Baltic Bastion: The Military Balance of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia

An analysis of the Baltic states’ military capacities as of October 1, 2025, reveals an unprecedented leap in their defense posture, driven by the shifting geopolitical landscape of Eastern Europe. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all surpassed NATO’s benchmark of two percent of GDP on defense, channeling funds into rapid modernization, upgraded infrastructure for allied deployments, and expanded personnel numbers.

Lithuania: The Regional Heavyweight

Lithuania has emerged as the region’s “heavy fist.” The country is assembling a full-scale division, prioritizing Western heavy armor and artillery: Leopard 2 tanks, HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, Boxer armored vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers like the PzH 2000 and the French CAESAR. Defense spending consistently hovers around 2.7 percent of GDP, with plans to push that to 3 percent. Lithuania now fields the largest regular army of the three—about 23,000 troops—and boasts the most advanced NATO reception hubs at Pabradė and Rukla.

Estonia: The Total Defense Model

Estonia’s approach is built on the “total defense” concept—a system that integrates the entire society into national protection rather than focusing solely on force size. Its regular forces number about 7,700 troops, but the backbone of its deterrent lies in the Kaitseliit Defense League, a volunteer territorial militia of more than 30,000 members, including auxiliaries. Estonia leads the region in cyber defense, hosting NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn. Its ongoing procurement of K9 Thunder howitzers and Spike and Javelin anti-tank systems reinforces its high-tech edge. The country’s Achilles’ heel remains air defense, though 2025 saw the launch of IRIS-T medium-range system acquisitions.

Latvia: Catching Up Fast

Long viewed as the weakest link, Latvia has moved aggressively to close the gap. Since 2023, it has reinstated mandatory conscription through the Valsts aizsardzības dienests (National Defense Service). Riga’s top priorities now include co-developing medium-range air defense with Estonia, acquiring NSM coastal missile batteries to secure the Gulf of Riga, and deploying HIMARS systems. Modernization of the mechanized brigade continues with Patria 6x6 armored carriers, though progress remains slower than in neighboring countries.

The Numbers Behind the Build-Up

By the third quarter of 2025, Estonia was spending roughly 3 percent of GDP on defense—about €1.3 billion. Latvia allocated around 2.7 percent (€1.1 billion), while Lithuania’s defense budget reached 2.72 percent, equivalent to €2 billion. Active personnel stand at approximately 7,500 in both Estonia and Latvia, and 23,000 in Lithuania. Estonia maintains the largest trained reserve—around 73,000, including Kaitseliit members—compared with 20,000 in Latvia and 28,000 in Lithuania.

None of the three countries currently operates main battle tanks, though Lithuania has already signed a Leopard 2 procurement deal. Estonia fields 44 CV9035 infantry fighting vehicles; Latvia has ordered Patria 6x6 APCs; Lithuania operates 91 Boxer Vilkas IFVs. In artillery, Estonia deploys 24 K9 Thunders, Latvia uses five M109A5Ös, and Lithuania runs 18 PzH 2000s. Lithuania has already received eight HIMARS units, with Estonia and Latvia expecting deliveries soon. On air defense, Estonia and Latvia are preparing for IRIS-T and NASAMS deployments, while Lithuania already operates two NASAMS-3 batteries.

The Enduring Vulnerabilities

Despite real progress, the region remains dangerously exposed during the first 72 to 96 hours of any potential conflict. Geography is the key limitation: a lack of strategic depth and the narrow Suwałki Corridor connecting Lithuania to Poland remain major weak points. Layered air and missile defense systems capable of repelling saturation strikes are still lacking. Supply lines are fragile—Baltic logistics hinge on the ports of Klaipėda, Tallinn, and Riga, and the Rail Baltica corridor, all of which could be easily interdicted. The Baltic navies remain “mosquito fleets,” focused on minesweeping and patrol duties, with no capacity to secure sea lanes or challenge larger naval forces.

The NATO Umbrella

For now, the cornerstone of Baltic security remains NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence—multinational battalion battle groups stationed in each country. These contingents serve less as a decisive fighting force and more as a political tripwire to trigger Article 5—the collective defense clause—should deterrence fail.

A Shift From Symbolism to Substance

This assessment, commissioned by the Latvian organization Biedrība Astraea, synthesizes open-source intelligence (OSINT) to trace the transformation of the Baltic region from a symbolic contributor to NATO’s collective defense into a credible shield along the alliance’s eastern flank.

Estonia’s Defense Forces (Eesti Kaitsevägi)

Strategic Doctrine: The Price of Occupation

Estonia’s national defense strategy, known as Laia riigikaitse—“comprehensive” or “total defense”—is rooted in hard geographic and historical truths. A small nation with no strategic depth, sitting next to a potential adversary, cannot afford a drawn-out war. Instead of aiming for outright victory, Estonia’s doctrine is built on making any occupation intolerably costly.

Its foundation rests on four pillars:

1. Initial Deterrence: A small but highly capable professional army—anchored by the 1st Infantry Brigade—designed to inflict maximum damage and buy time.
2. Total Resistance: Invasion triggers the mobilization of reservists and the Kaitseliit militia, transforming the entire country into a web of guerrilla and sabotage zones.
3. Allied Reception: The regular army’s core mission is to hold key airfields, ports, and transport nodes long enough for NATO reinforcements to arrive.
4. Cyber Resilience: Estonia treats cyberspace as a full-fledged battlefield. Its Cyber Command (Küberväejuhatus) can conduct both offensive and defensive operations in the digital realm.

Force Structure and Organization

Estonia’s Defense Forces comprise three main components:

• The Regular Army, about 7,700 troops including conscripts, built around two infantry brigades.
• The Kaitseliit (Defense League), a volunteer paramilitary network with roughly 18,000 active members and another 12,000 in support roles, forming the nucleus of territorial and guerrilla defense.
• The Mobilization Reserve, around 43,000 trained personnel.

The overall structure includes the Land Forces (Maavägi), Navy (Merevägi), Air Force (Õhuvägi), Cyber Command, and the Special Operations Command (Erioperatsioonide väejuhatus). The land component remains the backbone; the navy focuses on coastal patrol and mine warfare, while the air force specializes in radar, air defense, and base operations.

Bases and Infrastructure

Estonia’s defense network is dense and strategically layered:

• Tallinn Headquarters: The central command in the Juhkentali district oversees strategic planning and operations.
• Tapa Base: The largest garrison, home to the 1st Infantry Brigade and the British-led NATO eFP battlegroup. It hosts tanks, IFVs, artillery, and full logistics infrastructure, complete with a NATO rail spur.
• Ämari Air Base: A cornerstone of Baltic Air Policing, with a 2,750-meter runway supporting Eurofighters, F-16s, F-35s, and allied aircraft. Ongoing upgrades are expanding air defense and fuel capacity.
• Jõhvi Base: Near the Russian border, it houses the Viru Infantry Battalion and serves as a key training site.
• Paldiski Base: Once home to the Scout Battalion, now functions as a logistics hub.
• Tallinn Naval Base (“Mine Harbor”): Headquarters of the Estonian Navy, hosting mine and patrol squadrons.
• Võru (Taara Base): Headquarters of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and the historic Kuperjanov Battalion, designed as a rapid-mobilization reserve force.
• Central Training Area: Located near Tapa, it’s the country’s largest live-fire range for CV90s, K9s, and NATO joint drills.
• Cyber Command & NATO CCDCOE: Both based in Tallinn, handling cybersecurity, offensive cyber ops, and NATO cyber research and training.

The Asymmetric Fortress

In essence, Estonia has constructed a layered, high-tech defense ecosystem where every square kilometer of land—and even the digital domain—is woven into a comprehensive architecture of resistance. It stands as a model of “asymmetric impregnability”: a small, sharply armed fortress whose strength lies in technology, resilience, and the collective will to fight.

2.4 Composition and Readiness of Major Formations

The 1st Infantry Brigade (1. Jalaväebrigaad) remains the backbone of Estonia’s operational strategy. Headquartered in Tapa, with key elements in Paldiski and Jõhvi, the brigade blends professional units with conscript and reserve battalions. Its core includes the professional Scout Battalion (Scoutspataljon), equipped with CV9035EE infantry fighting vehicles; the Kalev and Viru battalions as conscript/reserve nuclei; an artillery battalion fielding K9 Thunder self-propelled guns; an air defense battalion (ranging from man-portable Mistral systems to upgradeable medium-range assets); an engineer battalion; and a logistics battalion. Tapa also hosts an expanded multinational eFP battlegroup under British command, turning the garrison into an operational hub for coordinating national and allied forces and enhancing rapid-response capabilities across the region. The brigade is integrated into the Multinational Division North (MND-N), giving it access to multinational logistics and firepower in a crisis.

The 2nd Infantry Brigade (2. Jalaväebrigaad), based in Võru, is oriented toward defending the southern axis. Formally a reserve formation, it holds strategic importance: its core is the Kuperjanov Battalion, which doubles as a training unit and a mobilization reservoir. Re-equipment for the 2nd Brigade follows completion of priority deliveries to the 1st; in raw firepower and mobility it currently lags behind the 1st Brigade, but it gains leverage from its geography and ability to rapidly deploy internal reserves.

The Kaitseliit (Defense League) underpins the total defense concept. Organized into 15 territorial districts—malev—each district focuses on local mobilization, reconnaissance, and guerrilla actions. As of Q3 2025 the active Kaitseliit contingent stands at roughly 18,000 members, with another 12,000 in auxiliary formations. Volunteers are relatively well-armed at the individual and small-unit level: Javelin and Spike anti-tank missiles are common, along with small- and medium-caliber mortars, mobile communications gear, and basic reconnaissance platforms. Regular joint exercises with the armed forces and NATO partners sustain high levels of motivation and proficiency. Kaitseliit performs combat roles but also handles logistics, infrastructure protection, and civil defense duties—effectively serving as a multi-purpose resilience tool for the state.

Readiness assessment: the 1st Brigade is highly professional and modernized, but its endurance depends critically on the timely arrival of heavy equipment and ammunition from allies under crisis conditions. The 2nd Brigade functions as a tactical reserve whose capabilities will increase as re-supply and re-equipment proceed. Kaitseliit gives Estonia an asymmetric edge for area denial and rear-area attrition, but the success of this model hinges on secure supply lines, ammunition stocks, and resilient communications.

2.5 Defense Industry and Key Enterprises

Estonia’s defense industrial base is small but niche-focused and technologically advanced. The country has prioritized capabilities where high-tech components deliver strategic leverage without the need for large-scale mass production.

Milrem Robotics stands out as a flagship, specializing in unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Its THeMIS family has become a global benchmark for multi-role support robots, and the Type-X project aims to field a robotic infantry fighting vehicle. Milrem’s strengths are software architecture, sensor integration, and modularity; its vulnerability is dependence on imported precision components, engines, and electro-optics. Still, export contracts to more than 16 countries and deliveries into European defense frameworks underline the company’s commercial and operational viability.

Cybersecurity forms the second pillar of the industrial base. Guardtime, Cybernetica and several startups have created an ecosystem that protects critical infrastructure, data governance, and distributed verification systems. Hosting NATO’s CCDCOE in Tallinn inflates human capital, feeding the market with specialists, doctrine and joint training programs. Cyber capability offers Estonia both defensive benefits and exportable services—software and advisory work in demand abroad.

Shipbuilding is concentrated in Baltic Workboats, which produces patrol craft and auxiliary vessels tailored to border guard and coastal defense missions. Facilities on Saaremaa allow relatively rapid expansion of a fleet of small combatants and patrol boats suitable for the “mosquito fleet” maritime concept.

Ammunition production is the system’s weak link. Estonia lacks mass-scale manufacturing capacity for artillery shells and standard small-arms ammunition; existing facilities are limited to niche production lines and small-batch runs. As of Q3 2025, negotiations on a joint Baltic ammunition plant continue, but until concrete projects materialize the states remain dependent on imports and allied stockpiles.

Bottom line on industry: Estonia bets on intellectual capital—robotics, software and specialized shipbuilding—raising flexibility and export potential, but leaving a critical vulnerability in bulk munitions and consumables. In a protracted conflict this shortfall will require deliberate procurement planning and regional cooperation to establish shared reserves.

2.6 Combat Order and Equipment (Key Platforms)

Despite modest force size, by 2025 Estonian forces field a modern, NATO-standard arsenal aligned with the country’s defense priorities—mobility, precision and network interoperability.

Armored vehicles. The backbone of armored units is 44 CV9035EE infantry fighting vehicles (a modernized variant of the Swedish Strf 90), primarily assigned to the Scoutspataljon. In addition, roughly 113 Patria Pasi APCs (XA-180 and XA-188 variants) remain in service. Under a trilateral program with Latvia and Finland, a contract for 230 Patria 6×6 APCs will standardize fleets and boost mobility for territorial Kaitseliit units.

Artillery. Estonia operates 24 South Korean 155mm K9 Thunder self-propelled guns, with an additional 12 on order to fully staff the artillery battalion. The reserves and training pools include 18 towed FH-70 155mm howitzers and about 30 legacy Soviet D-30 122mm guns. A 2022 contract for six M142 HIMARS launchers—scheduled for delivery in 2025–2026—will markedly increase deep-strike capability and interoperability with U.S. targeting networks.

Anti-armor. Hundreds of Javelin (Block 1) and Spike SR/LR ATGMs provide Estonian ground forces with potent stand-off anti-tank options, making them a serious threat to enemy armor even without indigenous tanks. Older Israeli MAPATS systems are held in reserve.

Air defense. Short-range coverage relies on Mistral MANPADS—mounted both on tripods and APCs—and Polish Piorun (Grom-M) systems ordered in 2022. ZU-23-2 twin-barrel 23mm mounts remain in use for close-in defense. The principal modernization aim is a layered medium-range air defense architecture: joint IRIS-T SLM acquisitions with Latvia began delivering in 2025. Nevertheless, as of Q3 2025 Estonia still lacks a fully echeloned national AD system, a key defensive gap.

Air force. Estonia’s air arm performs support roles and fields no combat aircraft. Inventory includes two M28 Skytruck transports and four Robinson R44 training helicopters. Airspace control and combat air patrols are provided by NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission operating from Ämari Air Base.

Navy. The Estonian Navy is optimized for mine countermeasures and coastal patrol. Key assets include two British-built Sandown-class minehunters—ENS Admiral Cowan and ENS Sakala—and several domestically built patrol craft. Deliveries of NSM coastal anti-ship missiles in 2024–2025 will permit a limited anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability along Estonia’s coast and strengthen control of the Gulf of Finland approaches.

Taken together, Estonia’s forces show a high degree of technical interoperability with NATO partners and are evolving from a light territorial defense model toward an integrated system that incorporates long-range fires and networked effects.

2.7 Defense Budget and Spending Priorities

The trajectory of Estonia’s defense budget in recent years shows a deliberate shift: more money, spent faster, on smarter tools.

In 2021, Estonia allocated €647 million to defense, or 2.11 percent of GDP. In 2022, spending rose to €748 million, or 2.34 percent of GDP. By 2023, defense funding crossed the one-billion threshold, hitting roughly €1.1 billion and about 2.73 percent of GDP. For 2024, planned expenditures climbed to around €1.33 billion, equal to 3.2 percent of GDP. The 2025 plan projects approximately €1.35 billion in defense spending, about 3 percent of GDP.

The structure of that spending has also changed. In 2024, around 45 percent of the budget went to procurement of weapons, vehicles, and munitions; roughly 25 percent covered personnel; and about 30 percent funded infrastructure, logistics, and operating costs.

The pattern is clear: procurement is accelerating, and it’s doing so in defined priority areas. Estonia is putting money into air and missile defense, long-range fires (HIMARS rocket artillery), additional K9 self-propelled howitzers, ammunition stockpiles, and infrastructure to permanently host allied forces.

In other words, Estonia isn’t just “spending more on the military.” It’s using the defense budget as an industrial tool to harden the country, modernize the force, and lock in its identity as what Estonian planners like to call a “smart defense state.”

2.8 Joint Training and NATO Operational Integration

Estonia is one of NATO’s most forward-leaning member states on the alliance’s northeastern flank. A UK-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup is permanently stationed in Tapa, backed by rotating forces from France and Denmark. The eFP mission is not only about firepower. It’s political. Allied troops on Estonian soil create an immediate Article 5 trigger in the event of an attack.

Since 2004, Estonia has also hosted and supported Baltic Air Policing, NATO’s continuous air patrol mission over Baltic airspace. Ämari Air Base is one of the key rotation hubs for NATO fighters—F-16s, Eurofighters, F-35s—cycling roughly every four months.

The country runs both national and multinational large-scale exercises on a regular basis. The most prominent are Kevadtorm (“Spring Storm”) and Siil (“Hedgehog”).

Kevadtorm is an annual May exercise that stress-tests full-integration warfare: regular troops, reservists, and Kaitseliit volunteers in one battlespace. Participation can reach up to 25,000 personnel and plays out full-spectrum national defense scenarios.

Siil is Estonia’s largest mobilization exercise, held every few years. It brings in reservists, territorial defense units, and NATO allies, rehearsing the defense of the country against both hybrid threats (sabotage, unrest, covert pressure) and conventional invasion.

Estonian units also deploy to multinational NATO drills abroad—Baltops, Saber Strike, Iron Wolf, and others—where the focus is interoperability, logistics under pressure, and rapid deployment of multinational brigades and divisions.

All of this plugs into NATO’s updated regional defense plans, approved at the Vilnius summit. Those plans assume a rapid-reaction model: NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is expected to deploy within 72 hours of a crisis. Estonia’s national job in that scenario is simple and brutal—hold the line. That means keeping key nodes like Tapa and Ämari in friendly hands long enough for allied heavy forces to flow in.

2.9 SWOT Assessment

Strengths. Estonia enjoys unusually high societal cohesion and willingness to fight. More than 80 percent of citizens support the total defense model and personally participate in Kaitseliit training and mobilization structures. The “whole-of-society defense” concept is one of the most mature in Europe: Kaitseliit is not a symbolic militia, it’s a territorial defense lattice with real combat training.

Estonia is also a recognized global leader in cyber defense and cyber warfare. This is not just about tools, it’s about institutions: the country runs an integrated Cyber Command and hosts NATO’s CCDCOE in Tallinn.

On the ground, the 1st Infantry Brigade fields modern CV90 infantry fighting vehicles and K9 Thunder self-propelled artillery, maintains a high state of readiness, and is wired directly into NATO’s command architecture. That gives Estonia immediate interoperability with allied firepower and logistics.

Weaknesses. The country has no strategic depth. Estonia is geographically small, and critical infrastructure sits within range of artillery and missile systems positioned just across the border in Russia’s Leningrad region.

Layered air and missile defense remains underdeveloped. That makes Estonia vulnerable to massed strikes in the opening hours of a conflict.

The standing army is small—around 7,000-plus active personnel—which means survival in a crisis depends on how fast reservists and Kaitseliit units can mobilize.

At sea, the navy is thin. Two Sandown-class minehunters and a handful of patrol craft cannot independently secure sea lines of communication or guarantee port access under fire.

Opportunities. Tallinn has room to go deeper with NATO integration: permanent divisional-level headquarters on Estonian soil, a strengthened eFP presence, and continued investment in infrastructure to receive larger allied formations.

The defense industrial base has real upside. Milrem Robotics and the cyber sector have already proven they can export. That’s not just prestige, it’s leverage: Estonia can trade relevance for security guarantees.

Joint procurement with Latvia and Finland—Patria 6×6 armored carriers, IRIS-T air defense, and similar programs—lays the groundwork for a more integrated Baltic-Nordic defense space.

Threats. The most dangerous scenario is a lightning strike: a limited, high-speed operation aimed at seizing critical nodes before NATO can meaningfully respond.

The broader region remains exposed to Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems deployed from Kaliningrad and the Leningrad region: long-range missiles, coastal denial assets, and layered air defenses designed to bottle up allied reinforcements.

Hybrid pressure—cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage of civilian infrastructure—never really stops. It’s background noise by design.

Particularly vulnerable points include Tallinn’s port; the Tapa rail hub; air defense around Ämari Air Base; and Estonia’s dependence on imported ammunition, spares, and fuel.

The net assessment is blunt: Estonia has built one of the most intellectually coherent defense architectures in Europe. It has fused social will, digital superiority, and targeted procurement into a national shield. But that shield is still thin. The country’s ability to absorb a large initial strike ultimately depends on how fast NATO moves and how reliably allies can keep Estonia supplied under fire. It is a NATO bastion on the northern flank—tough-minded, digitally hardened, socially mobilized—but still physically vulnerable to a concentrated blow.

3.1 Historical Context and Defense Doctrine

For a long time, Latvia was the soft spot in the Baltic triangle. After joining NATO in 2004, Riga effectively outsourced its strategic security to the alliance. The national strategy was minimalist by design: delay, signal distress, wait for help. Latvian planners called it, half-jokingly, the “barbed wire doctrine”—the idea that the country only needed to hold out symbolically until NATO armor showed up.

That logic drove a major structural decision. In 2007, Latvia scrapped conscription and shifted to a fully professional force of fewer than 8,000 troops. The problem: a small pro force without a meaningful reserve looks fine when you think war is theoretical. But 2014 (Russia’s seizure of Crimea) and then 2022 (Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine) shattered that assumption. Latvia’s bet on minimal deterrence suddenly looked less like prudence and more like exposure.

By 2023, Riga had rewritten the playbook. The new State Defense Concept (Valsts aizsardzības koncepcija) lays out a national “total defense” model built on rapid mobilization and mass reserve training.

The reform pillars are blunt:

— The return of conscription. On July 1, 2023, Latvia launched the State Defense Service (Valsts aizsardzības dienests, VAD). Initial intakes were voluntary, but the system becomes mandatory starting in 2024. The target is to train up to 7,500 conscripts per year by 2028, building a layered reserve of up to 50,000 personnel.

— Air and coastal defense first. For the first time, air defense and coastal defense are priority number one. Between 2022 and 2025 Latvia signed contracts for medium-range air defense systems (NASAMS and IRIS-T) and for NSM coastal anti-ship missile batteries, in close coordination with Estonia.

— Hardening infrastructure. The bases at Ādaži and Lielvārde are being upgraded as core reception hubs for allied forces. Ādaži is evolving into the main station for a multinational NATO brigade, while Lielvārde is being developed into a rapid-response air base.

— Whole-of-society defense. Borrowing from Estonia, Riga is rolling out a model known as valsts visaptveroša aizsardzība—comprehensive national defense. Civilian agencies, the private sector, and the population are all drawn into national security planning. In this system, the Zemessardze (National Guard) is not just auxiliary; it’s the backbone of mass mobilization and territorial resistance.

In less than a political cycle, Latvia has pivoted from a “symbolic NATO participant” to a state trying to build Scandinavian-style resilience: national mobilization, regional integration, and layered defense designed to survive the opening shock, not just protest it.

3.2 Structure of the National Armed Forces (Nacionālie bruņotie spēki — NBS)

Latvia’s modern armed forces are built around four pillars: the professional standing force, the State Defense Service (conscription), the territorial guard, and the trained reserve. The system is designed for controlled expansion in crisis, with the ability to scale to roughly 45,000–50,000 personnel under full mobilization.

Regular Forces. Roughly 7,500 professional soldiers form the core combat element. Their job is to maintain constant readiness, integrate with NATO units, and train incoming conscripts. Command is based in Riga. Operational ground forces are concentrated in Ādaži, the naval component in Liepāja, and air units in Lielvārde.

State Defense Service (Valsts aizsardzības dienests, VAD). Launched in 2023, this is the engine of Latvia’s military transformation. The first intake was voluntary, which allowed the country to test its training pipeline, barracks capacity, and command structure. Starting in 2024, service becomes mandatory for men aged 18 to 27. The standard term is 12 months, after which conscripts transition into the active reserve.

Territorial Defense (Zemessardze, ZS). The Zemessardze is Latvia’s territorial guard and, increasingly, its national spine. It consists of around 10,500 active volunteers and up to 3,000 more in reserve. The force is in the middle of an accelerated upgrade cycle: it is being equipped with Stinger and Piorun man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), Spike anti-tank guided missiles, and modern communications gear. In peacetime, Zemessardze units guard critical infrastructure, help with cyber defense, and support public security. In wartime, they are designed to become the backbone of asymmetric resistance and local defense.

Reserve. Latvia maintains a pool of roughly 20,000 trained reservists. Historically this was the country’s main vulnerability: there was no deep bench to mobilize at scale. The introduction of mandatory service through VAD is meant to fix that, steadily feeding manpower into a reservoir that can be called up quickly in a crisis.

Force Structure.
— Land Forces (Sauszemes spēki): the main combat arm, made up of mechanized infantry, artillery, engineers, reconnaissance, and support units.
— Naval Forces (Jūras spēki): small in size but geared toward mine countermeasures, coastal patrol, and maritime surveillance, backed by modern minehunters, patrol craft, and coastal radar.
— Air Force (Gaisa spēki): responsible for airspace surveillance, radar and air defense integration, and air transport. The air force also operates unmanned systems.
— Zemessardze (National Guard): structurally integrated into the NBS chain of command, with a clear wartime handoff to regular headquarters.
— Special Operations Command (Speciālo operāciju pavēlniecība): elite units that deploy with NATO missions and train with allied special forces.

Taken together, Latvia has pivoted—fast—from a small professional army with thin reserves to a layered hybrid system built around mass mobilization, territorial defense, and a growing national production base.

3.3 Complete List of Military Bases, Facilities, and Training Areas

Ādaži Military Base (Ādažu militārā bāze). Ādaži, just outside Riga, is Latvia’s main land forces garrison and the country’s most important NATO footprint. It houses the Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Sauszemes spēku Mehanizētā kājnieku brigāde) and the Canadian-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup. The base includes brigade headquarters, 1st and 2nd mechanized infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a sustainment battalion, engineering units, and allied elements equipped with Leopard 2 tanks, Piranha infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. Ādaži is not a transient training camp; it is a permanent, expanding NATO hub. Through the 2020s, the base has been undergoing continuous expansion: new barracks, ammunition depots, maintenance facilities, and training infrastructure for State Defense Service (VAD) conscripts.

Lielvārde Air Base (Lielvārdes gaisa spēku bāze). Located in Lielvārde, in the Ogre region, this is Latvia’s main air base. It hosts the Air Force headquarters, air surveillance and air defense elements, and an airlift unit that currently operates An-2 transports. Lielvārde also functions as a contingency node for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. The base includes a modern air operations control center and fields Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial systems. The airfield is certified to receive NATO tactical fighters and heavy transport aircraft. Plans call for deploying medium-range air defense batteries to Lielvārde, which would significantly strengthen Latvia’s national airspace protection.

Liepāja Naval Base (Liepājas Jūras spēku bāze). This is Latvia’s naval center of gravity, located in Liepāja—its only major ice-free port. The base is home to Naval Forces headquarters (Jūras spēki), mine countermeasures and patrol squadrons, the coast guard, an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) dive unit, and the maritime surveillance center. The facility is undergoing modernization: upgraded piers, new storage sites, and repair capacity capable of servicing allied vessels. Latvia plans to station NSM coastal defense batteries in the Liepāja area to cover the Gulf of Riga and the Kurzeme shoreline with anti-ship fire.

Alūksne Base (Alūksnes bāze). This is a key army training hub near the Estonian border in Alūksne. It serves as the main intake and training location for Valsts aizsardzības dienests conscripts and for infantry formations. The base includes modern classrooms, maneuver ranges, and live-fire facilities. It is a standing installation, not a temporary camp.

Joint Forces Headquarters (Apvienotais štābs). The national command node in Riga. From here, Latvia runs strategic command and control of all branches of the NBS and coordinates directly with NATO.

Multinational Division North Headquarters (Multinational Division North — MND-N). Originally stood up at Ādaži and later partially shifted to Riga, MND-N is a trilateral NATO command developed by Denmark, Latvia, and Estonia. Its mission is to synchronize Baltic-Nordic land defense, coordinate multi-country operations, and ensure that Estonian and Latvian brigades plug seamlessly into a common command structure. In practice, it’s the backbone of regional warfighting coherence.

Sēlija Training Area (Sēlijas poligons). A new strategic training complex under construction in the southeast, spanning parts of Aizkraukle and Jēkabpils regions. Sēlija is being built as Latvia’s second major maneuver area after Ādaži. It is designed for brigade-level exercises, live-fire artillery drills, and HIMARS launches. The long-term plan is for Sēlija to anchor large-scale joint training with NATO forces and to provide operational depth in the central and southern part of the country.

By the end of 2025, Latvia’s defense infrastructure looks less like a single hub and more like a network. The north—anchored by Ādaži and Lielvārde—is the reception belt for NATO reinforcements. The west—centered on Liepāja—is the maritime access point. The northeast—Alūksne—is the conscript pipeline. The south—Sēlija—is the emerging maneuver space for large-scale operations. This layout tells the story of Latvia’s defense reform: the goal is not just to defend territory, but to lock the country into NATO’s warfighting architecture as an integrated operating environment rather than an isolated frontline.

Mechanized Infantry Brigade: Latvia’s Frontline Force

Latvia’s Mechanized Infantry Brigade, based in Ādaži, serves as the country’s primary land combat unit and the backbone of its national defense. It’s the only fully operational formation capable of independent action under both national and NATO frameworks.

Structure and Equipment

The brigade includes two mechanized battalions equipped with CVR(T) armored vehicles and new Finnish-made Patria 6x6 transporters, along with a third infantry battalion that functions as a reserve and training hub. Supporting units include an artillery battalion armed with M109A5Ö self-propelled howitzers, an air-defense battalion, an engineering battalion, and a logistics battalion.

Modernization and Upgrades

The brigade is in the middle of an extensive modernization effort. The aging British CVR(T) fleet—Scimitar, Sultan, and Spartan vehicles acquired in the early 2010s—is being phased out. The new Patria 6x6 armored personnel carriers, part of the multinational Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) program involving Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia, are gradually taking their place. By 2026, both core battalions are expected to complete rearmament.

The artillery battalion is undergoing a digital overhaul, with modern communication systems and fire-control software being integrated alongside reconnaissance drones for precision targeting. The air-defense unit is transitioning to short-range RBS-70 NG systems, with plans to introduce medium-range NASAMS in the near future.

NATO Integration

The brigade hosts NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battlegroup, led by Canada and including troops from Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. Training and operations are coordinated under the Multinational Division North (MND-N), which provides joint operational planning for Latvia and Estonia. Riga envisions the brigade as the core of a future national division to be fully formed by 2030.

Zemessardze: Latvia’s Citizen Army

The Zemessardze, or National Guard, has evolved from a volunteer reserve into a strategic component of Latvia’s defense architecture. Following reforms in 2022–2023, it’s no longer a secondary force—it’s designed to operate autonomously in a national emergency.

Organization and Role

The Zemessardze is divided into four territorial brigades comprising 18 battalions across the country. Each is responsible for defending its region, managing mobilization, and coordinating with civilian authorities. Once reliant on leftover equipment, the force has undergone rapid modernization since the war in Ukraine began.

Weapons and Training

Its battalions are now outfitted with Spike SR/LR anti-tank systems, RBS-70 and Polish Piorun MANPADS, modern mortars, and digital radios. Drone units and mobile reconnaissance teams have been created, supported by light armored vehicles. The Guard’s mission centers on territorial defense, safeguarding mobilization zones, protecting key sites, and conducting asymmetric operations in case of invasion. In peacetime, it assists in border security, infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and disaster response.

The Zemessardze is becoming a well-trained national reserve—an embodiment of Latvia’s “total defense” concept, which blends civilian resilience with military readiness.

Together, the Mechanized Infantry Brigade and Zemessardze form a two-tiered defense model: a professional combat core supported by a broad territorial network. This mix offsets Latvia’s limited manpower with agility, mobilization speed, and adaptability.

Latvia’s Defense Industry: Small, Agile, and Strategic

Latvia’s defense industry remains compact but increasingly important. Rather than producing heavy armor or weapons at scale, the country focuses on maintenance, repair, and innovation in high-tech niches such as drones, ground robots, and defense logistics.

Unmanned Systems and Robotics

In and around Riga, several startups and small firms are building lightweight aerial reconnaissance drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and perimeter defense missions. These small-scale operations cater directly to the needs of Latvia’s armed forces and NATO’s eFP contingents. Their advantage lies in cost-effective production, rapid software upgrades, and flexible logistics—key features for a small nation’s defense economy.

Patria Latvia: Localizing Production

The joint venture Patria Latvia—a partnership between Finland’s Patria and Latvia’s Unitruck—assembles and services Patria 6x6 armored vehicles at a plant in Cēsis. The project is part of the broader CAVS initiative and reflects Latvia’s effort to localize maintenance and reduce reliance on foreign supply chains. However, critical components such as chassis, transmissions, and electronic systems still come from abroad.

Maintenance and Logistics

Latvia relies on a network of skilled repair centers and mobile workshops that keep its fleets of CVR(T)s, M109 howitzers, and small arms operational. Recent investments have expanded these capacities, training new technicians and creating deployable repair teams that can operate in the field—vital for sustaining readiness during large-scale exercises or potential conflict.

Ammunition and Supply Chains

Latvia currently lacks large-scale domestic ammunition production. The government has announced plans to build a national munitions factory with foreign partners, though as of Q3 2025 the project remains in early development. Until it’s operational, Latvia depends on imports and regional stockpiling agreements—a recognized strategic vulnerability mitigated through cooperative supply frameworks.

Human Capital and Innovation Ecosystem

Latvia is investing in training programs for software development, communications systems, and drone integration—areas where small states can make an outsized impact. Domestic startups are moving from prototypes to serial production, supported by government incentives to localize supply chains.

While Latvia’s defense sector doesn’t yet meet every operational need, it fulfills crucial support and innovation roles. Its success will depend on attracting foreign investors and aligning with regional defense initiatives—a pragmatic strategy for a small but ambitious NATO ally at Europe’s eastern frontier.

3.6 Combat Composition and Equipment: Core Platforms

Armored Vehicles

Latvia’s mechanized units are built around more than 200 Patria 6x6 armored personnel carriers, supplied under a joint program with Finland and Estonia. These modern vehicles are replacing outdated CVR(T) and M113 platforms, offering better mobility, protection, and NATO interoperability.
Roughly 120 British-made CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles—Scimitar, Sultan, and Spartan variants—remain in service, some upgraded and equipped with Spike anti-tank missile systems. Older M113 and AT105 Saxon transports have been relegated to training roles or storage reserves.

Artillery

The brigade’s main firepower comes from about 50 Austrian M109A5Ö 155mm self-propelled howitzers. In 2023, Latvia ordered six HIMARS M142 rocket launchers, expected to arrive in 2026–2027. These long-range systems will link with Estonia’s and Lithuania’s arsenals to form a unified Baltic precision-strike network.

Anti-Tank Weapons

Latvian forces field a wide range of Spike SR, LR, and ER2 anti-tank guided missiles, along with AT4 disposable launchers. These weapons aren’t limited to regular troops—they’ve been distributed to Zemessardze territorial units, dramatically improving nationwide anti-armor resilience.

Air Defense

Air defense remains Latvia’s Achilles’ heel. Current systems include RBS-70 and Polish Piorun (Grom-M) MANPADS, along with aging ZU-23-2 23mm guns held in reserve. To plug this critical gap, Latvia has ordered NASAMS 3 and IRIS-T SLM medium-range systems, slated for delivery in 2025–2026. Once deployed, these will anchor a multi-layered national air defense grid. Until then, the shortfall remains a strategic vulnerability.

Air Force

Latvia’s air fleet is small but improving. Between 2023 and 2024, four UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters entered service, providing transport and search-and-rescue capability. Two aging An-2 aircraft are still used for training and support. The Air Force also operates six Bayraktar TB2 drones, stationed at Lielvarde Air Base and integrated into NATO’s surveillance network. Latvia has no combat aircraft of its own—its skies are guarded by NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission.

Navy

The Latvian Navy operates four Alkmaar-class minehunters (acquired from the Netherlands) and five locally built Skrunda-class patrol boats. For the first time, Latvia is developing a true coastal strike capability: two Naval Strike Missile (NSM) batteries are on order, expected by 2025. Once operational, they’ll enable precision strikes on sea and land targets up to 180 kilometers away.

3.7 Defense Budget and Military Economy

Budget Growth

Latvia’s defense spending has risen steadily in recent years. In 2021, the defense budget was around €0.7 billion (2.18% of GDP). By 2023, it reached €0.99 billion (2.27%), with a 2024 projection of €1.13 billion (2.4%). For 2025, Riga expects roughly €1.2 billion—around 2.7% of GDP. The government’s target is 3% by 2027.

Spending Structure

Roughly 40% of the budget goes toward arms procurement and equipment. Personnel costs, including conscripts under the State Defense Service (VAD), account for about 30%. The remaining 30% funds infrastructure—new construction at Ādaži, expansion of the Selija training area, and modernization of bases and barracks.

Strategic Priorities

Since 2023, Latvia has accelerated defense spending in five focus areas:

1. Air defense (top priority)
2. Coastal defense with NSM missiles
3. Long-range strike systems (HIMARS)
4. Armored modernization (Patria 6x6)
5. NATO infrastructure expansion

These efforts are transforming Latvia’s forces from a symbolic NATO contingent into a genuinely capable national defense system.

3.8 Joint Training and NATO Integration

Latvia hosts one of the most integrated NATO military structures in the region, centered on the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle group, the Multinational Division North (MND-N), and a continuous cycle of international exercises.

eFP Battlegroup

Ādaži houses NATO’s largest eFP contingent in the Baltics, led by Canada and reinforced by Spain, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Albania, and others. The group combines mechanized, armored, artillery, and engineering units. Canada has pledged to expand its presence to a full brigade by 2026.

MND-N Headquarters

The MND-N headquarters in Latvia plays a pivotal role in NATO’s command architecture on the eastern flank. It coordinates operations between Latvian and Estonian forces and links them with the Nordic command network—sharpening command-and-control efficiency and response times during crises.

Baltic Air Policing

Lielvarde Air Base functions as a reserve hub for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. This gives the alliance flexibility to redeploy fighters quickly and extend airspace monitoring across central Baltic air corridors.

Training and Exercises

Latvia runs an intensive year-round exercise schedule:

— Namejs: the largest national drills, integrating regular troops, Zemessardze units, and allied forces.
— Summer Shield and Winter Shield: NATO field exercises focused on interoperability and defense in varied climate conditions.
— Baltops: NATO naval exercises featuring the Latvian Navy and coast guard.

This constant cycle of training keeps Latvian and NATO forces operationally synchronized and combat-ready.

3.9 Analytical Assessment (SWOT)

Strengths

Latvia’s greatest asset is the NATO eFP battlegroup led by Canada—the largest in the Baltics. Its planned expansion to brigade level will sharply raise deterrence credibility. Hosting the MND-N headquarters embeds NATO’s command culture locally. Politically, Latvia’s defense commitment has solidified since 2022, marked by revived conscription, rising budgets, and broad public support.

Weaknesses

Years of underfunding have left gaps in air defense, heavy armor, and trained reserves. The State Defense Service (VAD) is still in its infancy and will take 5–7 years to mature. The Navy’s entire infrastructure is concentrated in Liepāja—a vulnerability in case of blockade. The domestic defense industry remains thin, and dependence on imported weapons and ammunition is critical.

Opportunities

The Patria 6x6 program anchors a localized production and maintenance ecosystem, setting the stage for future industrial growth. The new Selija training ground will support NATO brigade-level maneuvers and boost Latvia’s defense autonomy. With NSM, HIMARS, and NASAMS systems coming online, Latvia is poised to become a key defense hub on NATO’s northern flank.

Threats

Latvia’s geography remains its main liability. Riga and Ādaži lie within range of enemy tactical missiles, and the Gulf of Riga could be easily blockaded. Liepāja’s port lacks layered protection. The VAD system may not build sufficient reserves by 2028, leaving a temporary gap in manpower. Until medium-range air defenses arrive, the air-defense shortfall remains acute. Limited port capacity and logistics infrastructure could slow allied reinforcements in a crisis.

In essence, Latvia stands in a transitional phase—rapidly expanding its defense capabilities but racing against time. Its strength lies in political resolve and NATO integration; its weakness, in the material and temporal gap between ambition and full resilience.

4.1 Lithuania: Historical Context and Defense Doctrine

Lithuania’s role in Baltic security is defined by geography. The country borders both Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, and it sits astride the Suwałki Corridor — a narrow land bridge linking the Baltic states to Poland and the rest of NATO. That strip of land is both a lifeline and a pressure point. If it’s held, NATO can reinforce the Baltics. If it’s cut, the Baltics are isolated.

This vulnerability shapes Lithuania’s entire defense philosophy, which is notably different from that of its neighbors. Estonia leans on total defense and full-society mobilization. Latvia is racing to close critical gaps and scale up quickly. Lithuania, by contrast, has built its doctrine around “deterrence through combat”: hit the attacker hard, hold the Suwałki line, and secure space for allied reinforcements to flow in.

This doctrine rests on several pillars.

First, Lithuania is building a heavy division — not just light infantry or territorial defense forces, but a maneuver-capable formation designed to hold ground, conduct counterattacks, and operate independently. The official target is full structure and manning by 2030.

Second, Lithuania embraces what officers sometimes call the “hedgehog principle”: dense layering of anti-tank systems, artillery, fortified firing points, and locally established denial zones. The goal is to make any advance by an invading force slow, costly, and tactically miserable. In U.S. doctrinal language, this is A2/AD on national soil — anti-access/area denial built inside Lithuania’s own territory.

Third, Lithuania has restored conscription and treats its reserve not as a formality but as a core asset. The draft, reintroduced in partial form, lets the country maintain a large, trained pool of people who can be mobilized fast. Among the Baltics, Lithuania has arguably the most developed reserve.

Fourth, Lithuania’s strategy is inseparable from its partnerships. Beyond NATO as an institution, Vilnius invests heavily in bilateral defense ties with the United States, Germany, and Poland. That includes joint defense planning for the Suwałki Corridor and logistics schemes to speed up allied deployment.

In short, Lithuania’s defense doctrine blends an aggressive battlefield mindset with deep integration into allied intelligence, targeting, and fires networks. It’s not just territorial defense. It’s the expectation of fighting at high intensity, launching counter-action when necessary, and doing it in time for NATO’s main force to arrive.

4.2 Force Structure

Lithuania fields the largest and best-funded armed forces of the Baltic states, engineered specifically to execute the “deterrence through combat” model: heavy maneuver units, strong artillery, and direct integration with allied command-and-control systems.

Active forces number around 23,000 personnel, including roughly 4,000 current conscripts. This is not a token army. It’s built around mobility, firepower, and digital battle management across mechanized, artillery, and armored elements.

The National Defense Volunteer Force — known by its Lithuanian acronym KASP — acts as a flexible reserve and domestic security force. With about 5,500 active volunteers, KASP is structured for rapid response in specific sectors: guarding logistics routes, securing communications lines, and reinforcing regular army units during mobilization.

Lithuania’s reserve system is unusually deep for a country its size. Around 28,000 trained former service members are counted as active reservists, and the broader mobilization base is on the order of 100,000 people. That gives Lithuania strategic depth: in a crisis, the country can scale up quickly and field sizable formations.

The armed forces are organized into several core components.

The Land Forces (Sausumos pajėgos) form the maneuver backbone. This is where Lithuania is concentrating its effort to build heavy brigades and, ultimately, a national division-level structure.

The Navy (Karines juru pajėgos), headquartered in Klaipėda, focuses on coastal defense, maritime surveillance, and coordination with allied naval forces in the Baltic Sea.

The Air Force (Karines oro pajėgos), based primarily near Šiauliai, concentrates on air defense, direct support to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, and tactical support functions.

Special Operations Forces (Specialiųjų operacijų pajėgos) serve as Lithuania’s precision toolset for deep operations, strategic reconnaissance, and high-value missions, working in close alignment with NATO partners.

Rear Area Support and Logistics Command manages sustainment: food, fuel, munitions, repair, and technical support for deployed units. This isn’t glamorous, but in a high-intensity fight it’s the difference between a force that can fight for 72 hours and a force that can keep fighting.

All of this adds up to a military designed not just to hold out, but to keep fighting under pressure: a sizable standing army, a large reserve, a mobilizable volunteer force, and a logistics system built for sustained, high-tempo operations. Within the Baltics, Lithuania is positioning itself as the anchor state of armed resistance.

4.3 Major Bases, Installations, and Training Areas

General Staff (Ministry of National Defense and Armed Forces Command)

Located in Vilnius, on Totorių Street, this is the command nerve center of Lithuanian defense. It houses both the Ministry of National Defense and the Armed Forces headquarters. Strategic planning, crisis response, and coordination with NATO all run through this node.

Rukla Military Base (Ruklos karinė bazė). Rukla, in Jonava District in central Lithuania, is the country’s main army base and the core hub for NATO’s presence in Lithuania. It’s home to the Iron Wolf Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Geležinis Vilkas) and the multinational NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup led by Germany.

The base hosts the brigade HQ; an artillery battalion equipped with PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers; engineer and logistics units; and a German armor element that includes Leopard 2 main battle tanks and Marder and Puma infantry fighting vehicles.

Between 2024 and 2025, Rukla has been undergoing a major infrastructure buildout: new barracks, depots, maintenance facilities, and housing to support the permanent stationing of a German brigade of up to 4,800 troops.

Šiauliai Air Base (Šiaulių karinis oro uostas). Šiauliai, in northern Lithuania, is the heart of Lithuania’s Air Force and the primary operating base for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. The base hosts Air Force headquarters, airspace control and surveillance, a maintenance and repair complex, and fuel and munitions storage.

NATO fighter detachments rotate through Šiauliai to police Baltic airspace. The airfield itself has been steadily upgraded to NATO standards, including runway extension projects and expanded fuel infrastructure.

Pabradė Training Area (Pabradės poligonas). The Pabradė range, in the Švenčionys District near the Belarusian border, is the largest and most advanced training area in the Baltics. Officially named after General Silvestras Žukauskas, it’s equipped for live fire by heavy armor, self-propelled artillery, and multiple launch rocket systems. It’s also a primary training site for allied forces, including U.S. units.

Development and expansion of the range are backed by U.S. European Deterrence Initiative funding. A notable feature is the dedicated urban combat training complex — a purpose-built “battle city” for block-by-block fighting.

Klaipėda Naval Base (Klaipėdos karinė bazė). Klaipėda is Lithuania’s main naval port and the country’s only ice-free harbor. The base hosts Navy headquarters, the mine countermeasures fleet, coastal patrol elements, and maritime surveillance assets.

The base has a dual mission: securing Lithuania’s coastline and serving as a reception point for allied naval forces and NATO cargo deliveries. Ongoing upgrades to berthing and port infrastructure are turning Klaipėda into a critical logistics node for moving allied troops and heavy equipment into the Baltic theater.

“Gryfas” Base (Marijampolė). Located in Marijampolė, along the Suwałki Corridor, this installation houses the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytenis Battalion, which plays a logistical support role.

The base’s position allows Lithuania to secure key ground lines of communication and sustain units operating in the country’s southwest — exactly where reinforcement pressure would be heaviest in a crisis involving the Suwałki Corridor.

“Žemaitija” Base (Klaipėda Region). The Žemaitija Infantry Brigade is stationed in the Klaipėda area (the Palanga/Klaipėda region). This is Lithuania’s second major brigade, tasked with coastal defense and maritime support operations.

The brigade includes its headquarters, an artillery battalion (currently equipped with older M101 howitzers that are slated to be replaced by French CAESAR systems), and light cavalry-style units (dragoon and uhlan battalions). While formally designated as a reserve formation, the brigade trains actively and participates regularly in national and NATO exercises.

Air Defense Base “Grand Duke Vytautas” (Radviliškis). Near Šiauliai, this installation serves as Lithuania’s primary air defense hub. It hosts NASAMS 3 batteries, radar assets, and the command-and-control architecture for Lithuania’s ground-based air defense network.

New Facilities for the German Brigade. Under a 2024 Lithuanian-German agreement, Germany is establishing a permanent forward brigade in Lithuania: Panzerbrigade 45. This will be the first time a NATO ally stations a full heavy brigade on a permanent basis in the Baltics.

Infrastructure to support this deployment is being built and expanded in two main locations: Rukla (through expansion of the existing base) and Rudninkai, a new training area and base in Vilnius District.

Up to 4,800 German troops and roughly 200 civilian specialists are planned for permanent stationing. The force package includes a Leopard 2A7 tank battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion equipped with Puma infantry fighting vehicles. Construction and full basing are planned on a 2024–2027 timeline.

This is a structural shift for regional security. It effectively turns Lithuania into a forward operating fortress for NATO on the northeastern flank, and it hardwires German heavy armor into the defense of the Suwałki Corridor.

4.4 Composition and Readiness of Major Formations

The Iron Wolf Infantry Brigade (Pėstininkų brigada "Geležinis Vilkas") is Lithuania’s primary striking force and, in practical terms, the only heavy brigade in the Baltic region. Its headquarters sits in Rukla, and its mission is straightforward and brutally serious: maneuver, blunt an attack, and hold the key axis around the Suwałki Corridor.

Iron Wolf includes two full mechanized infantry battalions built on the Boxer/Vilkas platform; the King Mindaugas Battalion, a cavalry formation that carries forward Lithuania’s old hussar tradition in modern armored-recon terms; plus dedicated artillery and logistics battalions. The brigade’s artillery is centered on PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers — heavy 155mm guns with long reach and high rate of fire, giving the brigade real stand-off punch. Rukla is tightly integrated with NATO, hosting the German-led multinational eFP battlegroup. Within Lithuanian planning, Iron Wolf is treated as the backbone of the future national division.

The Žemaitija Infantry Brigade (Pėstininkų brigada "Žemaitija"), based in the Klaipėda region, is built for coastal defense and maritime-adjacent operations. Compared to Iron Wolf, Žemaitija is lighter, more mobile, designed to move along the coast, secure sea lines of communication, and protect the port of Klaipėda. Its artillery is still built around towed M101 howitzers — older systems with obvious limitations in mobility and survivability — but Vilnius intends to replace them with CAESAR wheeled self-propelled howitzers to improve shoot-and-scoot capability. Žemaitija also works closely with the Navy and coastal defense units to secure Lithuania’s western flank and keep maritime supply routes open.

The National Defense Volunteer Force, KASP, is organized into six territorial districts (rinktinė) and functions as a trained, immediately usable reserve. KASP units are equipped with modern anti-armor systems, including Javelin, and supported by mortars, digital communications, and regular high-intensity field training. Their core mission is territorial defense: protecting mobilization hubs, covering critical infrastructure, and holding ground along the Suwałki axis in the opening days of a crisis before heavier formations and allied reinforcements fully deploy.

Lithuania’s long-term structural objective is the stand-up of a full national division (Lietuvos divizija) by 2030. In its ideal configuration, that division would be built around Iron Wolf as the heavy maneuver brigade; Žemaitija as a lighter, more mobile coastal brigade; a planned reserve brigade known as Aukštaitija; and division-level assets. Those divisional enablers would include an artillery regiment equipped with HIMARS; an air-defense regiment; reconnaissance, engineer, and sustainment formations. To give that division real credibility on the battlefield, Lithuania is also moving to acquire Leopard 2 main battle tanks — around fifty-four are planned — and to build out long-range fires and battlefield command systems to make those tanks worth the cost.

The current state of Lithuania’s core units can be summed up this way: highly motivated, modernizing fast, and not pretending that peace is the default condition. Iron Wolf, by 2025, has already fielded most of the key systems needed to act autonomously and hit hard. Žemaitija is ramping up on the maritime flank and preparing to transition to a more modern artillery model. KASP gives Lithuania the mass it needs in the first 48–72 hours of a crisis, when holding terrain matters more than elegance.

The main structural challenge is synchronization. Buying heavy platforms, training crews to fight with them under NATO standards, and securing a reliable ammunition pipeline for sustained, high-intensity combat are not the same job — they’re three separate jobs that all have to land on time. Whether Lithuania’s division becomes a fully combat-capable reality by 2030 depends on aligning those timelines.

4.5 Defense Industry and Key Enterprises

Lithuania’s defense industry is not big, but it’s smart, specialized, and increasingly wired into Western supply chains. Instead of trying to build an entire army at home, Vilnius is focusing on critical niches: ammunition, high-end optics and laser systems, and in-theater maintenance of Western armored platforms.

Giraitės Ginkluotės Gamykla (GGG), based in Kaunas, is the crown jewel of Lithuania’s munitions base and, in practical terms, the only plant in the Baltics producing NATO-standard small-caliber ammunition. GGG manufactures 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and 12.7mm rounds. That output covers Lithuania’s own needs and supplies allied contracts. The plant runs a modern NATO-certified production line. The limitation is scope: GGG does not currently manufacture artillery shells or mortar rounds. Lithuania still depends on imports for 155mm and heavier munitions, which is a strategic vulnerability in any prolonged, high-intensity fight.

Lithuania’s sharpest technological edge is in optics and lasers. Firms such as EKSPLA, Light Conversion, and Brolis Semiconductors develop precision laser systems, thermal sights, electro-optical targeting devices, and laser designators. These companies don’t live only in the defense world; their tech spills over into industrial applications and medical systems. But from a military standpoint, Lithuania now produces advanced surveillance and targeting gear that is already in use by its own Special Operations Forces. That matters. Night-fighting, target acquisition, and battlefield awareness are exactly the areas where small states can punch above their weight without fielding massive armored formations. Lithuanian companies are also plugged into European primes such as Rheinmetall and Thales, which ties Vilnius directly into continental defense programs.

On the heavy-equipment side, Lithuania has moved aggressively to secure in-country service capacity for Western armor and artillery. Lithuania Defense Services (LDS), a joint venture created by Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (part of KNDS), handles maintenance, repair, and upgrades for Vilkas infantry fighting vehicles (Lithuania’s customized Boxer variant) and PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. LDS operates in the Jonava area, near Rukla, which means frontline units and their repair infrastructure are physically co-located. This is not just convenience. It’s strategic sustainment. LDS is already becoming a regional service hub for German-origin armor in the Baltics and could scale to support other NATO forces stationed in Lithuania.

Put simply, Lithuania is betting on a “small but smart” model: domestic production of NATO-standard rifle ammunition; export-grade optics, thermal, and laser technology; and in-theater sustainment for Western armor and artillery. This approach doesn’t make Lithuania self-sufficient. It does make Lithuania harder to break. It also aligns the country tightly with European defense industry ecosystems — which is not accidental, it’s policy.

4.6 Combat Power and Equipment: Core Platforms

Lithuania’s armed forces are in the middle of a deliberate shift: from light infantry built for delay-and-hold tactics to heavier, more mobile formations built to maneuver, counterattack, and coordinate with allied strike assets in real time. The entire structure is being standardized around NATO platforms.

Armor is the headline item. Lithuania does not yet have operational tank battalions, but in 2024 Vilnius made a strategic decision to acquire roughly fifty-four Leopard 2A8 (or comparable A7-standard) main battle tanks. Deliveries are planned for 2027–2030. That purchase is not symbolic. It is the seed of Lithuania’s future heavy component at the divisional level. Once Leopard 2s are in place — alongside long-range fires — Lithuania stops being only a tripwire state and starts looking like a blocking force.

Right now, the backbone of Lithuanian mechanized firepower is the Vilkas infantry fighting vehicle — Lithuania’s customized version of the German Boxer. Ninety-one Vilkas vehicles have been procured; eighty-nine are configured as full combat IFVs with a 30mm cannon and Spike LR anti-tank missiles, and two are dedicated trainers. These vehicles give Lithuanian infantry protected mobility, high-rate firepower, and precision anti-armor punch.

Legacy M113 armored carriers, around 250 of them, are still in service in supporting roles, especially in the second brigade and rear-echelon elements. They’re not frontline vehicles by modern standards, but they still move troops, carry supplies, and act as command or medical platforms. To improve tactical mobility and battlefield networking, Lithuania has also been fielding U.S.-made JLTVs (the Oshkosh L-ATV). By mid-2025, more than 500 had been delivered, with additional vehicles incoming. JLTVs are now a core tool for rapid movement, protected transport, and C2 (command and control) on the move.

Artillery is where Lithuania has already entered a higher weight class. The army operates eighteen PzH 2000 self-propelled 155mm howitzers — German-built systems known for accuracy, responsiveness, and range. For the second brigade, Lithuania has ordered eighteen CAESAR MkII wheeled 155mm howitzers, with deliveries expected after 2027. CAESAR gives shoot-and-scoot mobility and is easier to deploy along fragmented road networks. On top of that, starting in 2025 Lithuania fields eight American M142 HIMARS launchers, with the option to fire ATACMS-class long-range missiles. HIMARS, bluntly, is transformative. It gives Lithuania the ability to strike deep, shape the battlespace, and deny the enemy freedom of movement well beyond the immediate front line. Older 105mm M101 howitzers remain in reserve, mostly for training.

On the anti-armor side, Lithuania leans on a layered mix. Javelin is widely deployed, including across regular brigades and KASP territorial units. Spike LR is integrated on the Vilkas IFVs, delivering precision at standoff distance. For close fight and flexible support in urban or broken terrain, Lithuanian units field Carl Gustaf M4 recoilless systems. The net effect is a country where heavy armor can expect to be hunted at every range band.

Air defense is improving, but it is still one of the country’s most sensitive vulnerabilities. Lithuania currently operates two NASAMS 3 batteries, providing medium-range coverage that is directly plugged into NATO’s air-defense network. Short-range and point-defense coverage is provided by Polish Piorun MANPADS, Swedish RBS-70, and American Stinger systems. That said, the national picture is not yet airtight. Protecting Vilnius, Klaipėda, Rukla, and Šiauliai simultaneously stretches available assets. The Ministry of Defense is exploring additional layers to build a more robust, multi-tiered air-defense umbrella.

The Lithuanian Air Force is compact but useful. It operates three C-27J Spartan transport aircraft and six UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, with deliveries completing in 2025. Air policing of Lithuanian airspace — and, by extension, Baltic airspace — is handled by NATO fighter detachments rotating through Šiauliai. Lithuania does not maintain its own fighter fleet.

The Navy is mission-focused rather than prestige-focused. The fleet includes four British-origin Hunt-class minehunters and four former Danish Flyvefisken-class patrol vessels. The job is not blue-water dominance. The job is keeping sea lanes open, clearing mines, patrolling Lithuania’s slice of the Baltic, and making sure Klaipėda stays usable for allied logistics under stress.

Put together, Lithuania’s order of battle no longer looks like a border guard with flags. It looks like a force that is deliberately building toward sustained, high-intensity warfare: mechanized infantry with modern IFVs, incoming main battle tanks, long-range precision fires, and an air-defense architecture that is becoming more layered and more NATO-integrated year by year. The next decisive step is the formation of a true divisional command structure — with organic artillery, air defense, engineering, logistics, and armor — capable of fighting not just to delay an invasion, but to break it.

4.7. Defense Budget and Economics

Lithuania has the most stable and predictable defense financing in the Baltic states. In 2021 the defense budget stood at €1.17 billion (2.03% of GDP); by 2023 it had risen to €1.77 billion (2.52% of GDP), and in 2024 it reached €2.06 billion, roughly 2.75% of GDP. For 2025 the plan is about €2.1 billion, with an explicit trajectory toward reaching 3% of GDP by the end of the decade.

Spending remains well-balanced: roughly 40% goes to procurement of weapons and equipment, about 35% to personnel costs — including conscripts and volunteers — and roughly 25% to infrastructure and ongoing operations.

A defining feature of the Lithuanian model is long-term, programmatic funding tied to concrete projects: building a national division, acquiring Leopard 2 tanks, HIMARS artillery, Boxer armored vehicles, and constructing bases for the German brigade. To accelerate rearmament, Lithuania introduced a temporary “bank tax” whose revenues flow exclusively into a dedicated defense fund.

This financial architecture has made Lithuania a regional exemplar — a state that converted military reform into an engine of sustainable development and tangible NATO integration, not merely through rhetoric but with real resources, combat systems, and human capital.

4.8. Exercises and Operational Integration with NATO

Lithuania has long been a keystone of NATO’s eastern flank. Rukla hosts a multinational battlegroup within NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) led by Germany, with contributions from the Netherlands, Norway and the Czech Republic — effectively making Lithuania a primary staging ground for allied interoperability.

A major milestone in regional defense planning was Germany’s decision to station a heavy brigade, Panzerbrigade 45, in Lithuania — roughly 4,800 soldiers. Unlike previous rotational deployments, this will be a permanent stationing: a shift from “enhanced presence” toward a Forward Defence posture. Infrastructure work — barracks, warehouses, training areas, and communications hubs — is already underway and is slated for completion by 2027, creating a standing, combat-ready German-Lithuanian formation.

The United States maintains a rotational battalion presence, including Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, on the Pabradė training area. U.S. forces regularly take part in combined exercises, honing mechanized maneuvers, logistics, and artillery integration. In practice, Lithuania has become a fusion point of German structural rigor and American operational mobility.

Baltic Air Policing (BAP), centered in Šiauliai, remains a visible symbol of collective defense. NATO partners rotate fighter patrols to secure the Baltic skies, relieving Lithuania of the need to field its own air force of fighters while ensuring continuous airspace control over the region.

Flagship national exercises include Iron Wolf (Geležinis Vilkas), the country’s largest maneuvers, conducted in close coordination with eFP units. Bilateral drills such as Griffin Storm and Griffin Lightning, run with the German brigade, focus on defending the Suwałki Gap. Lithuania also hosts and supports major NATO exercises like Defender Europe, providing ranges, logistics hubs, and transport routes as a host nation.

4.9. Analytical Assessment (SWOT)

Lithuania stands out among the Baltics for its bet on heavy, armored forces. Its inventory — Boxer IFVs, PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers and confirmed orders of Leopard 2 tanks — has earned it the mantle of the region’s “armored fist.” The reintroduction of conscription in 2015 has built the largest reserve force among the three states and preserved peacetime readiness. Strong backing from Germany and the United States, plus the long-range punch of HIMARS equipped to fire ATACMS, further strengthen Lithuania’s deterrent profile.

Primary strategic vulnerabilities remain. The Suwałki Gap — a narrow stretch of territory between Poland and Lithuania, under 100 kilometers — is a critical logistical chokepoint. Coordinated strikes from Kaliningrad and Belarus could sever the Baltics from mainland Europe. Klaipėda, the region’s only seaport, is also vulnerable to blockade given the proximity of hostile positions. Air-defence density is another shortfall: two NASAMS batteries are insufficient to guarantee layered protection for Vilnius, Klaipėda, Rukla and Šiauliai.

Still, growth opportunities are substantial. By 2030 Lithuania aims to field the Baltic region’s first full division. Plans for a regional maintenance hub for Leopard 2, PzH 2000 and Boxer vehicles would elevate Lithuania to an industrial service hub for KNDS platforms. Integration with Poland is deepening — joint plans to defend the Suwałki Gap, synchronized logistics and enhanced intelligence-sharing all point toward a more resilient regional posture.

The main threats to Lithuania revolve around a “Suwałki blockade” scenario: strikes against command-and-control centers in Vilnius and Kaunas, and a blockade of Klaipėda. The country’s logistical dependence on two road corridors and a single rail line creates pronounced fragility. A related risk is the relative lack of air protection for the incoming German brigade, leaving it exposed to aerial attack.

If the Baltic states are viewed as a single operational theater, each plays a distinct strategic role. Lithuania is the armored spear — capable of striking back and holding the Suwałki corridor. Estonia is the thorny shield — emphasizing total defense, cyber resilience and precision artillery (notably K9s). Latvia functions as the connective tissue, closing gaps between north and south and enhancing flank coordination.

Together they form a three-tier defensive architecture across NATO’s eastern flank: Lithuania as the heavy core, Estonia as the digital and asymmetric brain, and Latvia as the flexible linker that sustains overall system resilience.

Budgets and Objectives

In 2024 Lithuania led the Baltics in absolute defense spending — about €2.06 billion, roughly 2.75% of GDP; 2025 planning centers on about €2.1 billion with a medium-term target of 3%. Estonia’s 2024 plan hovered around €1.33 billion (roughly 3.2% of GDP on paper), with intent to keep spending at or above 3%. Latvia budgeted about €1.13 billion in 2024 (around 2.4% of GDP), aiming for 3% by 2027. Combined, the three states will spend roughly €4.5 billion, averaging close to 2.8% of GDP overall, with a clear strategic drive toward 3% and above.

Human Capital and Mobilization

Estonia fields roughly 7,700 active-duty personnel; its territorial and volunteer defence structures (Kaitseliit and analogous units) add about 30,000 active volunteers and a trained reserve of some 43,000, for a mobilization potential near 80,000. Latvia maintains about 7,500 active professionals plus conscripts, with Zemessardze providing roughly 10,500 volunteers and a trained reserve around 20,000 — total mobilization potential roughly 38,000 and growing through VAD implementation. Lithuania hosts the largest manpower reservoir: about 23,000 active personnel (including conscripts), KASP volunteers near 5,500, an active reserve of about 28,000 and a broader mobilization pool of roughly 100,000–150,000 at full mobilization.

Platforms Comparison (Active / On Order; status as of Q3 2025)

None of the three currently fields tanks in active service, but Lithuania has an approved order for about 54 Leopard 2s (deliveries 2027–2030), which will shift the balance. IFVs: Estonia — 44 CV9035EE; Latvia — primarily CVR(T) (~123), transitioning toward Patria 6x6; Lithuania — 91 Boxer (Vilkas). APCs: Estonia fields about 113 Patria Pasi and expects 230 Patria 6x6; Latvia is replacing CVR(T) with a planned 200+ Patria 6x6; Lithuania relies on roughly 250 upgraded M113s and is receiving 500+ JLTVs for mobility and crew protection. Self-propelled artillery: Estonia — 24 K9 (plus 12 on order); Latvia — around 50 M109A5Ö; Lithuania — 18 PzH 2000 with an order for 18 CAESAR MkII and operational delivery of 8 HIMARS with ATACMS-capable options. Rocket artillery remains a priority: Lithuania already fields HIMARS; Estonia and Latvia are scheduled for deliveries in 2025–2026. Mid-range air defence: Lithuania has two NASAMS 3 batteries; Estonia and Latvia are procuring IRIS-T / NASAMS but have yet to achieve full, layered coverage. Coastal NSM anti-ship systems are being integrated across all three, with staggered deployments.

Key Vulnerabilities and Operational Implications

The first 72–96 hours of a crisis are decisive: insufficient layered air defence, limited strategic ammunition stocks and heavy reliance on rapid allied reinforcements form the core risks. Lithuania is attempting to offset the geographic exposure of the Suwałki Gap through large investments in heavy equipment and divisional capacity; Estonia leans on total defence, cyber capabilities and mobile precision fires; Latvia focuses on shoring up air and coastal defence while synchronizing with the eFP in Ādaži. Collectively, the three create a mutually reinforcing defensive architecture — but turning declarations into durable defense depends on delivery speed, replenishment of stocks, and logistics rehearsed under blockade-like conditions.

5.2. Comparative SWOT Analysis

The core strength of the three Baltic militaries is their deep integration with NATO. Command structures, logistics, and operational planning are tightly plugged into MND-N, the Multinational Division North. The constant presence of enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle groups led by Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom, plus rotating U.S. forces, has created a system of collective defense that is not theoretical — it’s live. This is one of the rare places in Europe where military integration is approaching an allied, almost joint-force model.

Morale is another strategic asset. Public support for the armed forces in the Baltics runs above 80 percent, and civilian willingness to take part in national defense is among the highest in Europe. When that level of motivation is backed by defense budgets north of 2.5 percent of GDP, you don’t just get new gear — you get structural modernization that’s moving faster than the NATO average. Each country is building out specific strengths: Estonia in cyber defense and signals intelligence, Lithuania in heavy mechanized forces, and Latvia in command-and-logistics as a hub for MND-N.

The weaknesses are also obvious. None of these countries has strategic depth. Distances from the border to the capital are measured in tens of kilometers, not hundreds. A precision strike on Vilnius, Riga, or Tallinn in the opening hours of a crisis could disrupt national command-and-control immediately. The single biggest vulnerability across the region is air and missile defense. Even with NASAMS and IRIS-T procurement, there isn’t enough layered coverage to simultaneously protect forces, bases, and cities. The logistics backbone is also fragile: the entire sustainment network leans on three ports — Klaipeda, Riga, Tallinn — and, on land, one narrow artery, the Suwalki Gap. Latvia faces an additional structural weakness: its reserve base remains thin. Riga is rebuilding conscription essentially from scratch, which means that in terms of trained mobilization depth, Latvia still trails Lithuania and Estonia.

The opportunities are strategic, not cosmetic. Stationing a permanent German brigade in Lithuania fundamentally changes the regional defense concept, shifting from deterrence by promise to defense by presence. Pooled procurement — especially the Patria 6x6 program and IRIS-T — lowers cost and standardizes equipment across forces that have to fight together. Over the longer term, the Rail Baltica project is designed to create a unified military mobility corridor, a core element of the EU’s Military Mobility (MILMO) concept: a dedicated high-capacity rail link that can move real combat power at speed. There’s also a maritime angle: with Finland and Sweden now in NATO, the Baltics have the opportunity to build an integrated naval/shore-defense zone — call it BALTOP — capable of shaping the battlespace in the Baltic Sea from Narva down to Gdansk.

The most serious threats combine classic military risk with hybrid pressure. One high-risk scenario is a fait accompli: a fast grab of the Suwalki Gap, cutting off Estonia and Latvia before NATO’s main force can fully deploy. Russia has built a local A2/AD “bubble” — anti-access/area denial — using Iskander, Kalibr, and Bastion missile systems based in Kaliningrad and in Russia’s northwest, designed to shut down airfields, ports, and transit routes in the opening hours. Alongside that is the permanent hybrid layer: cyberattacks, information ops, pressure through artificial border crises, weaponized migration, and other gray-zone tactics. Estonia hosts NATO’s CCDCOE, the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, and has built doctrine and institutions for this fight. But hybrid pressure is an arms race: it demands constant tech refresh and constant refinement of rules of engagement.

Taken together, the Baltic states are a compact but highly determined line of defense in which every kilometer of ground is strategic. Their strength is unity and readiness; their weakness is geography.

5.3. Regional Defense Readiness and Threat Scenarios

By 2025 Baltic regional defense looks like a mix of major progress and unresolved structural risks. The progress: deep NATO integration, higher defense spending, targeted modernization, and the development of specialized capabilities in each state. The risks: geographic smallness, dense exposure to A2/AD strike systems, gaps in layered air defense, and a logistics network that depends on a few critical corridors.

Scenario 1 — Hybrid operations (cyberattacks, border destabilization). The region is comparatively well-prepared for this lane of conflict. Estonia remains the reference case for cyber defense, anchored in CCDCOE and its national Cyber Command. Latvia and Lithuania have built practical experience countering engineered border incidents and migration-driven coercion. Territorial and volunteer defense structures — Estonia’s Kaitseliit, Latvia’s Zemessardze, Lithuania’s KASP — have already demonstrated speed, flexibility, and the ability to counter “little green men” and other deniable incursions. Bottom line: hybrid operations can inflict political and economic damage, but the Baltic military response will be coordinated and fast enough to localize the crisis.

Scenario 2 — Limited aggression (a move on the Suwalki Gap). This is the most dangerous and, in practical terms, the most plausible kinetic scenario. The attacker’s playbook is straightforward: a coordinated thrust from Kaliningrad and from Belarus to sever land access between the Baltics and Poland. The initial defensive burden falls on Lithuania’s Iron Wolf Brigade, the German-led eFP forces already in Rukla, the U.S. rotational battalion at Pabradė, and Polish units moving from the south. The key variable is the first 72 hours. If the Suwalki corridor holds in that window, reinforcement by land and sea remains viable. If it doesn’t, you’re in a blockade scenario with cascading consequences for the entire region.

Scenario 3 — Full-scale aggression (high-intensity conflict). In a major war, the Baltics don’t fight alone; the response is NATO-wide by design. The opening phase (0–96 hours) falls to national brigades and eFP units, whose mission is to hold priority terrain — airfields like Ämari, Šiauliai, and Lielvārde; ports like Klaipeda, Riga, and Tallinn — and to hit the attacker hard enough to slow tempo. The second phase (Days 5–10) is arrival and deployment of NATO’s rapid response forces, including the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) and follow-on units. That depends on two things: that the ports and airfields are still operating, and that the Suwalki Gap is still open. The nightmare scenario for NATO is simple: if Baltic air defenses and coastal defenses can’t keep ports and runways viable in Phase 1, Phase 2 reinforcement is delayed or disrupted, and the regional defense plan starts to unravel.

Conclusions and Action Items

The region has evolved from NATO’s “tripwire” into NATO’s forward bastion. Lithuania’s heavy punch, Estonia’s total-defense model, and Latvia’s logistics-and-command function collectively raise the cost of any military gamble. But the same two structural vulnerabilities keep flashing red: reliance on rapid allied reinforcement, and exposure to long-range strikes in the opening hours.

Short-term steps (through 2026)

— Ammunition reserves (urgent). Accelerate procurement and protected storage of 155mm artillery rounds, HIMARS rockets (including ATACMS-class munitions), anti-tank systems like Javelin and Spike, and basic small-arms stockpiles. Without depth in munitions, even well-equipped brigades lose combat power fast.

— Airfield protection. Deploy the first available IRIS-T, NASAMS, and other air-defense assets to shield Šiauliai, Ämari and Lielvārde. Airfields are the aperture for reinforcement; lose them early and you blindfold NATO’s response.

— Host-nation reception (Lithuania). Finish the barracks, depots, ranges, and communications nodes needed for the German brigade (Rukla, Rudninkai), and lock in unambiguous Host Nation Support procedures — customs, transit clearances, heavy-mobility routing — so that scaling up in crisis is frictionless, not bureaucratic.

Medium-term steps (2027–2030)

— Integrated air defense (IADS). Bring all procured NASAMS and IRIS-T systems to operational status and fuse them into a shared regional air-defense network under common battle management, effectively an upgraded BALTNET, with hooks into Polish and Nordic air-defense grids. Shared radar coverage, common targeting data, and agreed sector responsibilities are the only way to survive massed strikes.

— Divisional capability (Lithuania). Complete the buildup of Lithuania’s planned division, integrating Leopard 2 tanks, CAESAR self-propelled artillery, and HIMARS. That gives the Baltics a maneuver force capable of both holding the corridor and counterattacking instead of simply absorbing pressure.

— Coastal defense. Deploy NSM coastal anti-ship systems in Latvia and Estonia, then plug them into a unified NATO maritime defense plan for the Baltic approaches. The goal is to lock down access to the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Riga and complicate any attempt to impose a naval blockade.

— Reserve depth (Latvia). Scale up Latvia’s revived conscription (VAD) until it produces a fully trained reserve with at least brigade-level mass by the 2028–2030 window.

Long-term steps (2030–2035)

— Military mobility (MILMO). Deliver Rail Baltica as the backbone of high-capacity, NATO-standard rail logistics. This is how you reduce existential dependence on the Suwalki Gap and move real heavy metal — tanks, armored infantry, artillery — at speed along a protected corridor.

— Regional defense industry and MRO. Stand up regional production lines for 155mm shells and small-arms ammunition, and build maintenance/repair/overhaul hubs for Leopard 2, PzH 2000, Boxer, and Patria 6x6. That shortens repair cycles, localizes sustainment, and limits vulnerability to external supply shocks.

— Long-range fires. Move toward joint acquisition of deep-strike systems — for example, next-generation long-range missiles such as PrSM for HIMARS or comparable alternatives — to put high-value A2/AD nodes on the other side’s territory at risk from the outset, and to complicate their ability to seal off the battlespace.

In plain terms: the Baltics are no longer just a tripwire. They’re building a forward fortress. The next phase is making sure that fortress can still fight on Day 4, not just Hour 1.

APP-1. Military Bases and Strategic Nodes

Estonia’s defense network is built around four core sites. The Tapa base houses the 1st Infantry Brigade and the NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup under British command. The Ämari Air Base in Harju County is the main operating hub for NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. To the east, the Viru Infantry Battalion — part of the 1st Brigade — is stationed in Jõhvi, close to the northeastern approaches. Tallinn hosts the Miinisadam Naval Base, where Estonia’s navy headquarters and the country’s mine warfare fleet are based.

Latvia’s main military hub is the Ādaži base outside Riga. It serves as the anchor for the country’s mechanized infantry brigade, the headquarters of Multinational Division North, and the eFP battlegroup led by Canada. The Lielvārde Air Base functions as Latvia’s air force platform, a contingency air base for Baltic Air Policing, and the main operating site for Turkish-made TB2 drones. In Liepāja, Latvia maintains its principal naval base and the headquarters of the national navy.

Lithuania’s core defensive platform is the Rukla base, home to the Iron Wolf Brigade, the German-led eFP battlegroup, and the logistics hub for the incoming German brigade. The Šiauliai Air Base remains the centerpiece of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. The Pabradė training area serves as NATO’s and the U.S. military’s primary maneuver and live-fire range in the region. Klaipėda is home to Lithuania’s naval command and is the key port for strategic sealift in and out of the region. A new base at Rudninkai is being prepared to host Germany’s Panzerbrigade 45, a heavy armored brigade.

APP-2. Main Combat Formations and Force Structure

Estonia fields a 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade equipped with CV9035EE infantry fighting vehicles, K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, and Patria Pasi armored carriers. The 2nd Infantry Brigade is lighter and reserve-oriented, built around mortars and anti-tank systems rather than heavy armor. Estonia’s large territorial defense network, Kaitseliit (the Defence League), ties in thousands of volunteers trained and equipped with Javelin and Spike anti-tank systems.

Latvia is building out a mechanized infantry brigade that currently operates CVR(T) armored vehicles, M109 self-propelled howitzers, and Patria 6x6 armored personnel carriers. The Zemessardze (National Guard) consists of four territorial brigades with Spike anti-tank systems, RBS-70 man-portable air-defense systems, and indirect fire assets.

Lithuania’s flagship formation is the Iron Wolf Brigade, a heavy mechanized brigade built around Boxer Vilkas infantry fighting vehicles and PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. It is paired with the light Žemaitija Brigade, which operates M113 armored carriers and legacy M101 howitzers, and is slated to receive CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems from France. Lithuania’s volunteer force, KASP, provides territorial defense and is equipped with Javelin launchers and mortars. Lithuania is in the process of standing up a full division that will combine both brigades and field Leopard 2 main battle tanks, which are already under contract.

APP-3. Regional Defense Industry

Estonia stands out in high-end military tech. Milrem Robotics is known for its unmanned ground systems, including the THeMIS support platform and the Type-X robotic combat vehicle. Cybernetica and Guardtime specialize in cyber defense, secure data infrastructure, and blockchain-based security architectures for defense and government. Baltic Workboats, a shipbuilding company, produces patrol and support vessels that can be configured for both naval and coast guard missions.

Latvia is developing Patria Latvia, a joint venture focused on assembly and sustainment of Patria 6x6 armored vehicles. Latvian firms such as UGV and Atlas Aerospace are pushing into lightweight drones and unmanned ground systems for reconnaissance and tactical support.

Lithuania is reinforcing both traditional defense manufacturing and next-generation systems. The Giraitė Armaments Factory (Giraitės Ginkluotės Gamykla) produces NATO-standard ammunition in calibers from 5.56 mm up to 12.7 mm. Brolis Semiconductors develops laser and electro-optical systems, including thermal sights. Lithuania Defense Services — a joint venture of Rheinmetall and KNDS — is emerging as a regional maintenance and overhaul hub for Boxer and PzH 2000 platforms. Lithuanian firms EKSPLA and Light Conversion are recognized suppliers of high-performance industrial and military laser systems.

APP-4. Major Arms Procurement Contracts (2015–2025)

Estonia continues to receive K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers from South Korea under a 36-unit program, with 24 delivered by the third quarter of 2025. The CV9035EE infantry fighting vehicles sourced from the Netherlands have been fully integrated into active service. HIMARS long-range rocket artillery systems are on order, with deliveries scheduled for 2025–2026. Estonia has also ordered IRIS-T SLM air-defense systems from Germany, with deliveries expected after 2025. Deliveries of Patria 6x6 armored vehicles have already begun.

Latvia has taken delivery of M109A5Ö howitzers from Austria and UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters from the United States. Ongoing deliveries include Patria 6x6 armored vehicles and NASAMS 3 air-defense systems. Naval Strike Missile (NSM) coastal defense batteries have been purchased from Norway and are slated to enter service by the end of 2025. HIMARS deliveries are planned for the 2026–2027 window.

Lithuania has completed deliveries of Boxer Vilkas IFVs, PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, and NASAMS 3 air-defense systems. HIMARS launchers have also been delivered. The country is receiving JLTV (L-ATV) armored vehicles from the United States under a 500-unit program. Contracts have been signed for Leopard 2 main battle tanks from Germany and CAESAR MkII 155mm self-propelled artillery from France. UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters have already been delivered and are in active use for transport and medevac missions.

The Baltic theater today is both a fortress and a pressure point. Turning it into a truly resilient operating area will take more than money and hardware. It will take political synchronization: streamlined procedures for rapid allied deployment, pooled ammunition stocks, integrated air defense, and a shared regional maintenance and overhaul ecosystem. Those steps reduce the risk of a fait accompli scenario and raise the strategic cost of any attempt to coerce or attack the Baltic states.

This assessment was prepared and delivered for the organization “Biedriba Astraea” as part of an analytical program evaluating the defense resilience and military potential of the Baltic states.