May 12, 2025, was hailed in some corners as a historic turning point. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—officially designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several EU states—announced it was laying down arms and dissolving itself after over four decades of armed struggle. The declaration triggered a flurry of headlines and speculation across the globe. But Ankara didn’t celebrate. There were no handshakes or diplomatic fanfare. Just silence—measured, wary, and sharp-edged. In that silence, Turkey didn’t hear peace. It heard the overture to a new and possibly more insidious phase.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made the government’s position unmistakably clear: “This move concerns not only northern Iraq, but all the branches of this organization in Syria and Europe.” The tone wasn’t conciliatory—it was surgical. From Ankara’s perspective, rhetoric is not a substitute for dismantlement. Unless every node of the PKK’s network—from the YPG and PYD in Syria to its European shadow front under the KCK—is shut down for good, the so-called disarmament looks less like surrender and more like a rebranding campaign.
The PKK has never been just a guerilla force. It's a sprawling, transnational terrorist infrastructure—built not only in the mountains of Qandil but also in city councils, NGOs, universities, media outlets, faux women’s organizations, and political fronts. Its ideology of “democratic confederalism” is less a political vision than a smokescreen—obscuring the group’s real objective: the destabilization of Turkey's territorial unity and the creation of ethno-political enclaves to serve as pressure points across the region.
So when the PKK talks about dissolving itself, Turkey doesn’t take it at face value. This isn’t the first time the group has tried to change costumes without changing its core. The YPG, the PYD, and the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may parade under different names, but their DNA is pure Öcalan. None of them openly admits their ties to the PKK, but their origin stories, leadership structures, and military playbooks tell a different tale.
Right now, Turkey isn’t engaged in a diplomatic exercise—it’s facing a strategic fork in the road. Either this "self-dissolution" marks the beginning of a genuine and total dismantling of the terror network stretching from Syria to Europe—or it’s just another PR stunt meant to whitewash a pivot into the mainstream under the guise of reform.
And Ankara isn’t playing games anymore. It’s calling things by their names. If the PKK thinks it can switch outfits and sneak in through the side door, it won’t be met with applause—it’ll be met with precision strikes. For Turkey, national security is not a negotiation.
From Denial to “Indirect Dialogue”: Talks or Tactical Theater?
When Mazloum Abdi, commander of the SDF, went on Shams TV and hinted at “direct and mediated channels” with Turkey—and even openness to meet with Erdoğan—it sent ripples across the region. Al-Monitor quickly followed with a report suggesting that Ankara was considering backchannel talks involving either Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan or intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın.
But Turkish officials wasted no time shutting that down. A diplomatic source told Reuters the reports were “unfounded.” That kind of flat denial is par for the course in Ankara’s playbook, which has long preferred intelligence backchannels over official platforms when dealing with individuals it still designates as terrorists.
Still, those familiar with Turkish intelligence operations say quiet contact is happening—and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), not the Foreign Ministry, is driving the train. That wouldn’t be new. Even at the height of conflict, Turkey kept informal channels open—remember the 2013–2014 talks with Salih Muslim, the former PYD co-chair, during the short-lived peace process.
Timeline: From Kobani to a New Qandil (2022–2025)
- 2022: Turkish forces intensify cross-border operations in Iraq’s anti-terror zones, consolidating military presence near PKK strongholds.
- 2023: Ankara and Baghdad upgrade security coordination. For the first time, Iraqi officials publicly acknowledge Turkish participation in joint operations against the PKK’s HPG units.
- 2024: Israeli strikes on Iranian proxies in Syria indirectly weaken PYD positions and push some fighters into retreat.
- March 2025: Turkish intelligence executes a high-value operation, eliminating top KCK operatives in northern Iraq.
- May 12, 2025: The PKK announces its “self-dissolution.”
- May 27, 2025: Mazloum Abdi confirms existence of communication channels with Turkey.
Viewed through a military lens, Turkey has established operational dominance. The political terrain, meanwhile, is shifting rapidly beneath the region’s feet.
The question is no longer whether the PKK’s declaration signals an end to violence. The real question is whether it marks a genuine collapse of a decades-old terror network—or just a change of uniform in a war that’s far from over. Turkey, for its part, has made it clear: It won’t be fooled by semantics.
Interests in Play: A Regional Chessboard in Motion
Turkey is pushing for the full dismantling of the PKK and its Syrian and Iraqi offshoots, aiming to stabilize its southern frontier through what it calls a “deep security” model—an effort that may ultimately involve returning control of northern Syria to Damascus under strict conditions: the total exclusion of the YPG from any future equation.
Meanwhile, the SDF and its political arm, the PYD, are playing a high-stakes legitimacy game. Their strategy hinges on international recognition—particularly continued U.S. support—which they hope will preserve their military and political relevance on the ground.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is playing its own game. It wants the PKK out of Sinjar, where it’s competing for influence with both Baghdad and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. The PKK’s presence complicates the KRG’s relationship with Turkey and its balancing act with federal authorities in Baghdad.
Washington, for its part, is caught in a diplomatic contortion. The U.S. sees the SDF as its most reliable partner in the fight against ISIS. But formally acknowledging the PYD/YPG as branches of the PKK would torpedo the legal framework underpinning America’s military presence in northeast Syria. So, the U.S. walks a tightrope—supporting its anti-ISIS allies while sidestepping questions about their ideological lineage.
Russia continues to exert influence through the Assad regime, using Kurdish actors as a lever against Turkey. For Moscow, the Kurdish question isn’t ideological—it’s transactional.
Iran is playing an asymmetric game. It supports Shiite militias, counters Turkey’s influence in Sinjar, and quietly suppresses its own Kurdish movements—all while exploiting every shift in regional power dynamics.
Then there’s Israel. By ramping up airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria, it has indirectly weakened the SDF’s position, making Kurdish actors more reliant on Western backing and further fracturing the already unstable balance in eastern Syria.
Confederalism as a Smokescreen: From Öcalan to Mazloum Abdi
The ideological backbone of the Kurdish movement today—Democratic Confederalism—was crafted by PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan from his prison cell on Imrali Island. This theory now serves as the guiding philosophy for the PYD, YPG, YPJ, and the SDF. On paper, it rejects the creation of a Kurdish nation-state in favor of decentralized, grassroots self-governance. In practice, however, it functions as a blueprint for a parallel state—complete with a rigid, militarized command structure.
What began as a theoretical framework has morphed into a hybrid model where ideology, ethnicity, and authoritarianism collide. The groups claim to oppose hierarchy and nationalism, yet PYD maintains a political monopoly, and its armed wings enforce discipline through tightly controlled vertical structures.
Key tenets include:
- Jineology, or the “science of women”—a foundational concept that legitimizes the prominent role of female fighters and political actors. It’s heavily promoted by YPJ and YJA Star units.
- Anti-capitalism and anti-statism—though these principles are loudly proclaimed, in reality, power remains concentrated in PYD hands.
- Öcalan’s symbolic leadership—his portraits, slogans, and writings are omnipresent in YPG offices and military installations. His ideological grip remains firm even in absentia.
This is why Turkey consistently argues that YPG is simply a rebranded PKK—not just based on intelligence reports but on ideological continuity and command overlap. The transformation is cosmetic. The core remains intact.
The Numbers Game: Control, Losses, and Military Posture
As of May 2025, control over Syrian territory breaks down roughly as follows:
- SDF holds about 22% of the country, including most of Hasakah province, parts of Raqqa, and large swaths of Deir ez-Zor.
- Turkey and its Syrian National Army (SNA) proxies maintain control of a 40-kilometer-deep buffer zone along the border, including Afrin, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ayn.
- The Assad regime controls about 63% of Syria, encompassing Aleppo, Damascus, the coastal strip, and the south.
- Iran-aligned militias dominate parts of eastern Aleppo and southern Deir ez-Zor, where they serve as Tehran’s forward outpost.
Force estimates and attrition:
- According to Turkey’s Foreign Ministry, the YPG—operating under the SDF umbrella—fields between 35,000 and 50,000 fighters.
- Female brigades, such as the YPJ, number roughly 8,000.
- Since 2016, Turkish operations—including Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, and Claw-Sword—have eliminated over 15,000 PKK/YPG fighters.
- Between 2022 and 2024, Turkish forces neutralized at least 1,600 PKK operatives in northern Iraq, many of them senior commanders.
The Intelligence-Military Nexus: Who Sets Turkey’s Policy?
Right now, Turkey’s Syria policy isn’t being driven by diplomats—it’s being orchestrated by spies. The National Intelligence Organization (MİT), under İbrahim Kalın, is not just gathering intel—it’s setting the tempo for all interaction with the SDF. Kalın isn’t just a spymaster; he’s a strategic architect, balancing the intelligence game with diplomatic overtures and covert operations.
Meanwhile, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) provides the backbone—establishing logistical corridors, securing border crossings, and executing deep-field reconnaissance missions.
MİT has built an intricate web of informants in Kurdish-controlled Syria, drawing from defectors, tribal networks, and disillusioned SDF veterans. On the ground, Turkey’s elite special forces—the Bordo Bereliler—operate from a constellation of permanent bases in northern Iraq: Batufa, Bashiqa, Kani Masi. From there, they coordinate air-ground operations, eliminate high-value targets, and strike with precision—often without needing coordination from Damascus or Tehran.
The combination of military footprint and intelligence reach allows Ankara to project power, shape outcomes, and keep its adversaries guessing. In this game, Turkey isn't looking for applause—it’s hunting for results.
Regional Reactions and the Geopolitics of No Illusions
The fallout from the PKK’s “self-dissolution” has prompted a flurry of quiet recalculations—and not just in Ankara. While the announcement stirred little visible upheaval, it reverberated through war rooms and foreign ministries from Washington to Tehran.
United States: Publicly, the Biden administration maintains its strategic embrace of the SDF as a core partner in the fight against ISIS. Pentagon spokespeople continue to stress the group’s role in maintaining security and managing the detention camps holding thousands of ISIS fighters and their families. But behind closed doors, U.S. military officials are reportedly uneasy. Another full-scale Turkish offensive—especially one targeting SDF zones in Hasakah or Qamishli—could crack the fragile containment system and destabilize the last pockets of post-caliphate order.
Russia: For Moscow, the PKK gambit is another bargaining chip. The Kremlin is signaling willingness to facilitate the formal absorption of the YPG into the Syrian Arab Army—a move that would consolidate Assad’s control and offer Turkey a face-saving exit from the Kurdish quagmire. But this comes with strings: namely, Ankara must drop its backing for Syrian opposition forces in Idlib. For the Russians, it’s a zero-sum trade.
Iran: Tehran is watching Turkey’s moves with increasing concern. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) views the idea of autonomous Kurdish zones—whether in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere—as a direct threat to Iran’s internal cohesion, particularly in its own Kurdish provinces. Iran’s goal is simple: no federalism, no autonomy, no precedent.
Israel: While absent from Kurdish diplomacy, Israel is reshaping the Syrian battlefield in its own way. By intensifying strikes on Iranian proxies in southern Syria, it is eroding Tehran’s foothold—and, indirectly, weakening Assad’s ability to police the periphery. The collateral effect: the SDF is left more isolated and more dependent on Western patrons, with fewer cards to play.
European Union: Brussels, as usual, is on mute. Apart from issuing humanitarian statements and urging de-escalation, the EU has taken no tangible steps. But in the backrooms of Berlin and Paris, Kurdish diaspora groups continue to lobby through sympathetic lawmakers, especially those aligned with left-leaning or green parties. The PKK’s brand may be toxic, but its political tentacles in Europe remain active.
Scenarios on the Table: Between War and Negotiation
Scenario 1: YPG Integration into the Syrian Army
Russia’s preferred outcome—and one Turkey could grudgingly accept if it came with ironclad guarantees that PKK-linked commanders are sidelined. Assad, however, is reluctant. Infusing his army with fighters whose loyalty is questionable could create internal fractures.
Scenario 2: A “Confederal” Compromise
This involves the creation of an autonomous zone under international supervision—possibly with a UN mandate. It's a nonstarter for Turkey, which sees such a move as a dangerous precedent for its own Kurdish-majority provinces.
Scenario 3: Military Escalation
If Ankara concludes the PKK’s dissolution is a smokescreen, it could greenlight a major military operation—likely targeting SDF strongholds in Qamishli or Hasakah. This would dramatically shift the balance of power on the ground and potentially fracture Turkey’s already tense relations with Washington.
Scenario 4: Third-Party Mediation
Neutral venues such as Qatar, Iraq, or even Azerbaijan could serve as platforms for political negotiations or disarmament verification. Turkey favors formats that exclude the U.S. and EU, focusing instead on regional players less encumbered by Western political calculations.
No Illusions: Security Is Non-Negotiable
For Ankara, this is not a chapter in a long diplomatic novel. It’s a red line carved in stone. Anyone waving the banner of the “Syrian Democratic Forces” today who once fought under the PKK flag must understand: you don’t erase history by swapping logos.
Peace is possible—but only when guns are truly silenced, terror ideologies dismantled, and every organizational tether to a group that spilled Turkish blood is cut for good.
Turkey has learned to read between the lines—to parse tactical shifts for what they are, not what they claim to be. And if the “new chapter” of the Kurdish question is penned by the same authors under a new font, Ankara won’t hesitate to tear it out before it’s allowed to unfold.
Because peace isn’t weakness. It’s the strategic posture of a strong state—one always ready to remind the world: the defense of the nation is not up for negotiation. It’s a sovereign duty.