What we’re witnessing in Russia right now is nothing short of a historic engineering project. The Kremlin is pushing ahead with what it calls the “sovereign Runet” — a strategy that goes far beyond cyber-defense or traffic management. The goal is to turn the internet from a borderless global commons into a tightly regulated instrument of state power. The result is the slow but deliberate construction of a sealed-off digital ecosystem, designed to survive — and operate — independently of the outside world.
This transformation cuts both ways. On the one hand, Moscow frames it as a shield against foreign cyberwarfare and geopolitical pressure. On the other, it shrinks the open space for communication, curtails independent platforms, and accelerates Russia’s slide into technological isolation.
The Vanishing Web: Fewer Open Resources, Steeper Walls
The most striking marker of this shift is the collapse in the number of publicly accessible internet resources inside Russia. According to data from the ShadowServer Foundation, the country’s stock of open servers and connected devices plummeted from roughly 920,000 in October 2024 to just 270,000 by mid-2025.
That free fall is staggering. To put it in perspective: the U.S. is home to nearly 7 million open servers, Germany about 1.8 million, and China roughly 1.2 million. Russia, once a major digital player, now finds itself on par with mid-sized European states like Sweden or Romania.
And this isn’t a statistical quirk. Everything from email servers and VPN gateways to routers, surveillance systems, and load balancers has been shut down or cordoned off. The pattern points not to natural attrition but to a conscious dismantling of the open web — a purge aimed at creating a managed, sealed-off network.
The Architecture of Isolation
What the Kremlin is building amounts to a “digital curtain” — a twenty-first century analogue to the Iron Curtain. The Russian internet is being reshaped into a closed-loop system. More domains are moving into national zones, international channels are throttled and monitored, and the overall flow of data is increasingly funneled inward.
In practice, this produces what tech experts call an “intranet model.” The country stays nominally connected to the wider web, but access to outside resources is filtered, rationed, and often denied. Inside this firewall, the domestic infrastructure operates in semi-autonomous mode, insulated from global shocks but also from global innovation.
Officially, the pitch is about safeguarding “digital sovereignty.” In reality, it turbocharges censorship, locks in state control over information, and leaves Russian business, academia, and civil society gasping for air in a stifled environment.
The Fallout: Economy and Society Under Strain
The collapse of open resources isn’t just a line in a chart — it’s an economic and social chokehold. Every shuttered server or blocked channel means fewer ties to the global tech economy. For research institutions and IT firms, it’s like having the cables cut: data flows stall, international collaborations become a nightmare, and innovation slows to a crawl.
For ordinary citizens, the consequences are even sharper. As global platforms disappear behind firewalls, people are pushed into a digital ghetto where state-approved sources dominate and independent voices are muted. The narrower the pipeline, the easier it becomes to control the narrative — and to manipulate public opinion.
What Russia is building may be called sovereignty by its architects. But for those inside the curtain, it looks far more like confinement.
The Digital Protectorate: Mandatory Apps and Vanishing Calls
Russia is pressing ahead with its makeover of the internet, tightening every layer of its digital ecosystem under the logic of “sovereign cyberspace.” The latest move came by order of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, who signed off on an expanded list of mandatory apps to be pre-installed on virtually every category of consumer device. If the first wave of reforms built the “skeleton” of national infrastructure — from data centers to traffic routing — the new focus is the user interface itself. Moscow is engineering a digital protectorate in which every phone, tablet, or gadget hits the market already wired with “approved” services.
Starting September 1, 2025, Russia’s app store RuStore will come bundled not just with Android devices but also iPhones, iPads, and gadgets running China’s HyperOS. The signal is unmistakable: Moscow intends to chip away at the dominance of Apple’s App Store and Google Play on its home turf. Another headline change: the rollout of Max, a new platform designed to replace VK Messenger and become the all-purpose hub for communication.
A second phase kicks in January 2026. That’s when the state plans to retire RuTube in favor of “Unified Video,” a single platform meant to absorb RuTube’s functions along with those of other video services, consolidating content distribution into one state-controlled pipeline. Huawei’s HarmonyOS devices will get an even heavier package: seven additional apps, including Mir Pay and the “Honest Sign” labeling system. The pitch isn’t just about apps — it’s about handing users a pre-built digital ecosystem, sealed and ready to go.
A Standardized National Software Bundle
The outlines are stark. What’s emerging is essentially a nationalized software package — where social networks, payment tools, maps, email, and even entertainment apps are pre-selected, standardized, and backed by the state.
— On Android: a near-total “digital combine” powered by Yandex, Mail.ru, and VK.
— On iOS: a similar lineup, minus Mir Pay and some social platforms.
— On HarmonyOS: an expanded suite that turns the device into a terminal for Russian services.
— On HyperOS: RuStore for now, but likely just the beginning.
The crucial element here is the elimination of choice. A phone shipped with preloaded state-approved apps dramatically reduces the odds that a user will go searching for foreign alternatives.
The Disappearing Call Button
At the same time, Russia has been quietly gutting global messaging platforms. In August 2025, millions of users discovered that voice and video calls no longer worked on WhatsApp and Telegram. Roskomnadzor rushed to frame it as a crackdown on “phone fraud,” but experts dismissed the justification as a fig leaf.
What’s really happening is a squeeze play. The Kremlin is trying to push foreign services out of everyday communications and herd citizens onto Max or other homegrown tools. Voice calls are the pressure point: text chats are easy to monitor, but encrypted calls create “blind spots” for the security services. Cutting those channels isn’t about fraud — it’s about control.
Taken together, mandatory pre-installs and the throttling of WhatsApp and Telegram represent a comprehensive digital wall. Moscow is building a closed circuit in which social, financial, and informational interactions are funneled entirely through state-controlled platforms.
Not long ago, that scenario sounded dystopian. Now it’s being executed with surgical precision — from the level of network protocols down to the apps on a user’s home screen.
Three Layers of Digital Lockdown
The first theory points to the telecom industry. For years, free VoIP calls through messengers have eaten into the traditional revenue model of mobile operators, especially on international calls and roaming. In theory, banning them could restore profits to the “big four” carriers — MTS, MegaFon, Beeline, and T2. But that argument falls apart under scrutiny. As Mikhail Klimarev of the Internet Protection Society notes, the rise of data traffic more than offset the decline of voice, leaving carriers net beneficiaries of the VoIP boom. It’s hard to imagine them lobbying for a ban — and, tellingly, none rushed to claim responsibility.
The second theory is the official one. Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev insists that most scam calls — up to 80 percent — come through WhatsApp. But the state’s own numbers undercut that line. Last year, the share of fraud attempts via messengers dropped from 22.5 percent to 15.7 percent. With fraud already declining, the logic of a blanket crackdown collapses. Security here looks less like a genuine motive and more like a convenient cover story.
The third explanation is the most convincing. A partial block, rather than an outright ban, looks like calibration — a stress test. Authorities are preparing for scenarios that may require mass communication blackouts, from fall “shutdown drills” to experiments with whitelisting internet resources. Within that frame, disabling calls on WhatsApp and Telegram is part of a bigger rehearsal: building a managed digital environment where the state holds all the switches.
Resistance, Then Silence
What caught many off guard was where some of the pushback came from. Not just liberal circles, but also Z-bloggers, mid-level officials, and even lawmakers spoke out. Anton Tkachev, deputy chair of the Duma’s information policy committee, admitted the restrictions would drive a surge in VPN use. Yaroslav Nilov went further, blasting the move as “ill-timed” and “anti-social.”
Yet, as so often in Russia, the backlash fizzled quickly. The news cycle moved on, criticism faded into background noise, and the official line held firm. The message was clear: the digital curtain isn’t just theory anymore. It’s already descending.
DPI as a Weapon of Digital Censorship
The mechanics of blocking in Russia are no longer experimental — they’re routine. Telecom operators have deployed Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) systems as part of the state’s “Threat Counteraction System” (TSPU). These tools identify the fingerprints of voice traffic — for instance, the SIP protocol — and then either cut off connections to messenger servers, degrade the quality of calls, or block them outright. The result: a call that either drops mid-sentence or dissolves into static.
This is censorship with surgical precision. The state doesn’t just “switch off” a service — it can dial down its performance in increments, nudging users toward frustration and, ultimately, toward the “approved” Russian alternatives. The degradation is subtle enough to avoid panic, but effective enough to redirect behavior.
Alternatives Exist — Just Not in Moscow’s Playbook
Here’s the paradox: phone scams are real, in Russia and everywhere else. But the global experience shows they can be fought with far more sophisticated tools than a blunt-force blackout.
— Behavioral analytics and AI. In the U.S. and Canada, carriers deploy the STIR/SHAKEN protocol, which flags spoofed numbers and blocks shady calls. Russia has a homegrown “Anti-Fraud” system, but it’s barely used and operates only in narrow cases.
— In-app defenses. Telegram has long run its own filters, from the official Antispam Bot to machine-learning algorithms that detect suspicious spam chains. WhatsApp, despite its end-to-end encryption, restricts mass forwarding, tracks behavioral anomalies, and shuts down dubious accounts.
None of these measures is foolproof. But the point is they reduce risks without breaking the system itself. Unlike Russia’s blanket bans — which paralyze communication for millions — these technologies target the problem precisely, without stripping users of their rights.
That’s the real divide. Mature digital markets balance safety with freedom. Russia’s model relies on brute force, with blocklists as the go-to solution for every challenge.
The Logic Behind the “Sovereign Internet”
Officially, Moscow’s line is that this is about shielding critical infrastructure from foreign attacks. With sanctions choking off hardware upgrades, much of Russia’s network gear is outdated and exposed, making the argument sound plausible. Old servers and legacy systems do create vulnerabilities. Cutting external access points, the thinking goes, turns the Runet into a “digital fortress.”
But cybersecurity is only half the story — and arguably the least convincing half. The July 2025 cyberattack on Aeroflot, along with repeated breaches at banks and state agencies, showed that even billion-dollar IT investments can’t buy immunity. Security, in practice, serves as a rhetorical cover more than a genuine explanation.
The deeper motive is control. Since the “sovereign Runet” law of 2019, Roskomnadzor has accumulated the legal and technical means to wall off Russia’s corner of the internet. Test runs have already happened: regional blackouts of YouTube, throttling of Google, and key-switching infrastructure that can instantly turn the web into a giant filter.
This flips the original philosophy of the internet. What was designed as a decentralized, open system is being refashioned into a hierarchy where every channel can be cut or capped at will.
The Industry Angle: Building Behind Closed Doors
There’s also an industrial logic. By cutting off access to global services and tools, the Kremlin is betting it can jump-start domestic alternatives. From social media to payment platforms, the state is pouring money into homegrown clones.
The results, though, are mixed. RuTube, “Unified Video,” RuStore — they exist, but lag far behind Western competitors in usability and reach. Users grumble, but government pressure keeps these products on their screens. In effect, Russia isn’t winning users through innovation — it’s corralling them by force.
And that, in the end, may be the clearest marker of the new Russian internet: less a marketplace of ideas than a managed enclosure, fenced off and patrolled by design.
Fallout: Security at the Price of Isolation
For the Russian state, the strategy carries a double edge. On one side, it promises tighter control and the ability to respond instantly to external threats. On the other, it locks the country into deeper technological and informational isolation. Russian companies lose flexibility in global markets, and the online environment is recast as a closed-loop ecosystem.
For ordinary citizens, the consequences are even more immediate: a sharp decline in the quality of digital life. Access to familiar services is throttled, VPNs are blocked, and the shift to clunky domestic alternatives fuels frustration. What was once a window to the world is morphing into a storefront — its shelves stocked only with preselected, state-approved content.
China began laying the foundations of its “Great Firewall” back in the 1990s. Russia, by contrast, spent decades riding the wave of globalization. As long as Western technology was freely available, the notion of a “sovereign internet” barely registered. But after the geopolitical rupture of 2014, followed by sanctions and the full-scale confrontation with the West after 2022, Moscow’s vulnerability was laid bare: technological dependence had become its Achilles’ heel.
Now the Kremlin is racing to make up lost ground, pouring billions into the project. But the dilemma is stark: can Russia build a closed yet functional system — or will it trap itself in digital second-tier status, where control comes at the cost of innovation?
A Social Experiment on a National Scale
The “sovereign Runet” is not just a technical undertaking. It is a sweeping social experiment — the first time a country with nearly 100 million internet users has deliberately chosen digital autarky. The outcome will shape not only the future of Russia’s IT industry but also the very nature of how society interacts with the state.
This is a hinge moment, one that echoes the descent of the Iron Curtain in the 20th century. Only now, the barrier isn’t made of steel and concrete but of code, filters, and DPI protocols.
In Place of a Conclusion
Russia is building a new model of the internet — closed, state-managed, nationalized. If the global web was conceived as a space of freedom, horizontal connections, and equal access, the “sovereign Runet” is becoming a mechanism of digital protectionism and information autarky.
The question looming over this project is existential: can a nation sustain itself in digital isolation while remaining competitive — or will this path lock Russia into strategic obsolescence?
Sources
- ShadowServer Foundation — https://www.shadowserver.org
- Open host statistics in Russia (ShadowServer 2025) — https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/statistics
- The Great Firewall of China (Freedom House) — https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/china
- UAE and VoIP blocking (TRA UAE) — https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/voip-blocking.aspx
- WhatsApp call ban in Oman (BBC) — https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-oman-voip-ban
- DPI and internet control in Russia (NetBlocks) — https://netblocks.org/reports/russia-deep-packet-inspection-dpi
- Threat Counteraction System (Roskomnadzor) — https://rkn.gov.ru/tspu
- Sovereign Runet Law (2019) — http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201905010001
- Russian Ministry of Digital Development — https://digital.gov.ru
- Maksut Shadayev on WhatsApp and fraud (RBC) — https://www.rbc.ru/technology/shadaev-whatsapp-fraud
- Mishustin on preinstalled apps — http://government.ru/news/50000
- RuStore (VK) — https://rustore.ru
- RuTube — https://rutube.ru
- “Unified Video” project (TASS) — https://tass.ru/ekonomika/edinoe-video
- Huawei HarmonyOS in Russia (RIA) — https://ria.ru/20250601/harmonyos-russia
- Mir Pay — https://mironline.ru/mir-pay
- Chestny Znak — https://честныйзнак.рф
- Telegram on blocked calls — https://telegram.org/blog/calls-blocked-russia
- WhatsApp and call restrictions in Russia (The Bell) — https://thebell.io/whatsapp-calls-russia
- MTS on internet traffic — https://moskva.mts.ru/about/media-centr/press-centr/
- MegaFon official data — https://corp.megafon.ru/press/
- Beeline (VimpelCom) — https://beeline.ru/about/press/news
- Tele2 Russia — https://msk.tele2.ru/about/news
- Internet Protection Society — https://oisd.org.ru
- Mikhail Klimarev on blocking (Meduza interview) — https://meduza.io/feature/klimarev-interview
- Anton Tkachev on VPNs (RTVI) — https://rtvi.com/news/tkachev-vpn-ban
- Yaroslav Nilov on call bans (Kommersant) — https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/niilov-voip
- DPI as censorship (Citizen Lab) — https://citizenlab.ca/tag/dpi
- STIR/SHAKEN protocol (U.S. FCC) — https://fcc.gov/stir-shaken
- Russia’s Antifraud system (Central Bank of Russia) — https://cbr.ru/antifraud
- Telegram Antispam Bot — https://t.me/antispambot
- WhatsApp on fighting fraud — https://faq.whatsapp.com/general/security-and-privacy
- Freedom House “Freedom on the Net 2024” — https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2024
- NetFreedom Pioneers Russia — https://netfreedompioneers.org/russia
- Russian sanctions and IT (Carnegie) — https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-it-sanctions
- Aeroflot cyberattack (2025) (Reuters) — https://www.reuters.com/business/aeroflot-cyberattack-2025
- National Project “Digital Economy” — https://digital.gov.ru/eco
- Roskomnadzor on YouTube throttling — https://rkn.gov.ru/news/youtube-slow
- Russia’s whitelist of internet resources (BBC) — https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-russia-white-list
- Cyberattacks on Russian banks (Group-IB) — https://group-ib.com/blog/russian-banks-2024
- BGP and internet shutdowns (RIPE NCC) — https://ripe.net/bgp-russia
- DPI analysis in Egypt (OONI) — https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-blocks
- Tunisia and blocking (AccessNow) — https://www.accessnow.org/tunisia-blocks-voip
- Russia and digital autarky (Atlantic Council) — https://atlanticcouncil.org/russia-digital-isolation
- ICANN on network isolation — https://icann.org/russia-sovereign-internet
- WTO and digital trade — https://wto.org/digital-trade-2024
- OECD report on digital sovereignty — https://oecd.org/digital/digital-sovereignty-2024
- ITU on cybersecurity — https://itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity
- Russia and IT import substitution (Forbes Russia) — https://www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/it-import-substitution
- Global Voices on Runet — https://globalvoices.org/tag/runet