On October 14, 2025, the world watched a scene that once seemed like a relic of the 20th century: the military seized power in Madagascar and dissolved state institutions. Colonel Michael Randrianirina, a representative of the elite CAPSAT corps, went on national radio and declared, “We have taken power.” Soldiers flooded the streets of Antananarivo, where youth protests had raged for weeks, seizing the presidential palace. President Andry Rajoelina, according to media reports, fled the country.
But this was more than just another African coup. It was a signal of a deeper tectonic shift in the continent’s power architecture — a breakdown of old postcolonial political structures and the emergence of a new era of ideological and geopolitical confrontation. The key question analysts are now asking: is Madagascar an isolated internal crisis or a symptom of a broader systemic transformation — the reformatting of Africa as a strategic arena in the 21st century?
The answer matters far beyond the Indian Ocean. Madagascar’s stability and political direction affect shipping routes to South Asia and East Africa, the balance of power in waters that handle up to 30% of global container traffic, and the long-term strategies of players like the United States, China, India, and France.
A Circle Closes: Sixteen Years Later
The symbolism here is hard to miss. In 2009, the same CAPSAT corps backed then–Antananarivo mayor Andry Rajoelina’s rise to power through a military coup. Back then, it seemed like an extraordinary event — a temporary crisis in a young democracy. Now, the same forces that once elevated Rajoelina have brought him down.
This is more than historical irony — it’s proof of the cyclical nature of African politics. Since the 1950s, the continent has witnessed over 220 coups, with roughly 45 occurring in the 21st century. In just the last three years, Africa has seen at least nine attempted or successful putsches — from Mali and Burkina Faso to Gabon and Niger.
Madagascar, Africa’s 11th-largest nation with a population of around 30 million, holds vast reserves of nickel, cobalt, and graphite — critical materials for green energy and battery production. Its strategic location, linking routes from the Indian Ocean to the South Atlantic and the southern flank of the Horn of Africa, makes control over it a matter of global geo-economics, not just domestic politics.
A Protest Fueled by a Generational Fault Line
The spark that lit this crisis was a wave of youth-led protests — driven by Generation Z, a cohort raised amid digital globalization and chronic poverty. According to the World Bank, over 75% of Madagascar’s population lives on less than $2 a day, and youth unemployment exceeds 32%.
What began as a social outcry against corruption and government inefficiency quickly morphed into a political movement demanding the president’s resignation, early elections, and a complete overhaul of the system. By siding with this movement, the army stepped beyond its traditional role as a coercive institution and cast itself as an instrument of “restoring the people’s will” — rhetoric increasingly common in Africa’s new generation of coups.
The Core Question
Here’s the key question this story raises:
Is the military coup in Madagascar part of a broader systemic transformation of African regimes amid global competition and generational change — and how might it reshape the balance of power in the Indian Ocean and world politics?
Answering that requires a multi-layered analysis — from the internal dynamics of Malagasy politics to the global struggle for influence over the African continent. The next parts of this story will focus on:
– the internal causes of the crisis and the rise of “new military interventionism”
– the role of external players and the geoeconomic weight of Madagascar
– possible scenarios and their implications for regional and global security
– strategic recommendations for governments and institutions
Coups 2.0: From Power Grabs to Tools of Social Change
What’s happening in Madagascar is not a Cold War–style coup, where generals driven by ambition or foreign backing oust a government and impose military rule. Modern African coups increasingly frame themselves as socio-political movements, seeking legitimacy as responses to popular demands.
Colonel Randrianirina underlined this in his address: “The movement began in the streets, and we must respect their demands.” That’s not just rhetoric. The military is trying to present itself not as a power usurper but as an arbiter in a legitimacy crisis — a temporary caretaker guiding the transition. Hence the promises to form a civilian government and hold elections within “18 months to two years.”
This approach fits a broader trend: 21st-century coups are less often launched against society and more often with it. They become instruments of political reboot when existing institutions fail to address mounting challenges — from demographic pressure to inequality and state decay.
The Collapse of the Postcolonial Model
Madagascar’s instability runs deeper than Rajoelina or the specifics of this crisis. The country exemplifies a postcolonial state whose institutions were designed not for development but for control.
Inherited from France and replicated by local elites, this model concentrated power in a narrow circle — typically the president and his entourage. Political competition was cosmetic, parliament played a secondary role, and the judiciary remained dependent.
For decades, this order was sustained by a tacit pact between elites and the military — an arrangement best described as “authoritarian stability.” But in the 21st century, that balance began to erode. On one side, population growth nearly doubled since 2000, while the economic base lagged far behind. On the other, globalization and the digital revolution radically shifted public expectations: people are no longer willing to tolerate corruption, inequality, and authoritarianism.
According to a 2024 Afrobarometer survey, 71% of Malagasy citizens believe their government “does not represent the people’s interests,” and 62% support a fundamental reform of the political system. This isn’t just electoral dissatisfaction — it’s a legitimacy crisis. And it’s precisely that crisis that made a military coup seem less like a disruption and more like a reset.
Elite Splits and the Army’s Political Ambitions
A crucial factor behind Rajoelina’s fall was the fracture within the elite, particularly between the presidency and the security establishment. CAPSAT — a key pillar of Madagascar’s armed forces — has long seen itself as the “guardian of stability” and harbors political ambitions of its own.
Initially loyal to Rajoelina, the corps grew disillusioned amid worsening government corruption, scandals over cobalt and nickel mining contracts, and a decline in officers’ living standards. The president’s 2024 attempt to replace parts of the command and slash the military budget by 12% only deepened the rift.
Three power centers emerged:
– the president and his loyalists, determined to cling to power at any cost
– the military leadership, casting itself as the “savior of the nation”
– new civic movements pushing for radical democratization
Rajoelina’s downfall was the result of a collision between these forces. With its monopoly on force and support from the streets, the military gained the upper hand and imposed its agenda.
A Domino Effect Across the Continent
It’s critical to understand that Madagascar’s crisis is not unique — it’s part of a broader African pattern. Between 2020 and 2025, the continent witnessed a wave of coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Chad, and Gabon. All share common roots: the collapse of postcolonial state models, rising social pressures, and elites’ inability to adapt.
Madagascar is simply the latest link in that chain. But its importance goes beyond national politics. Unlike the Sahel or Central Africa, Madagascar sits in the Indian Ocean — a region rapidly emerging as a central arena of global competition. That means what happens in Antananarivo will reverberate far beyond the island.
The bottom line: the internal causes of Madagascar’s coup are more than just economic decay and political weakness. They reflect a collision between an obsolete postcolonial system and a new generation, new social energy, and a new logic of political action — one in which the military is no longer merely a coercive force but a political broker.
The Geopolitical Stakes: Madagascar as a Node in Global Rivalry
If internal dynamics explain why Madagascar’s coup was possible, external ones explain why it matters. The crisis in Antananarivo isn’t a local disturbance — it’s part of the larger global contest over the Indian Ocean, where Madagascar holds a pivotal position. Here, the interests of four major powers — the United States, China, France, and India — intersect, each viewing the island as a piece of its long-term strategy in southern Africa and the global geo-economic order.
Geostrategic Crossroads: The Gate to the Indian Ocean
Madagascar isn’t just a vast island stretching across 587,000 square kilometers — it’s a geopolitical pivot point that anchors key maritime routes linking East Africa, South Asia, and even Antarctica. The waters to its east carry enormous global weight: nearly 30% of the world’s container traffic moves through them, about 40% of China’s and India’s oil imports pass nearby, and major shipping lanes connecting East Africa’s ports to the Suez Canal and Indonesia cut straight through this corridor.
Its proximity to the Mozambique Channel — one of the planet’s most vital maritime chokepoints — makes Madagascar a potential launchpad for controlling the southern flank of the Indian Ocean. Any power establishing a naval base there would gain a commanding position over maritime trade routes and access to the region’s abundant hydrocarbon reserves, from the channel itself to the resource-rich Tanzanian coast.
France: The Metropole Never Really Left
For France, Madagascar isn’t just a historical footnote; it’s a linchpin in Paris’ enduring Françafrique strategy — an informal network of political, economic, and military influence over its former colonies. A French colony until 1960, the island still sits squarely in Paris’ geopolitical calculus.
France’s footprint remains substantial: a naval base on Réunion Island, sweeping economic ventures, cultural programs, and well-established intelligence networks. French companies control up to 30% of Madagascar’s nickel and cobalt exports, and Paris actively cultivates local elites aligned with Western interests.
The ouster of President Rajoelina set off alarm bells in Paris. France fears a repeat of the Mali and Niger scenarios, where new regimes sharply curtailed French influence and pivoted toward alternative partners. On October 15, the French Foreign Ministry called for a “restoration of constitutional order” and hinted at sanctions should the military refuse a transition plan.
Yet France’s leverage today is a shadow of what it was two decades ago. Its influence across Africa has shrunk dramatically: French troops have been pushed out of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger over the past five years, and public trust in France among Africans has plunged below 30%.
China: Betting on Raw Materials and Logistics
Beijing sees Madagascar as a crucial node in its Belt and Road Initiative. Since 2017, China has poured over $1.2 billion into the island’s economy, modernizing the port of Toamasina, building roads and power plants, and investing heavily in cobalt and graphite mining — both essential for batteries and green energy technologies.
Madagascar’s resource base fits neatly into Beijing’s strategy to reduce reliance on volatile suppliers of critical materials. The island could also serve as a key logistics hub linking East Africa to Chinese ports, strengthening the so-called “Maritime Silk Road.”
Beijing has remained tight-lipped about the coup itself, but its diplomatic activity in Antananarivo has noticeably intensified. Chinese state media are already emphasizing the “Madagascan people’s sovereign right to determine their own destiny” — the same language China used following coups in Mali and Niger, where it maintained strong economic footholds despite regime change.
United States: The Indian Ocean as a Frontline Against China
Washington views Madagascar not as an end in itself but as part of a broader Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at containing China’s influence in the Indian Ocean. With the “Global War on Terror” era now firmly in the rearview, U.S. foreign policy has shifted eastward, and Africa is no longer just a resource frontier — it’s a theater in a new global contest.
Since 2022, the U.S. has beefed up its military presence on Indian Ocean islands, reinforcing its Diego Garcia base and expanding partnerships with Seychelles and Mauritius. Madagascar is on the Pentagon’s radar as a potential logistics hub and surveillance site to monitor Chinese activity in the region.
Washington’s reaction to the coup was restrained but revealing. The State Department urged a “peaceful transition and return to democratic governance” without directly condemning the military’s actions. The message was clear: the U.S. may be open to engaging with the new regime — as long as it keeps its distance from Beijing and allows continued American access.
India: Securing the Southern Flank
For India, Madagascar is part of its SAGAR (“Security and Growth for All in the Region”) doctrine — a vision of itself as a major Indian Ocean maritime power. New Delhi has been deepening naval ties with island nations, building surveillance posts, and working to create a “security belt” around its coastline.
The Indian Navy has already conducted joint drills with Madagascar’s maritime forces, and in 2023 New Delhi opened its first regional center on the island to monitor sea routes. The regime change in Antananarivo could either accelerate or complicate that strategy, depending on how the new leadership views Indian involvement.
African Union and Regional Players: A Crisis of Credibility
The African Union’s reaction followed a familiar script: condemnation of the “unconstitutional change of power” and suspension of Madagascar’s membership pending a transitional government. But behind the strong language lies a deeper institutional crisis.
Over the past five years, the AU has denounced every coup on the continent — yet failed to prevent a single one. That track record erodes its legitimacy and raises doubts about its capacity to act as a credible arbiter in political crises. As continental mechanisms falter, external powers increasingly fill the vacuum.
The takeaway is clear: Madagascar’s geopolitical weight far exceeds its domestic struggles. Whoever controls the island controls the southern flank of the Indian Ocean, the flow of critical minerals, and vital arteries of global trade. The battle for power in Antananarivo is not merely a local political drama — it’s part of a larger U.S.-China rivalry, with France and India jockeying to preserve or expand their influence.
Scenarios Ahead: From “Managed Transition” to Geopolitical Turbulence
The coup in Madagascar is not the end of a crisis — it’s the beginning of a protracted and multilayered power struggle whose outcome will shape not just the island’s future but the balance of power across the Indian Ocean. Like any political upheaval at the crossroads of domestic and global interests, the situation could unfold along several plausible paths. Here are the three most likely scenarios and what they could mean for the country, the region, and the global order.
Scenario 1: Managed Transition — Military Holds Power, Then Oversees Elections
Core idea: The armed forces set up a provisional governing council and a transitional civilian administration, stabilize the situation, and organize elections within 18–24 months, open to both old elites and new civic movements.
Probability: 45–50%
Why this might happen:
– Broad public support for change after frustration with the Rajoelina regime
– The military’s willingness to cooperate with youth movements
– U.S. and Indian interest in stability to secure maritime routes
– China’s pragmatic stance toward any regime that protects its economic stakes
Possible outcomes:
– Military intervention becomes gradually legitimized as a “people’s transition tool”
– A new political system emerges where the military retains significant influence
– Increased foreign support, including IMF and World Bank loans tied to a “democratization roadmap”
– Reduced political tensions and a return to economic growth by 2027
Risks:
– The military may drag out the transition period
– A new “military-civilian oligarchy” could consolidate power
– Old elites could rebrand and return to power under a new banner
Scenario 2: Geopolitical Fragmentation — Foreign Powers Turn Madagascar into a Battleground
Core idea: The transition stalls, factions within the military leadership splinter, and each seeks foreign backers. The U.S., China, France, and India deepen their involvement, backing rival forces and driving geopolitical fragmentation.
Probability: 30–35%
What could drive this:
– Disunity within the military leadership
– Efforts by old elites to stage a comeback with French support
– Expanding Chinese corporate influence in key sectors
– U.S. determination to block Chinese or French gains in a strategic zone
Potential consequences:
– Madagascar turns into a “geopolitical chessboard,” with domestic players as proxies for foreign agendas
– Rising political turbulence slows economic recovery
– Growing dependence on foreign loans and military aid
– Risk of foreign “logistics hubs” and “humanitarian missions” doubling as military installations
Risks:
– Deepening rifts within the military council
– Potential outbreaks of localized violence
– Madagascar morphing into a proxy conflict zone akin to Sudan or Libya
Scenario 3: Destabilization and Collapse — Transition Fails, Crisis Deepens
Core idea: The absence of consensus between the military and civilian movements spirals into political chaos. The transitional government proves incapable of governance, the economy collapses, and protests erupt anew — potentially triggering another coup, this time from within the military itself.
Probability: 20–25%
What could drive this:
– No institutional foundation for an orderly transition
– Escalating power struggles between youth movements and the military
– Rising public anger as economic conditions deteriorate
– Foreign actors backing rival factions, fueling internal polarization
Potential consequences:
– Prolonged political instability and a deepening economic meltdown
– Madagascar morphs into a “gray zone,” with violence spreading across regions
– Plunging investment, infrastructure breakdown, and mounting migration pressure on neighboring states
– Strategic loss of control over the Indian Ocean’s waters and a surge in piracy
Risks:
– The country fractures into semi-autonomous regional enclaves
– Humanitarian crisis prompting African Union or UN peacekeeping intervention
– Long-term developmental stagnation and a missed opportunity to integrate into the global economy
A Window of Opportunity — and a Window of Risk
Madagascar stands at a crossroads. Its future could become a showcase of Africa’s “new transitional order” — if the military can transform its intervention into a tool for institutional renewal. But the same situation could end in failure if domestic actors prove incapable of dialogue and foreign powers turn the crisis into yet another arena of global competition.
The choice between these trajectories will shape not only the island’s destiny but also the strategic dynamics of the entire Indian Ocean — fast emerging as one of the central geopolitical theaters of the 21st century.
Conclusions and Strategic Takeaways: Turning Crisis into a Pivot Point
The military takeover led by Colonel Michael Randrianirina and the CAPSAT corps is not an isolated anomaly — it’s a symptom of systemic transformation. The postcolonial model of weak hyper-presidential republics in Africa has exhausted its legitimacy, and the Indian Ocean dimension gives any domestic crisis global resonance. Within 24 hours of the military’s announcement of a power grab and the dissolution of most state institutions (save for the lower house), the signals were already mixed — from Randrianirina’s pledge to transition to civilian rule and hold elections to counter-statements by President Andry Rajoelina’s administration rejecting the coup, as documented by leading global outlets.
On the socioeconomic front, Madagascar remains one of the poorest nations on Earth: according to the World Bank, roughly 80% of its population lives below the international poverty line of $2.15 a day (2017 PPP), and urban poverty has risen markedly over the past decade — the kind of “combustible fuel” that political crises thrive on.
Geo-economically, the stakes are even higher: up to 80% of global maritime oil shipments and a significant portion of world cargo transit through the Indian Ocean, where Madagascar is a natural control node for the southern approaches and the Mozambique Channel. That makes the island indispensable to the strategic calculations of the United States, China, France, and India alike.
Below are the key takeaways and practical recommendations for major actors over the next 18–24 months of the transition cycle:
1) What Madagascar’s Crisis Means for the Continent and Global Powers
1.1. A New Model of “Military Interventionism”
Armies increasingly present themselves not as dictatorships but as temporary arbiters, pledging a civilian transition and elections within an 18–24 month horizon. CAPSAT’s statements explicitly frame the coup this way, echoing the pattern of recent power shifts in the Sahel and Central Africa — now transplanted to an island setting in the Indian Ocean.
1.2. A Structural Crisis of Legitimacy
The combination of weak institutions, hyper-presidential governance, stagnant incomes, and rising urban poverty is fueling a deep demand not just for new leaders but for a new political order altogether. Poverty indicators and trends cited by the World Bank confirm the scale and urgency of this challenge.
1.3. The Indian Ocean as a Prime Strategic Theater
Every decision on Madagascar is inevitably filtered through the strategic lenses of Washington, Beijing, Paris, and New Delhi — from the supply chains of green technologies (nickel, cobalt, graphite, including the Ambatovy mine) to logistics and maritime surveillance.
1.4. Erosion of Continental Response Mechanisms
The African Union quickly convened an emergency session of its Peace and Security Council and expressed “deep concern.” But it still lacks a reliable mechanism to reverse unconstitutional power shifts — repeating the pattern of recent years and highlighting the fragility of Africa’s continental governance architecture.
18–24 Month Strategic Goals for Madagascar’s Transition
1. From Military Rule to Civilian Governance
The top priority is to stabilize the transition by steering it away from military dominance toward a technocratic civilian cabinet, anchored by a clear electoral roadmap. This isn’t just about process—it’s about restoring legitimacy through structure. The shift must be institutionalized, not improvised.
2. Keeping Geopolitical Games at Bay
Global powers may compete, but Madagascar must not become a proxy battleground. The island cannot afford to become anyone’s chessboard. The transitional leadership must hold the line against external fragmentation while allowing room for cooperative competition.
3. A Social Contract You Can See
Fix the lights. Fill the pipes. Cut the food prices. Rapid, tangible improvements in electricity, water, transportation, and basic goods—especially in the capital and port cities—are vital to keeping the streets calm and public trust intact. No PR campaign can replace working infrastructure.
4. Institutional Reform, Not Window Dressing
Madagascar must break the cycle of strongman politics. That means recalibrating power balances to avoid a return to hyper-presidentialism. Institutional guardrails are needed now, before the next crisis hits.
5. Turning Minerals into Development
Leverage the country’s critical minerals—nickel, cobalt, graphite—through “resources for development” deals. But this time, local value chains, transparent contracts, and ESG standards must be non-negotiable.
Who Needs to Do What—and When
3.1. Transitional Authorities / Military Committee
R1. A 30-Day Trust-Building Package
Roll out a detailed public roadmap with four key benchmarks: forming a civilian cabinet, initiating electoral reforms, establishing the voter registry and monitoring framework, and scheduling elections within 18–24 months.
Also: an immediate moratorium on prosecuting peaceful protesters, and the launch of a joint task force with Gen Z-led urban platforms to prioritize municipal services. CAPSAT’s initial recognition of street-level demands must be formalized, not left as a one-off signal.
R2. A Constitutional Safety Valve
Adopt a temporary transition amendment limiting decree powers and requiring parliamentary and judicial oversight—especially for dissolving chambers. The October standoff over executive authority is a case study in what must be prevented through smart legal engineering.
R3. Five Fast Wins in 180 Days
Prioritize electricity and water in Antananarivo and coastal ports, repair key highway arteries, secure fuel import contracts with price-stabilizing mechanisms, subsidize food transport, and revive key tourism assets. For a country where up to 80% live below the poverty line, quick wins aren’t a luxury—they’re a necessity.
R4. Mining-for-Development Deals 2.0
Renegotiate or extend contracts on nickel, cobalt, and graphite with mandatory local processing, port-linked industrial zones, full transparency on payments, and third-party audits. Social impact packages must directly benefit coastal and mining communities. With mineral exports—and Ambatovy’s role—so central, hard ESG conditions aren’t optional.
R5. Maritime Security, Minus the Bases
Agree on patrol arrangements that allow joint exercises and logistics hubs—no permanent foreign bases. Maritime traffic data-sharing and anti-piracy operations should run through regional coordination centers.
3.2. Youth Movements and Civil Society
R6. The ‘Urban 2026’ Coalition
Present a unified infrastructure demand sheet to the transitional government: water/electricity schedules, open bus route data, real-time food price monitoring.
Demand monthly public KPI reports from technocratic leaders on 10 quality-of-life indicators, with oversight from independent academic groups.
3.3. African Union and Regional Organizations
R7. Move Beyond Declarations
Replace sweeping condemnations with a modular AU-PSC roadmap: a transition checklist covering security, humanitarian relief, and elections, backed by rotating coordinators from respected regional governments. Sanctions should only kick in if milestones are missed. The AU has spotlighted Madagascar; now it needs to deliver the machinery.
R8. Humanitarian Corridors, Fast and Cheap
Deploy rapid-response grants—co-funded by the AU and multilateral banks—for school feeding programs, rural clinics, anti-malaria drives, and emergency water repairs. These low-cost, high-impact projects matter where legitimacy is earned: on the street.
3.4. Multilateral Financial Institutions (World Bank, IMF, AfDB)
R9. Standby Support for Transition
Deploy a targeted support package—around 0.8–1.2% of GDP—for social protection and quick wins. Layer in budget support tied to reforms in state-owned enterprises, procurement, and tariff policies. New poverty data and macro numbers justify a fast-track window of support.
R10. Mineral Finance Facility with ESG Hooks
Offer credit guarantees and loan mechanisms to fund local processing of critical minerals—on the condition of contract transparency, strict anti-corruption clauses, and environmental compliance triggers.
3.5. Key Foreign Powers
The United States – Stability Without Bases
Back maritime security, ISR capabilities, and logistics—but steer clear of permanent base deployments. Support should focus on election tech (cybersecurity, voter registries), monitoring, and co-financing urban services. The emerging U.S. posture—measured, Indo-Pacific-aligned, and civilian-focused—should remain the guiding line.
China – Minerals-for-Development 2.0
Extend Ambatovy and port infrastructure investments under tighter transparency rules, with mandatory local content and social impact clauses. To mitigate political exposure, avoid exclusive buyer setups. China’s long game on the island is regime-agnostic, but it must now meet higher ESG expectations.
France – From Françafrique to Service Partnerships
Paris must pivot from hard power to soft infrastructure: sanitation, healthcare, education. Reframe Réunion’s logistical capacity as a disaster response and civic hub, not a projection node. The backlash France has faced in the Sahel is a cautionary tale—one that may repeat if old habits persist.
India – SAGAR Plus
Expand joint patrols, maritime traffic intelligence, and coast guard training. Invest in port and customs IT. Politically, support the civil transition and align with the AU. India’s island engagement and interest in MDA centers offer a strategic resource for “security without militarization.”
4. Risk Management: Red Flags on the Road to Transition
RF1. The Clock Is Ticking
Dragging the transition beyond 24 months without a compelling reason will unravel the public mandate and likely trigger a return to street-level unrest. Time is not elastic. Delay equals distrust.
RF2. Proxy Traps
Any move to quietly convert logistical hubs into de facto foreign bases will provoke regional backlash. That’s not hypothetical—it’s a blueprint for confrontation in the Mozambique Channel, a strategic chokepoint for maritime oil and trade. Stability demands clarity, not covert militarization.
RF3. Social Backlash Is a Certainty, Not a Risk
If basic services and consumer prices in the capital don’t improve fast, the urban poor—who make up 75 to 80 percent of the population—will vote with their feet and take to the streets, regardless of who’s in charge.
RF4. Ghost Contracts, Real Consequences
Opaque deals in the nickel, cobalt, and graphite sectors are an express route to public backlash, local conflict, and international scrutiny. Transparency is the only firewall against accusations of plunder.
5. Indicators of Progress: A 12-Month Checkpoint
- Legal Milestone: A transitional constitutional act is in place, with restrictions on executive decrees and independent oversight mechanisms.
- Civilian Cabinet: A technocratic leadership team is formally appointed, with publicly available performance indicators.
- Urban Services: Daily blackouts in Antananarivo are reduced by 30%, water is delivered on a published schedule, and repair data is made open to the public.
- Electoral Infrastructure: An independent electoral commission is operational, the voter roll is cleaned and verified, and international monitors are in place.
- Multilateral Support: The “standby transition” fund is launched, along with targeted social safety nets for vulnerable households.
- Mineral Governance: All mining contracts are published, local value-add content is mandated, and pilot refining projects are underway.
- Maritime Security: Joint drills and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) data-sharing are active—without the footprint of permanent foreign military installations.
Madagascar Is Not a Footnote. It’s a Litmus Test for 21st Century Governance
The choices made here won’t just shape the island—they will resonate across Africa and beyond. Can the continent engineer an inclusive transition where the military serves as a temporary arbiter, not a new elite? Where natural wealth becomes local capital, not extractive rent? Where great power rivalry is constrained by rules rather than metastasizing into proxy warfare?
The answer hinges on three levels working in sync: national leadership, continental institutions, and global partners. A misstep risks turning Madagascar into a new flashpoint in the Indian Ocean—with cascading effects on finance, humanitarian conditions, and regional security.
The strategic window is real—but it’s narrow. The next 100 days will decide whether the island moves toward a sustainable civic order or slides into turbulence. The clock is running.