In the fast-evolving geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus, the recent visit by France’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Anne Boillon, to Karabakh was anything but routine. Framed as part of an official trip for foreign diplomats organized by Baku, the visit took a sharp turn when it became clear that Boillon had not been formally invited — she went on her own initiative. That seemingly minor detail, overlooked by most foreign policy observers, might signal something much deeper: a quiet but significant shift in Paris’s approach to Azerbaijan.
Diplomats rarely act on impulse, especially those representing a country like France, where foreign policy is executed with notorious calculation. And yet Boillon’s behavior in Karabakh stunned many. Speaking candidly and without the usual diplomatic varnish, she acknowledged Azerbaijan’s post-war recovery efforts in the region, praised its reconstruction work, and even emphasized the cultural significance of Shusha for the Azerbaijani people. According to Armenian media, the ambassador’s remarks caused “shock and confusion” — not surprising given France’s vocal alignment with Armenian interests in recent years, where criticism of Baku had become a hallmark of Paris’s regional policy.
So, what changed? Why the sudden shift in tone?
Testing the Waters in Tirana: Macron’s Subtle Pivot
The first cracks in France’s combative posture began to show in May 2025 during the European Political Community summit in Tirana. There, in the corridors of diplomacy, French President Emmanuel Macron and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev shared a rare moment of informal dialogue. According to on-site reports — including Politico Europe’s Tim Walker — Macron “chose to listen rather than lecture,” and signaled an openness to “turning a new page.”
This was a marked departure from the stance Paris held between 2021 and 2024, when it consistently blocked EU consensus statements on the region, backed one-sided pro-Armenian narratives, championed anti-Islamic resolutions at the UN Security Council, and issued repeated accusations against Baku — including Macron’s controversial claim that Armenians were being “expelled” from Karabakh.
But now, the calculus in Paris is shifting. Three key forces are driving this quiet recalibration.
1. Strategic Investment in Armenia Has Backfired
Since early 2023, France has poured over €80 million into Armenia through military training programs, reform packages, and humanitarian aid. Yet 2024 proved to be a year of cold returns. Despite promises from Yerevan, not a single major defense contract was implemented. A May 2025 report by France’s Directorate General of Armaments found that only 12% of all defense deals with Armenia had even entered the execution phase.
2. Azerbaijan Has Consolidated Its Gains
Following the full reintegration of Karabakh in September 2023, Azerbaijan not only reasserted control on the ground but also institutionalized its sovereignty. In May 2025, local municipal councils were elected in Karabakh — with an impressive 78.6% voter turnout, according to the country’s central election commission. Even skeptical observers began to acknowledge that the territorial question had reached a definitive close.
3. France Is Being Sidelined Regionally
Paris has been pushed out of every relevant diplomatic track. It was excluded from the March 2025 trilateral meeting in Berlin (Azerbaijan–Armenia–Germany) and the Geneva consultations where the U.S., Germany, and Sweden led the discussions. A June 2 report from the European Council on Foreign Relations put it bluntly: “France has lost the trust of both sides in the South Caucasus, transforming from mediator to political activist.”
And then came another jolt. On June 18, 2025, Anne Boillon addressed the Armenian parliament, openly stating that “territorial realities in the South Caucasus have changed,” and that “France must reassess its role in light of the facts on the ground.” The statement, reportedly delivered without prior clearance from the Élysée Palace (per Le Figaro), sparked speculation. Was this a rogue ambassador? Or a trial balloon from Paris to test reactions in Baku and Yerevan alike?
What is certain is that Boillon’s remarks broke sharply from earlier official rhetoric. Just three months earlier, French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné had reiterated France’s call for an “international status for Karabakh.” Now, slogans were being replaced by sober realism and de-escalatory language.
The Ryan Affair: A Brewing Intelligence Crisis
Meanwhile, a legal storm is gathering in Baku. French citizen Martin Ryan, arrested in January 2025, is currently on trial for espionage. Azerbaijani prosecutors allege that Ryan relayed classified information — including geolocation data on strategic pipelines and defense industry tenders — to French intelligence. According to case file No. 2025-0410, he reportedly used encrypted diplomatic channels through the French consulate to transmit this data.
If these accusations hold — and sources close to the trial suggest witness testimony points to a well-coordinated intelligence operation — the incident could become the most serious spy scandal in the history of Franco-Azerbaijani relations. The Jamestown Foundation has already warned that this case could “reshape the entire diplomatic architecture between Paris and Baku.”
A Forced Rethink in Paris
Caught between regional irrelevance, the failure of its Armenia-first strategy, and the looming shadow of a spy crisis, France appears to be seeking a reset. Macron is now using the European Political Community as a sandbox for quiet diplomacy — a space to rebuild bridges without making loud policy reversals. As Jean-Pierre Filiu of Sciences Po put it, “France is trying to limit the fallout from its failed bet on Yerevan, saving face while creating room for a bilateral reboot with Baku.”
But let’s be clear: this is not about genuine rapprochement or newfound affinity. It’s a cold, tactical move — an exercise in damage control. Even within the EU, France’s South Caucasus policy is drawing sharp criticism. A Bundestag foreign affairs report from June 11, 2025, slammed Paris for “politicizing the South Caucasus dossier in a way that harms broader European interests.”
France may be changing its tune in Karabakh — but make no mistake: it’s not a ballad of peace, it’s a survival song.
France on the Sidelines: How Paris Lost Its Geopolitical Footing in the South Caucasus
Over the past month, the South Caucasus has sent unmistakable signals: France is rapidly losing ground in a region where it once aspired to be a player of consequence. What we’re witnessing is not just diplomatic turbulence — it’s the unraveling of an entire strategy. And judging by France’s recent diplomatic moves, that realization has already started to sink in in Paris.
As of June 2025, France is no longer seen — in Baku, in Tbilisi, or even in Yerevan — as an independent, constructive, or reliable actor. The reasons are both structural and immediate, and they converge on three major fault lines:
1. The Collapse of Trust in Baku
Since the fall 2022 flare-up over Karabakh, France aligned itself openly and unapologetically with Armenia. The French National Assembly’s call for sanctions against Azerbaijan and recognition of the breakaway Karabakh authorities inflicted lasting damage on bilateral ties. Paris didn’t just pick a side — it torched the bridge with Baku in the process.
2. Disillusionment in Yerevan
Even among Armenians, enthusiasm for France is fading. After a string of flowery promises from President Emmanuel Macron about “unwavering support” for Armenia, expectations were sky-high. But when Azerbaijan launched its operation in Karabakh in September 2023, Yerevan waited for real French backing — and got none. No military assistance, no strategic guarantees. Just more words. A May-June 2025 poll by Armenia’s Modus Vivendi Center revealed a dramatic drop in public confidence: only 31% of respondents now view France as a reliable ally, compared to 64% in October 2022.
3. Foreign Policy Failures Elsewhere
France’s troubles extend far beyond the Caucasus. Its influence in the Sahel has crumbled. Its handling of the crisis in New Caledonia — where police cracked down on protests in June — drew fierce international criticism. And its final military exit from Lebanon, confirmed by AFP on June 6, marked the end of another chapter of failed engagement. The South Caucasus is just the latest theater where France is running out of leverage.
Signs of a Rethink in Paris
Since late May — and especially into June — France has begun making overtures to cool tensions and re-establish a line of communication with Azerbaijan. These aren’t yet full-blown policy shifts, but the tone has changed in ways that are hard to ignore.
1. Quiet Backchanneling
According to a Politico Europe report on June 12, French officials floated an informal proposal through EU intermediaries to hold discreet consultations with Azerbaijani diplomats in Brussels. Crucially, France made no preconditions — a sharp contrast to its previously combative stance.
2. A Rhetorical Reset from the Foreign Minister
In an interview with Le Monde on June 18, French Foreign Minister Stéphane Séjourné struck a radically different note: “France must avoid Manichean diplomacy in the Caucasus. The region is evolving, and our role is not to instruct, but to engage.” That’s a far cry from the usual sermonizing tone Paris deployed over the past two years, marked by relentless criticism of Azerbaijan and sanctimonious lectures about “threats to democracy.”
3. A Pivot Toward Eco-Diplomacy
After a bruising political loss over COP29 — where France lobbied hard to derail Baku’s hosting of the climate summit in favor of Armenia — Paris is now trying a softer angle: green diplomacy. At a biodiversity forum in Geneva on June 13, the French delegation proposed joint monitoring initiatives for Caspian Sea flora and fauna. French environmental expert Jean-Marie Letourneau (CNRS) went as far as to declare, “Azerbaijan is a pivotal partner in the Caspian basin. You can’t build a sustainable ecological architecture without it.”
The Strategic Disconnect
France’s failure in the South Caucasus boils down to one thing: a mismatch between ideals and reality. Azerbaijan evaluates partnerships through the lens of hard interests — energy, security, infrastructure, investment. France, meanwhile, spent years fixated on moral posturing and diaspora-driven politics, most notably the influence of the Armenian lobby.
While France recited declarations, others took action. Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, Hungary, and Russia have all entrenched themselves in the region with clear, multidimensional strategies. These actors aren’t interested in preaching. They’re investing, building defense ties, and securing positions in logistics corridors. In short: they’re playing the game France thought it could referee from the sidelines.
Now Paris is learning the hard way — you don’t get to lead in the South Caucasus just because you want to. You have to show up, deliver, and stay relevant. France, for now, is scrambling to do all three.
What Does Paris Want Now? France’s Quiet Pivot in the South Caucasus
France appears to be testing the waters for a reboot. According to sources close to the European Council on Foreign Relations, French experts at closed-door consultations in Strasbourg in June finally acknowledged the need for direct dialogue with Baku — without filtering through Brussels or Yerevan. As one ECFR analyst reportedly put it in an off-the-record conversation: “France will lose the region entirely unless it recognizes Azerbaijan’s sovereignty within its new borders and learns to speak the language of pragmatism, not pedagogy.”
That’s not just rhetoric — it’s a quiet admission of something deeper. The South Caucasus isn’t a playground for moral posturing. It’s a high-stakes arena for infrastructure, energy, military logistics, and cold, hard trade.
But the window may be closing. So far, Azerbaijan has kept its response to France ambiguous. The message from Baku is clear: France could still become a partner — but only if it shows it’s ready for a conversation among equals, not another sermon. The era of ultimatums is over.
The visit of France’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Anne Boillon, to Karabakh on June 12, 2025, wasn’t just a polite gesture. It was a telling symptom of a deeper recalibration in French foreign policy. Beneath her deliberately neutral tone and diplomatic restraint was an unmistakable test balloon: a shift away from knee-jerk backing of Armenia toward a more flexible — if still inconsistent — approach to Azerbaijan.
Since early 2023, Paris had leaned heavily into its pro-Armenian position, often at the expense of its own interests. But that strategy led to near-total isolation. Turkey, Georgia, Iran — none of them backed France’s initiatives in the region. Even the European Union distanced itself from Paris’s unilateral moves.
The facts speak volumes:
– Between December 2023 and June 2025, not a single major EU country endorsed France’s anti-Russia, pro-Armenia initiatives regarding the Caucasus.
– A May 17 report from the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) stated bluntly: “France’s attempt to impose its own agenda in the region failed due to a fundamental misreading of the dynamics between Turkey and Azerbaijan.”
– A June 10 IFOP poll showed that 62% of French respondents believe Paris has no clear or effective strategy in the South Caucasus.
Boillon’s Karabakh trip — while officially framed as a humanitarian engagement — signaled something new. For the first time since 2020, a French representative avoided language at odds with international law. The term “Nagorno-Karabakh” was conspicuously absent — both in public remarks and in the embassy’s published materials.
During the visit:
– Boillon refrained from criticizing Azerbaijan — a major break from years of hostile commentary by the French Foreign Ministry.
– She met with humanitarian groups operating in Karabakh under Azerbaijani accreditation.
– She sidestepped the issue of “status” entirely, instead stressing that it was “time to focus on a sustainable future for the region, not past tragedies.”
In short, Paris is now cautiously fine-tuning its message — at least at the embassy level. That shift is stark when compared to the confrontational posture of 2023–2024, when French officials routinely blamed Azerbaijan and openly championed Armenian demands.
So what’s driving this sudden adjustment? Several strategic pressures have come to a head.
1. Energy Dependence
According to a June 3, 2025 report by the European Commission, Azerbaijan has become Europe’s second-largest gas supplier after Norway. France relies on part of these volumes via Italian and Spanish terminals. A downturn in ties with Baku could jeopardize French energy security — a scenario Paris can’t afford in today’s fragile market.
2. Defense Deals Derailing
In May 2025, Pakistan pulled out of a deal to purchase French Rafale fighter jets. The reason? Intensifying military ties between Baku and Islamabad. In April, Azerbaijan signed a defense agreement with Pakistan that reportedly included behind-the-scenes pressure to freeze French arms imports. La Tribune (June 6) cited French defense officials admitting Baku played a central role in the diplomatic sabotage.
3. Waning Influence in the Muslim World
After Macron’s overt pro-Armenian stance in 2024, France was notably left off the invite list for the 2025 OIC Summit in Jeddah. Azerbaijan, by contrast, delivered a high-profile speech calling for greater protections for Muslims in Europe — a thinly veiled rebuke of France’s domestic policies.
Boillon’s visit isn’t just a handshake moment. It’s part of a broader “diplomatic shadow strategy” — a way for France to exit confrontation without public retreat. The contours of that strategy are already taking shape:
– Lowering the temperature: The French embassy in Baku hasn’t issued any accusatory statements against Azerbaijan since April 2025.
– Economic feelers: According to Azerbaijan’s Investment Agency, two French firms — including Veolia — have submitted proposals for water infrastructure projects in Karabakh and East Zangazur.
– Diplomatic caution: Boillon made no off-script remarks. Her visit was publicized only on Azerbaijani platforms — an unprecedented move for French diplomatic protocol.
Still, France’s political class remains divided. On June 14, Senator Nathalie Goulet once again called for “recognizing Karabakh’s independence.” Two days later, former ambassador Jonathan Lacôte penned a Le Figaro column lamenting that “Azerbaijan is destroying Caucasian civilization.”
This growing rift between France’s career diplomats and its diaspora-influenced political voices suggests an internal struggle over what’s next. For now, the diplomats are whispering. The question is whether Paris can turn those whispers into a policy — before it’s too late.
France at a Crossroads in the South Caucasus: From Nostalgia to Negotiation
Paris has finally woken up to the fact that it's losing the South Caucasus. What was once seen as a diplomatic playground has become a geopolitical trap — and the only way out is through a wholesale rethinking of strategy. That means abandoning diaspora-driven logic, shelving the accusatory rhetoric, and embracing realism.
If France wants to come back into the fold, it won’t happen through lofty speeches or historical sentiment. It will only happen if Paris starts speaking the language of interests — trade, energy, infrastructure. The window for reengagement is still open, barely. But in a few months, it could slam shut. And then, France will lose the Caucasus — just as it lost Lebanon and the Sahel.
The developments of May and June 2025 offer a glimpse into a new diplomatic posture. It's tentative, informal, and multilayered, but it reflects a growing awareness in Paris: the policy of emotional reflexes and one-sided bets has hit a wall. Karabakh will not be the launchpad for French influence. And now, France is learning to negotiate — not dictate.
The key question is whether Baku will take this shift at face value — or dismiss it as another calculated maneuver ahead of French elections and amid Macron’s waning credibility within the EU.
What’s undeniable is this: France can no longer afford to antagonize Azerbaijan without incurring strategic costs. Anne Boillon’s visit to Karabakh wasn’t a diplomatic blunder — it was a calibrated move, born of internal recalculations and external pressures.
Now Paris faces a binary choice:
– Double down on confrontation and cement its isolation;
– Or re-enter the game — but on new terms, stripped of illusions and anchored in respect for Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.
The South Caucasus is no place for moral sermons. It rewards those who understand realities, not those who impose frameworks. France will either adapt to the region’s new architecture — where Baku is not a problem to manage but a player to engage — or it will be written out of the story entirely.