In 2025, Turkey is on the cusp of a profound transformation in its defense architecture, reflecting not only a response to unprecedented regional instability but also the culmination of years of systemic efforts toward technological sovereignty. The "Steel Dome" program (Çelik Kubbe), officially unveiled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan following the NATO summit in The Hague, marks a fundamentally new approach. This isn't just the development of a single air defense system, but a radically different defense philosophy—a structure capable of integrating all layers of intelligence, combat management, and electronic warfare into a unified, AI-controlled network.
Erdoğan's words, spoken in Ankara on June 20, 2025, upon his return from the summit, were straightforward and precise: "No country can rely on just one or two systems anymore. We're building a cohesive organism. Our missiles, radars, electronic systems need to work like the nervous system of the human body." This statement clearly signals the end of an era when Ankara had no choice but to close its airspace using essentially imported solutions—ranging from American Patriots to Russian S-400s. According to a May 2025 report from Turkey's Ministry of Defense, by the end of this year, the following elements will be integrated into the Çelik Kubbe system:
- KORKUT (short-range, self-propelled anti-aircraft systems)
- HİSAR-A (low-altitude, short-range air defense)
- HİSAR-O (medium-range, including cruise missile interception)
- SİPER (long-range system designed to intercept targets beyond 100 km)
Interestingly, the "Steel Dome" is being built using an open, modular architecture: each of these systems will receive software-hardware gateways to connect to a unified digital network, operated by a specialized combat AI. Turkish military sources confirmed in June 2025 that the system incorporates both national technologies and collaborative efforts with Azerbaijan and Qatar, focused on sharing algorithms for situational awareness.
According to a report from the SETA research center (June 12, 2025), Çelik Kubbe will enable Turkey to defend not only against missile strikes and UAVs but also against highly maneuverable manned targets, including fifth-generation aircraft. This marks a conceptual difference from Israel's Iron Dome, which is primarily optimized for intercepting short-range missiles and projectiles. Turkey, on the other hand, is betting on a versatile system: from intercepting mini-UAVs to integrating with electronic warfare systems currently being developed in collaboration with Aselsan and Roketsan.
The Middle Eastern strategic environment, including the escalation between Israel and Iran, has introduced new demands for responsiveness. In April, Israel deployed over 500 Tamir interceptors against a barrage of missiles from Yemen, while Iran launched dozens of Shahed-238 kamikaze drones—highlighting just how layered modern air defense systems need to be.
In this context, the Turkish "Steel Dome" is not just an upgrade; it's an attempt to create a defensive architecture for decades to come. A May 2025 report from the Istanbul Technical University's Defense Technologies Institute (İTÜ Savunma Teknolojileri Enstitüsü) states: "For the first time in history, Turkey has the opportunity not only to use but also to systematically develop multi-layered air defense as a national technological product."
This shift reflects a much broader trend: Ankara is steadily building an independent defense industry, with an emphasis on localization and a full cycle—from sensors to AI algorithms. It's also worth noting that Çelik Kubbe is being designed as an exportable system. According to unofficial sources from Bloomberg Turkey (June 15, 2025), preliminary talks have already taken place with Pakistan and Qatar regarding potential component deliveries for the future system. For Ankara, this is not just a security issue but also a form of technological diplomacy, expanding Turkey's influence in the Islamic world.
Azerbaijan, in this context, is watching Çelik Kubbe closely. According to sources from Baku, Azerbaijani air defense specialists have already been invited to review prototypes of the new integration modules, as, with the growing threat of sabotage drones and missile attacks from Armenia, any multi-layered protection technology is of critical importance.
The situation in the region shows that attacks are becoming faster, more precise, and cheaper, meaning that defense must be fully automated, networked, and resilient. Turkey, in essence, is following the same path NATO has taken with its Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) concept but with adjustments tailored to its own interests and regional specificity.
The economic underpinning of the project is also undeniable. According to the Turkish Ministry of Defense Industry, in 2025, the budget for the development of national air defense systems rose by 21% compared to the previous year, totaling around $3.4 billion. These funds are already partially allocated to contracts with Aselsan and Roketsan, which are expected to deliver the first integration modules and control interfaces by the end of the year.
A Strategic Pivot in Air Defense
The Çelik Kubbe (Steel Dome) program is not just a military initiative—it is a calculated piece of Turkey's new defense paradigm, designed to address the rapidly evolving threats of hyper-speed, multi-vector, and hybrid warfare. Turkey is showing that it is ready to play the role of a regional security guarantor—not just for itself but for its allies as well, including Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijan, such technologies could offer a significant advantage in defending against any provocations or terrorist missile attacks.
With absolute certainty, one can say that the launch of the "Steel Dome" program is not a reaction to yesterday’s threats, but rather a strategic investment for the decades to come. It signifies Turkey’s definitive departure from dependency on imports in the critical realm of national security. This is the country’s key differentiator from many of its neighbors, who are still forced to purchase off-the-shelf solutions without the right to develop them further.
In the coming months, as the SİPER system goes live, the world will witness Turkey’s transition from a “buy and shield” approach to one of “build and control,” marking a historic turning point in the regional balance of power.
Soon after Turkey unveiled the concept of integrated air and missile defense, branded as the "Steel Dome" (Çelik Kalkanı), experts naturally began to question the fate of the Russian S-400 systems Turkey had purchased in 2017 for $2.5 billion. This deal, which had sparked a major scandal between Turkey and the United States, has since become a complex asset that no longer fits into Turkey’s new national security architecture.
According to recent data from the Turkish Ministry of Defense, published in the spring of 2025, the "Steel Dome" program is based on deep digitalization of the entire air defense system. The project aims to integrate radars, sensors, launch systems, electronic warfare tools, and automated command posts into a unified digital network with secure data exchange. Leading contractors such as ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, TÜBİTAK SAGE, and MKE have confirmed, in their latest quarterly reports, that Turkish cryptographic protocols and national management algorithms form the backbone of this new system.
This means that Russian S-400s, reliant on Russian software and engineer support, cannot easily be integrated into this protocol. As Professor Sedat Bülbül from the Defense Technologies University explained in an April 2025 interview with Milliyet, “Integrating the S-400 into Turkey’s digital ecosystem is a technologically unsolvable issue without full disclosure of the source code.” Naturally, Russia has not provided, and has no intention of providing, such source code.
Moreover, the political dimensions remain in play. NATO, particularly with the voice of its new Secretary-General Mark Rutte, reiterated in early 2025 that Russian systems remain a "foreign body" within the alliance. Rutte stated during a February 15, 2025, address at the Transatlantic Security Conference in Brussels: “Critical defense system compatibility with NATO infrastructure cannot be built on Russian technologies, which are susceptible to cyber risks and political vulnerabilities.”
Looking at the functionality of the "Steel Dome," the situation becomes clearer. Systems like KORKUT will be responsible for intercepting low-flying drones and loitering munitions—threats that have become particularly widespread in the last two years, shaped by the experiences of Ukraine and the Middle East. According to the Turkish Defense Agency's March 2025 report, over 90% of KORKUT prototypes have already been transitioned to full digital control with elements of artificial intelligence.
For the interception of cruise and ballistic targets, HİSAR systems will be deployed, with the new SİPER system slated for deployment by 2026. This architecture is based on "end-to-end" surveillance, where all sensors and command nodes automatically transmit data in real-time to command centers. It is crucial that all components work under a unified national protocol and are not dependent on an external supplier, who could at any moment block maintenance.
Thus, despite the nominally high specifications of the Russian S-400s—reaching up to 400 km in range and capable of tracking dozens of targets simultaneously—they find themselves isolated. When the contract was signed in 2017, Turkey viewed these systems as a political and military symbol of independence. However, today they have become more of a burden: they cannot be integrated into the "Steel Dome" without deep and, in fact, unfeasible modifications.
In this context, Ankara, according to a May 12, 2025 report from Anadolu Agency, is considering several scenarios. First, it may keep the S-400s as an autonomous backup system in case of total war, when even incompatible technology may become useful. Second, it could attempt to resell them to a third country, but this would run into U.S. CAATSA sanctions, which would automatically extend to any new buyer. The third scenario involves long-term storage with minimal maintenance until a more rational scheme for their use emerges.
A Statement of Technological and Defense Sovereignty
The "Steel Dome" (Çelik Kubbe) is already recognized as a strategic priority for Turkey through 2030. According to a report released by the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) on June 6, 2025, over $12.7 billion is earmarked for the modernization and development of this system by the end of the decade. Turkey is betting on full independence from foreign critical components, intending to defend its airspace exclusively with the capabilities of its national industry.
From this perspective, Azerbaijan’s position remains clear and logical. Baku has traditionally supported the development of Turkey's national defense industry, viewing it as a reliable foundation for strengthening regional balance and security. The question of integrating Russian systems into Turkey's ecosystem goes far beyond the mere "compatibility" of hardware. It’s a question of algorithmic sovereignty, trust in cybersecurity systems, and control over updates and vulnerability patching.
The realities of 2025 are such that the Russian S-400 systems have become an alien element in Turkey's digital and alliance landscape, while the "Steel Dome" stands as a symbol of Turkey's technological and strategic independence. This is why any prospects for the full integration of the S-400 into this model seem highly unlikely—both for political and strictly engineering reasons.
For several years now, Turkey has been relentlessly and consistently working on creating its own multi-layered missile and air defense system, which has unofficially been dubbed the "Turkish Iron Dome" by experts. In early 2025, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler confirmed that tests of individual system components were ongoing, and in the next two to three years, the country plans to deploy prototypes on combat duty. This primarily involves a combination of radars, command centers, and medium- and short-range missile interceptors developed by Turkish companies Roketsan and Aselsan. As Güler stated, “Turkey must develop its own technologies to be independent and confident in protecting its citizens.”
Expert assessments confirm that a full-fledged, multi-layered, and well-integrated system will take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. Turkey currently does not possess all the elements necessary to guarantee protection from massive strikes by modern hypersonic and highly maneuverable missiles. Analysts at the Istanbul Defense Research Center, in a March 2025 report, pointed out that as of now, Turkey’s armed forces can only partially protect key infrastructure from strike drones and medium-range missiles, and are still far from providing full protection to major cities in the event of a serious conflict.
However, Turkey already possesses foundational segments that can be integrated into an interim version. For example, the HISAR-O+ system, which was adopted into service in 2024, can intercept targets at ranges of up to 25 kilometers. The new radar variant, HISAR-RF, successfully passed a series of tests with real targets in the Mersin region in April 2025, as reported by Defense Turkey. According to Aselsan CEO Haluk Görgün, the first serial batch of eight HISAR-RF batteries is planned to be delivered to the military by the end of 2025.
Additionally, Turkey is heavily investing in the development of its own long-range missile defense system, Siper, designed to intercept aerodynamic and ballistic targets at ranges up to 100 kilometers. Testing of this system began in 2023, but in January 2025, the first ballistic target tests were conducted—according to Turkey's Anadolu Agency, 4 out of 5 simulated targets were intercepted. While this shows significant progress, it doesn’t yet guarantee full reliability.
Thus, Turkey is indeed capable of integrating the existing air defense and missile defense layers into a transitional system that will already provide a high level of protection against the most common threats—drones, cruise missiles, and slower missiles. But the integration of all components, refining communication systems, automated command centers, and target distribution algorithms will take years. As Turkish military sources emphasized in an interview with Hurriyet in May 2025, “The path to a full missile defense system is like building a new country: you need to connect thousands of details into a living whole.”
In terms of strategic consequences, this project effectively signals Turkey’s technological and defense sovereignty. For a long time, Ankara was criticized within NATO for purchasing the S-400 from Russia and for its inconsistent cooperation with Western manufacturers, including the Patriot program. But now, Turkey is aiming for a new level to minimize its dependency on either the U.S. or Russia. As Professor Kadir Has of the Serdar Gül University stated in the April issue of Ortadoğu Perspektif, “Turkey’s national air defense is a step toward true independence from the fluctuations of large allies.”
Strategic Shift and Regional Implications
The regional implications of Turkey's "Steel Dome" are far-reaching. Positioned on NATO’s southern flank, Turkey actively engages in Syria, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Its bolstered defense capabilities could provide Ankara with greater political maneuverability and enhance its influence in the collective security architecture. In essence, if the system proves successful, Turkey will be able to pursue a more independent foreign policy and even position itself as a supplier of air defense technology to other nations—such as Azerbaijan, with which military cooperation has significantly deepened in 2024–2025.
For Azerbaijan, this development is of pivotal importance. Historically aligned with Turkey, Baku has conducted no fewer than five joint exercises involving air defense and missile defense elements between 2024 and 2025, according to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, sources, including the Qafqaz Monitor Strategic Studies Institute’s May 2025 report, suggest that Azerbaijan is open to integrating parts of Turkey’s air defense systems into its own. This would reduce its reliance on outdated Soviet technologies and enhance its resilience against potential threats from Armenia or third parties seeking to destabilize the region.
A reliable, tested “Turkish Steel Dome” is a long journey that will take years of intensive development and integration. However, a transitional version based on HISAR and Siper systems is likely to begin operational deployment by 2027, according to a forecast by the Turkish Defense Industries consortium in its June 2025 review. By maintaining cooperation within NATO, Turkey will present the world with a model of national defense independence, strengthening not only its own security but also shifting the military balance in both the South Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean.
For Azerbaijan, supporting these efforts provides an additional tool for strategic stability. Although the final architecture of Turkey’s defense system will not be fully realized until the end of the decade, its interim capabilities could already serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors, stabilizing the region from Nagorno-Karabakh to Syria.