses on Herat and Kandahar. Iran promotes Chabahar. Pakistan tries to hold Central Asian transit through its own ports. As a result, several competing projects emerge without a single coordination mechanism. This lowers the efficiency of the entire system and increases dependence on political crises.
The third scenario is the strengthening of the Iranian axis. This could happen if instability in Pakistan deepens or Afghan-Pakistani relations deteriorate further. In that case, cargo from Central Asia may be redirected more actively toward Iran, Chabahar, and the route through Herat, Nimroz, and Dilaram. For Azerbaijan, this scenario also opens opportunities, especially through the Astara - Rasht direction and deeper integration with the North-South Corridor.
But none of these scenarios is automatic. Everything will depend on security in Afghanistan, the readiness of investors, the positions of regional players, tariff policy, the ability of states to reach agreements, and the quality of the infrastructure itself.
Rails as the Politics of the Future
The Trans-Afghan Railway is not merely a line on a map. It is a question about what Eurasia will look like in the coming decades. Will Central Asia remain an inland continental space dependent on a limited number of routes, or will it gain real access to southern seas? Will Afghanistan remain a permanent zone of instability, or will it at least partially become a transit bridge? Can Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan turn competition into coordination? Will Azerbaijan be able to use its position on the Caspian to strengthen its role in the new transport architecture?
The answers to these questions will be determined not by loud declarations, but by rail tracks, terminals, border crossings, financial guarantees, and political will.
Uzbekistan is one of the main initiators in this game. Its task is to break out of geographic confinement and reach ocean routes. Turkmenistan is trying to create its own western-southern branch. Russia is looking for additional southern outlets. Iran is strengthening the importance of Chabahar and its railway connections. Pakistan wants to become Central Asia’s gateway. India is searching for bypass routes into the region. Afghanistan is trying to turn its difficult geography into a source of transit power.
And Azerbaijan, located at the intersection of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Central Asia, has a chance to become one of the key connecting links in the new Eurasian logistics system.
The Great Game no longer looks the way it did in the nineteenth century. Today, it is not fought only over fortresses, capitals, and spheres of influence. It is fought over routes that will define the price of time, the cost of delivery, the resilience of trade, and the political weight of states. In this game, the winner is not the one who declares ambitions the loudest, but the one who can turn geography into infrastructure, infrastructure into economics, and economics into strategic influence.
The Trans-Afghan Corridor has not yet become a full reality. But the struggle for it has already begun. And this struggle shows that the future of Eurasia will be written not only in diplomatic papers, but also on sleepers laid across mountains, deserts, and the old shadows of empires.