In October 2025, China’s political establishment was rocked by what many are calling the most sweeping military purge since the Cultural Revolution. Nine top generals — including He Weidong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and effectively the second-most powerful man in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) after Xi Jinping — were expelled from the Communist Party and placed under investigation for “serious disciplinary violations” and “crimes involving vast sums of money.”
But this is far more than a corruption case. Beneath the dry official language lies a deeper story — one about the fragility and strength of China’s political order, the leadership’s fear of military autonomy, and the global consequences of a power struggle inside the PLA.
A Purge with Global Ripples
Beijing has launched its largest purge of the PLA’s top ranks in decades. The Communist Party expelled nine senior generals from both the party and the armed forces — an event already being described as the most dramatic blow to China’s military elite since Mao’s era. Officially, authorities insist this is an anti-corruption campaign. The Ministry of Defense said the generals are suspected of “grave misconduct involving exceptionally large sums and causing extremely harmful consequences.” Yet the political subtext is impossible to miss: this is not just about graft. It’s a sweeping crackdown designed to consolidate Xi Jinping’s personal authority and turn the PLA into a fully loyal instrument of his grand strategy.
The timing is no accident. The purge comes just before a critical Communist Party Central Committee plenum, where China’s long-term economic priorities will be set and new members of the top leadership installed. Clearing out the old guard now looks like a preemptive strike — eliminating potential rival power centers and rooting out any hint of disloyalty in the institution that underpins the regime: the military.
The list of those ousted is as staggering as their status. Among them are figures who have shaped PLA strategy and policy in recent years:
- He Weidong — Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, second in command after Xi
- Miao Hua — Head of the CMC Political Work Department
- He Hongjun — First Deputy Head of the CMC Political Work Department
- Wang Xubin — First Deputy Head of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center
- Lin Xiangyang — Commander of the Eastern Theater Command
- Qin Shutong — Political Commissar of the Ground Forces
- Yuan Huazhi — Political Commissar of the Navy
- Wang Houbin — Commander of the Rocket Force
- Wang Chunning — Commander of the People’s Armed Police
The most dramatic name is He Weidong — not only the PLA’s No. 2 but also a Politburo member. It’s the first time in years that a sitting member of China’s top political body has been placed under investigation. He’s been absent from public view since spring, fueling speculation of a purge that has now been confirmed.
Beijing is calling this a “significant achievement” in its fight against corruption, but many observers see a political operation aimed squarely at cleansing the military’s upper echelons. Xi talks about “self-purification” — a party that must remain “pure, disciplined, and capable of ruling indefinitely.” But that purity comes at a cost: a system that is more obedient and centralized — but also more brittle, cautious, and hostile to independent initiative.
As the October 20 plenum approaches, all eyes are on who will show up in the Great Hall — and how many seats will remain conspicuously empty. The scale of this purge may offer a rare glimpse into the depth of the political turbulence now gripping China.
The Military as a Mirror of the Party-State
The PLA is not just an army. To grasp the scale and significance of this purge, it’s necessary to understand that the PLA is not merely a military force in the conventional sense. It is a structural pillar of the Chinese state — the Communist Party’s “iron fist.” Since the founding of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong’s dictum has defined the system: “The party commands the gun.”
That principle is not rhetorical. It’s embedded in the constitution, the political architecture, and the DNA of the system itself. The PLA is not a state institution in the Western sense — it is the party’s armed wing. Its loyalty to the party line, rather than the constitution or the state, is the bedrock of the regime’s stability.
This is why a purge in the military is never just an “internal investigation.” It is always a deeply political act. And the scale of this one shows that Beijing’s goal is not merely to root out corruption — it’s to reshape the balance of power within the military elite itself.
He Weidong: Rise and Fall of a Symbol
The downfall of He Weidong is no routine disciplinary case. It’s the first time since the 1970s that a sitting CMC vice chairman has been investigated. His career traces the logic of China’s contemporary military hierarchy.
He was close to Xi Jinping dating back to their days in Fujian and Zhejiang in the 1990s. His rapid ascent — from commander of the Eastern Theater Command, the key unit responsible for Taiwan operations, to CMC vice chairman in 2022 — symbolized the personalized nature of Xi’s rule. He played a central role in orchestrating the massive military drills around Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit, a move Washington interpreted as a signal of Beijing’s willingness to use force.
His fall, therefore, is not just the removal of a corrupt official. It’s the dismantling of an entire faction within the military elite — one with its own strategic agenda and perhaps its own ideas about the limits of party control.
“Corruption” as a Euphemism for Dissent
The charges against He and his allies deserve close scrutiny. Phrases like “serious discipline violations” conceal far more dangerous allegations: “undermining the principle that the party commands the gun,” “damaging the CMC chairman’s unified command,” and “violating political loyalty.”
This is not the language of ordinary corruption probes. It’s the vocabulary of the intra-party struggles of the 1930s to 1950s — the language of factional purges.
What does that imply? First, that Beijing suspects the existence of an organized faction within the PLA seeking to build “an army within the army” — autonomous centers of power not directly under Xi’s control. Second, that this purge is preventive as much as punitive: it’s meant not only to punish past misdeeds but to preempt future ones — from resisting personnel reshuffles to obstructing strategic decisions.
Power Without a Safety Net
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, more than 13,000 PLA officers and officials have been dismissed, sidelined, or prosecuted. They include two defense ministers (Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu), dozens of regional commanders, and leaders of strategic branches.
These numbers make one thing clear: the current purge is not an isolated event. It is part of a systematic strategy to eliminate any possibility of alternative power centers. In a personalized system, power tolerates no “insurance policies” — everything must flow through the leader.
This makes the system more controllable, but also more vulnerable. As Neil Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute puts it, “The price of Xi’s power is a system that’s cleaner and more disciplined — but also more cautious, and at times, more fragile.”
The sword Xi has drawn may protect his rule in the short term. But in sharpening it against his own generals, he may also be cutting away the resilience his system needs to endure the storms ahead.
External Focus: How the PLA Purge Is Rewriting China’s Strategy and the Global Balance of Power
Reengineering Power as a Foreign Policy Tool
In China’s political culture, there’s never been a hard line between domestic and foreign affairs. Every major internal decision carries an external dimension. The sweeping purge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is no exception. In fact, it’s a central piece of a broader strategic redesign — one aimed at tightening control over the military as Beijing braces for mounting external pressure and intensifying global rivalry.
Xi Jinping has repeatedly spoken of China’s “two centenary goals”: turning the country into a leading global power by 2049 and completing the “great national rejuvenation.” The military component is just as crucial to that vision as the economic one. From that perspective, removing disloyal generals is not just internal housekeeping — it’s a calculated move to strengthen the key instrument of China’s foreign policy.
The PLA must be not only strong and modern but also predictable and entirely obedient. That quality becomes critically important as Beijing prepares for potential flashpoints — above all, around Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
Taiwan as the Litmus Test for a Rewired Military
The most immediate arena where the consequences of the purge will show is Taiwan. The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command — once led by He Weidong — is central to any operation aimed at “reunifying” the island with the mainland.
According to Pentagon assessments, He oversaw the massive August 2022 exercises launched in response to Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei. Those drills — the largest in PLA history near the island — simulated a maritime and aerial blockade and precision strikes on targets mimicking Taiwan’s infrastructure.
The removal of He and his closest allies has several strategic implications:
- The chain of command in the Taiwan theater will be rebuilt under Xi’s absolute control. The new commander will have far less autonomy and far more political guardrails.
- Planning for a potential operation will become more centralized and politicized. That could reduce the risk of “freelancing” by generals — but it may also limit flexibility on the battlefield.
- Beijing may revise its timeline. Earlier speculation suggested a possible military move before 2030. That calculus could shift: Xi is now likely to wait until the PLA becomes a perfectly controllable tool, free of internal friction.
The purge doesn’t kill the Taiwan scenario — it delays it in favor of strategic consolidation. In Beijing’s logic, taking Taiwan is not merely a military operation; it’s an act of political symbolism. And such an act cannot be entrusted to a system vulnerable to factional sabotage.
South China Sea: Projecting Power with a Tighter Grip
The second major theater where the purge’s impact will be felt is the South China Sea. Control over this region is not just about securing sea lanes — it’s a cornerstone of China’s strategy to push the United States out of the western Pacific.
Until now, the military command here — especially the Navy — enjoyed a degree of autonomy. Naval commanders were the driving force behind aggressive “gray zone” tactics, such as deploying coast guard and civilian vessels to pressure Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
The purge is likely to bring three shifts:
- Greater emphasis on “smart escalation,” with decisions on force now made at the level of the Central Military Commission rather than by individual fleet commanders. That would increase strategic coordination.
- A stronger focus on synchronizing military action with diplomacy. Beijing wants dominance, but not at the expense of economic ties with ASEAN nations.
- A potential pivot toward new forms of pressure — including cyber operations and economic coercion — as part of a broader hybrid strategy.
The result could be a South China Sea that showcases a new kind of Chinese power: less chaotic, more disciplined, and methodically executed.
Sending Signals to Washington and Its Allies
The PLA purge is also a message to the outside world. As China’s confrontation with the United States deepens, Beijing is signaling that it is “sealing the home front” and minimizing the risk of internal instability.
For Washington, the message cuts both ways. On one hand, it shows that China is taking the rivalry seriously and preparing its system for a long-term contest. On the other, it exposes a vulnerability: if Xi feels compelled to purge his top brass, it suggests doubts and resistance within the elite over his strategy.
This matters in the context of the tightening U.S.-Japan-Australia alliance under AUKUS and the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture. Since 2023, the U.S. and its allies have increased joint exercises near Taiwan and the South China Sea by 27 percent, with annual spending on regional military presence reaching $140 billion.
Against this backdrop, China is making a clear statement: the PLA will be purged, disciplined, and fully ready to confront the combined forces of the West.
Nuclear Strategy Under Xi’s Thumb
A less obvious but highly consequential aspect of the purge is its impact on China’s nuclear doctrine. Among those removed was Wang Houbin, commander of the PLA Rocket Force — the branch responsible for China’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
This is a particularly sensitive domain, as Beijing is rapidly expanding its nuclear stockpile. According to the Pentagon, China plans to increase its number of warheads from roughly 500 today to over 1,000 by 2030.
The removal of the Rocket Force commander likely signals Xi’s desire to tighten personal control over nuclear strategy. The possible implications:
- Tighter political control over nuclear weapons use — improving discipline but potentially slowing response times.
- A shift away from the “minimum deterrence” doctrine toward a more flexible posture, closer to U.S. and Russian approaches.
- A rethinking of deployment strategies — particularly in the context of a Taiwan conflict, where nuclear signaling could become a tool of political coercion.
Three Strategic Paths After the Purge
The current shake-up opens three broad strategic scenarios for China over the next decade:
Scenario 1: “Monolithic China.” Xi achieves total consolidation of control over the PLA, eliminating all factions. The military becomes maximally predictable and politically loyal. This paves the way for a more aggressive foreign policy, including a potential military move on Taiwan between 2030 and 2035 and a head-on confrontation with the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific.
Scenario 2: “The Fragile Giant.” The purges stifle initiative within the military, leading to passive resistance, declining professionalism, and a higher risk of errors. Beijing is forced to delay active operations and focus on shoring up internal stability. That could reduce the threat to Taiwan in the short term but increase it over time.
Scenario 3: “Managed Transformation.” Xi uses the purge to forge a new military elite that blends loyalty with competence. China modernizes the PLA into a high-tech force and doubles down on hybrid pressure tactics. The Taiwan scenario remains on the agenda but unfolds in a more complex, multilayered way — through cyber operations, blockades, and economic coercion.
The PLA purge is no mere “internal matter.” It directly reshapes the global security architecture. It signals that China is entering a new phase of its rise — one in which internal consolidation is treated as a prerequisite for external expansion.
That makes Beijing both a more formidable rival and a more exposed one: dependent on a single political will, fearful of institutional autonomy, and vulnerable to self-censorship within the elite.
For the United States, Europe, and Asia, this demands a new China strategy — one that accounts not only for Beijing’s strength but also for its internal weaknesses. For the world, it’s a sign that the “rise of China” is evolving into an era of concentrated power — and with it, a new age of global competition.
External Projection: What the Key Players Should Do Next
The central hypothesis here is clear: the sweeping purge of the PLA is not a run-of-the-mill anti-corruption campaign but a political and organizational overhaul of China’s war machine, designed to enforce a far more centralized decision-making model. That reduces the risk of unauthorized escalation at the tactical level — but it also increases the likelihood of deliberate escalation at the strategic level, where decisions come from a small, disciplined center of power. This creates a narrow but significant window for outside actors to fine-tune their policies while Beijing is busy tightening its “command circuits” and recalibrating its main theaters: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Rocket Force.
United States: Deterrence Without Provocation
Objective: Maintain strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific without triggering a demonstration of force from a more centralized, “politically purified” PLA over the next two to three years.
Recommendations:
– Quiet but unmistakable demonstrations of alliance cohesion, especially within AUKUS, focusing on missile defense and anti-missile capabilities.
– Establish permanent “de-escalation windows” through direct naval communication channels to prevent accidental incidents.
– Apply “pressure modulation” in the economic domain: staged export controls rather than shock moves that might push Beijing into adventurism.
– Strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities in air defense, cyber resilience, and mobile weapons systems.
– Communicate with Beijing in the language of strategic ambiguity — firmly committed to the status quo without laying down explicit red lines.
European Union: Strategic Autonomy Without Illusions
Objective: Preserve access to China’s markets and technology without inadvertently fueling the accelerated modernization of the PLA or increasing the vulnerability of Europe’s critical infrastructure.
Recommendations:
– Pursue sector-specific “de-risking,” particularly in energy, transportation, and high tech, with tighter controls on dual-use technologies.
– Prioritize cybersecurity and 5G/6G standards aligned with NATO protocols.
– Deepen diplomatic initiatives with ASEAN and develop new logistical and environmental cooperation formats.
– Expand economic and technological dialogue with Taiwan on IT security and supply chain resilience.
Turkey: Balancing the Black Sea and Extending Reach into Asia
Objective: Maximize Ankara’s role as a multi-move mediator between East and West while preserving strategic autonomy and strengthening its defense-industrial base.
Recommendations:
– Institutionalize consultations on missile defense, air defense, and drones in the Black Sea region.
– Promote “smart port” and terminal cybersecurity projects to reduce technological dependency.
– Cautiously expand cooperation with ASEAN in shipbuilding and logistics.
– Build new cooperation channels with Taiwan and South Korea at the second- and third-tier supplier levels.
Russia: The Temptation of Dependence
Objective: Retain access to Chinese markets and technology without becoming a peripheral player and while maintaining a minimal degree of strategic maneuverability.
Recommendations:
– Diversify the eastern vector through deeper engagement with India, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
– Reduce reliance on gray-market imports and improve compliance standards to avoid becoming a liability for China.
– Localize production of basic components and focus on “small wins” in the defense sector.
Three-to-Five-Year Horizon: Key Takeaways
– The Taiwan scenario will likely be postponed until the PLA’s internal consolidation is completed, probably between 2026 and 2028.
– In the South China Sea, Beijing will shift from improvisation to methodical, politically coordinated tactics.
– Tighter control over the Rocket Force could lead to subtle adjustments in China’s nuclear doctrine.
– China’s defense sector and civilian industries will become increasingly intertwined, with export controls becoming a permanent tool of statecraft.
– While Beijing is preoccupied with internal restructuring, outside actors have a limited but valuable window to reinforce their security, cyber resilience, and logistics standards.
The message for the world’s major players is simple: China’s sword is being reforged. Before it’s fully unsheathed, there’s still time to shore up defenses, recalibrate strategies, and prepare for a global order in which a more disciplined — and potentially more dangerous — China plays by its own rules.