Iraq’s 2025 parliamentary elections have redrawn the country’s political map, revealing trends that could shape its future — and redefine how much influence foreign powers, especially Iran, can wield in Baghdad. The vote, the sixth since Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003, drew significantly more voters than in 2021 and handed victory to Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition. But while Sudani’s bloc emerged as the largest, it fell short of an outright majority, setting the stage for protracted coalition talks. More tellingly, the new parliament will feature an unprecedented number of lawmakers aligned with Tehran — a development that’s stirring alarm about Iraq’s sovereignty and deepening external meddling.
Election Results: Sudani’s Edge and Tehran’s Quiet Win
According to Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission, the November 11 vote saw Sudani’s Construction and Development alliance, a coalition of Shiite political groups, come out on top with roughly 1.3 million votes — about 370,000 ahead of its nearest rival. That haul translates into an estimated 46 of the 329 parliamentary seats.
Sudani hailed the outcome as proof that Iraqis’ faith in the political process is recovering, noting turnout reached 56.1%, compared with just over 40% in 2021.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, took second place with just over 1 million votes and about 26 seats, reaffirming its dominance in the Kurdish north. Former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Sunni-led Progress (Taqaddum) bloc placed third, winning around 945,000 votes and roughly 28 seats. Iraq’s three largest parliamentary factions thus remain divided along sectarian lines — Shiite, Kurdish, and Sunni.
Close behind came several pro-Iran Shiite forces. The State of Law coalition of ex-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki secured roughly 27–28 seats, while Asaib Ahl al-Haq’s political arm, As-Sadiqoun, took about the same number. The National State Forces alliance, led by Ammar al-Hakim with backing from former premier Haider al-Abadi, won between 15 and 19 seats.
More striking, though, was the strong showing of candidates linked to Shiite militias. Hadi al-Amiri’s Badr Organization captured 18 seats; Kataib Hezbollah’s political branch, Haqooq, won six; the Imam Ali Brigades secured eight; and Sayyid al-Shuhada took four. Even the Christian Babylon Movement of Rayan al-Kildani, known for its close ties to Iran-backed groups, managed to get two lawmakers into parliament.
Among Kurdish parties, Barzani’s KDP scored a decisive win over its longtime rival, the Talabani family’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is widely seen as more aligned with Tehran. The PUK ended up with roughly 15 seats, about half the KDP’s tally. On the Sunni side, Halbousi’s Progress was joined by Khamis al-Khanjar’s Azm alliance, which secured about 15 seats, while smaller Sunni groups collectively took around ten more. The overall makeup of Iraq’s 329-member parliament still reflects the country’s demographic mosaic — Shiite Arabs as the majority, alongside Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, Yazidis, Turkmen, and others holding quota-based representation.
Sectarian Patterns and Political Surprises
The results largely mirrored Iraq’s sectarian geography: Shiites dominated the central and southern provinces; Sunnis prevailed in the west and north; and Kurds swept the autonomous region in the north. Since 2003, Iraq’s power-sharing formula has remained constant — the premiership goes to a Shiite, the speakership to a Sunni, and the presidency to a Kurd.
Yet, the vote wasn’t without surprises. In Nineveh province, whose capital is Mosul, Barzani’s KDP — not an Arab Sunni party — won the most seats, capitalizing on Kurdish voter mobilization in mixed districts like Sinjar. Conversely, in Diyala, a province with a sizable Kurdish minority, no Kurdish candidate won a seat for the first time since 2005, a setback attributed to low Kurdish turnout and intensified Shiite-Sunni competition.
Another major factor was the boycott by powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Once commanding the largest bloc in parliament, Sadr called the elections “flawed” and urged followers to stay home. They did — and the impact was palpable. Turnout in Sadrist strongholds such as Baghdad and Najaf dropped sharply, easing the path for pro-Iran factions. By stepping back, Sadr effectively dismantled a key counterweight to Tehran’s allies, allowing them to consolidate power across much of the Shiite heartland.
Building a Government: The Hard Bargain Ahead
Despite Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s coalition emerging as the largest force in Iraq’s 2025 elections, it still fell far short of the 165 seats needed for a parliamentary majority. No single bloc came even close to that threshold in the 329-member Council of Representatives. That means Iraq is headed for another grueling round of coalition negotiations — a familiar ritual in the country’s post-2003 power-sharing system, where every government is a fragile patchwork of sectarian and political deals. In past cycles, these talks dragged on for months: nearly six in 2018, and an exhausting eleven in 2021 before a cabinet was finally confirmed.
This time won’t be any easier. Sudani has made clear he wants a second term, but his prospects are uncertain. His Construction and Development alliance is more a loose federation than a disciplined party — an uneasy mix of his own Al-Furatayn movement, defectors from rival Shiite factions, a handful of independents, and several heavyweight regional power brokers such as Faleh al-Fayyad, the commander of the pro-government Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), along with tribal sheikhs whose loyalties are transactional at best. Many joined Sudani out of convenience, drawn by his control of state resources and access to patronage, and could just as easily switch sides if offered cabinet positions or other perks by rival Shiite blocs.
Meanwhile, Sudani’s main competitors within the Shiite camp — notably Nouri al-Maliki of State of Law and Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq — have signaled they won’t automatically back him for another term. Under Iraq’s informal muhasasa system, the premiership is a “Shiite quota,” meaning that Shiite parties must collectively agree on a candidate. “The prime minister is just an executor of the Coordination Framework’s decisions,” Khazali declared, in a pointed reminder that no one man can claim the office unilaterally. The old guard, wary of Sudani’s growing independence and political confidence, appears determined to reassert control.
To stay in office, Sudani will have to pull off a delicate balancing act — holding together his unwieldy coalition while cutting deals with rivals like Maliki and Khazali. That likely means bringing the Kurds and Sunnis into the fold. Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party has hinted it’s open to cooperation, provided Kurdistan’s interests are safeguarded — namely control over key ministries and a guaranteed flow of federal funds. Sunni leaders Mohammed al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar, for their part, could lend support in exchange for maintaining influence over the speakership and other posts.
But even with Kurdish and Sunni backing, Sudani will face resistance from within the Shiite establishment. Pro-Iran factions could easily nominate their own consensus candidate more to Tehran’s liking if talks stall. A similar standoff paralyzed Iraq in 2022, when Muqtada al-Sadr’s electoral victory failed to translate into power, triggering an 11-month political vacuum that only ended with Sudani’s appointment. This time, with Sadr absent from the political scene, there’s no counterweight to keep the pro-Iran bloc in check.
Tehran’s Tightening Grip on Baghdad
The 2025 results leave little doubt: pro-Iran forces now dominate Iraqi politics more completely than at any point since Saddam’s fall. Analysts estimate that parties and blocs either aligned with or deferential to Tehran control around 200 of 329 seats — roughly two-thirds of parliament. That gives Iran’s allies the upper hand in every major decision, from cabinet formation to national security policy.
The core of this bloc consists of Shiite movements directly linked to militias within the Popular Mobilization Forces. Asaib Ahl al-Haq holds 27 seats; Badr Organization, 18; while Kataib Hezbollah, the Imam Ali Brigades, and Sayyid al-Shuhada together control more than 15. These groups, once battlefield auxiliaries against ISIS, now command real political power — and remain closely tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Add to that Maliki’s State of Law faction with nearly 30 seats, Ammar al-Hakim’s National State Forces with about 15, and the picture is clear: the Coordination Framework and its affiliates now define the center of gravity in Shiite politics.
Iran’s reach extends beyond the Shiite camp. In the Kurdish north, the Talabani family’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan — long friendly with Tehran — won about 15 seats and is expected to side with pro-Iran coalitions. Among Sunnis, the story is more about acquiescence than opposition. Halbousi’s Progress and Khanjar’s Azm together hold around 40–45 seats, but neither is likely to challenge Tehran’s dominance. In fact, Halbousi’s own political trajectory illustrates the cost of defiance: after clashing with Iran-backed militias during his tenure as speaker, he was ousted by Iraq’s Supreme Court in 2023, in what many observers saw as payback orchestrated by pro-Iran factions. His subsequent return to politics came only after signaling a willingness to play by the new rules.
That leaves Iraq’s anti-Iran camp with barely a hundred seats — a loose alliance of Sudani’s relatively centrist bloc, Barzani’s pro-Western KDP, a handful of Sunni independents, and a few secular reformists. They lack both cohesion and numbers to counterbalance Tehran’s network.
For the first time in two decades, Iran’s allies hold an undisputed majority in Iraq’s legislature. The implications are stark. Many of the incoming lawmakers are not career politicians but militia figures, blurring the line between state and armed groups and further eroding the rule of law. Sudani’s previous attempts to rein in the PMF or fold its units into the national security apparatus now look doomed. With a compliant parliament, pro-Iran factions will be able to block any reform that threatens their interests — or Tehran’s.
Fallout and Challenges: Iraq’s Fragile Sovereignty Under Foreign Pressure
The strategic aftermath of Iraq’s 2025 elections has sparked deep concern across the region and in Western capitals alike. Many analysts describe the outcome as a strategic setback for Iraq — a nation whose political system is now more dependent than ever on external centers of power, above all Tehran. The new parliamentary balance effectively ties Iraq’s sovereignty to the maneuvering and rivalries of foreign actors operating on its soil.
For Washington, the consolidation of Iran-backed forces in Baghdad represents a direct challenge. The U.S. has spent years trying to nurture a moderate, pragmatic camp in Iraq capable of containing Tehran’s proxies. Under President Donald Trump, that policy took clearer shape, with Washington betting on Sudani and similar technocratic figures as stabilizing partners. “There is no place in Iraq’s future for armed militias backed by Iran,” U.S. Special Envoy Mark Savaian recently declared — a sentiment echoed by Iraq’s own foreign minister, Fuad Hussein, who urged Shiite leaders to heed Washington’s warnings.
But after the 2025 vote, the political arithmetic looks unfavorable for those aligned with the U.S. If Tehran manages to rally its allies and form a government without Sudani — one overtly hostile to Washington — much of the American influence painstakingly rebuilt after the defeat of ISIS could evaporate overnight.
The anxiety extends beyond the West. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf monarchies view the rise of Iran-backed militias in Baghdad as a potential threat to regional stability. Turkey, meanwhile, is watching the Kurdish dimension closely: Ankara continues to back Barzani’s KDP and remains wary of the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which it sees as too close to Tehran and its network of proxies edging toward the Turkish border.
Risk of Escalation
Behind closed doors, military contingencies are once again on the table. According to leaks discussed in regional media, U.S. and Middle Eastern strategists have considered scenarios in which, should tensions with Iran escalate, preemptive strikes could be launched against PMF targets inside Iraq. So far, Washington has held back, wary of undermining Sudani’s position. But if the next Iraqi government tilts fully toward Tehran and adopts an openly anti-American posture, the balance in Baghdad could collapse completely.
Some regional analysts believe Washington might eventually give a quiet green light for limited Israeli action against Iran-backed militias operating from Iraqi territory. Such a development would mark a sharp escalation, turning Iraq once again into a battleground for proxy warfare — the very fate Baghdad has tried to avoid since the fall of ISIS.
The Stakes for Iraqis Themselves
For ordinary Iraqis, the stakes are existential. Two decades after the advent of democracy, citizens are still waiting for tangible improvements — jobs, reliable infrastructure, functioning schools and hospitals, and a government capable of curbing corruption. Yet the 2025 campaign barely touched on any of these issues. Instead, it revolved around patronage, sectarian competition, and the scramble for ministries.
That disconnect is dangerous. Nearly nine million Iraqis didn’t even register to vote — many of them young, disillusioned, and convinced that the country’s elites have no intention of reforming a system built on favoritism and foreign leverage. If the next government remains consumed by internal infighting or by serving the agendas of Tehran and Washington, the erosion of public trust could deepen into outright political alienation.
Conclusion: A Crossroads for Iraq
The 2025 elections have brought Iraq to a critical turning point. On one hand, higher turnout — up to 56 percent — signals a lingering desire for change and civic engagement. On the other, the vote strengthened forces that draw legitimacy not from social mandates or policy platforms, but from foreign backing and military muscle.
Iraq’s sovereignty now hinges less on its institutions than on the interplay between Tehran, Washington, and their regional allies. The deeper Iran embeds itself in Baghdad’s political and security structures, the greater the risk that Iraq once again becomes a proxy theater for other nations’ conflicts.
The next Iraqi leadership — whoever forms the government — faces an unenviable task: to balance sectarian interests, prevent renewed fragmentation, and steer clear of great-power confrontation while addressing citizens’ urgent social and economic needs. Only by restoring that fragile equilibrium can Iraq hope to reclaim genuine sovereignty and chart a path toward stability in an increasingly volatile Middle East.