...

The war that saw Israel and Iran clash head-on, with the U.S. entering as a heavy-hitting enforcer, ended in an unexpected ceasefire. But this ceasefire doesn’t feel like an ending—too much points to the fact that the standoff has merely paused, not concluded. Iran has suffered significant damage to its nuclear infrastructure, but how badly exactly—no one outside Tehran knows. In the worst-case scenario, Iran could rebuild its program to pre-war levels; in the best-case scenario for them, it might even accelerate its path toward a full-fledged nuclear bomb, utilizing surviving materials and technologies.

At the heart of the issue is a few hundred kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, which had been under the control of the IAEA until the Israeli airstrikes, after which it was mysteriously moved. Theoretically, this amount could have been enough for about 10 warheads, assuming further refinement. Moreover, Tehran had already established backup production chains and concealed part of its centrifuges in new underground facilities that survived the strikes. These reserves could provide the launching pad for a rapid revival of the program.

Iran continues to insist it doesn’t need nuclear weapons, citing a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei back in 2003, which imposed a religious ban on bomb-making. However, in practice, the Islamic Republic’s strategy has always been about balance: officially staying within the bounds of the Non-Proliferation Treaty while keeping the necessary technologies on hand to build a nuclear weapon in short order if needed. This “threshold” status was essentially the goal of the program: to deter Israel and Arab neighbors with the threat of quickly shifting to a real nuclear arsenal.

This balance led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA. Iran agreed to scale back its military nuclear activities and open its facilities to strict IAEA inspections in exchange for sanctions relief and an influx of funds, some of which were funneled into supporting Shiite militias and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. The deal lasted only three years before Donald Trump pulled out in 2018, deeming the terms too lenient. Attempts to strike a new deal failed, and by 2019, Iran was once again expanding its capabilities.

Old centrifuge plants in Natanz and Fordow were already producing uranium enriched to 20% and even 60% by 2025, and the upgraded cascades of new centrifuges allowed for increased production. These sites became the first targets of massive Israeli and U.S. airstrikes. For instance, in Fordow, the Israelis and Americans used penetrating bombs to destroy ventilation shafts and part of the underground halls. The Natanz facility also took a combined hit, which destroyed above-ground infrastructure and damaged underground power lines.

However, experts say that Iran had already laid the groundwork for recovery before the war. Some of the equipment had been relocated to unknown sites, and new workshops were being built deep underground, including in Isfahan and near Natanz. These complexes either survived the strikes or were only partially damaged. On top of that, the raw material base remained intact—uranium concentrate and the technologies needed to turn it into UF6 gas, which is crucial for the centrifuges.

If Iran decides to push forward, it will need to convert the enriched hexafluoride into metallic uranium and create the core for a future warhead. To this end, a factory to produce metallic uranium was built in Isfahan. While it hasn’t been operational yet and has been targeted in the strikes, the foundation and some of the equipment may have survived.

Another development line is the “Amad” program, which in the early 2000s was focused on creating the nuclear weapon design itself. Officially, it’s been closed, but the Iranian military engineers and their expertise have not disappeared. Archives, which were once stolen by Israeli intelligence, show that significant progress had been made twenty years ago: detonation systems, neutron sources, and implosion designs were in the works. Essentially, if Iran is provided with weapon-grade material and enough time, it could assemble a working bomb.

IAEA head Rafael Grossi has already stated that restoring inspections after the strikes will be extremely difficult. Some facilities have been destroyed, others evacuated, and Iran may exploit this chaos to quietly restart production.

It seems that the strikes only temporarily disrupted the production and enrichment chain, but didn’t completely dismantle it. This means the game of being a "near-nuclear state" could begin again—this time, with even higher stakes. Washington has made it clear that it will negotiate solely from a position of strength, threatening further strikes. Tehran, for its part, has traditionally responded by asserting its “right” to develop peaceful nuclear energy and resisting any pressure.

In other words, the big stick that the U.S. and Israel swung at Iran’s nuclear ambitions has only delayed the next phase of the crisis—but it hasn’t canceled it.

Most likely, large-scale production of uranium hexafluoride in Iran is currently paralyzed. The main enrichment plants—including the largest one in Natanz, which was handling the most resource-intensive part of the work—have either been destroyed or damaged to the point where they can’t be quickly restored. The fate of the third plant, in Fordow, remains unclear: reports are conflicting, but it’s evident that the infrastructure there also took a hit. It was precisely because of this facility that the U.S. was forced to intervene in the conflict, deploying its most powerful penetrating bombs.

Yet, the underground complexes that Iran has been constructing in recent years remain largely untouched. According to inspectors, one of these facilities is equipped to produce centrifuges, which theoretically could allow Iran to restart enrichment in a few months. However, there’s a key risk: Iran may simply not have enough raw material left—specifically, uranium hexafluoride, the stocks of which were heavily damaged.

At the same time, Tehran most likely still holds reserves of highly enriched uranium—both 20% and even 60%, which, according to experts, would be enough for several warheads. These materials are no longer under IAEA control, which makes the situation even more alarming.

The question also remains regarding components for nuclear warheads. There’s a possibility that Iran has managed to create and store the necessary elements—such as shockwave generators or neutron sources. However, the country currently lacks an operational facility capable of quickly turning uranium into a metallic core for a bomb, one that matches their national design specifications.

Overall, the strikes by Israel and the U.S. did not completely wipe out Iran’s nuclear program—it’s simply too advanced to be erased in a single blow. The attacks have only delayed Tehran’s ambitions and may have weakened the political will of Iranian leaders to push forward.

Meanwhile, a fierce debate is raging in the U.S. over how effective the strike truly was. This debate has long since moved beyond military assessments and become part of the political battle. American society is deeply divided: over 80% of Republican supporters back the strikes, while nearly 90% of Democrats strongly oppose them.

The roots of the conflict trace back to 2018, when Donald Trump tore up the deal signed during Barack Obama’s presidency, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. That’s when polarization began—not just in Congress and the administration, but also within the expert community and the media. Some argue that Obama’s deal kept Iran in check and was worthwhile even with its 15-year timeline, while others are convinced that only brute force can compel Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

What has added sharpness to the dispute is Trump’s bold statement that “Iran’s nuclear program has been wiped off the face of the Earth.” Many in the U.S. have questioned this claim, especially in light of the strikes on Fordow. There is still no clear data on how deeply the underground facilities were destroyed.

The U.S. used the world’s most powerful penetrating bombs, the GBU-57/B, against Fordow—bombs that had never been used in combat before. But even their power might not be enough to destroy a site protected by dozens of meters of rock and reinforced concrete. This forms the basis for the arguments of Trump’s opponents, while his supporters remain confident in the complete success of the operation. U.S. intelligence agencies have joined the split, offering conflicting reports on the scale of the damage.

Yet, the underground complexes that Iran has been constructing in recent years remain largely untouched. According to inspectors, one of these facilities is equipped to produce centrifuges, which theoretically could allow Iran to restart enrichment in a few months. However, there’s a key risk: Iran may simply not have enough raw material left—specifically, uranium hexafluoride, the stocks of which were heavily damaged.

At the same time, Tehran most likely still holds reserves of highly enriched uranium—both 20% and even 60%, which, according to experts, would be enough for several warheads. These materials are no longer under IAEA control, which makes the situation even more alarming.

The question also remains regarding components for nuclear warheads. There’s a possibility that Iran has managed to create and store the necessary elements—such as shockwave generators or neutron sources. However, the country currently lacks an operational facility capable of quickly turning uranium into a metallic core for a bomb, one that matches their national design specifications.

Overall, the strikes by Israel and the U.S. did not completely wipe out Iran’s nuclear program—it’s simply too advanced to be erased in a single blow. The attacks have only delayed Tehran’s ambitions and may have weakened the political will of Iranian leaders to push forward.

Meanwhile, a fierce debate is raging in the U.S. over how effective the strike truly was. This debate has long since moved beyond military assessments and become part of the political battle. American society is deeply divided: over 80% of Republican supporters back the strikes, while nearly 90% of Democrats strongly oppose them.

The roots of the conflict trace back to 2018, when Donald Trump tore up the deal signed during Barack Obama’s presidency, which limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. That’s when polarization began—not just in Congress and the administration, but also within the expert community and the media. Some argue that Obama’s deal kept Iran in check and was worthwhile even with its 15-year timeline, while others are convinced that only brute force can compel Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

What has added sharpness to the dispute is Trump’s bold statement that “Iran’s nuclear program has been wiped off the face of the Earth.” Many in the U.S. have questioned this claim, especially in light of the strikes on Fordow. There is still no clear data on how deeply the underground facilities were destroyed.

The U.S. used the world’s most powerful penetrating bombs, the GBU-57/B, against Fordow—bombs that had never been used in combat before. But even their power might not be enough to destroy a site protected by dozens of meters of rock and reinforced concrete. This forms the basis for the arguments of Trump’s opponents, while his supporters remain confident in the complete success of the operation. U.S. intelligence agencies have joined the split, offering conflicting reports on the scale of the damage.

What’s Iran’s Next Move?

Despite the immense damage done to its nuclear infrastructure, Iran finds itself at a crossroads, facing three potential paths forward.

The first option is to completely abandon its nuclear ambitions. But this scenario is virtually impossible. Iran has invested too much in maintaining a strategic lever that has allowed it to negotiate with the world and keep its adversaries in check. Even if Tehran does take a step back, it will likely be a tactical pause, accompanied by significant concessions in return.

The second option is to attempt to restore the nuclear program to pre-war levels. But there are two immediate obstacles here. First, the U.S. has made it clear that it will not allow Iran to return to its previous enrichment levels without consequences. Second, Iran would need considerable time and resources to rebuild the entire chain of production, including constructing heavily fortified facilities, while competing with other military projects like missile forces, which also suffered damage during Israeli strikes.

The third, and most risky, option is a desperate gamble: to rush ahead and try to create a real nuclear warhead out of whatever Iran has managed to preserve. Tehran still has around 500 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that is no longer under IAEA supervision. In theory, this could be used to assemble a basic atomic bomb using a "gun-type" design—similar to the one the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima. In this design, a subcritical projectile of enriched uranium is propelled toward a target made of the same material using conventional explosives, forming a critical mass and triggering a chain reaction.

Such a device is technically possible even with 60% enrichment, though the size and mass of the bomb would increase, and its effectiveness would remain extremely low. Furthermore, Iran would have to find a way to quickly fabricate a metallic core, as it currently lacks an operational factory to do so.

However, the main obstacle to this scenario is not the technology, but the politics. Even if Iran manages to create a rudimentary warhead, using it would be tantamount to suicide: the response from Israel or the U.S. would be catastrophic. There are also unresolved issues regarding delivery systems and whether the military leadership would be willing to take such a step.

So far, Tehran has refrained from acting out of emotion. Instead of a sharp exit from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Iranian parliament has settled for freezing cooperation with the IAEA but leaving a window open for inspections to resume—provided the UN acknowledges Iran’s right to peacefully enrich uranium. This is a compromise designed to buy time and keep the door open for future negotiations.

How Will the U.S. Respond?

Washington has already started preparing for the next phase. Donald Trump has made it clear that he will only agree to a deal if Iran completely abandons its enrichment program—essentially, an ultimatum. When Tehran refused, the strikes followed, and now the White House is looking to negotiate from a position of strength.

In essence, the U.S. is offering Iran a new compromise: lifting some sanctions and assisting in the creation of a controlled, "safe" nuclear program—under strict oversight, funded by Iran’s wealthy Arab neighbors. In exchange, the U.S. demands that Iran abandon any ambitions for a military nuclear program. And if this “carrot” doesn’t work, Trump and Israel are prepared to launch a new series of strikes to finally strip Iran of any chance of even coming close to nuclear weapons.